ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF GUERILLA WARFARE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY • OCTOBER 1951

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FORWORD

Although this manual is classified CONFIDENTIAL, information contained in Part Six, EXPLOITATION OF FRIENDLY GUERILLA FORCES, when used without reference to the rest of the manual, is classified RESTRICTED. When so used, information contained in Part Six may be utilized for general instructional purposes.
PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

a. This manual covers the doctrine and principles for organizing, training, commanding, and exploiting guerilla forces in war.

b. Whenever possible guerilla forces should be organized and their efficiency developed to such a level that they will be able to give active assistance to the military operations of regular forces. The principles and doctrine covered in this manual apply even when the development of a full-scale guerilla movement is not possible.

c. The organization and exploitation of guerilla forces often touch upon spheres and policies outside those of the military establishment. When this occurs, the application of the principles in this manual will be coordinated with the affected agencies and departments of the national government.
2. DEFINITIONS

a. The term guerilla force, when used in this manual means an irregular force, organized on a military basis, supported chiefly by sympathetic elements of the population, and operating against established civil and military authority. It may receive support from a foreign government.

b. Guerilla Warfare is defined in SR 320-5-1 as operations carried on by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying, and disrupting military operations of the enemy. The term is sometimes limited to the military operations and tactics of small forces whose objective is to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy rather than to seize or defend terrain; these operations are characterized by the extensive use of surprise and the emphasis on avoidance of casualties. The term as used in this manual also includes organized and directed passive resistance, espionage, assassination, sabotage, and propaganda, and, in some cases, ordinary combat. Guerilla warfare ordinarily is carried on by irregular, or partisan, forces; however, regular military forces which have been cut off behind enemy lines or which have infiltrated into enemy rear areas may use guerilla tactics. Guerilla activities carried on by regular military forces are discussed briefly in appendix II.

c. A resistance movement consists of the operations of discontented or hostile elements of a population against established civil and military authority by various hidden and open methods. The individuals who take part in a resistance
movement are held together by common sympathies and interests, often political. They may ally themselves to external regular forces or to a government whose national and military aims are sympathetic to their own. The individuals of a resistance movement who band together on a military basis are the guerilla forces of a resistance movement. Unfavorable conditions may prevent a resistance movement from finding active expression in guerilla warfare, and the movement may be limited to undercover, poorly organized forms of expression. External assistance may bring about the organization of guerilla forces within a resistance movement.

3. GUERILLA ACTIVITY IN MODERN WARFARE

The great dependence of a modern war machine upon industrial and economic production makes it increasingly vulnerable to attacks directed at these supporting factors and vital lines of communications. A future war, waged with highly mobile forces and supported by scientific and mechanical means of tremendous destructive potential, will lead to dispersion of forces, fluid battle fronts, and widespread isolated actions—a setting that is ideal for guerilla warfare in its broadest aspects. In spite of technical developments, man remains the most important element to use against a modern war machine and its essential supporting resources. Guerilla warfare, using traditional principles as well as new methods and means, will play an increasingly important role in modern warfare.
CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF WORLD WAR II

4. EUROPE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE AND THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

a. After the Germans had overrun Western Europe in June 1940, thousands of people in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway refused to accept defeat and sought to continue the struggle. To foster, support, and exploit these potential forces within the German lines, the British organized the Special Operations Executive (SOE). The broad mission of the SOE was to attack German war potential wherever it was exposed, thereby causing a drain on German resources, and to organize guerilla forces that would give maximum assistance to the forces of liberation when the continent was invaded.

b. To initiate this plan, personnel, arms, and equipment had to be delivered to the German-occupied countries. However, before this could be accomplished, contact had to be established with these countries to collect information and to determine the prospects of resistance within the various areas. Schools were set up to train selected individuals and teams for contacting and establishing communication with individuals and groups around which guerilla forces could be organized. Research stations were established to
develop and produce special weapons and equipment such as light, two-way radios, identity papers, and ration cards. Methods were developed to deliver personnel and supplies to objective areas.

c. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established by the President before the United States entered the war. Its mission and operations generally paralleled those of SOE. The OSS operated under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN FRANCE

a. Through the efforts of SOE and OSS, guerilla forces were fostered in Western Europe, the Balkans and the Far East (exclusive of the Southwest Pacific area). Of all the European countries occupied by the Germans, none resisted more violently after occupation than France. In 1943, the SOE and OSS merged their French Special Operations sections, based in England, to form the Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ). The amount of support given to the French guerilla forces was steadily increased. From February to May 1944, arms for 60,000 men were delivered throughout France, the bulk of the support going to the Maquis in central and southeast areas. After May, the emphasis was shifting to the northern sectors which were to have an immediate bearing on the Normandy operation. To overcome political differences, jealousy, and distrust among the various organizations, the National Council of Resistance was created to exercise military control over the Free French Forces of the Interior.
b. All guerilla plans were aimed at giving maximum assistance to the initial Normandy landings and the build-up to follow. The widespread and continuous sabotage on roads, railroads, and wire communications, together with actual attacks on German forces, delayed and prevented the Germans from concentrating their strength. Six German divisions were prevented from reaching the battlefields for Norway during the critical period 6 June to 26 July 1944. Heavy German armored units, forced to move by road instead of rail, arrived in the battle area too late and too disorganized to fight. Throughout France, between 10 and 12 German divisions were hopelessly cut off, and finally they surrendered to the French guerilla forces. General Eisenhower estimated the value of the French guerilla forces to be equivalent to 15 allied divisions.

6. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

a. In the southwest Pacific, an entirely different procedure, independent of SOE and OSS, was followed. Here, the theater commander, to obtain information, to weaken the enemy by sabotage and destruction of morale, and to organize and support guerilla forces, organized the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) in July 1942 under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. To avoid duplication of effort, special operations group was primarily concerned with fostering resistance and conducting sabotage behind the enemy’s lines, while AIB was primarily concerned with strategic and combat intelligence.

b. The Philippine guerilla movement was by far the largest and most effective guerilla movement
exploited in the Pacific area. After initial contacts were established, emergency supplies were delivered on an ever-increasing scale until several submarines were engaged almost exclusively in this work. The Philippine guerilla units expanded and grew strong, and by October 1944 they were ready to cooperate with the American forces in liberating the Philippines. The guerillas on Leyte assisted the American forces invading that island, while the forces on Mindanao kept the Japanese there bottled up until near the end of the Philippine campaign. On Luzon, other guerilla forces assisted the landing and in many cases took part in combat in the subsequent operations. Some difficulties arose because of the lack of knowledge of the local situations and of the guerillas' characteristics and capabilities. In some cases, too much was expected of the guerillas, and their resulting lack of success caused unmerited doubts of their value. In other cases, excellent opportunities for exploiting guerilla capabilities were neglected. Nevertheless, Philippine guerilla units performed valuable services by operating coast and air-watcher stations, providing information, obstructing Japanese communications and operations, and maintaining the morale and loyalty of the civilian population.

c. When the war was over, a big administration problem arose in the settlement of guerilla pay and claims. This resulted from the lack of a firm policy for the administration of guerilla forces. Many Filipinos who had never participated in any activity whatsoever claimed recognition and pay as guerillas. In the difficult process of weeding out such persons, some deserving guerillas doubtlessly
were deprived of recognition. In other cases, slowness in paying claims created ill will toward the United States and the Philippine Governments.

7. POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

Since the end of World War II, guerilla activity has continued and developed as an instrument of “cold war” by which nations seek to undermine or overthrow the existing governments of other nations without themselves engaging in hostilities.

a. France and Italy. In these countries, the communists, who had played prominent parts in guerilla resistance against the Nazis, soon became opponents of the postwar governments. The guerilla movements have been kept alive through “ex-partisan” associations, and arms and equipment have been kept hidden. Although they have not engaged in overt hostilities, these groups are a potential threat to the security of the present government.

b. Philippines. The communist-inspired Hukbuhalaps have greatly retarded the postwar developments of the Philippines and have occupied a large number of the Government’s military forces in efforts to control them.

c. Greece. Conflict between the government and communist-led and communist-supported guerillas broke out shortly after the liberation of Greece and for 4 years threatened to dislocate completely the economic and political life of the country. The communists gained complete control of the northern border areas of Greece and were supplied by the communist nations of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Within these areas, regular communist military forces were organized.
Additional forces waged guerilla warfare in other sectors of Greece. Only after large-scale economic and military assistance from the United States was the Greek government able to overcome the communist forces.

d. Indonesia. The Indonesians, who had never accepted Dutch control, openly resisted Dutch efforts to reoccupy the country at the end of the war and effectively denied a large part of the country to the Dutch military forces. As a result, the Netherlands government was forced to grant virtual independence to the area.

e. Malaya. Communist Chinese guerillas resisted British efforts to reassert control of the area, and they have seriously interfered with the economic rehabilitation of the country. Great Britain has had to use a large military and police force against the guerillas.

f. Indochina. The Communist Viet Minh forces in Indochina have forced the French to employ sizable portions of their regular military forces to combat guerilla operations in that area.

g. Burma. Various hill tribes that fought against the Japanese in Burma during the war have effectively resisted efforts of the Burmese government to bring them under control.

8. LESSONS LEARNED IN WORLD WAR II

a. Guerilla warfare can be of great assistance to the operations of regular forces by decreasing the enemy’s offensive and defensive capabilities. Guerilla forces can also provide valuable information about the enemy and perform many other important services.
b. To be effective, guerilla forces require substantial administrative, logistical, and operational support from regular forces.

c. The organization and conduct of guerilla warfare by regular forces must he supervised and coordinated from the highest levels to insure—

(1) Support by all necessary services.

(2) Coordination with other types of special forces operations and to avoid duplication, conflict, and omission of effort.

d. The promotion and direction of guerilla warfare cannot be carried on effectively as an activity of any one general staff section.

e. The political and postwar aspects of guerilla operations must be considered as well as the immediate military aspects.
CHAPTER 3
CONCEPT OF GUERILLA WARFARE

9. A PHASE OF TOTAL WAR
Guerilla warfare is a way of creating and employing additional forces against the enemy by using portions of civilian populations that are not desirable or available for incorporation in regular forces. As it is carried on in the enemy's home territory or in areas he has occupied, it threatens the security of his rear areas and installations and decreases his offensive and defensive capability against regular forces.

10. GUERILLA WARFARE SUBORDINATE TO EFFORT OF REGULAR FORCES
Guerilla warfare is, by itself, seldom capable of gaining a military decision against strong and determined regular forces. To gain such a military decision, guerilla forces must adopt the tactics of regular forces by seizing and holding terrain objectives. However, when guerilla forces do this, they must sacrifice many of the advantages inherent in the guerilla type of warfare. Guerilla warfare, on the other hand, is capable of gaining political and economic decisions.
11. CONFLICT WITH REQUIREMENTS OF REGULAR FORCES

Despite the theoretical desirability of attacking an enemy at all points, nations and their military commanders always must limit their efforts to conform to the resources available. Thus, the requirements of guerilla warfare operations are always competitive to a degree with the needs of regular forces. While the quantity of men and equipment initially required to organize guerilla activities is small, the subsequent supply of a guerilla force can become a large undertaking. Much specialized equipment is needed, and extensive special training of the personnel involved is desirable. The task of delivering personnel and equipment is an operation of considerable magnitude and difficulty. The staff work and communications effort required to control Special Forces operations is considerable. Lastly, the organization and promotion of guerilla warfare can have political effects that extend beyond the phase of military operations into the postwar period. Therefore, the decision to organize and promote guerilla warfare involves a serious commitment and should be made only after considering the political and military factors involved.
12. BASIC CONCEPT

To foster, support, and exploit guerilla warfare successfully requires favorable human, psychological, and physical factors.

a. The human factors pertain to such things as population density, population concentrations, and whether the population is predominantly rural or urban. Age groups, size of families, habitual diets, and resistance to common diseases are also factors. The separation of many of the physical factors from the mass psychology factors, such as educational levels, when evaluating the population of a selected area, will be difficult.

b. In dealing with human characteristics individually and collectively, there are many factors to consider. These pertain to the ideology of a people, their thinking, their beliefs, and their education. Guerilla forces can be organized successfully only among people who have the courage and stamina to endure hardships and face imminent death while fighting against innumerable odds. Command and leadership are essential and must be considered in conjunction with these basic factors. Although a people as individuals may possess those qualities needed to function as members of a guerilla force, leaders must emerge
to weld these individuals into an organized and active force.

c. The psychological factors take into account the complexities of human beings--their ideals, their temperament, and their political and religious beliefs. Propaganda may be used to shape and adjust these factors and to develop the human emotions to the point where they can be exploited in action. To organize a guerilla force, confidence in eventual success must be created. The people must be convinced of the possibility of ultimate victory or liberation. Public opinion must be molded into a sympathetic and supporting mood. In a country overrun by the enemy, civilian support, whether voluntary, induced, or imposed, is absolutely essential to maintain guerilla forces for prolonged periods. To gain and hold civilian support, a resistance movement must be unified in emotions, politics, and ideals. Friction in these concepts leads to petty jealousies, internal conflicts, and even civil war. As resistance movements are usually national in character, political considerations often have great influence on guerilla warfare.

d. The physical factors that affect guerilla warfare include space and time, topography, climate, and material support. Enemy forces must be weak, overextended, or engaged on another front so that only a limited force can be diverted against the guerillas, particularly during the early stages of their organization. The country must provide the guerillas with cover and support. Climate determines the need for additional local support in terms of clothing and shelter. To exploit guerilla warfare at an opportune moment
enemy forces and allied action must be considered carefully in relation to time and space factors. To exploit fully the capabilities of guerilla warfare, contact and coordination with regular forces must be established, and moral and material support supplied to the guerillas.

13. TOPOGRAPHY AND CONTROL

a. Terrain influences both the organization and operations of guerilla forces. Regular enemy forces usually can control open terrain with fast-moving detachments and strategically located garrisons or strong points. When the area of open terrain is too large compared with the number of troops available to occupy it, control, security cannot be maintained, and the situation is favorable for guerilla warfare. This was the case in the Arabian Desert during the time of Colonel T.E. Lawrence’s guerilla exploits against the Turks in World War 1.

b. Control is difficult in mountains, forests, jungles, and marshes. In these areas, occupying forces usually secure only limited areas along vital lines of communication. This leaves extensive uncontrolled areas that provide ideal protection and strongholds for guerilla forces. The mountains and jungles of the Philippines, Burma, and Malaya, and the forests and marshes of the Soviet Union, were quite helpful to guerillas during World War 11.

c. Generally, rural areas are suitable for large compact units engaged in overt operations. Urban centers usually restrict smaller units to undercover activities.
14. SOURCES OF MANPOWER

People throughout the world fall into different political, economic, religious, ideological, and racial groups. Many of these groups extend over the world, unrestricted by national boundaries. The individuals of each are bound together by common ties. A war effort, or any force that seeks to enforce a new order on the people of an area, will meet potential support from some groups and resistance from others. Usually, members of the dominating group within a country will resist any external force that seeks to alter the status quo, while the various groups opposed to those in power may support an external effort that offers a likely means, either directly or indirectly, to advance their own causes. These various groups provide the medium for a resistance movement and a potential source of manpower for guerilla forces.

15. FIRST PHASE OF ORGANIZATION

The organization of guerilla forces normally progresses through several phases. In the first phase of organization, individuals band together under local leadership. Their main concern is shelter, food, and weapons. Shelter is provided by isolated buildings or villages on the outer limits of enemy-controlled areas. Food and weapons are obtained locally the activities of these small bands are limited to propaganda, small scale attacks, and sabotage.

16. SECOND PHASE OF ORGANIZATION

In the second phase of organization, the number and size of units increase. Small units
unite under common leadership. The ranks of these units are further strengthened by additional volunteers, individual soldiers, and army units cut off in the course of combat. Command and leadership improve when tested local leaders emerge as commanders, and as trained personnel, cut off or infiltrated from the regular forces, are added. The quantity of war materials is increased by battlefield salvage and raids on enemy installations. Great efforts are made to establish contact with allied regular forces or with a sympathetic national government. Widespread sabotage, raids, and ambushes result in greater enemy pressure. Enemy countermeasures often break up smaller units, and dispersed groups join better-established units. Guerilla bases of operation are shifted to difficult terrain or deeper into uncontrolled areas.

17. THIRD PHASE OF ORGANIZATION

a. During the third phase of organization, unified command is established over certain areas. This may result from
   (1) A strong and competent leader emerging as the recognized commander.
   (2) The presence of a recognized senior military leader.
   (3) The recognition or infiltration of a regular allied forces commander.

b. Control and coordination among the various guerilla forces and between them and regular forces are established by communication and liaison.
   (1) Within guerilla-controlled areas, command, combat, and service
installations are organized and protected.
(2) Effective intelligence and counterintelligence nets are methodically developed. Strict security measures are enforced.
(3) Extensive control is imposed on the civilian population.
(4) Intelligent propaganda is employed to counter enemy propaganda and to stimulate the morale of guerillas and loyal civilians.
(5) The effectiveness of individuals and units is improved by training, engaging in operations, and obtaining technical personnel locally or from external sources.
(6) Military equipment is augmented by infiltration of supplies from allied regular forces.

c. The guerilla forces, supported by an external force, develop a cohesive military establishment capable of tenaciously defending certain areas and of striking with substantial force at selected objectives. The guerilla activities during this phase normally are controlled by general directives from regular forces.

d. In the second and third phases of organization, units increase in size, consolidate, and unify commands; this does not necessarily mean mass concentration of personnel. On the contrary, small units remain dispersed in depth throughout the area. The extent to which unified commands develop is influenced by terrain, enemy dispositions and control, political and administrative considerations, and the policies of
the regular allied forces supporting the resistance movement.

18. INFLUENCING RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

a. A resistance movement arises as a voluntary expression of the will of the people and is normally spontaneous. Such an expression is founded on ideologies cultivated over a considerable period of time. The active expression of such a movement in terms of guerilla forces depends on the human, psychological, and physical factors discussed in paragraph 12.

b. A power cannot hope to suddenly influence the characteristics of a people. However, if favorable characteristics exist, individuals may be guided into appropriate action through organization and support. The greatest opportunity to influence the development of a resistance movement lies in the psychological and material fields. Through effective propaganda and by moral material support, together with organization and control, a resistance movement may be molded.

c. The timely application of the influencing factors is important. They may have to be applied, in part, even before the outbreak of hostilities. Once a resistance movement has developed, the character of such a movement is not easily altered. Political attitudes, for example, seldom can be influenced on short notice.

19. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The responsibility for fostering, supporting, and exploiting guerilla forces before and during hostilities is a national one. These operations are
conducted by a national agency. However, the mission and operations of that agency will pass to the control of a theater commander when the operations fall within the theater's sphere of influence. On the other hand, a theater commander may be charged with the mission of fostering, supporting, and exploiting guerilla forces with little or no support from a national agency. Regardless of the active participation by a national agency before a theater commander takes over, the national policies followed before hostilities will have a great bearing on the policies and methods to be used.

b. The guerilla mission assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a theater commander may be outlined in detail or may authorize general freedom of action.

20. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Political factors must be considered carefully in developing and supporting guerilla forces. They can have a great effect both on the conduct of current operations and on the situation.

a. Effects on Current Operations:

(1) Support of a particular faction or resistance group may alienate other rival factions and groups and cause them to give open support to the enemy. Thus the support given to Tito's Orthodox Montenegrins in Yugoslavia was a factor in causing the Catholic Croatian Ustachi to give support to the Nazis.

(2) The political antipathies of a people can greatly assist or handicap the fostering of a resistance movement. The Dutch found
it impossible to foster a resistance movement in their colony of Indonesia. Hatred of their German allies caused many Italians to join the Italian resistance movement.

b. Postwar Effects:

(1) A successful resistance movement is, at the end of hostilities, the most important political factor in a liberated country. Guerillas, existing and fighting under conditions of great hardship, develop extreme attitudes and become very jealous of their prerogatives to determine the postwar complexion of their country. This may make difficult or impossible the establishment of a moderate government in the liberated country.

(2) An extreme political faction that fights for a common cause against an enemy during a war may, after the war, become a powerful trained and armed adversary of its own government.

(3) Support of a guerilla force may lead all participants to expect payment from the supporting nation for services or damage connected with the war, no matter how tenuous the claim. Failure or slowness to satisfy these claims may generate ill will.

(4) To obtain the guerilla assistance of certain groups may require pledges of aid and cooperation in postwar political actions. Great Britain, to secure the cooperation of the Senussi Arabs in Cyrenaica, promised them postwar freedom from Italy.
(5) The nation that promotes and supports a successful resistance movement has a great political advantage in that area at the close of hostilities, particularly if the movement is ultimately supported by the arrival of regular forces.
21. INTRODUCTION
a. During World War II, guerilla forces were organized and employed more extensively than ever before. This incitement of strife behind an enemy's line was basically the application of old principles and techniques to modern warfare. Nevertheless, many factors impeded the efficient organization and conduct of guerilla operations. Professional military men generally did not understand the art of guerilla warfare. Many regarded it as illegal and dishonorable. The strategic and tactical relations of guerilla forces to regular forces were rarely appreciated. Special operations organizations, shrouded in secrecy, were hastily judged by many as "cloak and dagger outfits" engaged in wild exploits to add to the confusion that often existed, the responsibility for
organizing, supplying, and exploiting guerilla forces often shifted from intelligence to operations staffs, or to a special agency when the problem became too large for each in turn to handle. The command relationship between guerilla forces and a theater headquarters often remained vague and caused confusion within and between guerilla forces. The logistical support of guerilla forces was often neglected or ill timed with the operation plans of regular forces. Because of these major factors, the potentials of guerilla forces were not fully developed and exploited.

b. In future wars, the organization and conduct of guerilla warfare in the enemy's rear areas, and other types of special forces operations may be expected to receive even greater emphasis than during World War II. As a result, such operations must no longer be considered as unusual or exceptional and must be accepted as a normal feature of military operations. This makes it essential that the theater organization contain adequate provisions for the conduct of special forces operations.

22. SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

These may be broadly defined as operations conducted for a military purpose in enemy controlled territory beyond the combat zone. In addition to the organization and direction of guerilla forces as described in this manual, these operations may include any or all of the following:

a. Dissemination of propaganda.

b. The infiltration or organization of agents within the enemy's spheres of influence.

c. Subversive activities.
d. Commando operations.
e. Organization and operation of special intelligence nets.
f. Recovery of escaped allied prisoners of war and downed aircrews.

23. THEATER ORGANIZATION

a. The theater commander may organize a theater special forces command on the same level as the theater army, navy, and air (fig. 1). Close liaison and coordination is established between the theater special forces and the other theater forces. All units engaged in special forces operations and responsible to the theater commander are assigned to the special forces command. All units engaged in special forces operations within the theater, but responsible to headquarters other than the theater headquarters, are attached to the theater special forces command for coordination and logistical and administrative support.

b. As an alternative to the above organization, the special forces may be placed under the direction of a designated commander at theater

Figure 1. Theater special forces command organized on the same level as theater, army, navy, and air
level who will also advise the theater commander on special forces operations. To avoid emphasis on the one function over the other, special forces should not be placed under the exclusive control of the theater G2 or G3.

24. COMBINED OPERATIONS

The principles covered in this manual apply whether United States forces are acting alone or together with those of other nations. Combined operations are governed by these additional considerations:

a. Administrative, financial, and logistical support should be provided by participating national forces according to definitely agreed schedules.

b. All special forces operations within a theater should be conducted through the theater special forces. All special forces operations in adjacent areas that affect a theater of operations should be coordinated with the theater special forces.

c. Although many participating national forces may be represented in the staff and executive organization of the theater special forces, lower units of the same nationality should be assigned the responsibility for special forces operations in particular areas. This assignment may be based on political considerations or on particular qualifications for activity in the area.

Section II. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

25. RESPONSIBILITIES

The theater special forces commander is responsible to the theater commander for the
training, administration, and employment of special forces personnel and units. He is responsible to the theater commander for the conduct of special forces operations and the coordination of those operations with the theater army, navy, air, and organized joint task forces. As the composition of the special forces in a theater of operations is determined by its mission and the support from higher headquarters, no one fixed organization applies to all theaters. Figure 2 illustrates a typical organization of a theater special forces command.

Figure 2. Typical Organization of theater special forces command
26. STAFF

The staff is organized according to the desires of the theater special forces commander. A typical special forces staff is composed of the following:

a. A personal staff group which performs duties prescribed by the commander and which is responsible directly to him. This staff group may be composed of aides and staff officers handling special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control.

b. A general staff group, organized according to functions (personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics) which is responsible directly to the chief of staff. Its principal duties include formulation of policies, preparation of plans, and coordination and supervision of all activities pertaining to its respective functions.

c. A special staff group, to provide technical and tactical advice to the theater special forces commander and general staff group.

27. TRAINING CENTERS

Training centers are organized and administered by the theater special forces command to provide specialized instruction for individuals, operational groups, special agents, and units that are to perform missions in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. Individuals or operational groups may be specially trained before arriving in the theater. The theater-training center gives final training to qualify personnel for specific missions.
28. BRIEFING CENTERS

a. Special forces units and personnel are processed through briefing centers after completing specialized training and before being sent on a mission into enemy territory. These centers are isolated stations and so compartmented that agents or units for different missions have no opportunity to come into contact with each other. When equipped and given final instructions, units or personnel are sent by small boats, air, submarine, or other means to a rendezvous point in enemy territory.

b. Keeping abreast of intelligence in special forces operation areas is an important function of the briefing centers. These centers receive intelligence from theater special forces headquarters. Personnel recovered from enemy territory are processed through these centers, and they are interrogated on—

   (1) Enemy dispositions.
   (2) Enemy methods of operation.
   (3) Attitude of local inhabitants.
   (4) Location of resistance elements.
   (5) Identification documents currently in use.
   (6) Enemy counterintelligence methods.

29. COMPOSITION

The theater special forces command may include instructional units, organized commando units, replacements, operational groups or sections, and technical personnel.
30. ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

Theater special forces administrative units consist of all technical and service units assigned to the command. The types of units that may be included are quartermaster, transportation, communication, engineer, medical, and ordnance.

31. GUERILLA FORCES

Controlled guerilla forces operating in enemy controlled territory are the major subordinate commands of theater special forces. Each major subordinate guerilla command is composed of a rear headquarters (par. 45) located in friendly controlled territory and a guerilla area command (par. 78) located in enemy-controlled territory. At an appropriate time during a campaign, the guerilla force, including its rear headquarters, may pass to the control of a regular force having dominant interest in the area (fig. 3)
Figure 3. Successive assignment of guerilla area command and its rear headquarters to subordinate regular commands having dominant interest in area.
32. GENERAL

Upon receiving a mission from the theater commander, the theater special forces commander evaluates the available information, estimates the situation, and makes a decision. He announces the essential elements of information and his decision to his staff. The special forces intelligence officer analyzes the decision to determine the intelligence requirements for planning and operations. He prepares an intelligence plan to set up the tasks for collecting agencies. He insures coordination of effort with other major theater forces (army, navy, and air). Because special forces operations, are conducted behind the enemy's lines, theater missions assigned to special forces may be primarily the collection of information.

33. REQUIREMENTS

Intelligence essential for theater special forces planning, briefing, and operations may be broadly classified as basic intelligence and detailed intelligence.

a. Basic intelligence for a projected area of operations include

(1) Geography: topography, soil conditions and trafficability, water supply, areas suitable for drop or landing zones, local
resources, flora and fauna, endemic diseases, lines of transportation, rivers and lakes, actual and potential inundation, cities and towns, key features, and tactical and strategically effects of these factors.

(2) Meteorology: temperature, humidity, visibility, cloudiness, rainfall, and winds.

(3) Oceanography: depths, shoals, tidal waves, local currents, anchorage, harbors, and beaches.

(4) Light data: sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset, moon phases, and morning and evening twilight.

(5) Ethnology: characteristics, distribution, and peculiarities of the people.

(6) Political background: organizations, parties or factions, minority groups, police and judicial system, attitude and relation to foreign nations, resistance groups, and personalities.

(7) Religious background.

b. Detailed intelligence for a projected area of operations includes—

(1) Armed forces: history, organization, personnel, armament, equipment, strategy, tactics, techniques, doctrine, logistics, installations, order of battle, current operations, and dispositions.

(2) Enemy intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

(3) Scientific and technical developments.

(4) Political situation.

(5) Economic situation.

(6) Manpower.
(7) Resistance or guerilla groups: location, strength, organization, contacts, personalities, and politics.

c. The information in paragraph b (7) above is most essential. Before sending operational groups into enemy territory, intelligence of this type must first be developed methodically and communication established with the resistance or guerilla groups.

34. COLLECTION AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

a. Basic intelligence of the enemy and the theater of operations usually is obtainable from higher headquarters and the several departments of the armed forces in the form of basic studies. Information from which additional intelligence may be produced may be obtained from diplomatic and consular reports, libraries, tourist agencies, steamship and airlines, commercial firms, and individuals that have lived or traveled in the area of interest.

b. During hostilities, ground, navy, and air force reconnaissance is a source of useful information. Other sources of information include
   (1) Prisoners of war.
   (2) Captured materiel and documents.
   (3) Political refugees.
   (4) Resistance and guerilla groups.
   (5) Hostile and neutral press and radio
   (6) Personnel recovered from enemy territory.

c. The following collecting agencies are available to assist in the collection of required information.
35. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

Intelligence planning must make allowance for the time and space factors involved and for the lack of training and intelligence literature in guerilla units. Operational groups or special agents sent to establish contact with guerilla units must be able to brief the guerilla commander on the theater special forces' intelligence requirements and to train key intelligence personnel within the unit. Adequate identification charts and similar material must be provided. Priority targets are clearly indicated and methods established for the rapid transmission of important reports.

36. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Special forces have a specific psychological warfare mission in the dissemination of covert (black) propaganda in enemy territory. They may also distribute overt (white) propaganda. Propaganda is of great importance in developing and supporting a spirit of resistance in enemy controlled areas. Therefore, the special forces commander has on his staff a psychological warfare officer who maintains close liaison with the theater psychological warfare agency. Psychological warfare units may be assigned to theater special forces.
37. GENERAL

In special forces operations, planning is a continuous process in all staff divisions and is carried out concurrently with operations. Because special forces operations have strategic implications especially in the early stages of guerilla operations and because of the time required to organize and support forces effectively, long-range planning is essential. Special forces operations planning must be closely coordinated with the over-all theater operation plan which normally will determine timing and establish priorities. As the special forces are dependent on the support of other theater forces (army, navy, and air), planning must also be coordinated with the interested agencies. Consideration is given to guerilla forces that operate in areas within or closely adjacent to the projected zone of ground operations by theater forces. These guerilla forces will eventually become tactically useful, and plans for them must be well-timed and coordinated with the operations of regular forces.
38. BASIC POLICIES

Political, economic, and military factors all directly affect special forces operations and are considered in planning and executing operations. From a military point of view, special forces operations are bound by the principles and methods of war. However, the application of these principles and methods may vary.

a. Security in special operations is obtained primarily by stealth, deception, dispersion, and mobility, rather than by organization and formations in force.

b. As in normal operations, resources should not be used piecemeal nor dispersed so thinly that effective results cannot be obtained.

c. The objectives of various special forces operations should be coordinated with the strategic and tactical land, air, and naval operations and with each other.

d. The technique and methods of operations of guerrilla forces, their capabilities and limitations, the strength of enemy forces, and the attitude of the local inhabitants are factors that must be evaluated in planning.

39. PROCEDURE

a. In a newly activated theater of operations, the special forces commander initially is assigned broad missions. He conducts preliminary staff studies to develop operations that will accomplish these missions. He prepares plans for specific operations and tentative plans for proposed and alternate operations.
b. Organizing and conducting guerrilla forces behind enemy lines may be expected to involve staff studies, tentative operation plans, and operation plans for six phases. They are—
   (1) Psychological preparation.
   (2) Initial contact.
   (3) Infiltration of operational groups.
   (4) Organization and partial supply.
   (5) Logistical build-up.
   (6) Exploitation.

c. In many cases, the first three phases must be accomplished to obtain enough information on which to base estimates and plans for the operations involved in the last three phases.

d. The theater special forces commander issues directives to place in effect his plan for a proposed operation. These directives normally cover a complete operation and include tentative plans to allow lower echelons and supporting agencies time to prepare. Tentative operations plans are amended kept up-to-date and placed in effect by supplemental directives and orders of, the special forces commander.
CHAPTER 8
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Section I. OPERATIONS

40. GENERAL

This section deals with operations conducted by theater special forces commanders to contact, organize, and train guerilla forces. The conduct of guerilla operations is developed in paragraphs 156-193. The conduct of other special forces operations, such as commando raids, espionage, subversion, and the like is not within the scope of this manual.

41. FORCES AVAILABLE

The principal field-operating agencies and units available to the theater special forces commander to accomplish this mission include:

a. Special Agents. These are carefully selected individuals, usually bilingual, who are highly trained for operations in enemy territory. They may be employed individually or in teams. Normally, they operate clandestinely.

b. Guerilla Force Rear Headquarters. These headquarters are organized and operated within our lines. Administrative, service, and technical units or detachments are assigned to these headquarters.

c. Operational Groups. These are composed of
specially qualified military personnel, in uniform, organized, trained, and equipped to operate as teams within enemy territory. The size and composition of an operational group varies with the mission it is assigned. Groups may be employed directly under the theater special forces commander or under subordinate command echelons of the special forces.

42. PROCEDURE

The organization of guerilla forces within enemy territory normally subdivides into several operational phases. These phases usually are undertaken in the following order:
  b. Initial contact with resistance or guerilla groups.
  c. Infiltration of operational groups to the guerillas.
  d. Organization of guerilla forces (par. 77-89).
  e. Build-up.
  f. Exploitation (par. 203-232).

43. PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION

Psychological warfare is used to develop and increase the spirit of resistance and hatred toward the enemy in the selected area. The inevitability of ultimate victory is stressed, and it is pointed out that active assistance by the people of the enemy-occupied areas will hasten the day of their liberation. Information collected in the area is used to develop propaganda addressed to the area. Overt propaganda is supplemented by covert propaganda distributed in the area by agents.
44. INITIAL CONTACT

Highly trained special agents are infiltrated into the target area. These agents normally operating clandestinely, establish themselves and contact the resistance or guerilla groups. Representatives of resistance elements who have made their way into our lines may be used to help special agents make contact with the resistance elements. Generally, the phase of establishing contact by special agents with resistance elements should not be bypassed, nor should subsequent phases of an operation be based solely upon the recommendations of a resistance representative. The special agents make reports and recommendations based upon their findings to the special forces commander by radio, messenger, or air or submarine pickup about any or all of the following:
   a. Activities and situation or resistance of guerilla groups.
   b. Potential of such groups.
   c. Attitude of the population.
   d. Political considerations.
   e. Enemy forces.
   f. The best way to deliver personnel and equipment to the area.

45. ESTABLISHMENT OF GUERILLA FORCE REAR HEADQUARTERS

a. During the early phase of fostering a resistance movement, sections are organized in each of the staff divisions of theater special forces to supervise and coordinate activities for a specific area. When a guerilla force is organized within the area, the staff sections concerned with that
particular area are used as a cadre around which the guerilla force rear headquarters is organized. This headquarters, composed of regular force personnel, is located within our lines and maintains contact with the guerilla force and with the operational groups attached to the force. It is a link in the chain of command and supply from theater special forces to the guerilla force. Liaison personnel from the guerilla force are assigned to this headquarters.

b. When a guerilla command is transferred to the operational control of a lower theater command (army, task force, or the like) the guerilla force rear headquarters is transferred to the same command (fig. 3). The commander of the guerilla rear headquarters advises the commander of the regular force to which he is assigned about the limitations and capabilities of the guerilla force and makes recommendations for its employment.

46. INFILTRATION OF OPERATIONAL GROUPS

a. The following elements may be used in the makeup of an operational group. The strength and composition will depend on the mission.
   (1) Command and liaison section.
   (2) Intelligence section.
   (3) Communication section.
   (4) Demolition section.
   (5) Training section.
   (6) Logistical section.
   (7) Personnel section.

b. Plans to infiltrate operational groups into enemy territory are based on the reports and recommendations of the agents who made the
initial contacts. With the plans completed, orders are issued, and operational groups are briefed and equipped. The operational group then is sent to a prearranged rendezvous point in enemy territory where contact is made with the special agents and elements of the resistance group. Operational groups take enough equipment and supplies to maintain themselves and to establish communication nets within their projected area of operations: one net for the guerilla force and another to communicate with their designated guerilla rear headquarters. The operational group uses and expands the surveys made by the initial contact agents. Through their command channels they report and make recommendations to the theater special forces commander. The operational group organizes, trains, and maintains liaison with the guerilla force in accordance with its assigned mission.

47. MISSION OF OPERATIONAL GROUPS

a. The mission of an operational group may be broad or specific, depending on intelligence about the area and the resistance group.
b. The underlying mission is usually to organize existing guerilla forces or resistance groups into a guerilla force under a unified command, capable of conducting strategically and tactical operations against the enemy in coordination with theater operations. Normally, the commander of an operational group is given great freedom of action during the early phases of an operation. As the operation develops and control is gained, the assigned missions become more specific.
c. An operational group may be assigned specific intelligence missions such as establishing air warning, coast-watcher, and weather stations, intelligence nets, and escape routes for prisoners of war and downed air crews.

48. FUNCTIONS OF OPERATIONAL GROUPS

The operational group may command, maintain liaison with, train, or give technical assistance to guerillas.

a. The commander of an operational group may command the guerilla force. In the early phases of a resistance movement, it is common to find factions that oppose one another for ideological or other reasons. When no local guerilla commander had successfully overcome these differences and established himself as an over-all commander, harmony and cooperation may be gained if an over-all commander is appointed by the special forces commander. To add prestige, such an appointment should be made in the name of the theater commander and should carry with it appropriate rank. When a resistance movement has produced a recognized over-all local commander, however, no effort should be made to alter his position. The operational group then works to increase the prestige of the local commander and, by tact and diplomacy, to bring him under control of the special forces commander. Many varied command problems may be encountered; each must be carefully analyzed, solved, and realistically administered. Local commanders should be supported to increase national spirit and local support of the guerilla force.

b. The job of an operational group may be principally that of liaison between a guerilla force...
and the theater special forces. The operational
group commander is the senior liaison officer and
uses other members of the group to maintain
liaison with various activities throughout the
guerilla force. The status of an operational group
functioning in a liaison capacity must be clearly
understood by both the operational group and the
guerilla force command.

c. Members of operational groups are stationed
not only at the headquarters of the guerilla
commander but also with each of the major lower
units. This enables them to make independent
report about the capabilities and needs of those
units. If the enemy destroys the guerilla
headquarters, these group members reestablish
contact between special forces headquarters and
the remnants of the guerilla forces. Operational
group members attached to lower units must be
particularly careful not to undermine the authority
or prestige of the guerilla area commander by
encouraging the ambitions of lower commanders
or promising separate aid or supplies.

d. An operational group normally gives training
and technical assistance to guerilla forces. This
training may encompass command, staff,
individual, and unit training, and it is given to
combat, service, and technical units.

49. LOGISTICAL BUILD-UP OF GUERILLA FORCES

Logistical support for guerilla forces is phased
according to the special forces operations plan and
the reports and recommendations of the
operational groups. The timing, priorities, and
quantities of support depend on the missions
assigned to the guerilla force and the internal
problems and functions of the guerilla command.
A typical plan for the logistical build-up of a
guerilla force that is to be exploited follows:
  a. First Phase.
     (1) Communication equipment and technical
          personnel to establish
          (a) One or more alternate control
              stations.
          (b) An extensive guerilla force
              communication system.
          (c) Air warning, coast-watcher, port-
              watcher, airfield-watcher, and
              weather stations.
     (2) Arms and ammunition in limited
          quantities to secure installations for
          training.
     (3) Demolitions for specific missions.
     (4) Medical supplies.
     (5) Additional personnel requested by the
          operational group.
     (6) Limited quantities of clothing,
          equipment, training literature, off-ice
          supplies, and miscellaneous materials.
  b. Second Phase.
     (1) Communication equipment and technical
          personnel to—
          (a) Replace destroyed or defective
              equipment.
          (b) Establish communications, within
              lower echelons.
          (c) Establish additional intelligence
              stations.
     (2) Arms and ammunition in limited
          quantities for additional training to
          secure additional installations, and to arm
as many of the force as possible.
(3) Demolitions
(4) Increased medical supplies.
(5) Additional personnel.
(6) Miscellaneous items.
c. Third Phase (to be accomplished in time for
distribution before guerilla forces are to begin
extensive overt operations).
(1) Technical personnel and communication
equipment (replacement).
(2) Arms and ammunition in quantity, to
arm all of the force.
(3) Demolitions.
(4) Medical supplies.

Section II. TRAINING

50. GENERAL

This section deals only with training
individuals and units within our own lines.
Training of guerilla forces within enemy territory
is developed in paragraphs 115-117.

51. BASIC TRAINING

Normally, individuals and units assigned to
special forces operations in a theater will have
completed basic training. Limited basic training
may be necessary to train locally recruited
personnel or individuals recovered from enemy
territory. This training is conducted according to
current theater training directives.
52. SPECIALIZED TRAINING

Specialized training is broadly subdivided into elementary specialized and advanced specialized training. Personnel and units assigned to the theater special forces may have received elementary specialized training. If not, such training becomes a responsibility of the theater special forces commander. Specialized training, elementary and advanced, is conducted by a training center operated by the theater special forces.

a. Elementary specialized training consists of training individuals and teams to carry out their assigned functions. Intensive courses are conducted and include the following:

(1) Map reading and sketching.
(2) Patrolling.
(3) Close combat.
(4) Physical training.
(5) Fieldcraft.
(6) Tactics of both regular and guerilla forces.
(7) Demolitions and techniques of sabotage.
(8) Use and care of weapons, including those of the enemy forces.
(9) First aid.
(10) Use of enemy and civilian motor transportation.
(11) Enemy organization and methods.
(12) Methods of organizing and training guerillas.
(13) Security information.
(14) Methods of supply to guerilla forces.

b. Advanced specialized training is conducted to qualify individuals and teams for specific missions.
in enemy territory. During this training, individuals are organized into the teams in which they will be employed. Thereafter the group trains, lives, and operates as a unit under simulated conditions of the area where they are to be employed. Special techniques, skills, and orientation are stressed to enable them to carry out their mission and to weld them into efficient, mobile, and self-sufficient teams. Parachute or amphibious training is given, depending on the contemplated means of entering enemy territory.

c. Besides the training outlined above, technical training is given radio operators, medical technicians, demolition experts, and other specialists.
CHAPTER 9
SPECIAL FORCES COMMUNICATIONS

53. GENERAL

The special forces commander is responsible for anticipating and preparing for all foreseeable communication as it is to regular forces. Unified guerilla forces establish communication systems to exercise command, control, and coordination. A unified communication system is needed to promote intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and propaganda. The communication system requires signal units with specially qualified personnel and provided with the signal equipment necessary to accomplish the mission. Communication interests of special forces and other theater services normally overlap. In planning the establishment of a communication system, the theater special forces commander and his staff consider and evaluate the following:

a. The physical distances that separates the major subordinate units of the command.
b. The topography of the area over which the communication system must operate.
c. The communication facilities needed by lower units to perform their missions.
d. The communication security requirements.
e. Supply and resupply procedures.
f. Technical assistance and training needed.

54. SIGNAL AND STAFF SECTION

The signal officer on the staff of the special forces commander is the adviser on all matters pertaining to signal communication. The signal officer should always be completely informed about the mission of the lower units.

a. Aside from planning and operations, training signal communication personnel, providing cryptographic systems and security, and providing for the supply of signal communication equipment, responsibilities of the signal officer include—

(1) Supervising directly the communication system serving the headquarters.

(2) Coordinating signal communication with other theater forces.

(3) Planning, supervising, and coordinating communication systems of special units and guerilla commands operating in enemy territory.

55. AVAILABLE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES

a. Radio is the most effective means of communication, because guerilla organization and operations require great flexibility. Radio communication at special forces headquarters includes high-powered radio transmitters. Other facilities are similar to those used by regular forces within the theater.

b. The radio network of a special forces command normally consists of several nets. These nets are established and expanded in conjunction with the progressive organization of the guerilla
area commands in enemy territory. Nets are established in order of the greatest need, normally as follows:

1. The theater special forces command net. This net is established initially with contact agents and operational groups, then expanded to provide communication between the theater special forces commander and the guerilla area commanders.

2. Intelligence net. This net is established when the volume of intelligence traffic warrants it.

3. Special nets. These include communication with coast-watcher, air warning, and weather stations, drop zones, and naval units. They are established as required by the local situation.

4. Relay stations. Because of the distances between the guerilla area command and the theater special forces command, relay stations may be necessary in enemy and friendly territory to provide two-way contact.
CHAPTER 10
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Section I. SUPPLY

56. GENERAL

The types, quantity, and phasing of supplies to guerilla forces influence the organization, the capabilities and limitations, and the kind of mission they may undertake. Supplies and equipment made available to the guerillas likewise influence their morale, for each shipment represents encouragement and assurance of support from the outside world. Furthermore, once a channel of supply is established, the guerillas will continue to rely on that source for support; this gives the special forces commander a strong lever with which to enforce compliance with his directives.

57. CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIAL FORCES LOGISTICS

a. Theater directives establish the support to be rendered special forces by the various services and organizations under theater control. Requirements that are peculiar only to special forces are supplied by theater from local sources and from agencies within the zone of the interior.

b. Logistical activity of special forces, is continuous. The plans and preparation for guerilla operations include some difficult logistical
problems. These problems are coordinated with theater, with major lower commands under theater, and with supporting agencies within the zone of the interior.

c. Preparations for the logistical support of guerilla operations require much time. Often it is necessary to move men and equipment and to start the build-up of needed facilities and supplies before detailed tasks are assigned. In these circumstances, the logistical support activities begun are based on the broad missions assigned special forces by the theater commander. Time and distance as well as enemy action and capabilities are important factors affecting all logistical activities. The projected area of guerilla operations and the enemy's dispositions and capabilities may require special transportation facilities as well as close coordination with other major forces within a theater.

d. The lapse of time between planning and execution as well as the length of time involved in the execution of an operation exposes the logistical situation to unforeseen developments and many changes. To be successful, the entire logistical scheme must be highly flexible.

58. PLANNING

a. Normally, logistical plans provide for support to guerilla forces on a progressively increasing scale within the limitations and capabilities of the special forces command. In general, the initial plans are based on forecasts prepared by the staff of the theater special forces commander. The ability to meet eventual requirements for any projected operation depends
to a large extent on the correctness of the initial forecast.

b. The logistical plans, as well as the organizations and agencies that execute the plans, must be capable of rapid adjustment to meet changes imposed by higher headquarters, enemy action, weather and unforeseen developments within the objective area. The support provided guerilla forces should be continuous, and plans to provide that support must be kept flexible to meet changing conditions. Flexibility can be achieved by—

1. Having several principal and alternate points for delivery of equipment and supplies to guerilla forces.
2. Providing adequate reserves of personnel, equipment, and supplies from which prompt delivery to guerilla forces can be made.
3. Locating installations so as to reduce transit time to guerilla forces to the minimum consistent with acceptable calculated loss risks.
4. Providing adequate transportation facilities.
5. Providing adequate communication.
6. Having prepared alternate and contingent plans.

59. SUPPLY ORGANIZATION

a. During the early phases of the development of a guerilla movement when requirements are low, supply is accomplished by theater special forces headquarters through theater supply and transportation facilities (fig. 4).
b. When the resistance movement has developed and supply requirements have increased, the guerilla force rear headquarters is established (par. 45) and assumes responsibility for supply of
the guerilla force. Guerilla force rear headquarters may supply supporting units by—

1. Submitting requisitions and delivery instructions to local supply and transportation facilities that have been designated to provide the required support by their parent commands at theater level. This will be the normal procedure for air or submarine delivery (fig. 5).

2. Drawing supplies from designated local facilities, and delivering the supplies to the guerilla force with assigned vehicles or boats. This system may be used when delivery by land or surface craft is practicable (fig. 6).

c. Generally, both special forces and guerilla force rear headquarters avoid acquiring large base and supply installations. They restrict themselves to handling requisitions and making necessary arrangements with supply and transportation services. Only special supplies, not available from theater supply, agencies are procured and stocked by special forces.

d. When established, guerilla force rear headquarters assumes full responsibility for supervising and coordinating the delivery of supplies. This responsibility includes briefing the delivery agency on the delivery points and the contact method. The reservation of this function to theater special forces headquarters creates the possibility that the smoothness of the supply operation will be interrupted when the guerilla rear headquarters is transferred to a lower force (par. 45b).
60. TYPES OF SUPPLY

Guerilla force supplies may be grouped logically according to the stage of development and exploitation of the force.
Figure 6. Subsequent supply of guerilla force by guerilla or headquarters utilizing own transportation.
a. Initial supplies are provided as soon as possible to keep the force in limited operation, and to permit further development. These supplies may include—

(1) Ammunition for weapons on hand. This may create difficulty as the force may be armed with weapons of the original forces of the country or with weapons captured from the enemy. The types of weapons the force is to use must be decided early. Captured enemy weapons may be used if a continuous supply of both weapons and ammunition can be maintained.

(2) Communications equipment. This must be adequate for establishing contact between theater special forces and the guerilla force, and between the guerilla force and its principal units.

(3) Medical supplies. Supply of this item should be generous, as the guerilla force will probably find it necessary to use part of its medical supplies for the benefit of the supporting civilian population.

(4) Demolition equipment.

(5) Limited clothing. Principally shoes and, in cold climates, warm coats and blankets.

(6) Equipment for collecting and recording information. This should include binoculars and drawing materials.

b. Build-up supplies are supplied during the period in which the guerilla force is being built to the desired strength. Build-up supplies include—

(1) Additional hand weapons.
(2) Light crew-served weapons.
(3) Additional ammunition and demolition equipment.
(4) Hand grenades.
(5) Additional medical supplies.
(6) Communication equipment to complete the internal communication requirements of the force.
(7) Clothing. Often it will be practicable to provide cloth and sewing materials with which the guerillas can have their own uniforms made by the civilian population.
(8) Morale supplies like cigarettes and candy.

c. Pre-D-day supplies are delivered to put the guerilla force into final condition to accomplish expected D-day missions (par. 211-213). Depending on the situation and the expected missions, heavier arms and transportation may be included. This equipment is delivered in time for the guerillas to become familiar with its operation and use. Pre-D-day supplies may include—

(1) Light artillery and ammunition.
(2) Additional ammunition for weapons on hand.
(3) Light vehicles and boats.
(4) Food. Normally, it is not necessary for theater special forces to supply food to guerilla units. However, the concentrations and movements and the disorganization of regular guerilla supply channels during the D-day period will usually make supplemental food supplies necessary. Food supply should, where possible, take into account the eating
habits peculiar to the guerillas' nationality.
(5) VHF radios for communication with tactical aircraft. This equipment will usually be accompanied by tactical air control parties.
d. After-D-day supplies for guerilla troops are approximately the same as those of regular troops and include administrative supplies necessary to enable the guerilla force to put its administration in order before being demobilized.

61. PREPARATION OF SUPPLIES FOR DELIVERY

The situation existing at delivery points is considered when supplies are prepared. When delivery is to be made in an area in which enemy troops are active, supplies are divided into one- or two-man loads to make movement easier. Supplies are packaged to protect them against the elements and, in the case of those supplies to be dropped from aircraft, an allowance is made for loss and damage. Before preparation, equipment is carefully checked for completeness. All components of each piece or set are loaded in the same aircraft or other conveyance. When possible, instructions included for the assembly, use, and care of new or unusual equipment are printed in the language of the guerilla force receiving the equipment.

62. MEANS OF DELIVERY

How supplies are delivered to guerilla forces is covered in paragraphs 125-131.
63. GENERAL

a. During the initial stages of a resistance movement, financial problems seldom arise. Guerillas serve without reward, and support usually is provided by the civilian population on a voluntary basis. However, when a guerilla force comes under the control of regular forces, it is necessary for the regular forces or an allied government to assume financial responsibility for the force's operation. In comparison with the cost of supporting an equal number of regular troops, the cost of supporting guerilla forces is small. However, carefully planned policies are necessary to protect the interests of the supporting government and at the same time to avoid interference with the effectiveness of guerilla operations.

b. The financial cost involved in organizing and supporting a guerilla movement will not necessarily be borne by the United States government. This cost should ultimately be borne by the allied government that succeeds to control of the area after it has been recovered from the enemy. Definite agreements should be made with the allied government to this effect. However, during the time that hostilities are actually in progress, the allied government is not likely to be able to contribute physically to the support of the operation, and the cost of the operation will have to be borne during this period by the regular forces. In any event, all funds and supplies for the support of the operation should be furnished through and in the name of the theater commander
in order not to interfere with his prerogative of command over the guerrilla force.

64. METHODS OF PAYMENT

a. Guerrilla forces may pay for supplies and services in one of the following ways:
   (1) With gold or currency supplied by regular forces.
   (2) With receipts.
   (3) With funds borrowed from the local population.
   (4) With currency obtained from the local population in exchange for currency supplied by regular forces.

b. Cash can often procure supplies and services when other means are not possible. Also, it eliminates the necessity of later claim settlements, and, if supplied by regular forces, it is evidence to the population of outside support to the guerrillas. However, cash is subject to loss or misappropriation, and it often creates a security risk to the receiver. The greatest disadvantage of using cash is that it creates inflation in the area and tends to dilute the patriotic fervor of the guerrillas and their civilian supporters with considerations of material gain. Therefore, cash should be used only when other procurement means are not practicable, the cash being furnished by the regular forces or borrowed on receipt from the local population. The guerrilla area commander should be authorized to pay for other locally procured supplies with receipts. Unlike cash, receipts do not circulate and thus create inflation. They cement the loyalty of the local population to the guerrilla force because each
civilian feels that he has an investment in the force and in its final victory. Instructions for the use of receipts are contained in paragraph 123.

c. Often the enemy will introduce his own occupation currency into the areas that he occupies, and he may prohibit the use of currency formerly used. In this situation, a guerrilla force must often use occupation currency for security reasons. It may borrow such currency from the local population, or it may obtain such currency in exchange for funds supplied by regular forces. Procurement in this manner will tend to support the value of the occupation currency. If it is desired to depress the value of the occupation currency, the regular forces may make and furnish to the guerrilla force counterfeit occupation currency. Such counterfeit currency must be changed as new types of occupation currency are issued by the enemy.

65. FINANCIAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
DELEGATED TO AREA COMMANDER

a. Once contact is established between theater special forces and the guerrilla area command, the guerrilla commander is told what financial aid he can expect and in what ways he can obligate special forces (or an allied government) for the support of his forces. Instructions include the type and quantity of goods and services he is authorized to procure locally upon the authority of the special forces commander. Guerrilla forces may require funds or obligation authority for—
   (1) Pay of troops and civilian employees.
   (2) Food.
   (3) Clothing.
(4) Medical supplies and services.
(5) Miscellaneous equipment and supplies.
(6) Pay of intelligence agents and purchase of information.
(7) Procurement of local currency for above purposes.

b. Monthly allowances should be established for guerilla expenditures on either fixed or troop-strength bases as appropriate.

c. The guerilla area commander is responsible for the sub-allocation of funds and obligation authority within his command and for seeing that economy and honesty are observed in the procurement and use of supplies. Operational groups attached to the guerilla force observe and report to special forces on the adequacy of funds and obligation authority and how these are utilized by the guerilla forces.

d. Authority may be granted to the area commander to procure occupation currency by issuing receipts, as he does for goods and services. Funds obtained in this way are accounted for like funds obtained from special forces. Receipts given should state that repayment will be made in the currency legal in the post-hostilities period and at a rate equivalent to the value of the occupation currency at the time the loan was made. The area commander or attached operational groups periodically report the current value of the local currency.

66. SETTLEMENT OF PAY AND CLAIMS

Settlement of pay and claims is discussed in paragraphs 227-228.
67. INTRODUCTION

a. The mission assigned to the special forces commander by the theater commander determines the personnel requirements of a special forces command. The internal personnel administration of a special forces command is, in general, similar to that of any of the other major theater commands. This chapter presents a guide for the personnel administration of guerilla forces under control of the theater special forces commander.

b. The special forces commander is responsible for the administration of guerilla forces according to the procedures and policies established by the theater commander. These administrative matters include everything that has to do with the well being and moral of the guerilla soldier, the supporting civilian population, and prisoners of war.

c. The principle that administrative procedures should not be allowed to interfere with operations is even truer for guerilla forces than for regular forces. Because of the mobile character of guerilla units, their need for security, and their limited communication facilities, all administrative procedures that can be delayed (until physical contact with the guerilla force can be established)
are postponed. However, necessary administrative policies and instructions are determined well in advance and are communicated to the guerilla area commander at the earliest date possible.

68. DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

a. Personnel administration is decentralized within the special forces command. Special forces headquarters limits itself to matters of policy and planning and delegates actual responsibility for administrative matters affecting guerilla forces to the rear headquarters of that force. This rear headquarters has custody of all records received from the guerilla forces and maintains a history of all actions, decisions, and policies that are necessary to the later settlement of the administrative affairs of the guerilla force.

b. Established policies are administered by the operational groups infiltrated to guerilla forces. To reduce radio transmissions covering administrative matters to a minimum, the operational group commanders are briefed on administrative policies and are authorized to act on behalf of the theater special forces commander. Only major modifications of important administrative policies are referred to the theater special forces commander for action.

69. STATUS OF GUERILLA PERSONNEL

a. The theater special forces commander, in accordance with the theater policies, establishes the status of guerilla personnel brought under the control of his command. Normally, the status
granted a guerilla is that of a soldier inducted into the service of a duly constituted military organization, responsible to appointed officers and answerable to an established government. A guerilla should be oriented at once on his status, command relations, and responsibilities. The status granted guerillas may be that of—

1. Soldiers inducted into the military service of the United States.
2. Soldiers inducted into the military service of a power allied with the United States.
3. The guerilla status outlined above is granted only to personnel inducted formally within authorized strength limitations established by the theater special forces commander. This status is not extended to loyal civilians supporting a resistance movement, even though such civilians may be organized into voluntary units that support the guerilla forces and their operations.

70. STRENGTHS, GRADES, AND COMMISSIONS

The special forces commander establishes the quotas for strengths, grades, and commissions within guerilla area commands. In general, grades and commissions are based on the table of organization of regular United States forces or of an allied power, whichever is applicable.

71. PROMOTIONS

Authority to make promotions, in general, is delegated to the guerilla area commander. These promotions are confined to the quotas that the
theater special forces commander establishes. Normally, the theater special forces commander commissions and promotes the guerilla area commander.

72. PAY AND ALLOWANCES

The theater commander establishes the pay and allowances of guerilla personnel.

73. DECORATIONS AND COMMENDATIONS

Authority to award certain lower ranking decorations is delegated to the guerilla area commander or to the operational group attached to the area headquarters. Recommendations for the higher-ranking decorations, together with the concurrence of the operational group attached to the area headquarters, are forwarded by the area commander to the theater special forces as communication facilities permit. Recommendations are acted upon promptly and the action is communicated to the guerilla force. Outstanding guerilla accomplishments are recognized by commendations from the theater or special forces commander. Security considerations often require that awards and commendations be classified for the duration of active guerilla operations. Besides the normal decorations, a distinctive, campaign-type decoration should be awarded at the close of hostilities to all guerillas, as well as those civilians who participated in the resistance movement.

74. RECORDS AND REPORTS

The special forces commander requires only a minimum of administrative records and reports from
guerilla units. The guerilla area commander is told what records must be kept, but they are decentralized throughout the guerilla command and are not collected and forwarded until it is safe to do so. The security risk involved in the preparation and retention of rosters and like records by guerilla units is always considered. Security of records and reports is further discussed in paragraph 98.

75. MORALE

a. Because guerilla missions normally are carried out in enemy-controlled territory, the guerilla is not provided with the systematic supply and evacuation facilities that support regular units. He usually depends on his own resources and the support of civilians. Enemy propaganda readily reaches all civilians and guerillas. The civilian who supports the guerilla has no protection from the enemy reprisals, and generally there is no pardon for the guerilla if taken alive. Both the supporting civilian and the guerilla realize the fight is to death. For this reason, morale is of prime importance in guerilla warfare. It is a factor that must be considered in respect to both the guerilla and the supporting civilian.

b. The many factors that affect individual feeling and thought are impossible to evaluate. The belief in ultimate victory is the most important morale factor for guerilla soldier and civilian sympathizer alike. The constant proximity of the enemy makes every success or reverse felt through all ranks. When it becomes a common belief that the cause is hopeless or lost, guerilla warfare is doomed.

c. A theater special forces commander may
primarily influence morale of guerilla forces through good leadership and administration. The ability, quality, and personal characteristics of personnel infiltrated to the guerilla force from theater special forces greatly influence the morale of a guerilla force as well as that of the supporting population. Through command and liaison personnel, the theater special forces commander demonstrates his concern with the problems facing the guerilla forces and his interest in their well-being. All requests made by a guerilla force commander to theater special forces are given thoughtful attention and prompt replies. Many such requests, when received in the secure and comfortable atmosphere of a theater special forces headquarters may at first appear to be trivial. These requests must be sympathetically analyzed and their importance weighed in the light of conditions that surround the origin of the request. All echelons of a theater special forces command should make a determined effort to overcome obstacles and fulfill all legitimate requests made by the guerilla forces. Administrative operations that greatly influence guerilla morale are—

(1) Logistical support.
(2) Periodic news and reports.
(3) Commendations, decorations, citations, honors, and awards.
(4) Publicity.
(5) Personnel procedures.

76. NEWS, REPORTS, AND PUBLICITY

a. Pertinent news and reports strengthen the morale of guerilla forces and their supporters and
help to combat enemy propaganda. The theater special forces command beams daily radio broadcasts to the guerillas covering the progress of the war in general and details of successes that are of particular interest to them. Attention is focused on enemy weaknesses, and the military and political aims of the enemy are exposed. Newspapers, special news bulletins, and reports are infiltrated or dropped from planes to the guerillas. In this way, the guerillas and their supporters get something concrete from the outside world to strengthen their hopes for final victory or liberation.

b. When security permits, publicity given to outstanding guerilla feats has a beneficial effect on guerilla moral and acts as a spur to further accomplishments. However, care must be taken that the publicity does not draw undesired enemy attention to the guerilla force.
PART THREE
GUERILLA ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER 12
TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

77. GENERAL

The division of a country into guerilla command areas is governed by political, ideological, topographical, security, communication, and other factors. Clearly defined boundaries must be established for the operational areas of guerilla units. This facilitates coordination and control, and minimizes friction between adjacent units. If a resistance movement has produced well-organized guerilla forces headed by locally recognized leaders, the command areas should conform to the existing spheres of influence of the established commanders. Normally, boundaries are recommended or established by an operational group infiltrated into the area. If an operational group arrives during the early phases of a resistance movement, the territorial boundaries between guerilla command areas are easily influenced and controlled. In general, sub-areas having basic religious, ethnic, or political differences should not be included in the same command area. No area should be larger than can be effectively controlled by available communications and logis-
tical support. As communication and logistical support improve, separate areas may be consolidated into single areas.

78. AREA COMMANDS AND DISTRICT COMMANDS

a. A guerilla area command is the largest territorial organization commanded by an over-all commander who is physically located within enemy territory. The area command includes enough terrain for the deployment, security, and administration of the guerilla forces.

b. A district command is the major subordinate command of a guerilla area command.

79. METHODS

In general, a country may be divided into guerilla command area by one of the following methods:

a. By Following Established Administrative Divisions, Counties, districts, Provinces, Departments, and States. This system is usually satisfactory when guerilla operation plans include sabotage, propaganda, and espionage conducted by small cellular units.

b. By Following Natural Geographical Boundaries. This system is best for military reasons and for overt operations on a large scale. Each major command area should include difficult terrain or uncontrolled areas suitable for strongholds and bases of operation. Each command area and subordinate district command must also include food-producing areas that will support the guerilla force in that area. This consideration can be ignored only when logistical support from external sources is available on a substantial scale.
CHAPTER 13
GUERILLA COMMANDERS

80. GENERAL

The personality and characteristics of a commander in guerilla warfare are extremely important. His ability must extend beyond military and technical fields. To command successfully a guerilla force with all its diverse elements requires psychological and political skill. A local commander should have distinction among the inhabitants and the confidence of his followers. In addition to such leadership traits as courage, decisiveness, initiative, endurance, enthusiasm, tact, and justice, the qualities of a guerilla leader include—

a. Diplomacy.
b. Understanding of basic weapons and demolitions.
c. Understanding of both regular and guerilla tactics.
d. Appreciation and understanding of strategy.
e. Ability to appreciate and foresee objectives and war aims of regular forces.
f. Ability to correlate guerilla activities with the overall war aims.
g. Ability to organize.
h. Ability to recognize and pick leaders.
i. Skill in improvisation.
j. Appreciation of intelligence.
81. RECOGNITION OF GUERILLA LEADERS

a. As a general principle, the local guerilla leaders are recognized as commanders within their spheres of influence. In the organization of a unified command, every effort is made to produce and recognize a local leader as the over-all commander. This principle should not be violated just because the local commander lacks the requisite military qualifications. If he can command the respect of the people and subordinate commanders in the area, military advisers and technicians may be infiltrated to assist him in carrying out his functions. Replacing locally developed leaders with commanders from external sources, even though the new commanders are native-born, may create personal or political rivalries, or aggravate those already in existence. The recognition of commanders, especially the over-all commander, must not be arbitrary nor hasty. Recognition should be based on a thorough on-the-ground study of existing conditions and attitudes.

b. If a resistance movement has failed to crystallize, and serious personal rivalries or political differences exist, the principle of recognizing a local leader as over-all commander may be justifiably violated. Then a commander who can command the respect and unify the efforts of opposing factions is appointed and infiltrated from external sources. Such a commander may or may not be native-born. Sometimes, a commander may better accomplish the task when he is not native to the country.

c. Historical examples abundantly illustrate the success of non-native guerilla commanders in
countries where native leadership was inferior or impracticable. Colonel Lawrence in Arabia accomplished more than any native commander could have possibly achieved. The distrust and friction that existed between native tribes were overcome by the skillful leadership and diplomacy of a man who won the trust and confidence of the local natives.

82. MISSION OF AN AREA COMMANDER

The theater special forces commander assigns the mission of an area commander. Normally, the mission prescribes in general terms the command, organization, functions, immediate operations to be undertaken, and contemplated operations. Initially the mission allows general freedom of action. During the course of operations, more specific missions and courses of action are assigned by the special forces commander. These missions are based on the evolution of the guerilla organization, its capabilities and limitations, enemy forces, and the operations of theater regular forces.

83. RESPONSIBILITIES

A guerilla area commander is responsible for the organization, training, administration, and operations of guerilla forces within his area. He is responsible for carrying out the mission assigned by the special forces commander. He may be responsible for the administration of the civilian population. More specifically, the major responsibilities of the guerilla area commander are—

a. Appointment or recognition of subordinate
commanders.

b. General administrative policies.
c. Morale and welfare measures.
d. Policy for disposition and handling of prisoners.
e. Organization and operation of an intelligence and counterintelligence net.
f. Continuous determination of the resources combat strength, dispositions, movement, and capabilities of the enemy that will affect the accomplishment of his assigned mission.
g. Preparation and employment of propaganda.
h. Preparation of plans to accomplish assigned missions and contemplated missions.
i. Preparation and assignment of missions to subordinate commands.
j. Progressive training of individuals and units.
k. Operations of the forces under his command; coordination of operations between subordinate forces and with allied regular forces.
l. Security and defensive measures within the area command.
m. Levy and collection of supplies from local sources.
n. Requisition of supplies and equipment from external sources.
o. Allotment and distribution of equipment and supplies to subordinate commands.
p. Establishment of adequate signal communication systems between the various forces of his command.
q. Special responsibilities may include—

(1) Organization, training, or support of special intelligence installations like coast-watcher, air warning, and weather
stations.
(2) Reception, support, and protection of special intelligence or operational groups sent in by theater special forces.
(3) Rescue, care, and removal of downed air crews, prisoners, and prominent civilians.
(4) Organization of the civilian population.
(5) Administration of the civilian population.
CHAPTER 14

ORGANIZATION OF A GUERILLA AREA COMMAND

84. GENERAL
The organization of guerilla forces from the elements of a resistance movement, or the reorganization of existing guerilla units into a unified area command, is a time-consuming operation. The organization should follow a definite plan, phased and coordinated with the operation plans of the theater special forces. Directives from the theater special forces commander (through the operational groups) to the guerilla area commanders prescribe the general course of action. Based on the detailed reports and recommendations of operational groups, more specific directives are issued later to attain the desired organizational level before the guerilla command is extensively employed in overt operations.

85. PHASES OF ORGANIZATION
To illustrate the progressive organization of a guerilla area command, the organizational period may be divided into three general phases. These phases are not specific time periods but normally overlap and merge into one another. They are closely tied into the special forces plan for the logistical build-up of guerilla forces discussed in
paragraph 49. Under each phase, typical organization and functions are outlined. These, of course, vary with the conditions within a specific area.

86. PHASE ONE

a. The area commander locates his headquarters. It should be where he can directly influence organization and operations in the most important sector of his area command. It should be in a relatively secure area, which is either difficult to gain access into or uncontrolled by the enemy, thus minimizing enemy pressure. The surrounding terrain should be unfavorable for large-scale mobile operations. Further consideration should be given to supply of the headquarters and to health conditions in the area. Besides the main headquarters site, two or more alternate sites are selected and prepared for emergency use.

b. He appoints a deputy commander and organizes a staff along the same lines as established for staff organization. The staff should be kept small and mobile. Special emphasis is placed on the organization of the intelligence division. Headquarters units are organized to carry out administrative functions.

c. Based on directives from the theater special forces commander, the area commander makes an estimate of the situation, formulates tentative organizational and operational plans, and issues directives to place them into effect. In general the directives include the following:

(1) Division of the area command into two or more district commands.

(2) Appointment of district commanders.
(3) Assignment of missions to district commanders.
(4) Organization to be accomplished in each district; designation of units and authorized strengths.
(5) General operating principles and procedures.
(6) Communication system and responsibilities.
(7) Administrative policies.

d. In districts that have no guerilla forces and no strong resistance movement, the area commander supports an appointed district commander for the penetration and organization of the district. This support may consist of assigning cadre personnel for a district commander's headquarters and combat units to provide security and a nucleus around which he may organize and expand his district forces. Through personal visits and dissemination of propaganda, he helps the district commanders to obtain the support of the local inhabitants.

e. In districts where a number of independent guerilla units exist, the area commander gives the appointed district commander the support he needs to bring about unity of command. This may be done by personal contact between the area commander and the various local leaders. More drastic action and force is applied to independent leaders and units that resist subordination. Normally, the control of communication equipment and logistical support from external sources are major factors that influence independent leaders to accept the leadership of appointed district commanders.

f. Normally, a skeleton organization is attained during phase one, with command headquarters
established in each subordinate district, with a communication system linking the area command headquarters with district headquarters, and with an extensive intelligence and counterintelligence net covering the entire area command (fig. 7). The overall strength of the command as well as the strength of the component units may be kept as low as one-third of the final strength to be developed. Premature expansion and build-up of strength during this phase can cause an undue drain on local resources, create hardships, and result in dissension among the population.

87. PHASE TWO

a. During phase two, area command tentative plans, prepared and modified from time to time in phase one, are adopted and placed into effect. Continuous studies are made and additional tentative plans are prepared for the further expansion of organizations throughout the area command. The expansion that is ordered during this phase is correlated with the logistical support from the theater special forces, the assigned missions, and the necessary internal functions of the guerilla area command.

b. Organizational expansion during phase two may include—

(1) Increasing the strength of the skeletonized command, combat, and service units to 50 percent of their final strength.
(2) Organizing additional units.
(3) Expanding the communication systems within the area command and within subordinate district, commands.
(4) Expanding the intelligence and counter-intelligence nets.
(5) Increasing the control and organization of the civil population.

c. Phase two is normally the most critical period in the organization of a guerilla force. Enemy pressure may be heavy and put both the guerilla forces and the supporting population to a severe test. From the reports and recommendation of the operational groups during this period, the theater special forces commander can, with fair accuracy, estimate the future potentials of a guerilla area command. Based on this estimate, final operation plans are prepared to include the missions to be assigned and the logistical support to be furnished the guerilla forces (fig. 8).

88. PHASE THREE

a. Based on the missions assigned by higher headquarters, the area commander makes an estimate of the situation and reaches a decision. In turn, the announced decision results in operational plans that established requirements for area command, combat command, and combat and service echelons. Extracts of tentative plans are made known to the various district commands so that they in turn may be guided in the early preparation of their own plans.

b. Typical organizational expansion during phase three may include—
   (1) Building existing units up to authorized strength.
   (2) Activating additional units.
Figure 8. Typical phase-two organization
Shifting units nearer to areas of contemplated operations.

(3) Increased control and organization of the civilian population.

c. During the third phase an effort is made to develop a well-rounded and balanced guerilla force, trained, and capable of carrying out the missions assigned by higher authority. The organization of the force will now closely approximate that of a regular military force, and a division between area and tactical responsibilities will be necessary in higher levels of command. Figure 9 illustrates a typical phase-three organization.

89. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Because of limited communication facilities, the necessity of keeping headquarters small and mobile, and the ever-present possibility of part of the command structure being destroyed by enemy action, extreme decentralization of functions is the rule. This, in turn, requires the utmost latitude for lower commanders in determining the methods for carrying out their missions. Instructions to subordinate commanders are worded to permit flexibility. Deadline dates and hours are specified only when absolutely required by the situation. The greatest mutual confidence between commanders is necessary. Senior commanders make frequent visits to lower units, both for morale purposes and to become acquainted with the local situation. Where personal visits are not possible, exchange of informal letters between commanders should take place frequently. Under no circumstances should the basis of an outside investigation of the facts of the case.
Figure 9. Typical phase-three organization.
CHAPTER 15
INTELLIGENCE

Section 1. GENERAL

90. INTRODUCTION

Knowledge of the enemy, the terrain, and the weather within an area command is essential for plans and operations of guerilla forces. The search for information must be continuous. It must be methodically organized to provide complete coverage and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Timeliness is a critical factor in producing and disseminating intelligence.

91. MISSION

The mission of the area command intelligence organization is to provide intelligence for the area commander and all lower commanders, and to destroy the effectiveness of the enemy intelligence system within the area command. The missions assigned the area commander by the theater special forces commander normally include the collection, processing, and transmission of information on the enemy, the weather, and the terrain.

92. AREA COMMAND INTELLIGENCE SECTION

a. Organization. During phase one of the organization of an area command, the intelligence
section of the staff is given special emphasis. Throughout all phases the intelligence net is expanded progressively until the intelligence requirements for the area command headquarters and for higher headquarters can be fulfilled. Although supervised by the area command intelligence section, the collection of information is decentralized as far as practicable to subordinate district commands.

b. Functions. The functions of an area command intelligence section is—

(1) To collect, record, evaluate and interpret information of value to the guerilla forces and theater regular forces, and to disseminate the resulting intelligence to the commander and staff and to higher and lower commands.

(2) To organize, supervise, and coordinate, in conjunction with the operations section, special intelligence teams (coast-watcher, port-watcher, airfield-watcher, air warning and weather stations).

(3) To plan and supervise the procurement and distribution of maps, charts, photos, and other materials for intelligence purposes.

(4) To recommend intelligence and counterintelligence policies.

(5) To collect and disseminate information on escape and evasion to include instructions for downed allied aircrews and escaped prisoners of war.

(6) To establish liaison with the intelligence staffs of lower commands.

(7) To provide intelligence personnel for duty with lower commands.
(8) To conduct training to carry out intelligence functions.

c. Forward Echelon. The intelligence section is organized into a forward and rear echelon to provide continuous operation where enemy pressure forces the area command headquarters to move to alternate locations. These moves are anticipated and the forward echelon sets up and beings operations in the prepared alternate site before the rear echelon moves. During large-scale overt operations, the forward echelon provides an intelligence section for an advance command post organized to direct the operations of two or more district commands.

Section II. AREA COMMAND INTELLIGENCE

93. REQUIREMENTS

A guerilla area command must produce the intelligence needed for its own security and for local plans and operations against the enemy as well as the information required by the theater special forces.

a. Thorough knowledge of the terrain and of the enemy forces is a prerequisite for the successful organization and exploitation of a guerilla force. The term "enemy forces" includes all anti-resistance organizations as well as armed forces. Detailed current intelligence included enemy strength, dispositions, movements, armament, and habits. To be useful, area command intelligence must detect and disseminate up-to-the-minute changes. To maintain support of the population, it must cover the enemy's political, economic, administrative, and propaganda policies and measures.
b. Covert or overt operations against the enemy require intelligence that covers specific objectives in minute detail. Intelligence may include—

(1) Detailed study of the topography surrounding and within the objective area.

(2) Enemy strength, equipment, location, disposition, organization, and movements.

(3) Enemy reinforcements within supporting distance.

(4) Communications.

(5) Details on defense to include guards, alarms, and obstacles.

(6) The actions and habits of the forces.

(7) Civilian activities within and around the objective area.

(8) Psychological warfare vulnerabilities of enemy troops and/or the civilian population; evaluation of current friendly psychological warfare campaigns.

c. Guerilla forces may be required to collect and forward information about any or all of the following:

(1) Ground forces.

(2) Naval forces and commercial shipping.

(3) Air forces.

(4) Defenses (ground, naval, air) to include passive measures employed.

(5) Enemy intelligence and counterintelligence systems.

(6) Scientific and technical developments.

(7) Political, economic, and manpower situations in the objective area.

(8) Topography.
(9) Location of and conditions in enemy prisoner-of-war camps.

(10) Location, activities, and loyalty of certain important civilians.

94. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

a. General.

(1) The requirements of the area command and the intelligence missions assigned by theater special forces form the basis of the intelligence plan. The preparation of an intelligence plan is an essential step in determining the organization and development of collecting agencies and in coordinating the efforts of all echelons. The assignment of tasks to agencies that function directly under the area command or to agencies of district commands is based upon the availability and suitability of the collecting agency to accomplish the mission. Certain agencies, even though physically located within district commands, may work better under area command control. The completed plan forms the basis for orders governing the organization of agencies, the search for information, and for requests to the theater special forces commander for additional personnel and equipment.

(2) Organized forces within the area command are charged with intelligence responsibilities. However, in many situations, agents and informers who have limited contact with the guerrillas and little or no knowledge of the disposition
of guerilla units and installations can do a better job. These agents maintain their civilian status and operate clandestinely.

Figure 10. Collecting agency, sources, and flow of information in guerilla forces.
b. Agents.

(1) The area commander is responsible for the control and employment of the special agents. The area command intelligence section maintains a pool of highly trained special agents. These agents are used on special missions. When practicable, the collection of information is decentralized to district commanders. Besides the organic district forces, each district commander is authorized to recruit enough civilian agents to accomplish the collection of information. Civilians that may possibly be used are—
   (a) Civilians living near or in enemy installations.
   (b) Government officials.
   (c) Employees of the enemy.
   (d) Civilians engaged in transportation, industry, and communications, whose trade or occupation gives them access to information.
   (e) Civilians whose trade or occupation allows them to travel freely.

(2) Agents are selected and trained, to collect information. Normally they are assigned to cover a specific objective. To avoid arousing suspicion, they collect information while carrying out their normal or assumed civilian pursuit. They may be employed in cell-type units or they may work alone. Two or more agents work under a roving agent or field agent who assigns missions to and collects information from the agents under him. The field agents, in turn, report or transmit the collected information to a
designated guerilla unit, normally, a sub-unit or a district command. Information throughout a district command is forwarded to the district headquarters where it is consolidated and forwarded in a prescribed periodic report form to the area commander. Agents are not given any more information than is essential to carry out their assigned tasks.

c. Informers. Local inhabitants who are sympathetic to a resistance movement are exploited as informers. The quality of information from such sources is questionable; however, it may be used as the basis for assigning missions to qualified personnel. By training key informers throughout an area, useful information may be obtained to supplement that collected by other agencies.

d. Special Agencies. To collect information of certain types and when necessary to forward such information in time to be of value to the using echelon, special agencies are organized and operated and are furnished with adequate communications. Special agencies may include the following:

(1) Air warning stations along principal enemy air routes in the area. In operational situations, they flash immediate reports of air movements by radio to the area headquarters or to outside stations designated by theater special forces. In non-operational situations, tabular records are kept and submitted periodically.
(2) Airfield-watcher stations in the vicinity of all operational airfields. Information regarding the numbers and types of planes on the field and landings and takeoffs is furnished by flash radio or periodic reports.

(3) Coast-watcher stations at points along the coast near the principal enemy shipping lanes. Information regarding enemy sea movements is provided by flash radio or periodic report.

(4) Port-watcher stations in the vicinity of all ports and harbors in use by the enemy. Information regarding types and numbers of ships present and ship arrivals and departures is furnished by radio or periodic report.

(5) Weather stations distributed throughout the area furnished regular radio reports regarding local meteorological conditions. These reports are consolidated by area headquarters and radioed to theater special forces.

e. Prisoners. Guerilla forces take prisoners by ambush or raids. Skillful interrogation of prisoners taken by guerilla forces provides an important source of information. When very important prisoners are taken, they may be evacuated to the theater special forces command for further interrogation.

f. Captured Equipment. New types of equipment may be captured by guerillas. Descriptions, charts, and photographs of such materiel have intelligence value.
g. Captured or Stolen Documents. Guerilla forces take advantage of every opportunity to capture or steal enemy documents. These documents are forwarded to the area command intelligence section for study and further disposition.

95. PROCESSING INFORMATION

Information is processed according to the principles set forth in FM 30-5.

96. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Information and intelligence are sent from the area command to the theater special forces by radio, airplane, submarine, or surface vessel pickup. The theater special forces commander exploits every possible means to pick up regularly consolidated written reports to supplement daily radio reports from guerilla commands. Periodic reports of this nature include situation maps, annotated photographs and mosaics, sketches, charts, enemy documents, and similar material.

Section III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

97. GENERAL

Counterintelligence, like intelligence, is centralized in the area command intelligence section, but the operations are decentralized as far as practicable to lower district commands. Counterintelligence measures and policies are thoroughly coordinated with all staff sections. Very close coordination must exist between the intelligence section and the civil affairs section. Counterintelligence measures are executed by
counterintelligence personnel, special agents, informers, security forces, and troop units.

98. SECURITY OF INFORMATION


   (1) Information is limited to those who need to have it each person is given only the information needed to accomplish his mission. Special efforts are made to restrict the amount of information given to individuals who are often exposed to capture by the enemy.

   (2) Administrative records of a guerilla force, if captured by the enemy, are the source of valuable information that may result in reprisals, not only against the families and relatives of the guerrillas, but against the supporting population and entire civilian communities. In the past, the capture of unit rosters and supply receipts has resulted in the complete destruction of effective guerilla forces and the cutting off of their support from loyal civilians. For this reason, higher headquarters requires that only the minimum number of records be kept. The area commander prescribes the reports and records to be maintained, their classification, and the emergency destruction of all classified or incriminating documents.

b. Installations. Command, combat, and service installations are located in concealed areas. Difficult terrain areas not controlled by the enemy are especially suitable. All installations are kept
mobile and are surrounded by guard and warning systems. Alternate locations are prepared in advance so that any installation threatened by enemy action can be quickly evacuated and made operational in a safer area. Information as to the strength, location, disposition, and type of each installation is limited to personnel who actually man or have direct dealings with that installation. In general, members of lower units in the chain of command do not know the location of the next higher units. The application of this principle throughout the structure of a guerrilla organization safeguards the security of the organization and limits the information that may be extracted from any individual captured by the enemy.

c. Security Discipline. All personnel are instructed in security measures. They are impressed with the importance of not divulging operations or dispositions to civilians or any unidentified person. Individuals seeking such information are apprehended or reported to the proper authority. All personnel are particularly instructed that if captured they must not, even under torture, give the enemy information regarding their unit or their comrades, and they are warned that if they give information to the enemy, regardless of the circumstances, they will be regarded its traitors and punished accordingly. If it is learned that captured members of the unit have given information to the enemy, an effort is made to kill them as a warning to other members of the unit.

d. Training and Briefing. The principle of restricting the information concerning the location of headquarters and installations (b above) is
observed in training. Headquarters personnel responsible for the training or briefing of units or individuals of lower units, conduct these activities either in the lower units' area or some other place away from the headquarters. Likewise, agents make their reports at some point away from the area command headquarters.

e. Communications. The area commander prescribes standing security procedures for all communications. These measures include restriction on the classes of material that may be transmitted, the use of codes, radio procedures for concealment and deception, and authentication means.

f. Civilian Population. The area commander prescribes standing procedures for the control of the civilian population in guerilla-controlled areas. These measures may include the screening of the entire population to discover collaborationists and espionage suspects, restrictions on civilian travel and communications, and the removal of civilians from the vicinity of various installations. All civilians are made to understand clearly that giving information to the enemy regarding the guerilla forces or their activities, regardless of the circumstances, will result in severe punishment. The enemy may use threats or torture to force civilians to give information. The fact that information was given under such circumstances cannot be considered an excuse. Patriotic civilians are advised not to acquire unnecessary information regarding the guerilla forces so that, even if tortured, they can give little information of value. Responsible civilian leaders are instructed to hide or evacuate poor security risks and families of
known guerillas when enemy forces are active in the area.

g. Counterespionage. The area commander prescribes the standing procedure and coordinates action by lower units to detect and apprehend spies, informers, and collaborators. Within controlled areas, strangers or suspects are arrested and investigated. The counterespionage operations are decentralized to district commands. Normally, local civilians loyal to the resistance movement play a major role in the detection and apprehension of enemy agents.

h. Terrain Counterintelligence. Every effort is made to prevent the enemy from gaining information regarding the area. Road signs and mileposts are destroyed or placed at other points. Bridges leading into the interior are destroyed. Highways are blocked with fallen trees or landslides. Civilians are instructed to tell the enemy that rivers are unfordable and that there are no direct trails through areas. Guides lead the enemy by circuitous and difficult routes. New trails concealed from aerial observation are constructed for guerilla use.

i. Deceptive Measures. False rumors and information are disseminated to the enemy, regarding the guerilla forces, their numbers and strength being minimized or exaggerated, as the situation requires. False reports of the death of prominent guerilla leaders may be circulated. Code and fictitious names are used by units and leaders and are changed periodically.
99. MAPS AND AIR PHOTOS

The area command intelligence officer is responsible for procuring and distributing maps and air photos within the area command. Requirements established by the intelligence officer are filled by requisitions on theater special forces.

100. TRAINING

The area commander is responsible for conducting intelligence training. Normally, key intelligence personnel are made available to guerrilla forces from the operational group infiltrated from the theater special forces command. Requests for additional personnel and means are made to the theater special forces command by the operational group or the guerrilla area commander. Intelligence personnel within the area command may be trained under the supervision of the area command intelligence officer, or training may be decentralized by detailing cadre personnel and instructors to district commands.
CHAPTER 16
AREA COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS

Section 1. GENERAL

101. PURPOSE
This chapter describes area and lower unit command communications. The doctrines and responsibilities of communication outlined here may be modified to conform to the condition peculiar to each guerilla area command and to the requirements of small guerilla forces.

102. RESPONSIBILITIES
The communications facilities to be established are determined by the requirements of command and specific operational missions of the guerilla units. The extent of local means of communication available has a direct effect upon the amount of assistance given to the guerilla area command by the theater force command. The guerilla area commander is responsible for maintaining his link in the special forces communication system, and for the development of communication with district commands and with special agencies functioning directly under the area command. Plans are made to train and equip the communication units within the area command to produce an effective, efficient, and coordinated system.
103. PLANS

a. The communication plan is an integral part of the operations and intelligence and intelligence plan established by the guerilla area command. During the progressive phases of organization, and as more requirements are given the guerilla units, the communication system is expanded by developing additional means or by expanding those used during the initial stages. Intelligence matters and important operational matters have priority on guerilla communication systems. Other requirements are served when the communication system becomes capable of handling the flow of traffic.

b. The area commander's detailed plans include—
   (1) Means by which messages will be transmitted between the forward and rear headquarters of the area command.
   (2) Security measures to be taken by all communication personnel when transmitting messages.
   (3) Local communication facilities within the enemy lines that can be used successfully without major supplementation or reorganization.
   (4) Supply of signal equipment needed for the communication system within all guerilla units.

104. PERSONNEL

Specially trained signal units are furnished to the guerilla area commander for contact, with theater special forces. Members of these units must be completely familiar with the operating difficulties within enemy lines. Communication men are
included in operational groups infiltrated to guerilla forces. As the need increases, additional personnel may be infiltrated to reinforce or replace the original communication men. Technical training within the guerilla units is accomplished by sending training teams to lower units. These teams are composed of guerillas, which have been trained locally or technical personnel infiltrated from regular forces. Radio operators, message center personnel, cryptographic specialists, and special messengers require special training. In selecting individuals to establish and operate the guerilla communication system, it must be born in mind that the whole guerilla mission may stand or fall on the effectiveness of the communication system.

105. AREA COMMAND SIGNAL STAFF SECTION

The area commander has a signal officer on his special staff. Special units are assigned to carry out signal functions and operations. The signal staff officer's job includes—

a. Supervising the communication facilities serving the headquarters.

b. Insuring the efficiency and readiness of communications to and within all elements of the guerilla command.

c. Supervising signal supply and maintenance.

d. Integrating the communication plan with the operation and intelligence plan of the guerilla units.

e. Training the signal units that provide the communication personnel for the area command, district command, and small guerilla unit headquarters.
Section II. MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

106. GENERAL

The principal means of signal communication within guerilla forces are messenger and radio. Other means include wire, visual signals, sound, and homing pigeons. This section develops the organization and operations of the principal means of guerilla signal communication. The messenger system and the radio nets used will vary with the terrain of the guerilla operational area, the enemy situation, operational requirements, and the means available.

107. MESSENGER SERVICE

a. The great distances between area, district, and smaller guerilla commands make communication a big problem. Rugged terrain and enemy-controlled areas that often separate units further complicate any physical system of communication. A messenger service operating under adverse conditions must be highly organized, flexible, and manned by well-trained, clever, and alert personnel.

b. Courier routes are established linking the area command headquarters with district headquarters. Similar routs are established within district commands linking lower unit headquarters. At each headquarters through which a courier route passes, a message center is organized. Additional message centers are organized at the junction of main routes. Between message centers, along all courier routes, relay stations are located every four to six hours traveling time. Each message center and relay station is manned by
qualified operating and security personnel who are formed into courier companies and detachments.

c. It is the responsibility of each message center and relay station to route and carry messages to the next center or station along the designated route. Each message center and relay station is responsible for keeping informed of the enemy situation and activities within its area. If a part of a courier route becomes compromised, the responsible relay or message center stations open alternate routes. Besides handling the flow of messages, the courier routes may serve as arteries over which personnel and supplies are moved. The personnel and the installations of the message service may operate openly or clandestinely, depending upon the enemy situation. Women and children may be employed extensively. They are particularly suitable to operate over parts of the routes that are exposed to enemy vigilance. Innumerable ruses are used to conceal messages on the runners. For example, messages are concealed in the linings of clothes or shoes, in hollow walking sticks or canes, in loaves of bread, and the like. During World War II in the Philippines, important messages were written on onion skin paper and rolled in native cigars. When a runner was detained for search, he smoked the cigar.

108. RADIO COMMUNICATION

a. Because of its flexibility, radio is the most effective means of communication for guerilla operations. The radio equipment should be light but rugged, and capable of being broken down into individual man loads. It should be long-range and have a wide frequency span. It should have an
efficient power unit and should be adaptable to alternate power sources.

b. The radio communication system of a typical guerilla area command normally links the area headquarters with its rear headquarters located with regular forces, and with the various district command headquarters. The initial area command net is established by agents and operational groups that are infiltrated during the early stages of organization of guerilla activities.

c. Security requirements may limit the use of radio. It is assumed that the enemy will monitor all radio transmissions. He obtains information merely by knowing that radios are operating. His analysis of the number of radios in operations, the volume of traffic, or the location of sets is particularly valuable and presents him with information with which he may hamper the activities of our guerilla forces.

d. All guerillas using radio communication must understand security measures.

1) Physical security includes those measures taken to protect signal equipment and classified documents from capture, damage, or loss. All guerilla units operating in enemy territory may have to move their radio transmitters frequently to prevent detection or capture.

2) Cryptosecurity is attained by using technically sound cryptographic systems. Cryptographic operating instructions must be strictly observed to reduce the possibility, of the enemy determining the extent, function, and type of operations
conducted by the guerilla units. Time spent in encrypting messages gives a high return in security. Lower unit if commanders must weigh all the facts before they make a decision to send messages in the clear.

(3) Transmission security, as it pertains to radio, results from all measures designed to protect radio transmissions from interception and traffic analysis. Radio transmission is particularly vulnerable to interception position finding traffic analysis, and deception. Radio operators must be thoroughly trained in correct procedures so they will not divulge information to the enemy through faulty operating procedures or techniques. For additional information on communication security, see AR 380-5 and JANAP 122A.
109. GENERAL

a. Guerilla forces derive much of their strength from the support of the local population. As a guerilla force within an area progressively expands and extends its areas of operation, the support of the local population must be expanded and extended. Normally, cooperation from the civilians is developed before guerilla operations are expanded into a new area. To insure support and cooperation, the guerilla forces gradually increases their control over the civilian population and continually seek to expand this control from the areas where they are firmly established into enemy controlled areas. The methods used by guerillas to gain and maintain civilian support vary with the character of the people, their sympathies, and the traits of the enemy forces. Generally, the area commander of a guerilla force announces broad policies, and measures to be used to create and maintain civilian support within the area. District leaders are given considerable latitude in carrying out these policies.

b. The degree to which guerilla forces participate in the civil administration of their areas also depends upon the character of the people and the activities of the enemy. Participation in the civil administration is
restricted to the minimum that will insure civilian support. Ordinarily, civilian officials chosen by the people or appointed by the guerilla forces administer civil affairs; direct guerilla participation interferes with their military mission and may give rise to civilian antagonism that will weaken over-all support for the guerilla forces. On the other hand, sufficient control must be exercised to insure that the population and its leaders are loyal to the guerilla movement and that they give it full support and cooperation.

c. The guerilla force should give all possible assistance to the population of the area. This will include harvesting of crops, emergency medical care, the capture and punishment of bandits, and the like. Efforts should be made to mediate disputes that interfere with effective support in the area. However, guerilla commanders should avoid becoming the arbiters for all civilian disputes in the area.

110. GUERILLA AREA COMMAND CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION

a. The civil affairs section of the area command, in close coordination with the other staff sections, especially intelligence and operations, supervises, plans, and coordinates civil affairs throughout the area command. The duties of the civil affairs section may involve—

(1) The establishment or super-vision of civil administration.

(2) Determination and assignment of quotas for supply of guerilla forces.

(3) Public health and medical service.

(4) Control of displaced persons.
Labor.
Price control.
Security.
Communications.
Propaganda among civilian population.

b. The civil affairs sections of district commands carry out the policies of the area and district commanders by supervising, planning, and coordinating civil affairs activities throughout the district command. The civil affairs staff officer prepares orders and directives for the district commander to implement civil affairs operations within lower units of the district.

c. The civil affairs detachments of the lower units are the field operating agencies of the civil affairs organization. They implement all orders and directives from higher headquarters. Civil affairs detachments may operate directly under the district commander in areas where no other major units are located. Each civil affairs detachment has a defined area of operations. In the course of operation, if a unit is moved from the area, the attached civil affairs detachment remains in its assigned area under district control. The operations of the detachments are then normally conducted through recognized or appointed local civilians.

111. PROPAGANDA, ORDERS, AND THREATS

During emergencies like war, individuals within each community emerge as popular leaders. The people look to them for guidance. A guerilla commander, to win the support of a community, seeks out these leaders and endeavors to ally them with his cause. Once the local leader is won over,
the majority of the people of his community follow. Sensible propaganda is used to generate sympathetic support among the population. By appealing to the people to support the objectives of the resistance movement, many people may become allied with local leaders who support the cause. Gradually administrative control of the entire community is tightened. Directives and orders are issued governing and controlling many phases of civil activities that have a relation to guerilla operations. The small but dangerous percentage of individuals within a community that opposes the popular move or that may collaborate with the enemy is forced to conform to the will of the community or is eliminated. So far as possible, the guerilla commander of an area controls the civilians of his area through locally appointed or recognized leaders who are in turn held responsible for the control of the people and for the arrest and punishment of collaborators. In areas where enemy control is ineffective, popular support can usually be won with relatively minor opposition. However, such control becomes more difficult as expansion is made toward enemy-controlled areas.

112. ANTIRESISTANCE AREAS

In areas where propaganda and mild persuasion cannot win support for the guerilla forces, more violent methods are used. Local popular leaders who oppose the resistance movement are apprehended and held as hostages or eliminated. Entire communities may be destroyed as an example or a threat to surrounding communities. Acts of violence are conducted to break the will of
the people into submission. The area is methodically policed for spies, and collaborators. Local civilians who actively oppose the guerilla forces or their appointed authorities are ruthlessly punished.

113. RELATIONS WITH ENEMY-APPOINTED OFFICIALS

In areas not under complete guerilla control, the enemy may be expected to appoint local officials to maintain normal civil administration and to facilitate his control over the area. Persons appointed may be outright enemy collaborators. On the other hand, they may be conscientious and loyal individuals who accept the positions to protect the civilians in their communities. While enemy collaborators, should be eliminated, it will usually be to the guerillas interest to leave in office enemy appointees who are loyal to the guerilla cause. Such officials not only solve the problem of civilian leadership for the community, but also able to protect guerilla interests and to furnish valuable information regarding the enemy. These officials should be warned that assistance to the enemy by acts against the guerilla forces will result in punishment. Whenever enemy pressure upon these officials to aid in anti-guerilla activities becomes too great, the officials are advised and aided to flee from the area.

114. ORGANIZATION OF CIVILIANS

a. To control and administer the civilians of an area effectively, they are organized under local leadership. The civilians are also used as a security screen for guerilla forces and
installations.

b. All able-bodied males are organized into units and are required to devote a portion of their time to some task in support of the resistance movement. They are used, for example, to collect and transport supplies to the guerilla forces. They are trained and used to build roadblocks, make demolitions, carry out sabotage, collect information, and apprehend spies and collaborators.

c. The women also are organized into local units and are required to devote a portion of their time to the resistance movement. They are used to repair or make clothing and they are taught how to give first aid. They also collect information and serve as messengers.

d. The organization of civilians has a far-reaching psychological effect. Because he is actively taking part in the resistance movement, each individual becomes hardened mentally and physically to enemy pressure. Once actively engaged in a resistance movement, an individual will seldom submit to the enemy while the movement remains active.

e. Organization of civilians simplifies control. Logistical burdens of a guerilla force may be delegated to organize civilian units. When guerillas are engaged in overt actions, a draft of all the population may be instituted.
CHAPTER 18
TRAINING

115. GENERAL
To operate successfully against modern military forces without sustaining severe losses, guerilla forces must receive individual and unit training. Through training and experience they acquire the skills peculiar to guerilla operations. The command, staff, combat, and service echelons strive to attain levels of proficiency approximating those of regular military organizations. Guerilla forces are capable of attaining a high level of proficiency under the most adverse conditions.

116. RESPONSIBILITY
The area commander is responsible for supervising and coordinating training activities within his command. He provides the training facilities for all lower units and coordinates the use of these facilities between the major lower commands. He conducts any special training that cannot be carried out at lower levels. The responsibility for carrying out the training programs and controlling the training methods and procedures is decentralized to district commanders.

117. PROCEDURE
The area commander issues training directives.
Based on these directives, the training program is implemented by the area command staff and district commanders. Individuals and units receive training in camps or installations located in safe areas. Technical training or special training is accomplished by dispatching training teams to lower units. Members of these teams are acquired locally or from personnel infiltrated with the operational groups from theater special forces. Some personnel may be sent to theater special forces for training. Limited instruction facilities may require training to be centralized; for this, a training center or school is established by the area commander. Special training teams or centralized training centers are used to instruct—
   a. Radio operators.
   b. Radio technicians.
   c. Demolition experts.
   d. Ordnance personnel.
   e. Medical technicians.
   f. Intelligence agents.
   g. Staff personnel.
CHAPTER 19
LOGISTICS

Section 1. LOCAL SUPPLY

118. GENERAL

Generally, guerilla forces live off the land. The resources of a country and the distribution of these resources influence the size and number of guerilla units that may be organized and maintained in each area. The guerilla area commander is responsible for supplying the units in his area. The resources, principally in food producing areas, are taken into consideration in establishing district commands. Districts with a surplus of supplies may be required to furnish supplies to poorer districts. The needs of the civilians within the area command must be considered. The supply plans are based on an equitable system that limits, so far as possible, hardship on civilians and does not alienate their loyal and energetic support.

119. GUERILLA AREA COMMANDER

The guerilla area commander normally delegates supply operations to district commanders, but he retains the responsibility for formulating over-all plans for reporting supply needs to theater special forces, and for issuing
directives covering operations. Plans and directives may include—
   a. The organization of supply and service units.
   b. The organization and use of civilian units.
   c. The employment of civilians.
   d. Systems of levy on civilians.
   e. The receipt of payment for supplies.
   f. Collection and distribution of supplies.
   g. Levels of supplies to be maintained.
   h. The allocation of supplies to major lower commands.

120. DISTRICT COMMANDER

   The district commander is responsible for the supply of all items to his lower units. The district commander's supply operation plans and orders are based on the plans and directives issued by the area commander. Also, he plans and directs the subdivision of his district into lower areas.

121. UNIT COMMANDERS

   The lower unit commanders are responsible for the supply of their units and for conducting supply operations according to the plans, directives, and orders of higher headquarters. Normally, supply operations are decentralized and conducted by lower units within their assigned area. For example, if the basic unit is a platoon, the platoon leader is assigned an area from which he locally collects supplies for his unit. The unit commander makes his needs known to the next higher echelon for supplies and equipment not available within his area. He is responsible for the distribution of all supplies and equipment received from higher head
quarters. Besides supplying his own unit, a basic unit commander may be charged with the responsibility of supplying adjacent units as directed by a higher echelon.

122. LEVY SYSTEM

To insure an equitable system of drawing supplies from the population, a methodical levy system is used. It is based upon the ability of each family to contribute. The organization of the civilians under local leaders provides an efficient operating agency. The basic unit commander of each area requisitions the supplies for his unit through the organized civilian unit leaders. Standing operating procedures cover the regular supply of expendable items. Special requisitions are made to procure items like clothing, blankets, and medical supplies.

123. RECEIPT AND PAYMENT

a. Supplies and equipment requisitioned or confiscated from the civilians to support a resistance movement normally should be receipted for or paid for in cash. Such a procedure tends to establish and maintain good faith with the supporting population. It will further tend to discourage abuses and limit or expose illegal practices engaged in by guerrilla units or by illegal bandit groups.

b. Most of the locally procured guerrilla supplies should be paid for with receipts signed by the unit commander or his authorized representative. The names and sample signatures of all persons authorized to sign receipts should be
kept and transmitted to special forces when communication. Facilities and security considerations permit. Receipts should describe the goods or services received and should include an agreed or recommended price. A sample receipt follows:

HQ, Co. B, Third District
I certify that I have on this date received from John Doe of Hill Village, Fantasia, the following:

100 lbs flour
1 pig, weight aprx 50 lbs.

The above-described goods or services will be paid for at the close of hostilities by the government of Fantasia in the lawful currency of Fantasia.

The (agreed) (recommended) price for the above goods or services is 845 Solders.

I further certify that the above described goods or services are necessary for the operation of this unit.

BY AUTHORITY OF THE AREA COMMANDER:

(Signed) John Doe
SUPPLY OFFICER

c. If a system of receipting is used a record of all transactions in code form is maintained by sub-unit commanders. Security measures, such as periodically burying records in waterproof containers, are enforced to safeguard all such records. Records are transferred to the rear echelon of the regular theater forces when transmission facilities permit. Persons to whom
receipts are given are cautioned to hide them in a safe place.

124. OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPLY

a. All echelons of a guerilla force are alert to supplement their supply needs at the expense of the enemy. Battlefields and the scenes of all encounters with the enemy are combed for usable supplies. Raids and ambushes may be conducted against enemy transport and installations to obtain supplies. Agents and friendly civilians who are employed by the enemy take advantage of the opportunity to pilfer enemy stocks.

b. Where practicable, units may operate shops and factories to produce needed items of equipment. Such activity should not, however, be engaged in at the expense of more important activities of the unit. For instance, it will seldom be practicable for guerilla forces to raise their own food, although assistance may be given to civilians at planting and harvest time.

Section II. SUPPLIES FROM THEATER SPECIAL FORCES

125. GENERAL

The extent to which a guerilla force can function when dependent solely on local supplies and equipment varies greatly. As a general rule, however, the potential of a guerilla organization cannot be fully exploited without supplies and equipment from external sources. The amount of external support may vary from irregular small supply shipments to total logistical support. The
theater special forces command infiltrates supplies to a guerilla force in accordance with established operational plans.

126. MEANS USED

Logistical support from external sources may be delivered to guerilla forces by land carriers, by surface vessels, by submarine, or by aircraft. The theater special forces commander selects the most advantageous means. The recommendations of the guerilla area commander and the operational group commander relative to the methods and means to be employed are given full consideration. Normally, aircraft and submarines are the most suitable means during the early phases of guerilla organization when secrecy is of prime concern. During the final phase, secrecy is of less importance, and the most efficient means are used to deliver supplies in the desired quantity, when and where they are needed.

127. SUBMARINE SHIPMENTS

The use of submarines for transporting supplies, equipment, and personnel for guerilla operations provides secrecy up to the point where the cargo is discharged. Therefore, to successfully deliver supplies by submarine, the guerilla force must have complete control of the reception area or have a thoroughly organized population that is unquestionably loyal to the guerilla force.

a. The movement of tons of supplies from a submarine unloading point and subsequent distribution normally requires considerable manpower and is a time-consuming operation.
There is a constant threat that the slightest leak of information may compromise the shipment.

b. The delivery of supplies by submarine has other disadvantages.

(1) Unless special submarines are used, or standard submarines are structurally modified, the size of equipment and packages is limited by the dimensions of the submarine hatch, except for items that can be lashed to the deck of the submarine.

(2) Normally a submarine will have to lay some distance off shore to discharge the cargo. Unloading then involves a laborious and time-consuming task in transporting cargo from submarine to shore by small boats or rafts. Such an operation can only be accomplished on a relatively calm sea and usually under cover of darkness. This in turn further restricts and limits suitable unloading points.

c. Submarines may also be used for evacuating personnel, and they provide a secure means for a guerrilla area command to deliver detailed written reports, sketches, maps, and administrative reports and requests to the theater special forces command.

128. SUBMARINE UNLOADING POINT

The guerrilla area commander, in compliance with instructions from the theater special forces commander, designates a principal and alternate unloading point for a submarine shipment. The theater special forces commander communicates
advance instructions to the guerilla area commander covering the following:
   a. Confirmation of principal and alternate unloading points.
   b. Expected time of arrival of submarine.
   c. Recognition and all-clear signals to be displayed, and submarine countersignals.
   d. Communication instructions.
   e. Cargo to be discharged—general nature and tonnage.
   f. Personnel to be disembarked.
   g. Liaison instructions.
   h. Instructions covering evacuation of personnel.

129. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

The guerilla area commander acknowledges all instructions received to the submarine shipment. He formulates plans, prepares directives, and issues orders to lower commanders for the reception of the submarine. A typical submarine reception operation is conducted as follows:
   a. Before the expected time of arrival, the area surrounding the designated unloading points, both principal and alternates are placed under close scrutiny to detect any unusual enemy activities. Units located in or near these areas are ordered to remain inactive to avoid attracting enemy attention. Plans are prepared and orders issued for—
      (1) Movement of troops and civilian carries into the area and for their administration.
      (2) Security measures to be used.
      (3) Details of submarine-to-shore unloading.
(4) Organization of carrying-parties and relief carrying-parties.
(5) Routes over which supplies are to be moved.
(6) Points of transfer of loads to relief carrying-parties.
(7) Breakdown and distribution of supplies.
(8) Establishment and operation of special communication facilities.
(9) Location and organization of the command post controlled the operation.

b. Outposts are established surrounding the unloading point and an advance echelon moves into the area to establish the command post. During the night, before the expected time of arrival, the guerilla combat troops and civilians carriers complete their movement into the area. All movements are executed with the greatest caution to avoid attracting enemy attention.

c. The shore signal details are instructed and posted to display the required recognition and all-clear signals at the designated time. Small boats with crews are assembled and concealed near the beach. Unloading details and carrier parties are organized under competent leaders. Armed escorts are assigned to each carrying party. Combat units are instructed in the courses of action to be taken to met an enemy threat once contact with the submarine is established and unloading begins.

d. As supplies reach the beach from the submarine, loads are assigned to the carrier parties and they are directed to move out. The entire operation is so managed that all supplies are cleared from the beach and moved as far away as possible before daylight. Relief carrying parties,
waiting at designated points, take over the loads and continue to move over prescribed routes. Breakdown points, at which supplies going in different directions are promptly separated and dispatched, are previously established along the route. Every effort is made to keep supplies constantly on the move until they are delivered to their final destination.

e. If the main rendezvous point becomes compromised, a flash warning is radioed and personnel at the alternate unloading point, where all preparations have been duplicated, stand by to contact and receive the submarine.

f. The commander of the advanced echelon is responsible for giving the submarine commander adequate warning of enemy actions that imperil the safety of the submarine. On making contact, he should tell the submarine commander what measures have been taken for the safety of the rendezvous and should inform him that in case of danger, he will be warned in time to remove his vessel to safety. Reports of enemy actions in the vicinity that pose no real danger, but which might cause the submarine commander to abandon his mission unnecessarily, should not be passed on to him.

130. AIR SHIPMENTS

a. Air transport is usually the most practical, flexible, and efficient method to support guerilla forces logistically.

b. Delivery of supplies, equipment, and personnel by air transport offers many advantages:
(1) Modern aircraft and newly perfected methods of parachute delivery make it possible to deliver a great volume of supplies and equipment efficiently and within a short time.
(2) Personnel and materiel may be parachuted into drop zones or landed by glider or powered aircraft on, prepared fields.
(3) Delivery and distribution can be facilitated by dropping or landing the loads in the immediate vicinity where they are to be utilized. This eliminates the laborious, time-consuming, and often risky operation of transporting and distributing personnel and materiel over land routes.
(4) Drop or landing zones can be quickly prepared; and their locations can be easily changed.

c. The principal disadvantages of air delivery are:

(1) Difficulty of pinpoint deliver.
(2) The possibility of the enemy locating guerilla supply points by observation. To eliminate this, dummy drops may be used to mislead enemy observers.
(3) Weather conditions restrict the flight of aircraft, and consequently may interrupt delivery schedules.
(4) Air support must be provided or air superiority maintained.
(5) Supplies may be dropped to the enemy, either through inaccurate drops or drops induced by enemy deception.
d. Drop or landing zones are selected in guerilla controlled areas that offer the greatest security. The following are basic requirements for drop and landing zones—

1. Ease of location and identification from the air.
2. Ability of guerilla forces to provide protection.
3. Near the area in which supplies are to be used.
4. Sufficient size to accommodate the load.
5. Terrain suitable for the kind of equipment being delivered.

e. The best time for parachute delivery is at dawn or dusk. This tends to conceal the point of delivery from enemy observers. Night delivery of supplies by parachute should be held to a minimum, because night pin-point navigation is difficult and may result in faulty delivery and loss of equipment. Whenever possible, aircraft should make only one pass at the drop zone to minimize the possibility of having the drop zone located by the enemy.

f. Normally land-based planes Eire used. However, seaplanes may be used to deliver and pick up equipment or personnel when sea coast areas or lakes are available.

g. To obtain the best results from any air delivery, pathfinders should be used.

1. Generally, panel sets are used to mark drop and landing zones.
2. Although smoke grenades are used in normal operations for indicating wind direction to pilots of the incoming aircraft, this method is not particularly
suitable for guerilla operations because smoke tends to rise and disclose the drop zone. Furthermore, low-flying aircraft often have difficulty in locating a smoke signal. Smoke should not be used for marking drop zones if it can be avoided.

131. AIR DELIVERY OPERATIONS

a. The guerilla area commander, in compliance with instructions from the theater special force commander, designates the drop and landing zones. Before the expected arrival time of the air shipments, the theater special forces commander communicates instructions to the guerilla area commander covering:
   (1) Drop or landing zones.
   (2) Estimated time of arrival of aircraft.
   (3) Recognition signals, ground and air.
   (4) Drop and landing zone markings.
   (5) Type wind direction signals to be used.
   (6) Signal operation instructions.
   (7) Pathfinder instructions.
   (8) Detailed information concerning type and amount of cargo to be delivered.
   (9) Personnel to be delivered or picked up.
   (10) Instructions for evacuation of personnel.

b. The guerilla area commander acknowledges all instructions and makes plans and issues orders for the reception of aircraft. In general, the procedure for receiving a shipment by submarine (par. 127-129) is applicable to receiving shipments by air.
Section III. TRANSPORTATION AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

132. GENERAL

Guerilla forces use every available kind of transportation that can be employed under the conditions imposed by the terrain and the enemy situation. During the early phases of organization and operations, they transport themselves and their supplies on foot. The bulk of supplies needed to support a small local unit can be collected within the unit sector. The distribution of men and materiel from higher headquarters within a guerilla command to lower units gives rise to complex problems in transportation and security. The distances involved are relatively great, transportation is usually scarce and the terrain is often rugged. Presence of the enemy also imposes security problems. The successful movement of personnel and material depends on sound organization, coordination, vigilance, ingenuity, and determination on the part of all individuals and units involved.

133. LINES OF COMMUNICATION

The organized and established courier routes of a guerilla area command serve as the lines of communication over which personnel and materiel are moved (par. 107). The type of shipment and the current enemy situation throughout the area are considered in routing each shipment. Security usually receives greater consideration than speed. Commanders of small units are allowed freedom of action in rerouting or delaying shipments to cope with unforeseen situations.
134. RESPONSIBILITIES

The guerilla area commander is responsible for issuing the necessary orders to accomplish and coordinate shipments to or through district commands. District commanders are, in turn, responsible for issuing orders and coordinating operations within their sectors. The choice of transportation means and the route is delegated to unit commanders whose sectors the shipments pass through. For security, a large shipment may be divided into many increments and routed over several routes. The responsibilities for protecting shipments from the enemy and for safeguarding them against pilferage are clearly fixed and are transferred to appropriate commanders throughout the movement of the shipments. Armed guerilla detachments accompany each shipment.

135. USE OF CIVILIANS

Civilians, organized into units under local leadership, provide manpower for moving supplies and equipment. Civilian units are employed under the direction of local unit commanders. Carrying parties are organized to transport loads. In rugged terrain, whenever possible, supplies and equipment are packaged in one-man loads. The shipments are relayed from one carrying party to another along a designated route. The final destination and route of a shipment are not disclosed to civilians carrying parties.
136. GENERAL

The guerilla area commander is responsible for the medical service within his command. The plan for medical treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization is prepared by the chief surgeon in close coordination with the operations section of the area command staff.

a. Prompt and efficient evacuation and treatment of casualties in guerilla operations is important for the following reasons:

(1) Guerilla forces are generally small; they are also specially trained and highly efficient. Their success is determined by losses they inflict upon the enemy with the least number of losses to themselves. Prompt evacuation of wounded and efficient medical treatment will reduce these losses.

(2) The success of an operation may hinge on the efficient evacuation of casualties. Any casualty falling into enemy hands becomes a possible intelligence leak which may jeopardize the security of the entire guerilla force. The success of a guerilla action, therefore, can be evaluated only after every man is physically accounted for.

b. The execution of the medical plan is decentralized as far as possible to the district and even to the individual force commanders. This is done to allow small unit commanders to meet sudden and unexpected local reverses. The degree of decentralization is influenced by the following
factors:
(1) Facilities available to the area command that facilitate decentralization, for example, transportation, medical supplies and equipment, and qualified personnel.
(2) The enemy situation.
(3) Medical support from theater special forces.
(4) Availability of supply from civilian sources.
(5) Existence of secure hospital centers.
(6) Existence of evacuation means.

137. USE OF CIVILIAN FACILITIES

a. Guerilla forces may utilize existing civilian medical installations. This should be done only in extreme emergency or in areas where the enemy lacks effective control. The loyalty of the civilians within the area, particularly those of the medical installation, must be unquestionable.

b. The area commander's plan may include the establishment of small covert hospital stations attended by loyal members of an otherwise questionable hospital. Loyal personnel from hospitals operating in insecure areas may be used to smuggle needed medical supplies to the guerillas.

138. PERSONNEL

Doctors, nurses, and technical personnel are recruited from the local population. Such personnel may be supplemented by trained personnel infiltrated from regular forces. Additional personnel, recruited locally, are trained to carry out nontechnical duties.
139. CIVILIAN FIRST-AID UNITS

Locally organized civilian first-aid units are used to supplement guerilla medical personnel and units. Civilian units are trained in first aid, and they establish emergency-aid stations within their communities. These units are incorporated into the medical plan of the area and district commanders. Unlike regular army medical units, these stations are not mobile, do not follow the units supported, and must be ready to provide care for the wounded for long periods. They must be able to hold and conceal their casualties until they can be moved to other accommodations.

140. MEDICAL SUPPLY

a. Medical supplies are of great importance in all guerilla operations. Normally they are scarce and difficult to procure. They are obtained from three principal sources:
   (1) Local improvisation and manufacture.
   (2) Enemy sources.
   (3) Outside supply from theater special forces.

b. Supply from outside sources will not interfere with the shipment of other supplies, as most drugs have little bulk or weight. Raw materials for surgical dressings may be delivered in bulk.

141. TYPICAL ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF A GUERILLA MEDICAL UNIT

a. When a guerilla force becomes large enough it organizes its own medical support. Plans for each guerilla operation should provide for one or more men whose duty is to carry medical supplies and provide first aid. One aid man is provided for
every 50 men unless the operation is very small and an aid man is unnecessary. With a force of 150 men or more, which requires 3 or 4 aid men, at least one aid man should be an experienced technician.

b. Two or more forces require a medical aid station under the control of competent medical personnel. Such an aid station is capable of fulfilling the needs of three or four 200-man units operating in a given area. It consists of a doctor and several trained assistants who may be augmented by special personnel when the situation demands. It is similar to a standard aid station for a regular infantry battalion. There are, however, these differences:

(1) There may be no need for a litter bearer section. Guerilla actions are usually short, and the guerillas are usually able to transport their own casualties after first aid has been given.

(2) The aid station must be prepared to conceal and transport casualties from the scene of action, and to continue treatment at some covert location until the situation permits evacuation to a more distant point.

(3) In guerilla warfare there is no army rear area in which casualties may be promptly evacuated. It is important, therefore, that surgical aid be given on the spot, probably at the aid station.

(4) Casualty-producing actions may be part of a covert operation, and casualties may have to be hidden and cared for close to the scene of the operation.
c. Small forces operating separately may temporarily augment their medical force with surgical or medical teams procured locally. These are not stationed necessarily at the scene of action, but may be stationed at some relatively secure spot to which casualties may be removed.

d. Each two to four aid stations have a central casualty collecting station. Such a station may sometimes be required to support a single aid station. A collecting station is similar to the standard regimental collecting station. It is provided with personnel to move casualties from aid stations and other concealed points to guerilla controlled territory and to provide adequate care enroute. It may be augmented by temporary medical or surgical teams. At least one officer at the collecting station should be familiar with the condition, transportability, and location of casualties and should know the plans and structure of the guerilla unit. He will be the counterpart of a regimental surgeon, but because of his command and tactical responsibilities, he need not be a professional physician or surgeon.

e. Up to this point the receiving, care, sorting, and evacuation of casualties is a unit responsibility much the same as it is in a standard infantry regiment. If secure guerilla hospital units exist, hospitalized patients should be moved from aid and collecting stations as soon as possible so the stations will be clear to receive new casualties. It is necessary, however, that this evacuation be made by personnel under the control of the guerilla area staff, with adequate coordination and secrecy. Evacuation must be secure and rigidly controlled.
f. A typical guerilla medical organization is illustrated in figure 11.
142. HOSPITALS

a. It is not expected that hospitals will be elaborate equipped or manned entirely by highly skilled personnel. Items like X-ray apparatus, pressure sterilizes, and refrigerators for blood banks are immobile and difficult to obtain. Therefore, hospitals should have a small nucleus of highly trained personnel and a large overhead of ordinary personnel for handling the average convalescent patient. Equipment will consist chiefly of dressing material, essential drugs, and those housekeeping items necessary to keep a patient comfortable until he can be transferred to a convalescent camp.

b. Whenever possible, casualties suffering from severe wounds and injuries, such as shot and shell fragment wounds, are treated covertly at civilian institutions possessing equipment and staffs until such time as the casualties may be moved to a guerilla hospital. Severe wounds of this type are not common in guerilla actions, most wounds being received from small arms.

c. Following is a description of the hospital organization of a guerilla command:

(1) Each hospital consists primarily of a small professional nucleus and a large group of semiprofessional personnel. The senior professional member of the hospital commands it. His principal staff officer or executive keeps in close coordination with the plans of the area command, including the plans of the chief surgeon. Because of his command administrative responsibilities he need
not be a professional physician or surgeon.

(2) In general, the hospital structure of the guerilla command will more closely resemble the organization of a holding company of the regular forces than it will resemble a regular hospital. It will be augmented by whatever personnel are available. In guerilla warfare, much of the emergency surgery, ordinarily performed at regular hospitals, is done in the field at aid stations and collecting stations.

(3) As there is no possibility of evacuation of the average medical case to a rear area, a local hospital provides care for all routine diseases, including epidemic diseases. An adequate medical laboratory is small and compact and easily moved. It requires few personnel but an adequate medical supply is essential. Medical patients suffering from ordinary diseases are usually easily transported in case a hospital must be moved.

d. Small mobile hospitals may be organized by the area command and located in district commands on an attached basis. These hospitals are located in secure areas. Two or more alternate sites are prepared for each hospital. If the principal site becomes compromised or is threatened by the enemy, the hospital is moved to an alternate prepared site. The beds are so constructed that they serve as stretchers on which the patients are evacuated when a move is ordered.
e. When it becomes both practicable and desirable to centralize hospital facilities, a number of small mobile hospitals may be combined and reorganized to form a large area hospital. This centralization presupposes good security and contemplates bringing the casualty care completely under the control of the guerilla force. Centralized hospitals will need logistical support from regular forces.

f. A typical guerilla hospital unit is illustrated in figure 12, but it is impossible to set a standard because available resources, security, and bed requirements all affect the organization. It will be noted that the surgical requirements are reduced to the minimum. This permits maximum utilization of surgical personnel in outside installations on an emergency basis.

143. CONVALESCENT CAMPS

Convalescent patient may be released from hospital control and be temporarily established in convalescent camps. These camps may vary in size and facilities according to the demand, supplies, and security. A four-man camp may be established under the supervision of a convalescent company aid man in the field near a source of water. A larger camp may be dispersed in a village. Convalescent camps come under the command of the hospital command structure in the area. They are useful for increasing the capacity of local hospital facilities, but require considerable administrative and logistical control. This is best done by the hospital last having jurisdiction over the patient. Convalescent camps are attached for
Figure 12. Functional chart of typical guerilla hospital.

rations and security to the unit in whose area they are located.

Section V. OTHER SERVICES

144. GENERAL

The missions assigned to a guerilla area command and the internal functions of the guerilla forces
require various technical and administrative services. Such services are activated as soon as the need for them can be foreseen. Both guerilla and civilian personnel are carefully screened throughout the area command to locate and assign individuals who have the skill to perform the functions of the service. Initially a service is kept small and is expanded progressively to meet operational or administrative requirements.

145. TYPE UNITS

Units activated may include engineer, quartermaster transportation, ordnance, and finance.
CHAPTER 20
ADMINISTRATION

Section 1. GENERAL

146. RESPONSIBILITY
The guerilla area commander is responsible for the administration of his command. Assisted by the area command headquarters staff, he plans and directs administrative policies and procedures. Area command headquarters retains supervisory control, but the administrative operations are decentralized so far as practicable to district commands and their smaller units. Certain administrative functions are centralized in the final stages of operations or immediately following the cessation of hostilities.

147. ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
Generally, the administrative requirement progressively increases as a guerilla force expands and its operations are extended. Requirements must be anticipated in advance and may be expected to include—
   a. Personnel.
   b. Replacements.
   c. Discipline, law, and order.
   d. Prisoners of war.
   e. Morale.
   f. Civil affairs.
   g. Civilian employees.
Section II. PERSONNEL

148. STATUS

a. A theater commander may issue directives establishing the status of guerillas as soldiers of a constituted military organization, responsible to the area commander and appointed lower commanders, who, in turn, are responsible to the theater commander and answerable to an established government (par. 69). This information is normally classified during the early phases of organization and operations. At an appropriate time, the status of the guerilla forces is openly publicized to the enemy.

b. In the absence of any established or announced policy from higher authority, the guerilla area commander clearly establishes the status of guerilla personnel under his command.

149. FORMAL INDUCTION

Every guerilla soldier is inducted into the service under oath. Before the oath is administered to an individual, its meaning and implications are clearly explained. He is required to take the oath verbally with appropriate ceremony, before an appointed officer. A copy of the formal induction, including the oath, is signed by the individual and an authorized witness. He is instructed to hide it in a secure place for use in establishing his status at the close of hostilities. A suggested oath and induction form follows:

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, (name), having been inducted into and having become a member of (name of unit) do solemnly
swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to (name of government or nation); that, regardless of the cost to myself, my family, or my friends, I will wage war against the enemy until victory is ours; that I will faithfully carry out the orders of the Theater Commander, the Area Commander, the District commander, and other superior officers placed over me; that I will not surrender to the enemy or allow myself to be captured through my own negligence; that, if captured, I will Five to the enemy no information regarding my unit, my comrades, or our civilian supporters; that I will not intentionally inflict damage or harm on the loyal civilian population; and that I will at all times behave in a manner befitting a patriot fighting for his country. I understand that if I break this, my solemn oath, I am subject to death or such other punishment as superior authority may direct. So help me God.

STATEMENT OF INDUCTION
I hereby certify that (name) whose signature appear below was inducted into (name of guerilla force) in the grade of (rank) on (date) and was assigned to the sub-unit known by the code designation, (code number). He is entitled at the close of hostilities to such remuneration as higher authority may establish for service in the guerilla forces.

(Signature of inductee) 
(Signed) 
(Rank) 
(Witness) 
(Rank)
150. STRENGTHS AND GRADES

The strengths and the allocation of grades of all activated units are published by the area command headquarters. Authorized strengths and grades during the progressive phases of organization and build-up are amended to conform to the policies announced by the area commander.

151. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The principles of personnel management are applicable to guerilla forces (FM 101-1). As time and training facilities are normally limited in guerilla warfare, all echelons of command must be aware of the importance of placing the right man on the right job through proper man and job analysis, efficient classification, and careful assignment. An unselfish spirit of cooperation must exist throughout all echelons to release personnel who are better qualified to perform jobs in newly activated arms or services. Because of shortages of qualified personnel, it will often be necessary for one individual to fill two or more positions.

152. PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS

a. The basic reasons and the criteria for promotion within regular forces apply to guerilla forces. The administrative policies covering promotions are published by the area commander headquarters. Normally all promotions below commissioned officers are administered by lower commands. Officer commissions and promotions are acted upon by the area commander in compliance with directives from the theater special
forces commander. In the absence of covering directives, the area commander acts on all officer commissions and promotions, qualifying his action as being subject to approval by higher headquarters at a subsequent date. The confirmation of all promotions by the proper authority is sought at an appropriate time.

b. Individuals, who prove themselves not qualified to fill positions of responsibility and leadership, are demoted promptly. Fear that the demoted individual may, for revenge, betray his unit to the enemy cannot be allowed to influence policy in this regard. When it is believed that this individual is likely to betray his unit, he is placed under guard.

c. Promotions and demotions are evidenced by orders or certificates, a copy of which is given the soldier with instructions to hide it in a safe place for use in establishing his status at the close of hostilities.

153. RECORDS AND REPORTS

a. Records and reports are kept to a minimum to reduce the administrative burden on all echelons. Generally, lower units maintain essential records such as induction papers, rosters, casualty reports, or any like report that must bear the name of an individual. The transmission of these records involves security risks. The centralization of these records would endanger the entire command if captured by the enemy. On the other hand, essential records covering the service of individuals should not be slighted for security reasons. Pay and benefits to the individual or his
dependents may eventually be based on such records.

b. Any record or report that is communicated from one echelon to another, either by radio or messenger, should be encoded. Security measures are enforced by all echelons to safeguard records and reports. Records not required for immediate use are not kept in a headquarters but are hidden in a safe place. In case of attack by enemy forces, records which might incriminate guerillas or civilian supporters are hidden or destroyed. The danger of personnel records falling into the hands of the enemy cannot be over-emphasized. Even if the enemy is unable to capture guerillas, captured records form the basis for taking reprisals by imprisoning or killing the dependents or relatives of known guerillas, confiscating their property, and even destroying entire communities. Such reprisals tend to drive a wedge between the guerillas and the supporting civilian populations.

**Section III. DISCIPLINE**

**154. GENERAL**

During the early stages of a resistance movement, most guerillas are men who have little or nothing to lose, men without families or property, and men commonly referred to as the "have-nots." Although there are individual exceptions, as a general rule, well established men and property holders, the "haves," tend to defer active participation with guerilla forces until the chance of conclusive action outweighs the risk of enemy reprisal. To mold dependable and efficient units composed of such diversified elements
requires skilled leadership and stern discipline. Undisciplined troops, whether fighting in large bodies or small isolated groups, disintegrate when faced by stiff opposition or by continuous hardships. Without discipline, security suffers; and the price will invariably be paid in lives and equipment.

155. DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

a. The general polices covering disciplinary measures are published by the area commander to insure uniformity throughout the command. The execution of these policies is decentralized to lower commands.

b. The conditions under which guerillas operate usually govern the procedures followed in passing judgment and sentencing individuals for breach of discipline. A system of investigation and trials may be followed. Under adverse conditions, less formal procedures are used. Disciplinary measures and punishment imposed by guerilla forces are, in general, harsh compared with the normal practice of regular forces. Serious infractions of orders or neglect of duty are often punishable by death.

c. Because of the wide dispersion that is characteristic of guerilla operations, the temptation and opportunity for guerillas to commit banditry or other unlawful acts will be great. This must be countered by stern disciplinary measures; otherwise such acts will soon antagonize the civilian population. Banditry, rape, or other offenses against civilians are ruthlessly punished, both by action against the individuals immediately concerned and by appropriate action against the immediate commander. However, care must be
taken to make sure that hasty action is not taken as a result of prejudiced reports of legitimate activities, such as commandeering supplies or punishing civilians for aiding the enemy.
156. GENERAL

Psychological warfare within enemy territory foments opposition to the enemy, helps destroy the morale of his armed forces, and helps maintain a high spirit in the guerilla forces and among the supporting population. The area command operations officer coordinates all psychological warfare plans and operations within the area command. These plans form the basis for requests by the area commander to the theater special forces commander for means and material and the basis for orders to lower commands. Plans prepared by district commands are submitted to the area commander for coordination and approval. Psychological warfare operations are normally decentralized.

157. PLANS AND OPERATIONS

a. Psychological warfare plans are founded on a study of the psychology of the enemy, the political situation, the national economy, the effects of military reverses, and the attitude of the population. Prepared material is disseminated by—
(1) Radio.
(2) News sheets and leaflets.
(3) Word of mouth.
(4) Release of papers and magazines from external sources.

b. The material used in psychological warfare seeks to popularize the war aims and the ideals of the resistance movement. Psychological warfare material should be continuous, novel, and interesting. It points out the enemy's weakness and deals with the conduct of the inhabitants in relation to the enemy. The material must be adapted to the people for whom it is intended. All information should be accurate. The publication of unreliable news can, at its best, produce only short-lived favorable results; once confidence is lost, it is difficult to win it back. Guerillas gain prestige if, acting on information from theater special forces, they are able to warn the loyal populace of scheduled air strikes.
CHAPTER 22
SECURITY MEASURES

158. GENERAL

The security measures used by regular forces are in general applicable to guerilla forces. There are, however, special security measures that are applicable to guerilla forces alone. The conduct of guerilla warfare within and behind the enemy lines demands constant alertness and vigilance. Sound security must be based on useful information of the enemy and an efficient counterintelligence system. The security measures must not only prevent losses by enemy action but must be designed to limit the interruption of operations and insure freedom of action to the guerilla commander.

159. RESPONSIBILITY

The guerilla area commander is responsible for all security measures for protecting his command. He coordinates these measures with his district commanders. Commanders at all levels provide additional security for their own local protection and coordinate these measures with adjacent units.

160. FACTORS AFFECTING SECURITY

a. Security measures prescribed by the guerilla
area commander are affected by the following factors:

1. Mission of the command.
2. Local situation of individual units.
3. Topography.
4. The enemy situation.
5. The capabilities and limitation of the guerilla forces.
6. Considerations affecting the civilian population.
7. Operations of allied regular forces.

b. During the early organization and build-up phase of a guerilla force, the missions of a guerilla command may in broad terms include completion of organization, organization of an extensive intelligence and counterintelligence system, and development of a communications system.

c. Security measures for these missions must be founded on secrecy, dispersion, and evasion. Overt acts and clashes with the enemy during the early phases may result in enemy reprisals against supporting civilians. Assuming the enemy has the capabilities, any overt guerilla action may bring large-scale enemy counter-guerilla operations.

d. The local situation of a guerilla command may govern the security measures and the counteraction to be taken against enemy forces. Security measures may vary among lower commands. In a sector in which the civilian population is loyal and cooperative, a "laylow" policy may be enforced, if the mission permits, to avoid enemy reprisal against the civilians.

e. The capabilities and limitations of guerilla forces as compared with those of the enemy may
affect the security measures adopted. During the early build-up phase, overt action may compromise external logistical support and jeopardize the strengthening of the guerilla forces as well as the supporting resistance movement. Generally, as the strength of the guerilla forces increases and their capabilities develop and more nearly equal those of the enemy, security measures will include more and more active resistance and counterattacks against the enemy.

f. The operations of allied regular forces that produce enemy reaction within the area of operations of a guerilla force may influence directly all of the factors affecting the security measures adopted by the guerilla forces. When the enemy's attention is focused on the actions of regular forces allied with the guerillas, the guerillas' security measures conform more and more to those used by regular forces in normal warfare.

161. DISPERSION

a. When guerilla forces must conform to a "laylow" policy, large concentrations of troops in camps and bivouacs are avoided. Even though logistical conditions may permit large troop concentrations, commands should be broken up in platoon camps and widely dispersed. Dispersion facilitates concealment, mobility, and secrecy. Large forces may be concentrated to perform specific operations. On completing the operation, the force should be dispersed quickly into small basic units.

b. Knowledge of the location of each unit is restricted to the members of the unit and to the
specific personnel authorized to deal with the unit. Only those members of a platoon who need to know the location of their company headquarters or the location of the other platoons should have such knowledge. The application of this principle throughout the structure of a guerilla organization limits the amount of information that may be extracted by the enemy from captured guerillas.

c. The principle of dispersion is applied to command, service, and technical installations. Large guerilla area command headquarters, for example, are divided into several echelons and dispersed.

d. In the event of a well-conducted, large-scale enemy operation against the guerilla forces, it may be necessary to break the units into small groups and disperse until the enemy action is over or to infiltrate into another area. This action should be taken only as a last resort as it means that the force will become inoperative for a considerable period and morale of the unit will be affected adversely. Re-assembly points are designated before the groups disperse. To be sure that the assembly points are not compromised, the units are warned to be cautious in approaching these points.

162. MOBILITY

All guerilla installations and forces must have a high degree of cross-country mobility. Equipment that must be moved should be capable of disassembly into one-man loads. Alert and evacuation plans for installations and units must provide for the caching of nonessential supplies and equipment that would reduce mobility.
Although pack animals may be used under certain conditions, alternate plans should include moving without animals.

163. DISPOSITIONS

Troops and installations within a guerilla-controlled area are disposed so as to strengthen the security of the command as a whole. Special consideration is given to the location of command and communication installations and the relative location of lower units. Figure 13 illustrates schematically the disposition of guerilla installations and forces within a guerilla-controlled area. An enemy force penetrating the guerilla-controlled area in the direction of the area command headquarters must first pass through the sectors of several lower units.

Figure 13. Guerilla security system.
164. SECURITY OF MOVEMENT

a. Accurate intelligence regarding enemy dispositions and activities is essential to all movements of individuals and groups. Guerillas can evade the enemy or engage him on advantageous terms only by knowing accurately his location and strength. The loyal civilian population and guerilla sub-units are sources of information regarding enemy dispositions and movements in areas through which the guerillas must move.

b. Movement is normally made along the courier routes. When important supplies or a large number of guerillas are moved, advance warning is sent to stations along the route. The alerted stations then become particularly watchful for enemy movements and have civilian porters available to carry supplies to the next courier station. Food, shelter, and local security are provided by loyal civilians and subunits along the route.

c. Formations for movements are similar to those used by regular forces. Within guerilla-controlled areas, movement is rapid and little attention is given to concealment except from aerial observation. On approaching enemy-controlled areas, greater care is exercised. Information is obtained constantly from local civilians. Inhabited areas are reconnoitered by advance parties. Civilians may be used as security elements for columns. Areas frequently patrolled or observed by the enemy or in which he has superior mobility are traversed at night.

d. Movement may also be concealed by using civilian clothing. Loads should be well
camouflaged, arms well hidden, and modes of transportation inconspicuous. Skylines and open areas are avoided.

165. SECURITY OF INSTALLATIONS

a. Guerilla headquarters, supply depots, hospitals, camps, and other semi-permanent installations are located in difficult areas or areas not controlled by the enemy. Normally they should be located away from roads, main trails, and civilian communities. The surrounding terrain should obstruct rapid motorized or mechanized approach into the area. The site of the installation should provide concealment and concealed routes of approach. Knowledge of the nature and location of any installation is limited to personnel who actually man or have direct dealings with that installation.

b. Each installation prepares two or more alternate sites so that any installation threatened by enemy action can be moved quickly and made operational in a safer area. To facilitate these moves, installations are organized into two or more echelons, each provided with a combat security force. Detailed plans are made to meet possible contingencies.

c. Installations are surrounded by guard and warning systems. Large installations, such as a guerilla area command headquarters or a communication center are secured by a guard and warning system in depth. Prepared covering positions are organized to delay or destroy enemy forces when this action becomes necessary or desirable.
d. Figure 14 shows the security organization of a typical guerilla installation. The principal location of a guerilla area command headquarters kind prepared alternate locations are shown. The headquarters is surrounded by security zones A, B, and C. It is desirable that the minimum time and distance from the headquarters to the outer limits of zone A be 18 hours. This minimum time distance prevents an enemy force from moving through the security zone to the headquarters entirely at night. When an enemy force enters zone A, organized observers and informers among the civilian population start submitting periodic reports through prescribed channels to the guerilla headquarters. Information submitted by agents' covers:

(1) Time and place leading elements of the
enemy force were observed.
(2) Size of the enemy force.
(3) Enemy arms and equipment.
(4) Enemy activities, such as questioning civilians, commandeering guides, and the like.
(5) Information possessed by enemy; presence of informers, captured guerillas, and civilian hostages.
(6) Probable objective and future route of enemy.

e. When the enemy force enters zone b, organized observers begin to submit periodic reports at more frequent intervals, covering in general the same information as submitted from zone A. The commander of the headquarters analyzes the information and decides whether to evacuate the headquarters to an alternate location. Normally these movements are made at night to avoid aerial observation and detection by enemy ground agents. According to prearranged plans, the first echelon moves out to the alternate location. Normally this echelon will move all heavy equipment and important documents and records; supplies that cannot be moved are hidden. The rear echelon of the headquarters prepares to move but remains operational. If the enemy force enters zone c, warning is given by the guard posts to the remaining echelon and it, too, moves to the alternate location. If necessary, the guard posts engage the enemy by fire to give the headquarters time to get away. The guard posts then withdraw and act as a rear guard for the main body. However, the rear guard must conduct its withdrawal so that it does not reveal to the enemy
the direction of movement of the main body. On the other hand, if the enemy force does not enter zone c, the rear echelon remains in position and is later rejoined by the forward echelon. When the enemy force is small compared to the guerrillas' strength and conditions are favorable to overt action, the rear echelon commander may order security forces to intercept the enemy force at prepared positions within zone C. In this case, every effort is made to annihilate the enemy force. Units in zones A and B are alerted to intercept enemy stragglers escaping from zone C.

f. An enemy force that presents a possible threat to a guerilla installation is kept under observation from the moment it enters an area until it leaves the area.

g. While the system described above may be considered typical, there may be exceptions in which units exist in the midst of enemy-controlled areas, relying upon the loyalty of the civilian population for security. During World War II, a Philippine guerilla unit had its camp in a jungle-covered ravine less than a quarter of a mile from a Japanese garrison. The enemy patrolled the outlying area but never considered it necessary to search for guerillas in his own neighborhood.

166. REACTION TO ENEMY OPERATIONS

Inexperienced guerilla commanders and troops are often inclined to move too soon and too frequently to escape enemy troops conducting anti-guerilla operations. Unnecessary movement during the panic caused by the presence of the enemy may expose guerillas to greater risks than if they remain calm and concealed in a camp or other
installation. Often the enemy may be sending out routine patrols or may be, trying to flush guerilla forces. His operations may be based on meager and general information. Unnecessary moves disrupt routine work, security and supply arrangements, and expose the guerillas to possible agents and informers that may be collaborating with the enemy. Enemy forces operating in strange areas must often depend on guides. Unless it is probable that the guides can find the location of the guerilla installation, the force should not move until an actual threat develops. Then, the move must be orderly and according to prearranged plans. When possible, these moves are made at night or over concealed routes.
CHAPTER 23
SABOTAGE

167. GENERAL

a. Sabotage may be used to undermine or destroy the enemy's occupation policy, administration, economy, morale, communication, industry, and armed forces. Sabotage may be carried (in from the enemy's zone of interior through the combat zone.

b. Under a well-organized plan, large-scale sabotage becomes one of the most effective weapons of guerilla warfare. It may be undertaken with resources available to guerilla forces and does not require elaborate logistical support from external sources. It is capable of producing material and moral disintegration in a short time.

c. Individuals and organized teams engage in sabotage. In some instances sabotage is carried on through the collective efforts of organized civilian groups such as labor or trade unions.

d. To counter sabotage activities, the enemy is forced to take elaborate security precautions and to dissipate his forces to protect widely spread installations subject to sabotage.

e. Sabotage may be divided into two classes according to purpose:

(1) Strategic. This type of sabotage aims at the destruction of facilities and materiel
essential to the enemy's war effort. It is usually covered in directives received from theater special forces command. These directives will also list installations that are needed for future use and which must not be sabotaged.

(2) Harassing. This type of sabotage seeks to lower the enemy's morale and to force him to divert forces from his main effort to provide security and to combat the guerillas.

(3) Intelligence, counterintelligence, and psycho-logical warfare are closely related to, and are an important part of sabotage operations.

168. COVERT SABOTAGE

a. Covert sabotage may be described as non-collaboration. A guerilla command in close coordination with a resistance movement may quietly undermine the enemy's morale and at the same time inflict severe material losses. This activity is conducted so that the enemy cannot find the origin of the trouble.

b. Examples of covert sabotage include:

(1) A public policy backed by the guerillas, of non-fraternization with enemy personnel and their collaborators. The inhabitants avoid public places such as theaters and cafes that are frequented by enemy personnel. They quietly leave places whenever enemy personnel enter. They deliberately go out of their way to avoid all contact with the enemy. In occupied countries enemy troops are
made to feel an isolated form of resistance that undermines morale.

(2) The guerillas may sabotage the administration. Agents and sympathizers in public offices fail to carry out enemy orders through apparent lack of understanding. They may delay action on various policies ordered by the enemy and secretly warn the public in advance of the enemy's contemplated actions. Equipment and materials of value to the enemy's war effort may be hidden or destroyed.

(3) Industry provides a broad field for passive sabotage. Slowdowns may be organized to cause production to fall off. Machines and installations fail because of improper maintenance. Spare parts for important machines are destroyed or hidden, causing delays. Technicians become sick or disappear underground. Finished products are misdirected through faulty routing.

(4) Lines of communication and transportation may be sabotaged in much the same way as industry. Equipment is allowed to break down. Short circuits are caused to burn out generators, transformers, and the like. Errors in routing may cause great delays in railway traffic. Neglected signals or switches cause wrecks.

(5) The economy of a country may be undermined by circulating large quantities of counterfeit regular or
Agricultural areas may be prevented from shipping food to urban areas controlled by the enemy by influencing the civilian leaders and picketing the roads and trails.

169. OVERT SABOTAGE

a. Overt sabotage may be directed against objectives that cannot be effectively undermined or destroyed by passive sabotage. It may be used to attack the enemy's war potential quickly. Unlike covert sabotage, the action is normally violent and the results leave no doubt in the minds of the enemy as to the objective or the cause. To be effective, large-scale sabotage operations must be based on a well-developed plan that is coordinated with the operations of allied regular forces. Premature outbreaks of overt sabotage result in strong enemy reaction that may jeopardize the strength of a guerrilla command and reduce its effectiveness.

b. Typical examples of overt sabotage follow:

(1) The enemy's lines of communication are one of the most worthwhile objectives for sabotage. When attacked properly, the effects are soon felt from the rear most echelon to the forward combat units. Railway traffic is disrupted by cutting or removing rails and blowing out bridges and tunnels. Rolling stock is destroyed. Traffic over roads and highways is disrupted by blowing out bridges and roadbeds and by causing landslides that block the roads. Where detour is
difficult, large trees felled across a road at close intervals make an effective block. Traffic signal systems are destroyed or made inoperative. Waterborne traffic may be attacked by sabotaging docks, heavy cranes, and other loading facilities. Locks and reservoirs may be destroyed. Ships may be put out of commission by mixing sand with the lubricants or by fire or explosives. In hot weather, fires can be started by pouring oil on the coals stored in the hold.

(2) Wire communications are vulnerable to sabotage. Signal communication centers may be destroyed with demolitions. Wire lines are cut and removed. Wire poles are destroyed.

(3) Essential war industries may be sabotaged directly at the installation itself or at subsidiary facilities such as sources of raw materials, spare parts, or power. If the guerrillas cannot destroy these installations and sources of supply, they may block the flow of food into vital areas, thus forcing the evacuation of labor from the area.

(4) Industries and military installations may often be sabotaged effectively by assassinating or abducting highly trained technical personnel who are essential to the operation of the installation.

c. Other methods of sabotage are described in FM 5-25 and TM 19-225. Destruction of military equipment is described in the manuals for each
170. ORGANIZATION OF SABOTAGE TEAMS

All guerillas are trained in sabotage techniques, including the use of explosives for elementary demolitions and booby traps. Within each company-sized unit, special sabotage teams are organized with individuals having previous experience with explosives. Members of these teams are trained in demolition techniques for destroying bridges, power stations, and the like. They are trained by instructors with previous mining or engineering experience or by demolition techniques infiltrated from the theater special forces.
CHAPTER 24
AMBUSHES

171. GENERAL

a. The ambush is a method of attack used against rail, motor, troop, and supply movements, and closed foot columns. The objective of an ambush may be—
(1) To destroy or capture personnel and supplies.
(2) To harass and demoralize the enemy.
(3) To delay or block movement of personnel and supplies.
b. The ambush is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning; it is developed under the strictest security precautions, and it is executed with surprise, shrewdness, and violent determination.
c. Night ambushes allow a wide choice of positions and offer a good opportunity to surprise and confuse the enemy. However, control while moving to and from the position and during the action is more difficult than in daylight. Therefore, an ambush requiring sustained action will seldom be possible at night. Night ambushes are suitable only when the mission can be accomplished during or immediately following the first burst of fire. The use of the maximum number of automatic weapons at close range is
therefore indicated. Daylight ambushes, on the other hand, while giving a more restricted choice of positions, facilitate control and permit offensive action for a longer time. Night ambushes may be effective in hindering enemy use of the roads at night while friendly aircraft attack the roads by day. They may also be used by units that have not yet gained enough confidence to face the enemy in daylight.

172. INTELLIGENCE

a. To insure success, plans for an ambush should be based on accurate intelligence covering:
   (1) Enemy strength and dispositions; arms and equipment; communication systems; and habits.
   (2) Habitual or probable movements by the enemy on routes suitable for ambush.
   (3) Terrain, to include suitable ambush sites, and the best routes for approach and withdrawal.

b. Intelligence must be backed up by an efficient warning system which will give timely warning of the approach of worthwhile ambush targets as well as of enemy reinforcements.

173. THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS

a. The decision having been made to conduct ambush operations, covering directives are issued. Normally, the directives are of a general nature and allow the ambushing units great latitude. The directives will include all available information of the enemy and the ambush mission. Simultaneous operations being conducted by adjacent units are
coordinated by the next higher commander.

b. The commander of the ambush unit reconnoiters the area. He conducts the reconnaissance so as not to disclose the contemplated operation to the enemy. When a small unit is to execute the operation, the platoon and squad leaders go on the reconnaissance. The plans are completed at the end of the reconnaissance.

c. In preparing the ambush plan, consideration is given to—

   (1) The mission.
   (2) The size, strength, and composition of the probable enemy formation that is to be ambushed.
   (3) The terrain along the route that is favorable for an ambush, to include unobserved approach routes and routes of withdrawal.
   (4) The enemy reinforcement capability against the ambushing forces.

174. MOVEMENT

Concealed assembly areas are designated near the ambush site. The units taking part in the operation are moved to the assembly areas, usually at night. Daylight movements may be made through guerilla-controlled areas that offer no security risk from either the local civilians or from the enemy ground or air observation. The troops are rested in the assembly areas and are given the over-all plan for the ambush. Detailed orders are issued by lower commanders. At the designated hour, details are moved into position to carry out their assigned tasks.
175. SECURITY

a. The disposition and size of the security force needed to cover an ambush are governed by the terrain, the capabilities of the enemy, the likely routes that he may use, the mission, the nature of the operation, and the size of the force carrying out the ambush. As a general rule, the longer the main ambushing force is required to remain in position after opening the attack, the stronger the security forces will have to be. For planning purposes, one-third to one-half of the overall force is used on security details. In an ambush that is simply a harassing mission, the main force normally withdraws after a short but violent action. In this case, the security details might be a third of the forces involved, or less. However, if the mission is to destroy an enemy column completely and salvage its equipment, the security force will run as high as one half of the total force. Often it may be necessary to organize a secondary ambush to intercept enemy reinforcements dispatched to the scene of the main ambush. Security forces may also have to cover the evacuation of salvaged equipment from the main ambush position.

b. Security elements are placed on the road or trail in both directions from the main ambush position. They give advance warning to the main force of the approach of enemy formations. They allow enemy formations to pass into the ambush and then they block the route with all means available to them, holding their positions until ordered to withdraw. When the ambush takes place on a road, one element is designated to block the road to vehicles by fire, mines, blowing bridges, 

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destroying the road bed, felling trees, and the like. Columns suited for ambush will usually include an advance guard. The forward security elements must be placed far enough to the front to engage the entire advance guard and prevent it from falling back on the main body.

c. Additional security elements are used to cover the main ambush force. Their disposition and proximity to the main ambush force depends on their mission and the terrain. They insure the security of the main ambush force, and designated units of the security elements cover the main force's withdrawal.

d. The entire area may be screened further by stationing observation details at critical points. Each post is manned by two observers who are in communication with the main ambush force. Their mission is to warn of the approach of the enemy. They engage the enemy for self-defense only.

e. For a typical organization of an ambush, see figure 15.

176. ORGANIZATION OF FORCE

a. The ambush commander may commit his entire force (less security elements) to an ambush position or he may hold out a reserve.

b. The forces are disposed according to the terrain at the site of the ambush. When the terrain permits, troops are deployed on both sides of the road. Troops are placed to eliminate all dead spaces that might offer cover to the enemy. Automatic weapons are located and sighted to cover the target area in depth.
Figure 15. Typical guerilla ambush position.
c. If the mission calls for the complete destruction of the enemy formation, the reserve may be used as a shock unit to attack on orders of the ambush commander and destroy the enemy. Other reserve missions may be—

(1) To attack or counterattack enemy formations that threaten the security of the main force.
(2) To counterattack enemy elements that succeed in breaking through the positions of the main forces.
(3) To pursue enemy elements that succeed in withdrawing from the ambush.
(4) To cover the withdrawal of the main force.
(5) To escort prisoners and salvage supplies and equipment.

177. CONDUCT OF ACTION

On receiving information that an enemy column is approaching, the ambush commander decides whether to ambush it or allow it to pass. He may decide not to ambush because the target is not worth while or because it is too well guarded. When he decides to ambush the column, the commander alerts his men. Security elements are allowed to pass on through the position. When the head of the main column reaches a predetermined point, it is halted by fire, demolitions, or other obstacles. This is the signal for all men in the ambush force to open fire. Men fire on the nearest enemy groups or vehicles. Fire is rapid and is directed where enemy personnel are massed, on exits from vehicles, and on enemy
automatic weapons. If practicable, hand grenades are used. Machine guns lay bands of fixed fire across escape routes. If the commander decided to rush the column, he, gives a prearranged signal, and selected groups of men rush forward and attack while other men direct their fire against enemy troops who have succeeded in escaping from the ambush area and who are returning fire. When the commander decides that the purpose of the ambush has been accomplished, or if the arrival of enemy reinforcements makes it necessary to call off the action, he signals, and the ambush force withdraws, covered by its security elements.

178. COLUMNS PROTECTED BY ARMOR

Action against columns protected by armored vehicles will depend upon the type and place of armored vehicles in a column and the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or disabled by rocket launcher fire, land mines, Molotov cocktails, or by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. If these methods are not feasible, an effort is made to immobilize the armor at a point where it will be unable to give protection to the rest of the convoy.

179. AMBUSH OF RAILROAD TRAINS

Moving trains may be subjected to harassing fire, but the most effective ambush involves wrecking the train. The locomotive is derailed on a downgrade at a sharp curve or on a high bridge. This causes most of the cars to overturn and results in extensive casualties among the
passengers. Fire is directed on the exits of overturned coaches and designated groups armed with automatic weapons rush forward and attack the still standing coaches. Other groups take needed supplies from freight cars and then set enemy fire to the train. Rails are removed from the track at some distance from the ambush site in each direction to prevent the arrival of reinforcements by, another train. In planning a train ambush, it must be remembered that the enemy will probably include armored cars within the train for protection and that important trains will be preceded by advance guard locomotives or inspection cars to check the track.
180. GENERAL

A raid involves a movement into enemy-controlled territory; an attack, characterized by surprise and shock action; and a withdrawal after a comparatively brief period. Raids may have one or more of the following purposes:

a. To inflict damage and casualties on the enemy.
b. To destroy a vital installation.
c. To capture prisoners or supplies.
d. To divert attention from another operation.

181. RECONNAISSANCE

Raids are preceded by extensive intelligence activity in and reconnaissance of the area and installation to be raided. The utmost secrecy is observed in this activity to prevent the enemy from being forewarned of guerilla intentions. Detailed information is obtained regarding:

a. Approach and withdrawal routes.
b. Loyalty of the civilian population in the area.
c. Physical layout of installation.
d. Security and guard system of target installation, including the communication system.
e. Defense system of the installation including location of pillboxes and other key defense points.
f. Attitude, training, and morale of defenders.
g. Location of enemy forces capable of
immediate intervention.
h. Location of other enemy forces capable of later intervention.

182. PLANNING AND REHEARSAL

a. A detailed plan is drawn up for the raid and given to the participating units. Though detailed, the plan must be simple and must not depend on too many contingencies for its success. Provision is made against the miscarriage of parts of the plan, and duplicate or alternate arrangements are made for the execution of key operations. Guerilla activities in the area may be suspended to give the installation a false sense of security.
b. Time and space factors are considered carefully when planning the operation, and enough time is allowed for assembly and movement, particularly movement during darkness. The requirements of the situation determine whether movement and attack should be made during daylight or darkness. Darkness favors surprise and is to be favored when the operation is simple and the layout of the installation is well known. Early dawn or daylight is favored when imperfect knowledge of the installation or other factors necessitates close control of the operation. A withdrawal late in the day or a night makes close pursuit by the enemy more difficult.
c. All participating units are rehearsed in their roles. The necessity for boldness and speed in executing the plan is stressed. Intelligence on the installation to be raided is kept up-to-date, and plans are revised as necessary to conform to the latest situation.
183. ORGANIZATION OF RAIDING FORCE

Normally, the raiding force includes these elements:

a. The initial surprise element surprises and overpowers the enemy security elements barring access to the installation. When possible, the attack is made silently, and enemy security units are eliminated without giving an alarm.

b. The action element carries out the objective of the raid. Its organization and composition will vary with the objective. When the objective is to capture supplies, it may include a number of civilian porters. This element moves quickly and boldly and accomplishes its mission without unnecessary loss of time.

c. The holding element has firepower enough to contain or destroy nearby enemy forces capable of interfering with the mission. When the objective is an enemy garrison, the action and holding elements are the same.

d. The special task elements seize or destroy communication installations, pillboxes or other guard posts, and other key facilities in the enemy's defenses. They may be used either inside or outside the objective installation.

e. The outpost and flank protection elements give warning and prevent the arrival of outside enemy reinforcements. They execute demolitions or establish ambushes along routes leading to the installation.

f. The reserve element acts as advance guard during the approach. It maintains the threshold line (A of fig. 16) during the raid, and it acts as a rear guard during the withdrawal. It also posts flank guards to protect advance and withdrawal
routes, and is available to the commander as a reinforcement for other elements.

g. The command element directs the advance, the raid, and the withdrawal. It deals with unforeseen factors during the raid and gives the order for withdrawal when the mission is completed or when it is apparent that the raid has failed. This element is divided into two echelons: the forward echelon commands the elements directly participating in the action; the rear echelon remains at the threshold line and maintains control of the reserve, outpost, and flank protection elements.

184. CONDUCT OF RAID

Essentially, the raid consists of the projection of a protected corridor into the enemy area to a threshold line as close as possible to the objective installation, the movement forward from the threshold line by the attack elements; and the attack upon, the installation. This is followed by withdrawal to and through the corridor. The element that protects the corridor withdraws behind the main force.

a. Agents observe the objective and key points along the route of advance and arrange for guides along the route of advance.

b. Units to take part in the raid assemble at a previously designated point at the edge of the enemy controlled area (A of fig. 16). Here they are organized for the raid and last-minute instructions are issued.

c. The units advance into the enemy area toward the objective preceded by the reserve. Agents and guides are contacted along the route of
advance and guards are dispatched to the flanks as necessary b. of fig. 16).

d. On arriving at the threshold line, the force is met by the agents who have been observing the installation and who provide up-to-the-minute information. Outpost and flank protection elements and elements to operate outside of the installation are dispatched c. of fig. 16). (When the situation requires, these elements may be dispatched earlier from the route of advance.)

e. The initial surprise element moves forward, followed in order by the special task elements, the holding element, the forward command element, and the action element. The reserve element, under command of the rear command element, is disposed to cover access to the threshold line d. of fig. 16).

f. The initial surprise element disposes of the enemy guards and the special task and holding elements move in quickly to accomplish their mission e. of fig. 16). As soon as the commander believes that they are in position, he orders the action element in to carry out its mission f. of fig. 16).

g. When the mission has been accomplished, the commander orders the action element to withdraw, and at the same time signals or notifies the rear commander to begin withdrawing the outpost and flank protection elements. He then supervises the withdrawal of the remaining active elements behind the protection of the threshold line g. of fig. 16).
A. Assembly of forces.
B. Movement toward installation.
C. Posting of outpost and flank protection elements.
D. Action of initial surprise element.

Figure 16. Guerilla raid on enemy installation.
E. Movement of Special task and holding elements.
F. Movement of action element.
G. Withdrawal.
H. Return to guerilla-controlled area.

Figure 16—Continued
h. After the last withdrawing attack element has passed over the threshold line, the reserve element withdraws, pulling in its flank guards, as it moves back of fig. 16).

i. When the limit of the enemy-controlled area is reached, or sooner if conditions permit, the force divided into its component units, and each returns to its home area.

j. A raid may, or may not, involve a firefight with the enemy. Some guerillas are capable of entering an enemy installation silently at night and killing enemies with knives, bolos, or strangulation cords. A raid of this type is particularly demoralizing to the enemy.

k. In some cases it may be possible to disguise and infiltrate the initial surprise and special task elements into the position before the raid.
CHAPTER 26
ATTACKS IN FORCE

185. GENERAL
Guerilla forces attack in force to destroy isolated enemy detachments and detachments and installations whose strength is inferior to that of the attacking guerillas. Guerilla mobility is utilized to concentrate a superior force and destroy the enemy before he can receive reinforcement.

186. PLANNING
Plans for the attack include—
a. Selecting an assembly area for forces making the attack.
b. Studying routes of approach to the objective and routes of withdrawal.
c. Providing for security during the approach and during the attack.
d. Providing for preventing the arrival of enemy reinforcement.
e. Making a time schedule for the assembly, approach, and attack.
f. Assigning missions to units making the attack.

187. SURPRISE
Every effort is made to achieve surprise in the attack and to overwhelm the enemy before he can occupy his defenses. The principles applicable to ambushes (par. 171-179) and raids (par. 180-184) also apply to attacks in force. Armed guerillas, disguised as civilians, may be infiltrated into the enemy position before the attack.

188. SUBSEQUENT ATTACKS

If the initial effort fails, subsequent attacks may be made at night. Guerilla forces will seldom be trained and organized well enough to make daylight attacks after the enemy's forces has been alerted. Attempts may also be made to set fire to enemy installations that lend themselves to burning. The guerilla forces may withdraw to give the impression that they are abandoning the attack and then suddenly make a new attack or ambush enemy parties that set out to get aid.
189. GENERAL

Guerilla strength, equipment, and training is almost always inferior to that of the enemy. Therefore, unless forced to do otherwise by the enemy, guerilla forces hold defensive positions only for brief periods in support of other operations by guerilla or regular forces. Guerilla forces usually defend themselves by flight or dispersion, by withdrawals, or by creating diversions. Whenever possible, defensive actions are accompanied by offensive raids and ambushes against the enemy's flanks and rear.

190. DEFENSE OF FIXED POSITIONS

The principles of guerilla defense of fixed positions are the same as those applicable to regular forces except that there are few supporting fires and counterattacks are not practicable. Maximum use is made of terrain, defensive works, and mines. Detachments are stationed at some distance from the defense perimeter to operate against the enemy's flanks and rear. Whenever possible, the initial enemy attack force is ambushed to inflict maximum casualties (fig. 17).
Figure 17. Guerilla defense of fixed position.
191. MINOR SKIRMISHES

Minor skirmishes may occur when guerilla and enemy forces encounter each other unexpectedly. Enemy attempts to rush forward and close with the guerillas are stopped by the delivery of the maximum amount of fire, particularly from automatic weapons. This will usually cause the enemy to take cover before firing. The guerillas then withdraw to avoid envelopment by the enemy. The enemy may also be ambushed during his subsequent movements.

192. DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY OFFENSIVES

a. Adequate intelligence measures will normally give advance warning of the preparation of large-scale offensives by the enemy. The following conditions and activities are carefully noted:

1. Advent of good weather suitable for field operations.
2. Arrival of new enemy commanders.
3. Enemy victories on the main front which make additional troops available for anti-guerilla operations.
4. Increases in the size of local garrisons and the arrival of new units in the area.
5. Extension of enemy outposts, increased patrolling, and aerial reconnaissance.
6. Increased enemy intelligence effort.

b. Upon receiving indications that the enemy is planning a large-scale offensive, the guerilla commander increases his own intelligence effort, checks the dispositions and preparedness of his sub-units, and makes plans to meet the anticipated enemy
action. If necessary, guerilla headquarters and key installations are moved deeper into friendly terrain. Nonessential records and supplies are hidden in dispersed locations. Hospital bed-patients may be transferred to civilian care.

c. Based on his estimate of the situation, the guerilla commander decides what actions to take to meet the expected offensive. This action may include—

(1) Diversionary activities in other areas.
(2) Defense of the area against the attack.
(3) Withdrawal in a wide circling movement followed by attack against the enemy's rear and base installations.
(4) Withdrawal into another area not likely to be included in the enemy offensive.
(5) Dispersal of units or individuals until the enemy offensive is over.

d. When movement to another area is planned, an advance party is sent to that area to establish intelligence and security systems and to make arrangements for the reception and supply of the force. When the defense of the area is decided upon, bridges are destroyed and roads leading into the area are blocked. Ambush positions are prepared, and booby traps and mines are placed along the trails and roads the enemy is expected to use. New concealed trails are cut for guerilla use. Strongholds are prepared at key points and are protected on all sides with wire, sharp stakes driven into the ground, and mines. Dug in positions, protected with earth and logs, are provided with intercommunication and escape tunnels. Areas are prepared on the flanks of the enemy advance in which guerilla forces can hide and from which they can operate against the enemy's
flanks and rear.
e. The object of the defense is to make the attack so expensive for the enemy that he will soon abandon it and will not wish to try it again. At no time does the guerilla force allow itself to be pinned down so that it can be encircled and destroyed. As the enemy overcomes various strong points, the defenders withdraw to successive defense positions or break up and infiltrate through the enemy's lines and attack his rear, flanks, and supply installations. Bridges that the enemy has repaired during his advance may again be destroyed.

193. DEFENSE AGAINST ENCIRCLEMENT

a. As encirclement is the greatest threat to the existence of a guerilla force, the commander is constantly alert for indications of such action by the enemy. Adequate intelligence will usually give warning of such an attempt. The appearance of enemy forces in two or three directions is regarded with suspicion and is immediately investigated. Upon receiving information that an enemy encircling movement is in progress, the guerilla commander decides immediately how he will move. He may move toward an unoccupied side of the circle, toward a gap between the encircling units or toward an area such as a swamp, jungle, thick forest, or hill mass that the enemy will have difficulty in covering during his advance (fig. 18). Secret records and surplus equipment are destroyed or hidden, and movement is begun at once in the desired direction. By this action the guerilla force either escapes the encirclement or places itself in position to meet it while the enemy lines are still thin and spread out and coordination between advancing units is not well
established. When the actual situation cannot be
determined, the best action is to move to a ridgeline.
This gives observation, commanding ground, and
allows quick movement in at least two directions. It
also will normally lie along the boundary between
two approaching enemy units, thus facilitating a
breakout.

b. During its movement to break through, the
guerilla force is preceded by two strong combat
detachments which, if there are still gaps between
the enemy units, seize and hold the flanks of the
escape line, these detachments attack suddenly to
create and protect an escape channel. To do this,
they may establish a hidden defensive position, allow
the enemy line to advance into it, and then strike out
suddenly against the enemy flanks. A breakthrough
attack is best initiated just before sundown. The
main body can then pass through the gap in the
darkness, free from enemy observation and accurate
fire.

c. If the breakout attempt is unsuccessful, the
commander divides the force into small units and
instructs them to infiltrate through the enemy lines
at night or hide in the area until the enemy forces
leave.

d. During the encirclement, guerilla units not
included in the circle make attacks against the
enemy’s rear to lure his forces away from the
operation and thus create gaps in the line.

e. If the guerilla force successfully escapes from
the encirclement, the enemy’s base installations may
be attacked. These actions will have the effect of
raising guerilla morale and of making the enemy
cautious in the future about leaving his bases to
engage in offensive operations.
Figure 18. Guerilla defense against enemy encirclement: choice of initial movements.
Figure 19. Guerilla defense against enemy encirclement formation of breakout attempt.
194. INTRODUCTION

The organization of guerilla forces may be begun in friendly controlled areas before the controlling forces withdraw. Similar preparations may also be made during peacetime in border areas expected to be overrun by the enemy during the early stages of hostilities. This prior organization and preparation give great impetus to the growth of a resistance movement and greatly decrease the time before the movement is able to be of assistance to the regular forces.

195. DIFFICULTIES

There are several factors that make prior organization difficult.

a. It may not be desirable from a military or political standpoint to admit the possibility of defeat in or withdrawal from the area.

b. It will not always be possible to predict the
course of enemy action, either in its effect or regular forces or upon the area, well enough to make possible detailed planning.

c. Adequate organizing personnel and equipment will be difficult to secure as it will be felt often that such personnel and equipment should be used or reserved for the effort of the main forces.
196. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

In contemplating the organization of guerilla units in a friendly controlled area before enemy occupation, the following are considered:

a. The suitability of conditions in the area for guerilla organization and operations, particularly as regards terrain, food supply, loyalty, morale, and the willingness of the population to endure hardship. These factors must be considered in the light of conditions that will exist after the shock of initial withdrawal or defeat of regular forces, when the enemy is occupying the area. A broad geographical, political, or ideological segment of the population may be enough to support a guerilla movement.

b. The availability of capable leaders to head a guerilla movement. For characteristics of leaders, see paragraph 80.

c. The existence of potential worthwhile missions in the area those guerilla forces can accomplish.

d. The political desirability of subjecting the population of the area to the increased enemy severity and restrictions that guerilla activity will bring.

197. PLANNING

a. Planning is preceded by a decision as to whether immediate or long-term results are desired.
This decision will be determined by the over-all plan of the regular forces. For a fully developed guerilla force to go into operation as soon as the enemy occupies the territory, it will be necessary to give all individuals advance training and possibly even to detach a regular military unit to go underground and become a guerilla force. Premature guerilla activity may cause an immediate enemy reaction that will make it difficult to build an enduring guerilla organization. If time is available and immediate guerilla resistance to the occupying force is not required, a larger movement can be organized among the civilians around the nucleus of small, trained stay-behind parties composed of civilian or military personnel, who organize resistance after regular forces withdraw. In some cases, no overt action may be required from the guerilla forces until the reconquest of the area by regular forces, the guerillas carry out covert missions and perfect their organization and training during the interim.

b. Plans for guerilla operation during the occupation period include

1. An estimate of probable enemy dispositions and activities in the area.
2. Organization and training of stay-behind parties.
3. Initial equipment and supply of stay-behind parties.
4. Size of guerilla force to be organized.
5. Tentative missions.
6. Targets for sabotage.
7. Location of prospective supply and operation bases for guerilla forces.
8. Means of supplying the guerilla force.
9. Methods and channels of communication
between regular and guerilla forces.
(10) Authority to be granted to the guerilla area commander.
(11) Status of the members of guerilla forces.

c. Plans for the period of enemy occupation should be general and should allow a large measure of initiative and discretion to local commanders. No attempt should be made to build up in advance a complex organizational structure. Instead, plans normally allow for leaving behind a number of semi-independent, self-contained parties, each directly responsible to the regular forces. With general provision being made for subsequent assumption of over-all command by a designated officer or individual. It should always be assumed that the enemy will locate and destroy part of the organization and its supplies during the early hostilities and that the guerilla organization will then build on what is left. If it is desired that a particular mission be accomplished soon after enemy occupation of the area, two or more parties should be assigned the mission.

d. Maximum secrecy should surround planning for the operation, and knowledge of details of the plan should be compartmented on a "need-to-know" basis.

e. The extent to which local civilian officials should participate in the initial planning will depend upon the particular situation. As such officials know the resources and characteristics of the area, they are in a position to furnish valuable information and assistance. On the other hand, their primary concern is the welfare and safety of the local population; and this may make them...
uncooperative for fear that the organization of guerilla activities will bring about enemy reprisals against the civilian population secrecy is also difficult to maintain if the project is made the subject of political discussion. The best solution is to seek the cooperation and advice on a personal basis of a limited number of civilian officials of unquestioned loyalty and discretion.

f. In some cases it may be possible to set up the framework for a guerilla organization within an existing political party or ideological group. However, before such action is taken, the political implications as described in paragraph 20 should be carefully considered. The ability to exercise subsequent control over the activities of such a group should also be considered. Liaison parties should be left behind to maintain contact with, observe, and give assistance to such an organization.

198. ADVANCE PREPARATIONS

The following advance preparations may be made for the organization of guerilla forces in friendly controlled areas:

a. Propaganda to prepare the population for continued resistance after enemy occupation of the area.

b. Military training of civilians that will be of value to guerilla forces. This can be done under the guise of home defense training. It can include:
   (1) Marksmanship and care of weapons.
   (2) Demolitions.
   (3) First aid.
   (4) Intelligence and counterintelligence.

c. Organization of home defense units. While
ostensibly for the purpose of assisting regular forces in defense of the area, these units can become the basis for guerilla units after enemy occupation. Membership in such units is also an excellent way to distribute arms and to imbue the population with the thought of continued resistance against the enemy.

d. Selection, organization, and training of leaders and stay-behind parties.
e. Establishment of caches of arms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies. These caches should be well dispersed, and the location of each should be known only to a few persons. Supplies should be packed to withstand long storage and exposure to weather. Necessary spare parts should be included for all essential items of equipment.
f. Tentative division of the area into sectors of operation and the assignment of stay-behind parties to each. Reconnaissance of areas by assigned stay-behind parties.
g. Preparation for the isolation of contemplated bases of operation by destruction of bridges on access roads and similar defensive measures.
h. Preparation and caching of training and intelligence literature and materials.
i. Preparation of rosters of key civilians who are potential sources of assistance or danger to a resistance movement. This information should be in a form that can be turned over to the designated guerilla leaders just before the withdrawal of regular forces.

199. ORGANIZATION

a. The relative proportions of civilians and
military personnel included in stay-behind parties will depend on the situation. Military personnel have the advantages of ready availability, training, and appreciation of secrecy requirements. Civilians on the other hand are not a drain on the manpower of the regular forces and have the advantage of being better acquainted with the country and the people. Ideally, stay-behind parties are composed of both military personnel and civilians from the area who have been inducted into the military service.

b. Stay-behind parties should be large enough to be self-contained but small enough to preserve mobility and concealment. This requires that parties consist of between 8 and 12 men. Parties should include the following positions, although one individual may fill two or more positions:

1. Commander.
2. Operations officer.
3. Intelligence officer.
5. Communications personnel.
6. Medical personnel.
7. Cooks and mess attendants.
8. Guards.
9. Interpreters and guides when necessary.

200. TRAINING

If Stay-behind parties are given the same training as that described for operational groups in paragraphs 50-52. Whenever possible, all stay-behind parties are trained together so that they may know and understand each other's capabilities and limitations and develop a mutual confidence and team spirit. While obviously unfit personnel
should he eliminated when discovered, such action should not be taken hastily, as it is often true that the odd, poorly adjusted individual is particularly qualified to function successfully in the vastly different conditions that will exist behind enemy lines.
CHAPTER 30

ACTIVITIES OF STAY-BEHIND PARTIES

201. INITIAL ACTIVITIES

a. Stay-behind parties are released from the physical control of regular forces before the final battle or withdrawn in time for them not to be involved in or compromised by that action. They move to their bases of operation, organize intelligence and security systems, and begin to carry out their missions. Communication is established with regular forces and with each other. Headquarters and supplies are gradually shifted to conform to the Situation actually existing after enemy occupation of the area.

b. Stay-behind parties may be used initially for intelligence missions and for demolitions that the withdrawing force was unable to execute or which are contingent upon certain courses of enemy action.

202. SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES

a. At an appropriate time, civilian or military leaders call upon the population of the occupied area to continue resistance against the enemy and grant official recognition to guerilla units organized for this purpose. The existence of stay-behind parties in the area is not mentioned.
b. The stay-behind parties then begin the recruiting, organization, and training of a guerilla force as described in paragraphs 77-155.
PART SIX
EXPLOITATION OF GUERILLA FORCES
CHAPTER 31
GENERAL

203. DEFINITION
Guerilla forces are exploited by employing them to assist regular forces to attain objectives. Assistance may be overt or covert and may take place before, during, and after D-day.

204. CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERILLA FORCES
Commanders must remember that controlled friendly guerilla forces may be available to them for operations. They must also remember that the proper employment of guerilla forces is as important as the proper employment of their regular forces. Commanders should know the general and particular favorable and unfavorable characteristics of controlled guerilla forces.

a. Favorable characteristics are—
(1) They are located behind enemy lines where vital enemy installations are most accessible and where the enemy is not normally alert or at peak combat efficiency.
They have an intimate knowledge of the terrain, the resources, and the people of the areas in which they operate.

They have the support of large segments of the civilian population of their areas.

They require a minimum of supply.

They can acquire a detailed knowledge of enemy dispositions, activities, and habits in their areas.

Small guerilla units have great mobility and ability to move throughout enemy occupied areas.

They can survive a great amount of enemy offensive action.

Unfavorable characteristics are—

1. Their training is not equal to that of regular forces.
2. They do not have the supporting weapons and services that regular forces have.
3. Their ability to concentrate large forces is limited by the availability of food supply, signal communication, and the threat of enemy action.
4. They normally cannot engage in sustained combat unless furnished logistical and operational support by regular forces.
5. Enemy counteraction is capable of reducing their capabilities for long periods.
6. They are of limited value in other than their home areas.
7. They are accustomed to great initiative in the planning and execution of
operations. Hence, they do not work well when rigid control is necessary.

(8) Their morale is subject to wide fluctuations. It thrives on success but sinks rapidly in the face of severe or continued defeat.

(9) Matters affecting the welfare of the civilian population will often have great influence on their activities as they come from, depend on, and have great loyalty to the supporting civilian population of their area.

(10) They hate the enemy and elements of the civilian population that collaborate with the enemy. This hatred may also extend to those civilians who seek to remain neutral. Unless countered by strong leadership, guerilla activities and actions may often be governed by these hatreds rather than by the requirements of the military situation. Guerillas have little respect for international or ordinary law so far as the persons or property of enemy forces and enemy collaborators are concerned.

(11) They have a tendency to be very sensitive in regard to their relations with regular forces. A feeling that their services are appreciated by and are of value to the operations of regular forces is essential to their cooperation and control. A feeling that they are neglected or not appreciated by the regular forces will affect guerilla operational capabilities and their willingness to
submit to control by regular forces. Operational capabilities will also be affected by failure of regular forces to understand guerilla capabilities and limitations or to appreciate the problems peculiar to guerilla operations.

(12) They are fully aware of their inferiority to regular forces in arms and equipment. Hence, when supply from regular forces becomes available, they are apt to be extravagant in their demands for logistical and operational support and to minimize their capabilities without such support.

c. Efficient exploitation of individual guerilla forces requires that the capabilities and limitations of each force be constantly reassessed in the light of the state of training and organization of the force, the enemy situation in the area, and the capabilities of regular forces to furnish logistical and operational support. The effect of an assigned mission upon the ability to perform a subsequent mission must also be kept in mind. A premature operation may cause such enemy reaction as to disorganize the guerilla force, result ill serious loss and expenditure of arms and ammunition, and render the force incapable of performing a later mission.
CHAPTER 32
EXPLOITATION BEFORE D-DAY

205. MISSIONS

Pre-D-day missions generally consist of fulfilling intelligence requirements, conducting strategic sabotage (par. 167), diverting enemy forces, and preparing and organizing for D-day activities.

206. INTELLIGENCE

One of the most valuable missions that guerilla forces can perform during this period is to provide intelligence on enemy dispositions and activities and to collect information about internal affairs not available to regular forces.

207. STRATEGIC SABOTAGE

Guerilla forces may be assigned missions to destroy or hinder the operation of certain industries or activities vital to the enemy's war effort. These activities can be coordinated with the strategic bombing program of regular forces, with the guerilla forces taking care of targets that are not suitable for air action.

208. DIVERSION OF ENEMY FORCES
The diversion of enemy forces may vary from a small increase in enemy troops necessitated by minor guerilla activities to a large diversion to deal with full-scale guerilla warfare. The size of the enemy force that can be diverted is influenced by the extent to which the enemy can be convinced that a serious threat to his operations exists from guerilla action.

209. PREPARATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR D-DAY ACTIVITIES

a. The mission of preparing for D-day activities should be assigned to all guerilla forces, whether or not the plan of the regular forces includes hostilities in each area. This mission gives each guerilla force a goal toward which to strive and acts as an incentive to increase its efficiency and combat effectiveness. It also makes possible the deception of the enemy as to the actual plans of the regular forces. Lastly, it is well to have such preparations made to provide for possible changes in the plans of regular forces.

b. Each guerilla force is directed to prepare and submit for approval plan to participate in, certain general lines of action of regular forces in the area. At this point a problem regarding security of projected plans arises. It may not be desirable that such information should be known to guerilla forces who are subject to capture and about whose security discipline there may be some doubts. Where it is felt that such information cannot be given to the guerilla commander, all information consistent with security requirements should be given to the leader of the operational group attached to the guerilla headquarters.
Further security is achieved by preparing plans to cover several courses of D-day action and by making clear to the guerillas that their particular plans cover only one phase of possible action by the regular forces.

**210. MISCELLANEOUS MISSIONS**

a. Guerilla forces may be assigned the task of receiving and supporting special agents or commando groups from regular forces, and can be of great assistance to such personnel. The sending of such personnel into an area without coordination with guerilla forces may be advisable during the early stages of a resistance movement. To do so after the resistance movement has reached full growth may result in failure of the operation and endanger the personnel involved. When it is not desirable that the guerilla area commander be informed of an operation, the leader of the operational group attached to the guerilla headquarters should be informed.

b. Guerilla forces may be assigned the mission of assisting downed aircrews and escaped prisoners of war in their areas. In some cases it may be possible for guerillas to construct emergency airstrips. Aircrews operating over the area are briefed regarding the location of airstrips and the methods of contacting guerillas in the event they are forced down. Rescued personnel are cared for by the guerillas until they can be returned to the regular forces. Guerillas may also be able to smuggle aid and news into prisoner of war camps in the area. Whether guerilla forces should actually arrange and assist in the escape of prisoners of war at this time is open to question.
Such operations detract from more valuable guerilla missions, and may result in unnecessary casualties among the prisoners.

c. Guerilla forces may be assigned the mission of distributing news and propaganda to the population or to the enemy. News broadcasts from allied radio stations are made slowly so that the guerillas may copy the news. Guerillas can provide information regarding enemy activities that can be used as a basis for propaganda by regular forces and can make reports on the effect of this propaganda. The situation of the guerilla force itself should always be considered in preparing propaganda. At times mention of guerilla exploits is a great boost to guerilla and civilian morale. At other times it may bring unwelcome enemy attention. Large quantities of propaganda material should not be shipped to guerillas at the expense of items needed for operations and logistical support.
CHAPTER 33
D-day EXPLOITATION

211. PREPARATIONS

As D-day approaches, guerilla units in the area are alerted and instructed to move into positions to accomplish their missions. Alert orders should be given in time to allow for guerilla concentrations and movements. Guerilla units are given instructions to report last-minute enemy dispositions and activities. They may be used to give instructions to the civilian population to stay off roads and to avoid military objectives. Guerilla units in other areas may be given the mission of reporting enemy reactions in their areas, particularly movements of troops to reinforce the threatened area or of air forces to attack the regular forces. They may also be given the mission of carrying out activities that will deceive the enemy regarding the actual point of attack.

212. TRANSFER OF COMMAND

D-day is a critical period for exploiting guerilla forces. It is at this time that they are usually transferred from the control of theater special forces headquarters to the control of the lower regular commands making the attack. Commanders of lower regular commands to which guerilla forces are transferred must be thoroughly briefed
regarding the organization, administration, supply, capabilities, and limitations of the units. Arrangements must be made for establishing liaison and communication and for the supply of the guerilla forces. Precautions must be taken that regular forces do not fire on guerillas. The transfer of command is greatly facilitated if the rear guerilla area headquarters is set up and transferred its described in paragraph 45. The new commander may send liaison and staff officers into the guerilla area before D-day.

213. D-day MISSIONS

The guerillas’ primary D-day mission is to help isolate the battlefield. Bridges and roads leading to the area are destroyed, and ambushes are laid along these routes. Guerilla forces may be assigned the mission of seizing or helping to seize important objectives such as defense positions and important road junctions or they may have the mission of preventing enemy destruction of key installations. Guerilla forces given missions to seize objectives should be relieved by regular forces its soon its possible. They may provide guides to lead regular forces into the rear of enemy positions. They may harass the enemy by destroying his communication system and making attacks on his headquarters, airfields, and supply installations. Guerilla attacks on the enemy’s rear while regular forces are attacking his front can have it devastating effect on the enemy’s moral and combat ability. Guerillas may be used to control the inhabitants to avoid undue casualties among them or their interference with the tactical plan of the regular Intel-forces.
CHAPTER 34
EXPLOITATION AFTER D-day

214. MISSIONS
   a. Missions for guerilla forces after D-day may be forward of and to the flanks of regular forces, in the combat area with the regular forces, or in the areas in rear of the front lines.
   b. Guerilla forces can continue to provide valuable information and intelligence to regular forces regarding the enemy-held areas. Enemy movements and profitable targets for air strikes are observed and reported.

215. OPERATIONS IN ENEMY REAR AREAS
   a. Harassing attacks in enemy rear areas can be stepped up greatly by providing air support to guerilla forces and by coordinating such activities with the operations of the regular forces. Properly timed this activity can turn an enemy withdrawal into a rout. Regular forces may he infiltrated into the enemy’s rear to operate with and support guerilla forces.
   b. Besides the seizure of key facilities in the enemy’s rear, guerilla forces may be assigned the mission of rescuing prisoners of war. When the enemy is withdrawing, the rescue of prisoners may be a profitable guerilla mission.
216. LOCAL ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT FORCES

Small guerilla units attached to regular forces can be of great assistance as guides and for patrolling. Because of their knowledge of the ground and enemy dispositions, they can often make it possible for regular forces to surprise the enemy completely. This close cooperation with regular forces may be handicapped by language difficulties.

217. FLANK PROTECTION

Flank protection by guerilla forces may be tactical or strategic. Small guerilla units may be attached to regular units to give warning of and to prevent enemy movement through, difficult terrain to the flanks of the regular unit. Large guerilla forces may be given the task of preventing effective enemy action in the entire area to the flank of the regular forces. The use of the Marquis during World War II to protect the right flank of the United States Third Army in its drive across France is an example of strategic flank protection by guerilla forces.

218. REGULAR COMBAT IN OWN SECTOR

When guerilla training, organization, and combat ability are adequate, or when the enemy combat ability is low. Guerilla forces may be assigned sectors for regular combat. In mountains or jungle, the guerilla forces so used may be superior to regular forces. The use of guerilla forces in this role usually requires extensive logistical and operational support by regular forces.
219. MOPPING UP BY-PASSED AREAS
Guerilla forces may be used to mop up areas bypassed by regular forces during their advance. Their detailed knowledge of the terrain makes them capable of carrying out this mission efficiently. They can also be used to receive the surrender of bypassed or cut-off enemy units. Although such unit will often be reluctant or afraid to surrender to guerilla forces, the presence of attached officers from regular forces will give assurance that the rules of warfare are observed.

220. CONTROL OF CIVIL POPULATION AND COUNTER ESPIONAGE
Guerilla forces may be used to control and to administer relief to the civilian population and refugees in rear areas, thus releasing regular forces for combat duties. Because of their knowledge of the language and of the local people they are particularly fitted for this role. They are also able to render great service in apprehending enemy collaborators and spies. This activity must be closely supervised to prevent the guerillas from liquidating such captured persons.

221. MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES
Guerilla forces can give advice regarding the location of suitable camp sites and water points. They can provide interpreters. They can assist in the recruitment of labor and can furnish or locate technicians capable of operating public utilities. Guerilla units can render valuable assistance to military government officers beginning operations in the area.
222. PROTECTION OF REAR INSTALLATIONS

Guerilla units may be used to guard or protect bridges, supply dumps, and other vital installations of the regular forces, thus releasing regular troops. Only when no more worthwhile missions are available should guerilla forces be used for this purpose, as such use ignores the particular qualifications of the guerillas for operations in the area. Furthermore, such use offers none of the emotional or patriotic incentive that is essential to guerilla moral and discipline. As a result, guerillas used for these duties are apt to give unsatisfactory service and become involved in looting or other illegal activities.

223. ADVICE TO COMMANDERS

The advice that follows applies particularly during the period that guerilla forces are being used in connection with the operation of regular forces:

a. Know your guerillas, their organization, their methods of operation, their capabilities, and their limitations. Make sure that lower commanders appreciate the value of and know now to make use of guerilla forces.

b. Anticipate the problems of supplying and giving operational support to attached guerilla forces.

c. Make provision for liaison with guerilla forces. Anticipate possible language and political problems in dealing with them.

d. As guerilla forces are not regular troops, do not assign missions to them that are beyond their capabilities.
e. Make full use of the capabilities peculiar to guerilla forces. Consult with them regarding ways in which they can assist your operations.
f. Make sure that the guerilla leaders understand that the regular forces are capable of engaging in sustained offensive combat against the enemy. Often guerillas are themselves so accustomed to hit-and-run tactics that they consider regular forces capable only of similar activities, and they will concentrate unduly oil protecting the regular forces from casualties instead of assisting them to locate and destroy the enemy.
g. Keep guerilla forces in action after D-day their period of usefulness is limited by the time that operations will be conducted in the area with which they are familiar. Guerilla forces should not be kept in reserve.
h. Use guerilla forces its complete units as much as possible. This not only gives the best results but also facilitates Supply and control.
i. Work through existing channels of guerilla commands imposition of a new organizational structure may destroy the usefulness of the unit.
j. Respect existing guerilla standing operating procedures. Though they may vary greatly from those of regular forces, they are particularly suited to the guerillas' own methods of operation.
k. Respect guerilla rank. Except in cases where the rank of a guerilla officer is clearly out-of-order give him the same consideration given regular officers of the same rank.
l. Do not spoil guerilla forces with lavish supplies. Give them only what is needed to accomplish their missions. This is facilitated if
guerillas are kept separate from regular troops.

m. Maintain guerilla morale by awarding decorations and letters of commendation and by expressing appreciation whenever such action is justified.

n. Anticipate and circumvent guerilla tendencies to divert their efforts toward settling old scores against portions of the civilian population that collaborated with the enemy.

o. Do not make political commitments or promises to guerilla forces unless authorized by higher headquarters.

p. Recognize when the value of guerilla forces is at an end and take prompt steps to suspend their operations, disband them, and collect their weapons.
CHAPTER 35

DEMOBILIZING GUERILLA FORCES

224. GENERAL

a. As the tide of battle rolls beyond an area, the purpose for which a guerilla force was organized and its ability to assist regular forces cease to exist. When this point is reached, the force should be demobilized without delay. If units are kept in existence past their period of usefulness, they become a liability to the regular forces and a source of potential trouble. As the pressures which held a force together during times of danger disappear, the force will begin to break up into rival factions and parties which may clash with each other.

b. The manner in which a guerilla Force is demobilized will have a great effect upon the postwar attitudes of the people of the area toward the government sponsoring the guerilla forces. Therefore demobilization should be conducted according to a carefully prepared and comprehensive plan. The task of demobilizing guerilla units should not be delegated to regular force tactical units which have little or no knowledge of the guerilla unit's administrative history.

c. Demobilization will usually consist of the following:
(1) Assembly of the guerilla force.
(2) Completion of administrative records.
(3) Settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits.
(4) Settlement of claims.
(5) Awarding of decorations.
(6) Collection of arms and equipment.
(7) Provision for care of wounded and injured.
(8) Provision for rehabilitation and employment of discharged guerillas.

225. ASSEMBLY OF THE GUERILLA FORCE

The force is assembled by units in one or more assembly areas and goes into bivouac camps. All records and equipment are brought with the units. Hospitals and convalescent camps are also concentrated. Close order drill, inspections, and other activities are conducted to keep the men occupied. It should be remembered that the guerilla force at this time represents a potent political factor in the liberated area. Support of its members for various causes will be sought by various factions both within and outside of the guerilla force. Therefore, in the interest of the democratic development of the area and the orderly demobilization of the force, political activity by or among the guerilla force should be prohibited or closely controlled. Movement of men is closely controlled to prevent absence without leave and desertion. The rear headquarters of the guerilla force moves into the principal assembly area and assumes responsibility for demobilization of the force.
226. COMPLETION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS

Under the direction of the rear headquarters, the area headquarters and all lower headquarters complete the administrative records of the force. Certificates are prepared to cover records that have been lost or destroyed. Complete payrolls are prepared and are reconciled with authorized unit strength figures. All arms and equipment are inventoried, and accountability is established.

227. SETTLEMENT OF PAY, ALLOWANCES, AND BENEFITS

Payrolls having been prepared, members of the force are paid previous partial payments being deducted. Authorized benefits are paid to the legal survivors of men who have tied or been killed. Soldiers disputing the accuracy of their service data or pay are required to produce their copies of their induction and promotion certificates (par. 149 and 152).

228. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS

Administrative delay in the settlement of claims arising from the activities of guerilla forces can be a source of ill will and injustice. A recommended method of settlement is outlined below. This method eliminates the need for all elaborate claims service from regular forces headquarters which may be forced to act without background information and makes possible the prompt payment of claims. It minimizes the possibility of fraudulent claims; and it directs dissatisfaction with claim settlements toward the guerilla forces instead of the sponsoring government.
a. A fixed, sum is credited to the guerilla force for the settlement of authorized obligations that it has incurred during its existence. This can be determined on the basis of the allowances previously authorized (par. 65) or it may be determined by it subsequent estimate of the force's strength and accomplishments. The area commander is instructed to divide this credit among his lower units.

b. Claims teams are set up within each unit of the force that had authority to issue receipts or otherwise incurs financial obligation. Disbursing officers from the regular forces are attached to each team. Advance notice is publicized in each area where the guerilla unit operated that the claims team will be present during a specified period to receive and pay claims.

c. The team sets up all office in the area during the advertised period, bringing with it all records pertaining to receipts and expenditures in the area. Receipts turned in for payment are verified and approved by the guerilla members of the team and presented to the disbursing officer who makes immediate payment to the claimant from the funds credited to the unit. Claims for services or damages not covered by receipts, if they are below a specified amount, are given final action by the claims team, based on their own knowledge. Larger claims are forwarded with the team's recommendations to the area commander and the rear headquarters for action.

229. AWARDING OF DECORATIONS

Prompt action is taken during this period on all recommendations for decorations and awards to
deserving guerillas and civilian supporters. The
awards are then made at impressive ceremonies in
local areas attended by the guerilla troops, the
local civilian population, high-ranking officers of
the regular forces, and officials of the new
government of the area. At the end of the
ceremony, the bulk of the guerilla force is
discharged.

230. COLLECTION OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Arms and equipment in the custody of the force
are collected before the settlement of pay,
allowances, and benefits. Care is exercised that
weapons are not kept hidden for later unlawful use.
Public announcement is made that all weapons must
be turned in to the regular forces and that after a
certain date unlicensed possession of weapons or
military equipment will be unlawful, whether or not
the possessor is a former guerilla soldier.

231. PROVISION FOR CARE OF WOUNDED AND
INJURED

Guerilla hospitals are kept in operation until their
patients can be taken over by regular military
hospitals or by civilian institutions. Every effort is
made to assure that Wounded and sick guerilla
soldiers are given necessary care. Permanently
crippled guerillas may be granted pensions by the
government succeeding to control of the area.

232. REHABILITATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF
DISCHARGED GUERILLAS

Suitable Measures are taken to assist
discharged guerillas to assume their places in
civilian life. Some may be given employment by the regular forces or by the government of the area. Others may be incorporated into the police or armed forces of the new government. Assistance in rebuilding damaged homes or farms may be granted.
## APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX II

INfiltration Units

Section I. GENERAL

1. INTRODUCTION

Infiltration units or forces differ from guerilla units as described elsewhere in this manual in that they are composed of specially trained and equipped regular troops that are sent into the enemy’s rear areas to conduct operations.

2. TYPES OF UNITS

Infiltration units are of two types:

a. Short-range infiltration units function in the enemy’s immediate rear where civilian life is very disorganized or nonexistent. Their missions are primarily tactical: destruction of artillery positions, tanks, headquarters, and similar installations. They operate in the enemy’s rear for relatively short periods. North Korean units which operated in the rear of United Nations forces in the early stages of the Korean War are an example of this type of unit.

b. Long-range infiltration forces penetrate far into the enemy’s rear where civilian life is quite normal. Their missions are primarily strategic; blocking lines of communications, seizing vital areas, destroying vital facilities, and the like. These forces remain and operate in the enemy’s rear for extended periods. Wingate’s Raiders and Merrill’s Marauders, which operated in Burma in World War II, are examples of this type of units.
Section II. SHORT-RANGE INFILTRATION UNITS

3. GENERAL

The fact that short-range infiltration units operate in an area where civilian life is disorganized or non-existent requires that the units be completely supplied by their own forces. It also means that civilians are neither an aid nor a threat to their security. Thus, short-range infiltration units can operate in an area where civilians would normally be hostile. As these units operate in the midst of numerically superior enemy forces, their tactics are normally of the guerilla “hit-and-run” type, using maximum surprise. This in turn means that these units are normally used in small, self-contained teams. These teams spirit and mutual confidence. Members of units may be qualified parachutists.

4. ENTRY INTO ENEMY AREA

The method of entry into enemy-held areas will depend upon the situation. In a moving situation or if the enemy’s line is thinly held, teams may infiltrate in groups on foot or even in light, heavily-armed vehicles. When the enemy’s line is held more strongly, entry may be made by combination of ground and air movement. A very small group with a radio set and pathfinder equipment infiltrates through the enemy lines, makes a reconnaissance, and selects a relatively secure place to receive the rest of the team. The rest of the team and supplies are then delivered by parachute, light aircraft, or assault transport late in the day or at night. Delivery may be made during an air attack against enemy forces in the neighboring area.

5. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION
6. Supply of these units is a considerable problem unless short-range infiltration units are able to operate in light vehicles. If units carry all of their supplies with them, the period that they can remain behind the lines is limited and much of their time is spent in the valueless and casualty producing effort of proceeding to and from their destinations. Therefore, units are supplied by air, and casualties are evacuated by light aircraft whenever possible.

7. MISSIONS

Missions carried out by short-range infiltration units include—

a. Intelligence.
b. Ambushes.
c. Raids.
d. Sabotage.
e. Forward observation for artillery or aircraft. Contact with friendly aircraft can be maintained by using a liaison plane equipped with an HF radio to talk to the unit on the ground and a VHF radio to relay instructions to combat aircraft.
f. The designation for aircraft. Infiltration units are equipped with large-scale, gridded air photos of the area, and copies of the photos are maintained at the unit's rear headquarters and at airforce headquarters. Units radio pin-point air photo coordinates of enemy installations and concentrations to rear headquarters which immediately transmits them to the airforce. Pilots use marked copies of air photos to pin-point air strike targets. Infiltration units behind lines can execute this type of mission without calling attention to themselves or requiring the larger numbers of personnel, arms, and equipment that would be needed to destroy installations by direct action.
g. Attacks in coordination with aircraft. Aircraft
attack targets at prearranged times. As soon as aircraft finish the attack, the flight leader signals this fact and the waiting unit dashes forward and completes the destruction of the enemy force or installation and then withdraws.

h. Establishing roadblocks in connection with regular operations.
i. Seizing and holding key installations in connection with regular operations.
j. Contact and operations with friendly guerilla forces already in an area.

8. USE OF UNITS IN VARIOUS SITUATIONS

Short-range infiltration units may be used in situations where friendly forces are advancing or retreating, or where they are static; and they may be used for special missions. A discussion of each type of use follows:

a. A Situation Where Friendly Forces are Advancing.
The primary mission of the unit in this case is to assist the advance. This includes blocking the movement of enemy reinforcements, destroying bridges, establishing roadblocks to prevent enemy retreat, or preventing enemy destruction of bridges and other key facilities necessary for the continued advance. In this situation the relief of the unit is planned in advance. Therefore, it must be employed openly in considerable strength to seize and hold objectives.

For this type of action, personnel may be dropped as a unit by parachute. Advance parties infiltrated through lines may be reinforced by parachute after achieving initial surprise. Small teams may be dropped by parachute for separate missions, or action may be taken by small parties previously infiltrated or parachuted into the area. In all such actions, plans are made to coordinate carefully the actions of such forces with the regular attacking forces, they are reorganized before being used again.
b. A Situation Where Friendly Forces Are Static. In this situation, teams carry out guerilla-type missions in the enemy’s rear areas. Small parties infiltrate through the enemy’s lines, make a reconnaissance in the rear area to select bases of operation, and then receive additional personnel and supplies by airdrop. They prepare message pickups for sending written reports, sketches, and similar data back to the main forces by aircraft.

c. A Situation Where Friendly Forces Are Withdrawing. Teams may be left behind in concealed positions with necessary supplies and communication equipment. They then operate against the enemy’s rear as long as possible. Subsequently, they are evacuated by air or sea.

d. Special Situations. Units may be used for commando-type operations like:

1. Amphibious landings in the enemy’s rear, executing special missions, and then withdrawing.
2. Parachute landings deep in the enemy’s rear, executing special missions, and then being picked up by air or naval craft.
3. Seizing or destroying enemy key installations before an amphibious landing by main forces.

9. VALUE

a. The use of short-range infiltration units forces the
b. The formation of short-range infiltration units absorbs a great number of physically and mentally superior men who would otherwise be available as leaders in line units. Special equipment and elite status given such units may have a depressing effect on the morale of regular units. Casualties will often be high in such units, and many wounded may die because of the difficulty in evacuating them to adequate medical facilities. Unless
commanders are thoroughly indoctrinated in the use of such units, there will be a constant temptation to use them in regular combat roles with a resulting rapid depletion of the specially trained and qualified men of the units.

Section III. LONG-RANGE INFILTRATION FORCES

10. GENERAL

While short-range infiltration units are organic parts of regular forces, long-range infiltration forces are usually complete forces in themselves. Their operations usually constitute major moves during the course of a campaign and may constitute a separate campaign in itself. Extensive logistical support is necessary. Such a force is necessarily large; several favorable conditions must exist if the unit is to accomplish its mission.

11. NECESSARY FAVORABLE CONDITIONS

Within his capabilities, the enemy will prevent large forces from entering and operating in his rear area. Therefore, the following conditions are necessary to the success of a long-range penetration:

a. There must be an area along the enemy perimeter that the enemy cannot hold in force or which he does not hold because he mistakenly believes it impassable to military forces. Such an area may be mountainous, heavily wooded, or desert terrain, or it may be an area that lacks adequate air defenses, which permits air movement of the penetration force.

b. Conditions must be such that the force is able to reach its selected area of operations without alerting the enemy. In the case of ground movements, this means that the population along the route of approach must be friendly to the invading force or nonexistent and that
there must be available routes of approach that are not in use nor heavily patrolled by the enemy. The force may be aided and reinforced by native guerilla units.

c. The selected area of operations must be defensible as it must be assumed that, when the force begins operations, the enemy will concentrate superior forces and seek to wipe out the force.

d. A service organization must be available to support the operation from friendly bases. This may involve extensive supply and evacuation by air; or supply may be land or sea routes when operations are being conducted against a long, exposed flank of the enemy.

12. ORGANIZATION

a. Long-range infiltration forces are composed of selected units that are given special training for the operation. During training, men who fail to meet the rigorous requirements of the mission are weeded out.

b. The forces headquarters is organized into two echelons: the forward echelon accompanies the force into enemy territory; the rear echelon remains in friendly territory and is responsible for the force’s supply and combat air support. Service units and air force units are included within the rear echelon. Communication with the forward echelon is maintained by radio and aircraft.

13. OPERATIONS

a. Essentially, the operations of long-range infiltration forces consist of four phases:

   (1) The concealed movement to the area of operations.

   (2) The preparation of the area to receive supplies and reinforcements. This will usually involve the construction of one or more airstrips.
(3) The operations against the enemy.
(4) The withdrawal or the link-up with friendly forces.
b. The mission of the long-range infiltration force may be one or more of the following:
   (1) The establishment of a barrier astride a vital enemy communication route.
   (2) The seizure of a critical area before the enemy has had an opportunity to prepare it for strong defense.
   (3) The seizure or preparation of an air base or air head.
   (4) The seizure and destruction of a vital enemy installation.
c. The operations of the force receive full support from tactical aircraft. Air strikes are directed by air-support parties accompanying the infiltration force.

14. VALUE
   a. The value of the long-range infiltration forces employed in Burma during World War II has been a subject of controversy. Wingate’s Raiders in 1943 were insufficient in number and did not have adequate logistical support, and as a result, were eventually driven out of the country with severe losses. Wingate’s larger expedition the following year, which consisted of several brigades, was much more successful, but was withdrawn after his death when a Japanese counterthreat to India developed. Merrill’s Marauders gave significant assistance to the advance of General Stilwell’s Chinese forces. However, this force, which left India with 2,899 men, had ceased to be an effective fighting force four months later because of sickness, casualties, and physical and mental exhaustion.
   b. The success of a long-range infiltration operation
depends primarily on surprise and the exploitation of the enemy failure or inability to prevent the penetration. Adequate security measures and reconnaissance by the enemy will usually protect him from long-range penetrations or will enable him to take prompt steps to contain the penetration before it can do serious harm. If he is unable to so protect himself, normal offensive action by regular forces will usually be sufficient to overcome him. The logistical effort required to support a long-range infiltration force is very great and depends on the control of the necessary land, air, or sea routes of communication. It is very difficult to train and condition large bodies of regular troops to function for extended periods behind enemy lines. This indicates that long-range infiltration operations will be limited to a very narrow field compared with short-range infiltration operations or the organization and exploitation of native guerilla forces behind enemy lines.
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