FM 31-21
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

GUERRILLA WARFARE
AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
MAY 1958
GUERILLA WARFARE AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

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*This manual supersedes FM 31-20, 10 August 1955, and FM 31-21, 23 March 1955.

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

FUNDAMENTALS

1. Purpose And Scope
   a. This field manual is designed to assist commanders and staff officers whose duties require a knowledge of the employment of special forces units. It is also specifically designed to assist the special forces group commander, his staff, and unit commanders in preparing for the operational employment of all elements of the group. It covers the mission, organization, characteristics and employment of special forces, and the methods and techniques of organizing, training, controlling, exploiting, and demobilizing guerilla forces in support of conventional forces.
   b. The material presented herein is applicable to both atomic and monatomic warfare.
   c. This manual should be studied in conjunction with its classified supplement FM 31-21A.

2. Explanation of Terms
   Guerilla warfare comprises that part of unconventional warfare which is conducted by relatively small groups employing offensive tactics to reduce enemy combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale. Guerilla operations are normally conducted in enemy-controlled territory by
units organized on a military basis. It must be emphasized that unconventional warfare is an activity which, in addition to guerilla warfare, includes evasion and escape and subversion against hostile states.

3. History

Guerilla warfare activities have existed since earliest time. A study of these activities reveals that they generally start with a small band of determined men who strike at the support and communications facilities of a more powerful enemy. Under strong leadership these groups grow larger and become better organized. In some instances they become strong enough to organize an army capable of seizing and holding ground.

4. Guerilla Activity in Future Warfare

a. Enemy lines of communication are the primary targets of guerillas. However, the increasing dependence of modern war machines on industrial support makes industrial and economic targets increasingly profitable objectives for guerilla forces.

b. Technical advancement in signal communications, advanced techniques of supply by air and sea, and the introduction of specially designed aircraft, such as helicopters, converti-planes, and assault aircraft for airdropped operations, make support of guerilla operations easier for the modern army. The introduction of new and more powerful lightweight weapons also increases guerilla warfare potential.

c. Nationality is no guarantee of loyalty. This is evidenced by existence of guerilla potential within areas controlled by all prospective belligerents. Nations that
utilized guerillas in World War II can be expected to use them again as an integral part of their military strategy. Such nations can be expected to make preparations for the organization, training, command, supply, and employment of guerilla units in potential areas of operations. The properly planned and coordinated employment of guerilla forces can make a significant contribution to the defeat of an enemy in any future war.

5. Legal Aspects of Guerilla Warfare

For the law of land warfare of the United States Armed Forces, see FM 27-10, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, discussed in DA Pam. 27-1.

6. Legal Status of the Guerilla

a. International law defines the prerequisites which entitle guerilla forces to be treated in the same manner as conventional units. In order to be entitled to treatment as prisoners of war under international law, guerillas must fulfill the following conditions

b. Be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

c. Have a fixed distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance.

d. Carry arms openly.

e. Conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT, OBJECTIVE, AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF GUERILLA WARFARE

7. General Concept of Guerilla Warfare

Guerilla warfare is a method by which a nation or group of people may oppose a more powerful enemy. It creates and employs forces against an enemy by using portions of civilian populations and resources that are part of the enemy's own warmaking potential. The guerilla force inflicts casualties and damage in the enemy's home territory or in areas which he occupies, threatening the security of the enemy's rear areas and decreasing his offensive and defensive capabilities. For further information, see FM 31-21A.

8. Objective

The fundamental objective of guerilla warfare operations is to reduce the enemy's combat effectiveness by disrupting his warmaking capability and weakening his ability to resist.

9. Missions of Guerilla Forces

a. The primary mission of guerilla forces is to interdict enemy lines of communication, installations, and centers of war production in support of conventional military operations.

b. Secondary missions of guerilla forces are—
   (1) Intelligence.
(2) Psychological warfare.
(3) Evasion and escape operations.
(4) Subversion against hostile states (resistance).

10. Characteristics

a. Guerilla warfare is characterized by offensive actions. Mobility, enterprise, and reliability of the forces employed are more important than numerical strength. Major decisive actions seldom take place. Instead, small units conduct brief, aggressive actions over a broad area under capable and versatile leaders operating under the general direction of area commanders. "Guerilla attacks make maximum use of surprise and shock action" followed by rapid disengagement and withdrawal.

b. Guerillas launch their attacks from guerilla base area. The location of guerilla units within a base area is not fixed, and only in extreme circumstances do they defend it. A system of alternate unit locations is established to enable guerillas to avoid and survive, antiguerrilla campaigns. Timely warning of enemy approach and rapid movement to predetermined alternate locations are the essential elements of an effective security system.

c. Guerillas depend heavily upon the support of the local civil population for the success of their operations. Civilians assist 'and support the guerillas while continuing their normal occupations. They provide food, clothing, and other supplies; operate the underground nets that gather information; send warnings; provide transportation and hideouts; and often arm
themselves secretly as a home guard. They act as
the moral force behind the guerillas. In fact, the
success of a guerilla movement is largely
determined by the civilian population's will to
resist and to support such a movement.
Psychological warfare plays a major role in
influencing the attitudes and opinions of the local
populace. Its use should therefore be planned to
prepare the way for the operation, to insure
continued support and to exploit all success.

d. Support also comes from the theater
commander who supplies equipment and controls
the military operations of the guerillas in
coordination with his planned conventional
military operations.

11. Capabilities

a. The primary capability of guerilla units is
offensive action to interdict enemy lines of
communication by demolitions, raids, ambushes,
and other disruptive actions. By the use of
surprise and maneuver aver terrain with which it
is thoroughly familiar, a guerilla unit inflicts
heavy damage and casualties with negligible losses
to itself. The enemy is compelled to use combat
formations for administrative moves and to deploy
combat troops to guard installations and lines of
communication. The enemy is denied the use of
alternate or secondary routes and must canalize his
movements. Thus more profitable targets are
created for interdiction by conventional military
means. Guerilla operations against lines of
communication make it difficult or impossible for
the enemy to shift his reserves and to resupply his
combat forces. Guerilla operations are most
effective when coordinated to support directly the theater commander’s conventional military operations.

b. Guerillas establish civilian warning, security, and intelligence nets to protect themselves from enemy penetration and to provide themselves with information about the enemy needed for their own operations.

c. Guerillas institute a propaganda effort to influence the civilian population in favor of their activities. Without this vital program, guerillas may fail to gain the strong loyalty of the populace, upon whom they must depend for support.

d. Whenever required, guerillas organize evasion and escape mechanisms in their operational areas to assist personnel in returning to friendly areas. Shelter, food, documentation, and medical treatment can be provided to evaders and escapees.

e. Guerilla forces are also capable of conducting subversion against hostile states (resistance).

f. Guerillas can also provide intelligence support (including target location and damage assessment) to conventional military commanders. However, exploitation of this capability should not be allowed to impair the primary capability of offensive action.

12. Limitations

a. Guerilla forces normally have limited capabilities for defensive or holding operations.

b. Usually targets must be within a reasonable marching distance, since equipment and weapons
must be manpacked.

c. Guerillas are generally dependent upon others for supplies and equipment.

d. A strong enemy security system requires guerillas to work cautiously and adhere to strict measures to guard against penetration of enemy agents.

e. Guerilla activities may be restricted to the hours of darkness, times of poor visibility, and bad weather.

f. Communications between higher headquarters in friendly territory and guerilla units behind enemy lines are ordinarily less extensive and slower than communications in front line units.

g. Sustained guerilla operations are dependent on sympathetic individuals or groups within the local population for active and passive support.

h. Compared to conventional units, guerilla forces are limited in firepower.

i. The degree of control and supervision of guerilla forces which can be exercised by commanders who do not have representatives present with the guerillas is limited.

j. The frequent need for dispersal after an action delays readiness for succeeding operations.

13. Relationship to Conventional Forces

a. In most cases, effective, overt resistance in the form of guerilla operations develops when the enemy becomes involved in war with another power. Because guerilla forces are usually unable to gain a final military decision, their activities are secondary in a military sense to the efforts of friendly conventional forces. However, theater forces can receive significant help from a guerilla
movement. The theater commander establishes and maintains contact with guerillas so that their activities can be controlled and coordinated to make a maximum contribution to the accomplishment of his mission.

b. It is particularly desirable from the viewpoint of the theater commander that coordination be established at an early date. This results in organization of the guerilla force along lines best suited to the purposes of the theater commander and a higher degree of control and coordination of effort. The control and coordination factors are discussed further in FM 31-21A.

c. During the greater part of its existence, the guerilla force is employed in overall support of a theater mission, and its operations are either tactical or strategic. The guerilla force operates either in the enemy communications zone or zone of the interior. It may be utilized to attack or isolate economic and production bases in enemy or enemy-held areas. These targets and objectives may be far removed from the area of conventional tactical operations but are conducted in coordination with long-range theater objectives to seriously reduce the enemy's military effectiveness.

d. As friendly forces advance toward the area of guerilla operations, the guerilla force is in a good position to support directly the operations of an army, corps, or division. Although this may be for only a comparatively short period, the guerilla support will make a significant contribution to the success of the conventional combat effort.

e. In return for cooperation with friendly
forces, guerillas receive moral and material support, and the operational direction necessary for the ultimate success of their activities.
CHAPTER 3

RESISTANCE AND GUERILLA WARFARE

14. General

a. Resistance by subjects of a regime begins with the desire of individuals to modify or end conditions imposed upon them by invasion, occupation or by an unpopular regime in their country. The feeling of opposition toward and hatred of conditions that conflict with the individual’s values, interests, aspirations, and way of life spreads from the individual to his family, to close friends, and to neighbors. As a result, an entire locality may be obsessed with hatred for the established legal authority. Initially, it is spontaneous. As the discontent grows, "natural leaders", e.g., ex-military personnel, clergymen, local office holders, and neighborhood spokesmen emerge to guide it into channels of resistance and encourage its growth.

b. There are many forms which opposition movements take, and development follows no rigid pattern. Discontented individuals typically engage in noncooperation, civil disobedience, work slowdowns, strikes, the spreading of rumors and propaganda. Discontent grows into disaffection. Some elements engage in subversion and sabotage. The outgrowth of such activities is that some individuals go into hiding to escape capture, imprisonment, or death. Some flee to rural areas where they become guerillas. Finally, armed revolt or insurrection occurs.
15. Types of Resistance

Ideally, a resistance movement is organized to best carry out specific activities. Generally, there are two types of resistance: covert and overt.

a. Covert resistance consists of undercover activities of individuals and groups living and working within the established order.

b. Overt or open resistance comprises the activities of individuals and organizations making no secret of their resistance. They divorce themselves from their normal pursuits and lead an outlaw type of existence. This type of resistance group organizes, trains, and arms itself for combat. In the formative stage, however, it may adopt covert methods of organization and operation. As it develops in size and capability, it retains some covert aspects. The collection of intelligence and security information necessary for the conduct of tactical operations, and the employment of civilians in the supporting activities retains a partly clandestine character.

16. Resistance Factors

The chief factors which influence and form the attitudes of people toward the organization and conduct of guerilla warfare are national character and geography.

a. National character is a composite of the personal characteristics of individuals and groups of people. It is mainly composed of the prevailing attitudes, social values, and aspirations.

b. The attitudes of people toward the regime in power and toward the actual or potential enemy of that regime are basic factors to consider in
developing and employing guerilla forces. Violent action against a regime may be caused mainly by the unbearable conditions it imposes rather than by sympathy for the policies of the opposing power. On the other hand, unwise policies of the regime's enemy may evoke general popular support even for a hated regime. Local support of guerillas may result from popular sympathy with the goals of the guerilla movement, or cooperation may be forced upon the populace by the ruthless tactics of the guerillas. From the local populace guerillas draw manpower, food, clothing, and information concerning the enemy. Guerillas utilize methods suitable to the situation to obtain, develop, and maintain adequate civilian support. Excessive forced requisitions by guerillas and enemy reprisals against civilian communities for supporting guerillas are detrimental to guerilla operations. However, support of a guerilla movement generally increases in direct proportion to its success.

In recent years, geography and local politics have become more important factors in the conduct of guerilla warfare. Targets and terrain are the fundamentals of guerilla warfare. Rugged mountains, swamps, and forested areas provide relatively secure guerilla base areas. In areas lacking favorable terrain resistance movements tend to take on a covert character. The most secure terrain sometimes cannot be used as the base area because guerilla forces should be within striking distance of profitable targets. Sparsely populated areas without adequate sources of food supplies generally are unsuitable for guerilla warfare unless ample outside logistical support and means of delivery are available.
17. Civilian Support

a. The guerillas depend almost entirely upon friendly civilians for food, clothing, and other basic supplies. Frequently, this places the civilians in difficult position, because they are caught between the guerillas demands for assistance and the enemy repressive activities. A guerilla movement may be sharply curtailed by reprisals against the local populace. Therefore, the guerillas must do everything possible to protect the local populace from enemy reprisals and initiate retaliatory measures when necessary.

b. If the will of the local populace to resist is strong, enemy reprisals cause guerilla and underground activities to increase. Underground support activities include intelligence, supply, early warning and evasion and escape operations which may be performed by secretly armed groups, sometimes know as home guards, and clandestine mechanisms. They civilian support activities are coordinated through committees which work directly with guerilla commanders and staff officers.

18. Outside Support

a. Guerilla operations are not ordinarily effective unless coordinated with conventional military operations. The theater commander must often support the guerillas with arms, ammunition, and equipment. In addition to logistical support a military commander may provide advisory and command personnel to develop and employ guerilla forces.

b. The theater commander decides to support
guerilla forces in his conduct of unconventional warfare when they can be reasonably expected to make significant contribution to the success of his combat mission.
PART TWO
SPECIAL FORCES
CHAPTER 4
SPECIAL FORCES FUNCTIONS

Section I. MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL FORCES

19. Definition

U. S. Army special forces are highly trained troops who conduct military operations far behind enemy lines. They foster and organize indigenous resistance potential in enemy territory in order to develop and exploit guerilla forces.

20. Mission

a. The primary mission of special forces units is to develop, organize, equip, train, support, and control guerilla forces and to conduct guerilla warfare in support of conventional military operations.

b. Secondary missions of special forces units are to—

(1) Engage in psychological warfare, intelligence, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states (resistance).

(2) Provide appropriate specialists and advisors to assist, in accomplishing the above missions on a coordinated basis.

(3) Perform such other missions as may be
directed by the theater commander.

21. Concept

a. The execution of a special forces mission takes into account differences in geographical, racial, cultural, social, economic, and security aspects of particular areas of operations.

b. The execution of a special forces mission embraces the following concepts

(1) The mission is designed to support the objectives of conventional military forces in time of war. It is responsive to the military requirements of the theater commander.

(2) This support is accomplished largely by indigenous forces and resources with the participation and support of U. S. Army personnel and equipment.

(3) On or immediately after D-day special forces teams are infiltrated into an area of operations where guerilla potential exists. This potential may be either organized or unorganized. The existence of organized guerilla forces is not assumed since in many situations special forces teams will be required to establish contact with local inhabitants to initiate the development of friendly elements into effective guerilla forces. The infiltration of special forces teams should begin as soon as possible and not wait for guerilla organizations and leaders to reach full development.

(4) Special forces teams organize, train, and
further develop existing and latent guerilla potential into guerilla forces. 
(5) It is essential that U. S. Army personnel achieve maximum operational control over the guerilla forces. This is accomplished through a complete integration of U. S. Army personnel with indigenous guerillas so that special forces team members not only hold command positions, but also work, fight, and live with the indigenous personnel. The special forces team and the local guerillas comprise one force, and this cohesiveness is vital to successful U. S. Army operational control. 
(6) The exploitation of guerilla forces involves committing them to military operations desired by the theater commander. 
(7) In conjunction with guerilla warfare activities, special forces teams are directly involved in evasion and escape operations within their unconventional warfare areas. Some elements of an evasion and escape mechanism are—
(a) A secure covert apparatus through which the evader will be introduced, processed, and passed to a refuge area. 
(b) A refuge area where the evader will be held and cared for until either covertly removed or overtly rescued. 
(8) For further information concerning the concept of special forces operations, see FM 31-21A.
22. Special Forces Units

a. Special forces units consist of operational and administrative teams under the command organization of a Special Forces Group, Airborne.

b. The Special Forces Group, Airborne, consists of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, a Parachute Rigging Detachment, and the required number of operational and administrative teams (fig. 1). The details of organization, the allotment of weapons and the distribution of items of equipment are shown in current tables of organization and equipment.
23. General

The Special Forces Group, Airborne, has the necessary administrative units to support the headquarters and the operational teams prior to combat operations. It can also support them during actual combat operations with such augmentation as the situation may require. Types of administrative units normally assigned are—

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

b. Quartermaster Special Forces Parachute Rigging Detachment.

c. AA Teams (Administrative Detachment, Company).

d. AB Teams (Administrative Detachment, Battalion).

24. Headquarters and Headquarters Company

a. Capabilities. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company (fig. 2) is organized to provide the following capabilities

   (1) Command, staff control, and planning for a special forces group located in friendly rear areas and, when provided with the necessary augmentation in personnel and equipment, for subordinate units committed for operations.

   (2) Supply distribution to a special forces group located in friendly rear areas, and when provided with the necessary augmentation in personnel and equipment, to subordinate units committed for operation.
(3) Organizational maintenance for a special forces group located in friendly rear areas.

(4) Administration for a special forces group.

(5) Supervision of training.

(6) Nontactical communications with subordinate units; tactical communications when provided with augmentation in personnel and equipment.

(7) Flexibility to permit augmentation for any large-scale operation.

(8) Medical service for a special forces group in friendly rear areas.

b. Composition. The company is composed of the following elements:

(1) The group headquarters, consisting of the commander and his unit staff officers.

(2) The group headquarters section, composed of the enlisted men working in the headquarters.

(3) The company headquarters section; including the company commander and necessary administrative personnel to accomplish the mission of providing billets, supply and other administrative requirements.

(4) The communications section, under the direct supervision of the communications officer, containing the necessary enlisted personnel to operate and maintain the group communications facilities.

(5) The personnel and administrative section, under the direct supervision of the adjutant, containing enlisted
personnel to operate the S1 and personnel offices of the group headquarters.

(6) The supply and maintenance section under the supervision of the S4, containing the officer and enlisted personnel required to operate the supply and maintenance functions of the group.

(7) The medical section under the supervision of a medical officer, who is also the group surgeon. It consists of medical service officers, and the enlisted personnel necessary to support the medical requirements of the group.

(8) For detailed organization, see the current table of organization and equipment.

25. Quartermaster Parachute Rigging Detachment

   a. Capabilities. The Quartermaster Parachute Rigging Detachment (TOE 10-419) is organized to provide parachute packing and maintenance support for a special forces group (fig. 3).

   b. Composition. The detachment consists of a headquarters and three squads: supply, packing, and maintenance. For detailed organization, see the current table of organization and equipment.

26. Administrative Teams

   a. Team AA, Administrative Detachment Company. When attached to a Team FB (par. 33) this team provides the necessary mess and administration for a nonoperational grouping of nine or more teams FA (par. 32). After the operational teams are committed, team AA is
available for augmenting the administrative functions of the special forces group.
b. Team AB, Administrative Detachment, Battalion: When attached to a Team FC (par. 34), this team provides the necessary administration for a nonoperational grouping of 45 or more teams FA (par. 32). It also has the capability of running a motor pool. After the operational teams are committed, team AB is available for augmenting the administrative functions of the special forces group.

27. Group Adjustments After Commitment of Operational Teams

a. The group commander must reorganize the group when commitment of operational teams to combat reduces group strength to the point that provisional companies and battalions are no longer required. The provisional company and battalion headquarters cease to exist at the time the operational teams go to the staging and briefing center. Teams AA and AB remain behind and revert to the control of the group commander. The personnel administration and interior management of the headquarters and headquarters company and of the parachute rigging detachment remain essentially the same as they were prior to the commitment of the operational teams.

b. The administrative teams, upon reverting to the group commander’s control, form a pool of personnel and teams which the commander may use. Some of the purposes for which they are utilized are

(1) Attachment to new provisional units undergoing training to provide them administrative support.

(2) Attachment to groupings of teams
recovered from enemy territory to furnish them administrative support.

(3) Augmentation of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the Parachute Rigging Detachment.

28. Administrative Support of Committed Teams

a. Prior to the departure of operational teams for the operational area, a complete personnel processing of each man is effected in accordance with standing operating procedures.
b. A detailed briefing will be given to the operational team leaders on the personnel policies and procedures under which they will operate. This briefing will define the latitude which the teams may take in interpreting these policies and procedures.

29. Administrative Problems of Operational Teams After Commitment

a. After commitment, operational teams are relieved of all records and reports that can be maintained by the administrative teams. The ranking operational commander in an area, however, as well as the commanders of teams assigned to individual missions, remain fully responsible for the efficient employment and welfare of special forces personnel under their jurisdiction. Morale and welfare considerations will include provisions for awards and decorations. Adequate arrangements and policies regarding disciplinary matters involving Army personnel, relations with civilian populations, and employment of indigenous civilians must be
developed on a basis of agreement with the guerilla commanders involved.

30. Administrative Guidance to Guerilla Units

a. At all levels, the administration of guerilla forces is complicated by a variety of ethnic, psychological, political, and economic factors with which commanders of conventional forces are not ordinarily faced. Factors pertaining to the basic motivation of resistance groups, guerilla relations with the local population, potential civilian sources of recruits, local customs, and religious practices all will have a bearing on the administrative policies adopted by guerilla commanders in the area.

b. The special forces commander works through channels of the area command organization to gain acceptance of basic theater policies and procedures, aided by a sympathetic understanding of the framework in which guerilla operations must be conducted. He assists the guerillas in solving their administrative and personnel problems through the coordinated area command. As new problems arise, or are foreseen, in connection with personnel policies and procedures, discipline, morale, finance and relations with civilian elements, special forces personnel should be prepared to assist promptly in working out solutions acceptable to all parties.

Section III. SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL TEAMS

31. General
a. The Special Forces Group, Airborne contains operational teams which are identified by using letter combinations.

b. Each operational team has the capability of organizing and developing a guerilla force for the purpose of—
   (1) Conducting guerilla warfare in support of conventional military operations.
   (2) Assisting in the execution of theater policies in the conduct of political, economic and psychological operations.

c. Special forces operational teams are conventionally organized into companies and battalions within the special forces group for control, administration and training during other than operational periods. The group headquarters and headquarters company retains its identity and organization. The team PC, augmented by a team AB, forms a battalion headquarters to which may be attached approximately five teams FB. Each team FB, augmented by a team AA, forms a company headquarters to which may be attached approximately 10 teams FA. The organization is so flexible that for a given situation it can be organized in the structure which best serves to accomplish the mission. See current tables of organization and equipment for details.

d. Operational teams have no organic vehicles. Their mobility may be increased by the capture or confiscation of vehicles behind enemy lines. Most of the time use of vehicles will be very restricted because of enemy control of roads and scarcity of fuel and replacement parts.

32. Team FA
a. This operational team (fig. 4) has the capability of developing, organizing, training, supporting, and controlling a guerilla company, battalion, or regiment.
b. In some situations a reduced strength operational team (fig. 5) has the required capability and will be employed instead of a full strength team.

33. Team FB

This team has the capability of providing a district command organization to supervise the employment and control of two or more FA teams. The district command organization is discussed in paragraph 60. During the early stages the FB team may be employed as an FA team prior to the requirement for a district command organization. Basis for allocation is one team per district command composed of two or more guerrilla units.

34. Team FC

The basis of allocation and the mission of this team is identical to Team FB. However, the FC team has a capability of controlling a larger district than the FB team. During the early stages the FC team may be employed as an FA team prior to the requirement for a district command organization.

35. Team FD

This team provides an area command organization to supervise the employment and control of two or more FA, FB, and/or FC teams which are engaged in the developing, organizing, training, supporting, and controlling guerrilla companies, battalions, or regiments. The area command organization is discussed in paragraph 60. The basis of allocation is one team per area
command.
36. Command Structure

a. Depending on the size of the area and the extent of planned operations, a team FA, FB, FC, or FD is the command and control team for all unconventional warfare operations within the area. The type of team chosen for infiltration into an operational area is also determined by the rank prestige factor when dealing with guerillas. A situation could very well arise when the guerillas will refuse to deal with the operational FA team because it is commanded by a captain and will ask for a field grade officer. In such a case, either an FB (major), FC (lieutenant colonel), or FD (colonel) team will be substituted for the FA team or the FA team commander will be replaced by a field grade officer. Two or more teams FB or FC (district command) are usually subordinate to a team FD (area command). Two or more teams FA are subordinate to a team FB or FC. These teams are closely integrated with the guerillas in the district, or area, and a unified command structure is established to create a coordinated guerilla warfare effort.

Section IV. SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING

37. General

The special forces trained soldier is identifiable by means of a suffix "3" as the fifth digit of the enlisted personnel's PMOS, and in the case of officer personnel the "3" is entered as a prefix to the PMOS. Normally all training to qualify an individual for special forces duty will be conducted in CONUS. However, during peacetime, oversea units may also conduct qualification
training.

38. Conduct of Training

a. Training will be conducted in accordance with current army training programs and training directives.

b. The post cycle phase includes selection of teams for area assignments and is undertaken after the group has attained the training objectives of the ATP. Post cycle training has three major objectives.

(1) Selection, training, and preparation of teams for specific areas of operation. This includes training in the language, geography, economy, customs, religion, technology, history, institutions, local maps, and local conditions such as travel restrictions, rationing, enemy forces, and security measures.

(2) Improvement of team capabilities by repetition of training previously received.

(3) Improvement of individual capabilities.

39. Training Objectives

The primary training objective is to prepare the special forces teams to successfully contact, organize, train, support, control, further develop, and exploit the guerrilla potential in the operational area.

Section V. THEATER ORGANIZATION

40. Types of Command.

a. Within a theater of operations, one or more special forces groups may be employed in support of the theater commander in carrying out his
mission. One of the following command organizations may be selected by the theater commander for this purpose:

(1) Normally a joint task force will be formed, composed of elements of two or more of the services, to engage in the conduct of unconventional warfare. The joint task force commander is directly under the command of the theater commander. In such an organization, the special forces units will normally constitute the army element of the task force for the conduct of unconventional warfare, under the operational control of the joint task force commander and supported logistically by the theater army component. Coordination between elements of the task force is achieved through a joint staff composed of personnel from all task force elements. In a large theater of operations, subordinated joint task forces may be organized for operations in designated areas. See FM 31-21A.

(2) Under exceptional circumstances, a theater component commander may be made responsible for the conduct of unconventional warfare.

b. Special Forces units are organized within a special forces operational base; a headquarters physically located behind friendly lines. The mission of the special forces operational base is to provide command, administration, training, technical operational support, logistical support, and intelligence for special forces teams committed
to action behind enemy lines.

c. Principles of organization and operations described apply whether United States forces are acting alone or jointly with those of other countries in a theater of operations. Combined operations are governed by additional considerations, including the extent of separate administrative and logistical support of allied forces. Within a United States theater of operations, however, all guerilla warfare and related activities will be conducted through a single command organization responsible to the theater commander.

d. When required, guerilla warfare is coordinated between adjacent theaters of operation through the joint theater staffs.
Note: For a discussion of the phases of guerilla warfare development that occur prior to infiltration, see FM 31-21A.

41. General

a. Infiltration is the entrance of personnel and supplies into an area or territory occupied or about to be occupied by hostile military forces, making, maximum use of secrecy and deception to avoid detection. Infiltration is not completed until special forces personnel reach their operational area.

b. Four means of infiltration for special forces are—

(1) Air.
(2) Water.
(3) Land.
(4) Staying behind.

c. Factors influencing the choice of infiltration means are—

(1) Mission.
(2) Terrain.
(3) The enemy situation.
(4) Weather.
(5) Status of personnel, equipment, and transportation.
(6) Guerilla potential and situation.
(7) Distance.
d. The most desirable situation for a special forces team upon initial infiltration into an operational area is to be met by an indigenous reception committee. Infiltration without a reception committee will be necessary when there are no prior contacts with the people in the area to arrange a reception committee, and time does not permit the making of such contacts.

e. Reception functions are as follows:
   (1) To select landing zones, drop zones, and other reception sites.
   (2) To provide detailed reports on selected sites.
   (3) To prepare the prearranged marking and identification code, panel, flare path and/or visual and electronic signals.
   (4) To conduct reception operations from the ground.
   (5) To organize the exchange of passengers and equipment in reception operations and provide for the dispatch of cargo or personnel in evacuation operations.
   (6) To provide security and cover for the operation site.
   (7) To provide medical aid when necessary.
   (8) To provide transportation and protection for the organization.

f. The organization of the reception committee is dependent upon the situation and varies somewhat with each commander and type of operation. It generally includes the following five elements
   (1) The command party comprises the reception committee leader,
communication and medical personnel, and other personnel whom the reception committee leader may want. The extent and complexity of the organization will be dependent upon the number of personnel and/or amount of supplies being delivered, the distance from the reception site to the guerilla base area, and the degree of restriction imposed by enemy action. The reception, committee leader must brief the party leaders on their duties and responsibilities, and place himself in a position where he can best control and supervise the operation.

(2) The light party contains personnel needed to establish the prearranged marking of the drop zone, landing site, or transshipment point. It is responsible for the placement and operation of site markings and recognition signals; and it must function efficiently in order to convey accurate and timely information to the carrier crew. The light party should be trained as a team prior to the operation to assure proper execution.

(3) The security party guards against enemy action. Security forces should be placed on high ground overlooking the reception site, if possible, and along possible avenues of approach, and will establish ambush sites along routes which the enemy may use to move to the reception site. Internal security forces will establish a perimeter defense close to the reception site to engage enemy troops.
that may succeed in breaking through the external security system. Security warning nets should be established throughout the area and extend as far from the site as the situation requires. Security personnel may be needed to escort and guide the personnel from the site to the guerilla base area or cache points.

(4) The recovery party collects equipment and supplies that have been delivered. This party also can be used to collapse parachutes and to guide personnel to assembly points. The recovery party is best suited for the policing of the reception site to eliminate all traces of the infiltration.

(5) The transport party receives supplies and equipment from the distribution or breakdown point, transports them to a predetermined location, and provides facilities for storage or issue. When supplies are transported by foot over long routes across difficult terrain, it may be necessary to establish alternate caches.

g. If a prearranged reception committee fails to show proper markings and recognition signals, the special forces team is not infiltrated. Close coordination is exercised during the planning stage to insure that the drop or landing, will take place on schedule and at the predetermined location. Extensive and accurate preembarkation planning is required.

h. Infiltration without the use of a reception committee is not desirable, but may be
successfully executed if the situation requires placing personnel and equipment into operational areas in this manner. The responsibility for removing all traces of the infiltration, caching of equipment, and establishing immediate security then falls upon the team leader. Before making any effort to contact friendly civilians in the enemy country, he must secure his team in some remote section of the operational area. Only then may he begin the delicate process of searching out friendly elements who will give him the aid that is normally offered by the reception committee.

42. Air Infiltration

a. This term is defined as entry into enemy occupied areas utilizing aircraft from point of departure to the target area.

b. Air transport is the most practical, efficient, and speedy method of infiltrating special forces personnel and equipment into an operational area.

c. Fixed wing aircraft (high and low performance, including seaplanes as well as land-based aircraft) are utilized as the infiltration mission requires. Rotary wing aircraft are used within their range arid load-carrying capabilities.

43. Desirable Characteristics and Capabilities of Aircraft

Aircraft should be capable of—

a. Dropping a minimum of 15 persons and 5,000 pounds of cargo simultaneously.

b. Long range flights at varying speeds and altitudes during darkness or adverse weather conditions at varying speeds over mountainous
terrain.

c. Locating the drop site with a minimum of
time in the target area.
d. Nonstop flight within a combat radius of
2,000 miles.
e. Landing and taking off on unprepared
landing strips, with minimum usable runways of
1,000 feet.
f. In certain situations, landing and taking off
on water.

44. Advantages and Disadvantages of Air
Infiltration

a. Advantages.
   (1) Speed in delivery of personnel and
       supplies.
   (2) Capability of delivering personnel and
       supplies at or near the operational area.
   (3) Short exposure to the enemy.
   (4) Ability of performing concurrent
       missions, i.e., the delivery of more than
       one team, and the use of aircraft as radio
       relay stations.

b. Disadvantages.
   (1) Difficulty of navigation.
   (2) Vulnerability to enemy air action.
   (3) Inaccurate delivery because of enemy
       action.
   (4) Injury of personnel, breakage and loss of
       equipment.
   (5) Weather limitations.

45. Water Infiltration

a. Water infiltration is defined as entry into
enemy controlled areas utilizing naval craft and vessels.

b. Infiltration by water is considered the most secure and economical method up to the point of debarkation from the parent craft. After debarkation, considerable distances may still need to be traveled before reaching the target area.

46. Desirable Characteristics and Capabilities of Water Craft

a. Adequate troop and cargo space.

b. Sufficient speed to employ evasive maneuvers.

c. Adequate armament for defense against enemy attack.

d. Navigational aids and communication equipment to insure accurate navigation during adverse weather conditions.

e. Combat radius sufficient to allow a safety margin for the operation.

f. Personnel and equipment to assist in offshore unloading and ship-to-shore movement of personnel and supplies.

g. Medical facilities for the evacuation of sick and wounded personnel.

47. Advantages and Disadvantages of Water Infiltration

a. Advantages.

   (1) Range capabilities are increased.

   (2) Weather has little or no effect on water infiltration up to the point of debarkation from parent craft.

   (3) Evacuation is possible with each
mission.
(4) Operational briefings can be conducted en route to the target area, and continued communication maintained with the base.
(5) Concentration and control of personnel and supplies.
(6) Evasive maneuvering and an ability to defend in case of attack increases the security of the mission.
(7) Large quantities of supplies can be delivered.
b. Disadvantages.
(1) It is necessary to have transshipment and offshore unloading of supplies.
(2) Personnel and equipment may be lost during ship-to-shore movements.
(3) There will often be inaccuracy of hydrographic intelligence on the landing site.
(4) Movement of supplies from the landing site to the operational area is necessary.
(5) Additional packaging and crating is required to protect equipment from salt water and corrosion.
(6) Additional training is necessary for all personnel involved in ship-to-shore movement.
(7) The team is vulnerable to enemy fire from enemy shore installations and to enemy mines.
c. Indigenous craft may be used to effect a rendezvous or reception at sea with naval craft, and to transship personnel and supplies to shore. This type of reception often increases the security of water infiltration. Careful planning is required.
in order to avoid delay at the rendezvous point.

48. Land Infiltration
   a. Land infiltration is the movement to an operational area by land through areas under enemy control or observation. The initial movement into enemy territory is usually accomplished on foot. In enemy rear areas, however, indigenous transportation may be successfully utilized:
      b. Infiltration by land is usually limited to short movements up to 150 miles by a limited number of personnel with minimum equipment.
      c. Time must be allowed for unforeseen delays in movement. Secrecy must take precedence over speed. Movement maybe limited to times of adverse weather conditions and darkness.

49. Conditions Favorable for Land Infiltration
   a. Fluid and unstable enemy lines.
   b. Adverse weather, such as fog, snow, or heavy rain.
   c. Terrain that is mountainous, heavily wooded; or having dense undergrowth.
   d. Minimum requirements for equipment to be transported.
   e. Friendly air superiority.
   f. Variable target date for arrival.
   g. Personnel highly trained in evasive techniques and cross-country navigation.

50. Advantages and Disadvantages of Land Infiltration
   a. Advantages.
(1) Personnel infiltrated by land have the capability of concurrently gathering intelligence.
(2) Personnel need not be trained as parachutists or in amphibious techniques.

b. Disadvantages.
(1) Limitations of equipment and supplies.
(2) Time limitations for reaching the target area.
(3) Greater probability of capture.
(4) Loss of integrity and control because of separation into small groups to avoid detection.

51. Stay-Behind Operations

A stay-behind operation is defined as a method of infiltrating the enemy lines by remaining "underground" and permitting the enemy to advance over the proposed operational area. Stay-behind operations are considered the best method of infiltrating when the enemy has reached the exploitation phase of a "breakthrough" against friendly forces.

52. Factors Governing Employment of Stay-Behind Operations

a. Lack of time to infiltrate by other means.
b. Lack of transportation facilities.
c. Fluid and fast moving front.
d. Capability of the enemy to overrun the operational area.
e. Terrain.

53. Advantages and Disadvantages of Stay-Behind
Operations

a. Advantages.
   (1) Minimum transportation requirements.
   (2) Personnel familiar with operational area, local populace, and resistance potential.
   (3) Large caches of supplies and equipment available.
   (4) Deception.
   (5) Security of infiltration.
   (6) Speed of infiltration.
   (7) No reception committee necessary.

b. Disadvantages.
   (1) Proximity to enemy combat troops.
   (2) Freedom of movement initially restricted.
   (3) Unit integrity lost due to dispersement.
   (4) Communication restriction during the initial phase.
54. General

a. In the execution of its mission, the special forces operational team is concerned with the training activities of the guerilla force since successful operations against modern conventional forces depend upon trained individuals and units of necessity, training must be decentralized and accomplished in the shortest possible time, so as not to delay operations any longer than necessary.

b. The special forces commander, working with key guerilla personnel, is responsible for developing and implementing a training program as soon as conditions permit. Guerilla units must be specially trained in the tactics, techniques, and skills peculiar to this type of warfare. Command, staff, combat, and service echelons of the guerilla forces should attain proficiency and flexibility approximating that of regular military organizations. Training should be conducted in areas uncontrolled by, or not readily accessible to, the enemy.

55. Development of Training Activity

In planning the program of instruction, the special forces commander must remember the problem of guerilla security, and develop a decentralized and flexible system of training. The
best method is to train selected guerilla personnel to become instructors themselves. These guerilla instructors are given concentrated courses designed to develop competent cadres which will in turn be assigned the task of training other units within the operational area. By these means, instruction can, be given to small, dispersed groups without the risk of enemy discovery inherent in a centralized program.

56. Considerations for Development of Training Program

The operational capabilities of the guerillas on initial contact and the tune and facilities available will govern the selection of subjects for the initial training program. Guerilla units must be trained in many subjects to perform effectively as military forces. It must be realized, however, that in many areas of the world most adult male citizens have received a considerable amount of military training. In those areas the chief task before the special forces team commander will be to teach the guerillas or potential guerillas how to use U. S. weapons, demolitions, and equipment. For those persons who have had very little or no military training, a complete training program must be initiated. Subject matter for guerillas includes the following, modified as the situation demands or time permits

a. Basic Training.
   (1) Care and use of individual and crew-served weapons.
   (2) Camouflage and concealment.
   (3) Organization and command of forces.
   (4) Security and warning systems.
(5) First aid.
(6) Map reading and use of the compass.
(7) March discipline.
(8) Supply economy.
(9) Physical conditioning.
b. Advanced and Specialized Training.
   (1) Intelligence nets and activities.
   (2) Counterintelligence activities.
   (3) Tactics and operations.
   (4) Communications.
   (5) Demolitions and sabotage techniques.
c. Psychological Orientation and Other Subjects

As Required.

57. Implementation of Training Program

The plan for implementation of the training program must include a consideration of—
   a. Selection of secure training areas.
   b. Selection and scheduling of essential subjects.
   c. Organization for training of individuals and units.
   d. Duration of training phase.
   e. Preparation and use of training facilities.
   f. Administration and supervision of training.

58. Control Factors Affecting Status of Training

In order to maintain control of his unit, the special forces team leader must periodically consider the following to obtain maximum results
   a. Effectiveness of security forces.
   b. Organization and buildup of guerilla forces.
   c. Size of the training area, and the extent of facilities.

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d. Establishment of additional training areas.

e. Expansion of the area, of guerilla influence.

f. Supervision of training.

g. Status of weapons and equipment.

h. Live raids, ambushes, and operations as training vehicles.
CHAPTER 7
EXPLOITATION

Section 1. OPERATIONAL CONTROL

59. General

a. Guerilla forces supported by a military commander will achieve much greater success than unsponsored guerillas and can effectively support conventional military operations when their activities are coordinated with the military commander's plans. Control and coordination of guerilla forces is discussed in FM 31-21A.

b. The theater commander designates the location of unconventional warfare areas, flexible as to boundaries and exact location, within or from which he plans to conduct unconventional warfare operations. Detailed operational plans are then prepared by special forces operational units based on the theater commander's plan. These detailed plans provide for the establishment of operational boundaries within the framework of the operational area concept described below.

60. Area Concept of Operations

a. The basic factors in planning for and developing unconventional warfare operations area targets, terrain, resistance potential, and logistics. Analysis of the terrain factor is based on geographical and operational considerations.

(1) Operational areas are defined according to natural terrain features such as rivers and mountain ranges considered in
relation to targets, resistance potential, and logistical requirements. In some cases, political and ethnic boundaries are important. The size of operational areas varies greatly according to the types of targets, terrain, and the nature and extent of operations envisaged. The ultimate developmental objective, as well as the initial deployment of operational teams, is considered in the selection of areas.

(2) Operational areas are those in which special forces teams perform multipurpose and interrelated unconventional warfare missions. The senior special forces team commander in an operational area is the United States commander representing the will and authority of the theater commander in that, particular area. As a consequence, all United States or allied operations planned for the area must be coordinated with the team commander.

(3) Operational areas are either composed of or divided into districts and areas at an appropriate stage of development. Such districts and area compositions must be provided for in planning to allow flexibility and to avoid confusion when reorganization, consolidation, expansion, and the organization of new units are necessary or desirable. A district command, based on geographical and operational considerations, is comprised of two or more special forces teams operating jointly. Two or more districts
having similar geographic areas, resistance potential, and logistic requirements compose an area command.

b. Special forces operational teams will be infiltrated into the operational area. The teams will either organize existing guerillas or develop guerilla potential and control and assist them in the name of the theater commander. They will also act as technical advisers to the guerilla commander on all military matters and in some instances may assume command of the guerilla force. They are responsible for advising the theater commander on:

1. The capabilities and limitations of the guerilla force.
2. The external logistical support required.
3. The utilization of supplies.
4. Other aspects of guerilla, operation of interest to him:

61. Coordination of Guerilla Effort With Conventional Force Operations

Two types of commands may be established by the theater commander for the conduct of guerilla warfare and other related activities: a joint task force, or a special forces operational base under the theater army commander (par. 40).

a. If a joint task force is organized, the command is placed on a level with theater army, navy, and air force. The command maintains close liaison with theater headquarters and with the headquarters of the theater conventional force. In this manner, appropriate decisions can be made for the commitment of special forces teams to contact and develop guerilla forces in areas best calculated to support operations of theater conventional
forces. This command structure is discussed in FM 31-21A.

b. If the theater army commander assumes direct responsibility for the conduct of guerilla warfare and other related activities, coordination and control is established through the special forces operational base.

62. Transfer of Control

An advance by friendly troops which contemplates linking up with guerilla forces requires plans for the transfer of operational control of the guerilla forces from theater level to the commander of the advancing force. A staff liaison group, organized from whichever type of command has been established to conduct guerilla warfare as indicated in paragraph 61 is attached to the ground force commander’s staff. This liaison group will explain the status of the guerilla force and recommend appropriate exploitation of its capabilities. It will also provide communications between the conventional force headquarters’ end the special forces operational teams in the field. Guerilla force supply may continue to come directly from the theater joint task force or special forces operational base because of previous procurement and storage of the types and amounts of supplies needed and its control over established means of delivery.


a. Commanders should know the organization, methods of operations, capabilities, and limitations
of the guerilla force. They should insure that their subordinate commanders know how to utilize guerilla forces. Problems of supply and operational support should be anticipated. Missions assigned to guerilla forces must be within their capabilities, and the forces should be kept active during their period of usefulness. Whenever possible, guerilla forces should be used as complete units. Of primary importance is respect for existing guerilla standing operating procedures; although these may vary greatly from those of conventional forces the guerillas own methods of operation may be particularly suited to the situation. Commanders should respect guerilla ranks and grades. Guerilla morale should be maintained by awarding decorations and letters of commendation and by expressing appreciation whenever such actions are justified. An effort should be made to anticipate and prevent guerilla reprisals against collaborators, and to direct, the guerillas to take lawful actions to punish proven collaborators. Plans also must, be made to deal with language barriers and political problems. In the realm of politics, commanders should not, make political commitments to guerilla forces unless authorized by higher headquarters. Finally, commanders should recognize the time when the value of the guerilla, force has ended and take prompt steps to suspend their operations.

Section II. OPERATIONAL MISSIONS

64. General

a. Missions assigned to guerilla forces are
tactical and strategic in nature. These missions support theater war plans and are, designed to exploit the guerilla force in its area of operations.

b. The execution of guerilla operations should be carefully timed. A premature operation may cause violent enemy reaction, which disorganizes the guerilla force results in serious personnel losses, a useless expenditure of arms and ammunition, and renders the force incapable of performing later missions.

65. Mission Before Link-Up

a. Prior to link-up with conventional forces, guerilla forces may be assigned missions to destroy or hinder the operations of strategic industries or activities vital to the enemy's war effort. These activities should be coordinated with the strategic destruction program of conventional forces to assure maximum benefit from guerilla forces' attacks. Guerilla forces may also be assigned missions to cut railway and highway nets to delay or prevent the movement of enemy reinforcements. Such action is also effective in isolating the enemy under attack by friendly conventional forces.

b. Guerillas, by carrying out relatively small offensive actions, can present a serious threat to the enemy's operations. Every rail or communications break; every piece of rolling stock damaged or destroyed; every enemy soldier killed, wounded, or diverted from other duties to fight, against the guerillas interferes with the enemy's freedom of action. It then becomes necessary for the enemy to divert large numbers of his troops to conduct antiguerrilla warfare, and this drain on
enemy manpower can be of vital importance to the overall war effort, especially in the initial stages of conflict.

c. Guerilla forces may assist downed aircrews, evading personnel, escaped prisoners of war, and other allied personnel in the area who need assistance. In some cases, guerillas may construct emergency airstrips. Aircrews or other military personnel operating in an area should be briefed regarding the general location of guerilla operational areas. Rescued personnel are cared for by the guerillas until returned to conventional forces. Guerillas may extend their operations into prisoner of war camps, and other internment facilities and arrange for escape of interned allied personnel providing the guerilla warfare mission is not jeopardized.

d. Guerilla forces may be assigned the mission of supporting theater psychological warfare operations. They can be utilized in assessing the impact of psywar operations, gathering information pertaining to psywar vulnerabilities, distributing propaganda. The guerilla forces' situation, their operational successes, the sympathy and support of the local population, enemy vulnerabilities, etc., should be considered in preparing propaganda.

e. The guerilla intelligence net may be used to gather information important to the theater commander, to include target location and damage assessment, such as guided missiles sites, radar installations, AA units, CBR installations, tactical troop concentrations of division size or larger, etc. Normally, however, the security of the guerilla and special forces communications nets should not be endangered by lengthy intelligence reports.
which do not contribute anything material to the guerilla warfare mission.

66. Missions During Link-Up

a. During the period of linking up with conventional forces, the primary offensive support mission of the guerilla force is to delay or prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements. Coordination is necessary to preserve lines of communication and facilities needed to maintain the advance of friendly forces.

b. Guerillas may also be assigned the mission of assisting or seizing important objectives and preventing enemy destruction of key installations. Guerilla units which have been given missions to seize objectives should be relieved by conventional forces as soon as possible.

67. Missions After Link-Up

a. Guerilla units attached to conventional forces can be of great assistance as guides and patrols. Their knowledge of the terrain and enemy dispositions can assist the operations of conventional forces.

b. They may also be assigned the mission of warning delaying, or holding in order to prevent enemy movement or oppose enemy action on the exposed flanks of conventional forces.

c. Guerilla units that are well trained and organized for conventional operations have the capability of fighting as combat units in assigned sectors of operations. The use of guerilla forces in this role usually requires additional logistical and operational support.
d. They may be used to mop up areas bypassed by conventional forces. Their detailed knowledge of the terrain can be of assistance in a mission of this type.

e. Further uses for guerilla forces are
   (1) Assisting civil affairs/military government in controlling and administering relief to the civilian population and refugees in friendly rear areas, releasing conventional forces for combat duties.
   (2) Apprehending enemy collaborators and spies.
   (3) Assisting in the recruitment of labor and providing technicians capable of operating public utilities:
   (4) Guarding or protecting bridges, supply dumps, and other vital installations:

Section III. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

68. General

   a. Guerillas may be used either independently or in coordination with friendly regular forces, to achieve a rapid fulfillment of military, political, and economic aims. They capitalize on the enemy’s inability to defend himself and his important installations at all places and at all times.

   b. Guerilla operations are conducted primarily against enemy lines of communication.

69. Method

   a. Guerilla forces operate in small units; fixed
combat positions are avoided. Attacks are executed at unexpected times and places to capitalize on the element of surprise—and its resulting confusion.

b. Plans for guerilla operations must include accurate information of the enemy's dispositions and movements and a thorough knowledge of the terrain to offset guerilla inferiority in logistics and training. Operations against highly organized troop concentrations are avoided. Large-scale effects on the enemy generally are achieved by coordinating the actions of many small units over a broad area.

70. Effects

a. Guerilla operations wear down and inflict causalities upon the enemy, cause damage to supplies and facilities, and delay enemy operations. The success of guerilla operations even the fact that the guerillas continue to exist lowers enemy morale and prestige; disrupts the economy, politics, and industry of the enemy occupied area; and maintains the morale and will to resist of the native population.

b. Because guerilla operations are directed against the lines of communication, they impede or interdict the movement of men and material and seriously affect the enemy's capability to supply, control and communicate with his combat forces. In addition, the enemy is compelled to divert manpower and equipment to combat guerilla activities.

71. Operational Areas

a. Operational areas will probably extend from
the enemy's combat zone through his communications zone and into the zone of interior. These zones will contain areas falling into one or more of the following categories:

1. Area controlled effectively by guerillas. Headquarters and camps may be located in this area, usually in difficult terrain. Guerilla headquarters will be located in areas offering the greatest obstacles to enemy penetration.

2. Area controlled effectively by the enemy. Activities in this area are usually restricted to raider type missions executed by small groups or individuals. This is normally the least desirable type, of operation from the viewpoint of effectiveness, but under these circumstances, it is the most expedient.

3. Area not controlled effectively by either force. Guerillas try to bring more and more of this area under effective control. Determined resistance to the enemy's entry is not offered, but guerilla forces harass the enemy's movements throughout the time he is there.

b. As friendly conventional forces draw nearer, or if requirements elsewhere force a reduction in the enemy's garrison, guerilla control of some areas may expand to such an extent that the enemy is virtually in a state of siege.

c. Areas of operation are divided among various subordinate guerilla units. Within these areas each subordinate unit carries out assigned missions, exercises the maximum control over the civilian population, and collects food and other
72. Large Scale Raids

a. The theater commander may determine or the guerrillas may find it necessary to attack well-guarded installations in order to damage the enemy’s war potential. Attacks to the form of a large scale raid may be launched to destroy or reduce to minimum effectiveness such installations as

(1) Air fields.
(2) Maritime bases.
(3) Industrial establishments.
(4) Coal and mineral mines.
(5) Oil fields; oil and gasoline storage facilities.
(6) Supply storage facilities.
(7) Repair shops.
(8) Radio and radar installations.
(9) Guided missile installations.
(10) Railroad centers and marshaling yards.
(11) Depots.
(12) Electrical power stations.
(13) Telephone and telegraph stations and installations.
(14) Artillery positions.
(15) Military headquarters.

b. The primary objective of such attacks is the destruction of or damage to the installation itself. Personnel losses inflicted on the enemy are incidental to the accomplishment of the mission. Attack plans should seek to minimize guerrilla casualties: every consideration should be given to the possibility of achieving success by means of interdiction, or firepower, avoiding direct attacks
by guerillas.

c. Whenever practicable, such attacks are accompanied by actions against the lines of communications serving the installation, such as roads, railroads, power transmission lines, fuel and water lines, and telephone and telegraph lines. Damage to lines of communication should be inflicted at isolated points where repair crews and equipment are susceptible to ambushes and other harassment.

d. If unfavorable conditions arise during the approach or after the attack has been launched which would cause excessive losses, the attacks should be postponed, forces reorganized and new plans prepared.

73. Limited Attacks

a. Adequately trained, organized, armed, equipped, and supported guerilla forces are capable of limited objective attacks against isolated enemy garrisons and combat units. Guerilla operations of this nature closely parallel conventional offensive operations and are guided by established principles of offensive combat.

b. Limited attacks may become more frequent and may be conducted on a large scale as the battle zone of friendly conventional forces approaches the guerilla forces area of operations. These guerilla attacks must be particularly carefully planned, controlled, and coordinated by the theater commander, through his joint task force staff, for timely action just a few days before a friendly offensive. Concentrated attacks against enemy lines of communications designed to prevent or seriously hinder the movement of
enemy troops and supplies during this entire critical period cannot but succeed in materially assisting the friendly forces in their operations.

74. Raids Against Installations

A key installation is attacked when its effectiveness cannot be reduced or destroyed by interdiction of its lines of communication. Certain considerations, however, must be emphasized in planning attacks on large, comparatively well-guarded installations.

a. In carrying out attacks against installations, guerillas depend upon detailed information of the target to offset their limitations in organization, training, weapons, and equipment. Often it may be possible to stop all activity in an installation by destroying or damaging specific key functions. Even if a general attack is launched, vital parts are designated as primary targets within the installation and it is necessary to learn their exact locations, functions, and security. Information needs will vary in accordance with the nature of the installation and the mission.

b. If the installation is attacked by strong, highly trained, heavily equipped guerilla units prepared for sustained combat, the mission assumes the character of conventional force operations. Such an attack loses the elements of surprise, speed in execution, and quick disengagement so necessary to guerilla tactics for success against conventional enemy forces.

c. For this reason, a large installation should be considered as many separate targets and assigned as such to several guerilla units or subunits. However, overall command and control
must be maintained for essential and effective unity of effort. If a mission involves the destruction of a key function or part of the installation, the mission may be assigned to a small group of highly, trained and rehearsed guerillas. In such cases, no further attacks may be necessary until the damaged or destroyed portions have been repaired or replaced.

d. The foregoing holds true even if the guerillas have sufficient strength to conduct a general attack against the installation as a whole. The character of guerilla warfare should be maintained in order to minimize casualties and deny the enemy a target on which he can concentrate superior forces.

e. The use of chemical agents, incendiary ammunition, and grenades is desirable in attacking installations.

f. Plans for attack should include alternate arrangements for destroying secondary targets within the installation in the event of failure to achieve the primary objective.

75. Interdiction and Harassment of Lines of Communication

a. General. Enemy lines of communication and supply installations are the most vulnerable targets for guerilla forces. Since interdiction seeks to prevent enemy use of areas or routes, care must be taken that alternate or duplicate systems are included in the interdiction program. It is necessary that a detailed target analysis and thorough reconnaissance of the area be made.

b. Purpose. Although the primary purpose of interdiction is to interfere with the effective
movement of supplies, personnel, raw materials, and communications in the enemy rear areas, guerilla security also increases under an efficient interdiction program. A widespread program of interdiction will cause the enemy to overestimate the guerilla forces and prevent him from pinpointing the guerilla base area by an analysis of guerilla operations. This materially reduces his superiority especially in heavy weapons.

c. Aspects. Operations against enemy rail and highway traffic are two important aspects of an interdiction program, but air traffic systems, inland waterways, wire and radio communications, power transmission lines, water supply lines, and petroleum lines are also profitable targets.

d. Variance of Types of Railway Targets. Types of railway targets to be attacked vary with the geographical area generally, open stretches of tracks, switches, repair facilities, and reserves of repair equipment and heavy equipment, such as railroad cranes and bridges, are considered to be most profitable. Consideration should also be given to water stations or pumps, coal or fuel stations, and fuel reserves on which locomotives must rely for their power. Where railway lines are electrified, consideration should be given to substations, power plants, hydroelectric power installations, and intermittent disruption of electric line service on open stretches.

e. Tracks.

(1) Railroad tracks present one of the most profitable and easily accessible targets for guerilla attack because it is almost impossible for the enemy to guard long stretches of railroad track effectively.
Lightly armed, highly mobile guerilla groups can inflict heavy damage on tracks almost anywhere in the world. Guerilla attacks can have disastrous results on an enemy who relies heavily upon railroad traffic for military movement.

(2) Attacks on open tracks use fewer explosives than attacks on other railroad installations. An 8 to 10 man squad of guerillas can interdict a mile of railroad track per night. Because a mile of railroad track is not easily repaired the following day, especially if other guerilla operations against tracks are occurring within the area, a squad of guerillas working regularly should be able to keep a single track out of operation most of the time.

(3) Attacks on tracks should cover an extensive area. Multiple breaks should be made in areas in which guerilla forces of squad size or larger can be used. Single breaks by individuals or very small teams should be made in areas not accessible to larger guerilla forces. Telegraph and telephone lines along the railroads are cut simultaneously.

(4) When conducting attacks on more than one railroad line in support of conventional operations, attacks must be carefully planned to use guerilla forces and supplies economically and to the best advantage. Careful studies to determine main arteries of railroad traffic and their connecting lines are vital to insure
complete coverage of a rail system.

(5) In an attack on tracks, security elements should be placed on the flanks of the attacking elements, along the tracks, and on any roads leading to the target area. Care should be taken, particularly at night, that small units attacking a stretch of rail line do not become accidentally engaged in firefights among themselves. Successive rallying points should be so located with respect to the target area as to permit withdrawal of units for reorganization.

f. Critical Equipment. Switches, repair facilities and reserves of repair equipment, railroad cranes, and other critical items are also targets for guerillas, but are more difficult to attack. Repair facilities and reserves of supplies will undoubtedly be guarded, particularly after interdiction operations by guerillas have started. This lack of vulnerability must be overcome by planned operations. Results obtained from these operations must be weighed carefully against the higher guerilla casualties which may occur. The success of the operations may well depend upon active or passive resistance from persons manning the installations.

g. Rolling Stock. Rolling stock may be simultaneously attacked with track interdiction. Demolition of tracks, at the time when trains are passing, can increase the damage to the tracks and track bed, cause supplies to fall into the hands of guerillas, kill and wound enemy personnel, or effect the liberation of prisoners. It must be remembered, however, that trains moving through
areas menaced by guerillas will move slowly and will be guarded. Attacks on guarded trains require trained and well-armed guerillas. Rocket launchers or other weapons capable of firing large caliber AP ammunition may be necessary; ordinary and special type mines also may be used.

h. Bridges. Critical points in the rail system bridges are usually well guarded; repair equipment and hasty bridging equipment are normally located in the vicinity. Destruction can be accomplished by the guerillas, friendly aircraft, or guided missiles. Guerillas would be instrumental in target acquisition and damage assessment for the air or missile attacks.

i. Harassment. Limited operations against tracks and traffic have the effect of harassment; widespread operations are necessary before any severe effect is felt by the enemy. Harassment of repair crews by sniper fire and small raids is effective in reducing enemy morale and the desire of the individual to expose himself to danger while making repairs.

j. Effects of Railway Interdiction. The primary effect of interdiction of railways is disruption of the enemy's flow of supplies, movement of troops and industrial production. Secondary effects are

(1) Disruption of the orderly processes of dispatching and controlling rail movements, which in turn may result in the accumulation of sizable targets for air attack at rail terminals and junctions.

(2) Depletion of reserves of repair materials beyond the capacity of the enemy to replace them, often resulting in the dismantling of secondary rail lines for the

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repair of primary lines.

(3) Transfer of nail traffic to primary roads and highways, which are also vulnerable to guerrilla and air attack.

(4) Placement of a burden upon enemy manpower guarding and repairing rails.

k. Highways. In some areas of the world, seasonal effects of weather will largely determine the effectiveness of a highway interdiction program. One of the roost effective means of interdicting road traffic is through the use of mines, either improvised or standard. Controlled mines placed in a defile and covered by sniper fire can destroy vehicles while they are in a position which will block the road. Operations may be in the form of nuisance mining and use should be made of dummy fields to preserve real mines.

l. Air Traffic Systems. Modern nations are dependent to a great extent on the use of cargo transport aircraft for the movement of supplies and troops. Control facilities, air terminals, supply systems, and maintenance and control personnel may be targets for guerrilla attack.

(1) Proper control of air traffic moving cross country often depends on navigational systems that utilize radio and radar beams emanating from widely spaced ground stations. They may be attacked and destroyed, resulting in confusion to planned and orderly traffic patterns.

(2) Carefully planned raids may be used to damage air terminal runways, control towers, lights, and parked aircraft, even if the installation is guarded.
(3) Air traffic is dependent upon a continuous availability of such items as fuel, lubricants, spare parts, and maintenance tools. Lines of communications and installations serving air terminals may be profitably attacked. (4) Flight, maintenance, and control personnel are highly skilled individuals with specialized training. Their elimination may seriously affect flight operations and strain the replacement capabilities of the enemy.

m. Waterways. In themselves, waterways are not especially vulnerable to guerilla attack. The most vulnerable aspects of waterway systems are electrical installations and dams and locks which are usually well guarded. The destruction of such installations can disrupt traffic effectively for a period of months. Other waterway installations such as signal lights, beacons, channel markers, and wire connections can be attacked effectively. The sinking of vessels in restricted channels by floating mines, limpet mines, or fire from heavy caliber weapons may be effective in blocking waterway traffic.

n. Communication Systems.

(1) Wire communications, extremely vulnerable to guerilla attack, generally run parallel to road and railroad lines. Poles and wires may be destroyed by fire, wire cutters, or axes little equipment is required for such an operation. Guerilla teams involved may be very small and still completely destroy wire communications in an area.
Telephone exchanges, and relay and telegraph stations may be attacked by guerillas although such action is not absolutely necessary for disruption of wire communications.

(2) Radio stations and enemy radio facilities may be centrally located and not readily open to guerilla attack. If the source of power supply for commercial stations is the customary electrical power system, they may be disabled by cutting off the power.

o. Power Systems. Power lines also are vulnerable to attack much in the same manner as wire communications. Large transmission towers, however, often require demolitions for destruction. Critical points in any power system are transformer stations; if these stations are not accessible to attacks by guerilla raiders, long-range fire from small or large caliber weapons may disrupt their operations. Power producing plants, such as hydroelectric dams and steam generating plants, may be too heavily guarded for raid operations. To disable them, guerillas should concentrate on cutting off the fuel supply.

p. Water Systems. The disruption of water lines supplying industries can often be profitably accomplished; water supplies generally are conducted through underground pipelines, and may be destroyed with simple explosive charges. Raids against reservoir facilities and purification plants are also feasible, but the effect upon the civilian population, and in turn, possible civilian antagonism against guerillas must be considered.

q. Pipe Lines. Petroleum and natural gases for
an industrial area usually are supplied by pipelines; damage to lines inflicted by rupture and ignition of fuel is considerably greater than damage inflicted on water lines. Large storage tanks at either end of a pipeline are highly vulnerable to weapon fire, especially incendiary projectiles. Contaminating agents, if available, may be injected into a pipeline or fuel tank.

76. Raids and Ambushes.

a. General. Raids, ambushes, and limited objective attacks are normal tactical operations conducted by guerillas. Without a thorough working knowledge of the principles and characteristics of these types of operations, the guerilla units will fail to accomplish their missions. Commanders of guerilla forces must recognize the necessity for thorough intelligence, careful planning, constant rehearsal, and flawless execution.

b. Raids. Raids are attacks characterized by surprise and shock action. They involve movement into enemy-controlled territory of an operational area, and a swift withdrawal after comparatively brief actions. In addition to inflicting damage and casualties on an enemy, raids may have one or more of the following purposes
   (1) To destroy a vital installation.
   (2) To capture supplies.
   (3) To divert attention from another operation.
   (4) To cause maximum deployment of enemy troops.

c. Reconnaissance. Raids are preceded by reconnaissance of the area and installations to be
raided. The utmost secrecy is observed in this activity to prevent the enemy from being forewarned of guerilla intentions.
d. Planning and Rehearsal.

(1) Although detailed, the plan for a raid must be essentially simple and not depend on too many possible but unknown factors for its success. Provision is made against parts of the plan miscarrying, and duplicate or alternate arrangements are made for the execution of key operations. Guerilla activities in the area may be suspended to give the installation a false sense of security.

(2) Time and space factors are carefully considered when planning the operation. Enough time is allowed for assembly and movement, particularly during darkness; the situation’s requirements determine whether movement and attack should be made during daylight or darkness: Darkness favors surprise and is chosen when the operation is simple and the layout of the installation is well known. Early dawn or daylight is favored when imperfect knowledge of the installation or other factors necessitates close control of the operation. A withdrawal late in the day or at night makes close pursuit by the enemy more difficult.

(3) All participants are rehearsed in their roles; the necessity for boldness and speed in executing the plan is stressed. Intelligence on the installation to be raided is kept up-to-date, and plans are
revised as necessary to conform to the latest situation.

e. Organization of Raiding Force. Two elements compose the raiding force.

(1) Assault element. The assault element's composition will vary with the target layout and the objective itself. It may contain such special task details as demolitionists, sentry elimination detail, capturing or killing detail, and initial surprise detail.

(2) Security element. The task of giving warning and preventing the arrival of enemy reinforcements during the action is given this element. In preventing additional enemy forces from arriving at the site of action, it may be necessary to ambush them along routes leading to the target. In addition, and when required by the nature of the planned action, the security element will provide supporting or covering fires for the attack and withdrawal of the assault element. If necessary, the security element fights holding actions against immediate enemy pursuit.

f. Conduct of Raid.

(1) Necessary preparations are made, including briefing, rehearsing, and checking of equipment before the raiding party moves out. Upon reaching a forward assembly area or rallying point as near to the objective as possible, security groups are dispatched. The assault and remaining security element is
disposed to carry out other functions which may be assigned. When the mission is finished, the leader of the raiding force signals a withdrawal to the guerilla base area. The various elements of the raiding force withdraw in prearranged order over predetermined routes through a series of previously selected rallying points. Should the enemy organize a close pursuit of the assault element, the security element assists by fire and movement, distracting the enemy and causing a dispersal of his force.

(2) Elements of the raiding force which are closely pursued by the enemy do not attempt to reach the initial rallying point, but exercise initiative to lead the enemy away from the remainder of the force and then lose him by evasive action over difficult terrain. If the situation allows, an attempt then may be made to reestablish contact with the raiding force at secondary rally points or to continue to the guerilla base area as a separate group. When necessary, the raiding force, or elements of it, separates into small groups or even individuals to evade close pursuit by the enemy.

(3) A raid need not result in a firefight with the enemy. Some guerillas are capable of entering an enemy installation silently and killing their enemies with knives, strangulation cords, or other silent weapons. A raid of this type is
particular demoralizing to the enemy.

**g. Ambushes.**

(1) An ambush is a method of attack used against moving or temporarily halted targets such as railroad trains, truck convoys, and troop movements. The purpose of the ambush may be to:

(a) Destroy or capture personnel and supplies.
(b) Harass and demoralize the enemy.
(c) Delay or block movement of personnel and supplies.
(d) Channel enemy movements by prohibiting the use of certain routes. This diverts the majority of movements to principal roads and railroads where targets are vulnerable to conventional air forces.

(2) To insure success, plans for an ambush must be based on accurate intelligence coverage. Intelligence must be backed up by an efficient warning system to give timely warning of the approach of enemy reinforcements or worthwhile ambush targets.

(3) In preparing the ambush plan, consideration is given to the—

(a) Mission, either a specific ambush against one movement or continual ambushes to interdict an assigned portion of the lines of communication.
(b) Size, strength, and composition of the specific enemy formation that is to be ambushed; or probable data on
enemy formations likely to be used in the assigned portion of the communication net.

(c) Terrain along the route that is favorable for an ambush, to include unobserved approach routes and routes of withdrawal.

(d) Enemy reinforcement capability against the ambushing forces.

(4) Night ambushes offer a wider choice of positions and better opportunities to surprise and confuse the enemy than ambushes conducted in daylight. Control of movement to and during the ambush at night is more difficult. Night ambushes are best accomplished with a short, immediate burst of fire. It is necessary that a maximum number of automatic weapons at close range be used. They will be effective in hindering the enemy's use of roads, while friendly aircraft can attack the roads by day.

(5) Daylight ambushes facilitate control and permit offensive action for a longer period of time. A day ambush also provides opportunity for the aimed fire of such important ambush weapons as rocket launchers and recoilless rifles.

h. Selection of Ambush Site.

(1) Regarding the selection of ambush sites, consideration should be given to such pertinent limitations as the light firepower of guerillas and the lack of resupply during actions. When possible, terrain at the site should serve to funnel
the enemy into the killing zone. The site should have good firing positions which offer concealment and favorable fields of fire through a screen of foliage, whenever possible. The entire killing zone within the site is covered completely to avoid dead space that would allow the enemy to organize resistance.

(2) Natural obstacles such as defiles, swamps, and cliffs will prevent the enemy from taking cover and from enveloping the guerrilla force. When natural obstacles are nonexistent, attention should be given to the use of mines and demolitions to channel the enemy.

(3) At times, the use of less obvious sites should be considered in achieving surprise, since maximum security measures by the enemy may be expected in the vicinity of favorable sites. The skillful use of mines and demolitions can produce conditions favorable for ambush at points where the enemy is likely to feel secure and, consequently, is less vigilant.

(4) Security elements and observers are placed on roads and trails to the ambush site to give warning to the assault element of the approach of enemy troops. The proximity of security elements to assault elements depends on terrain.

i. Conduct of the Ambush.

(1) Troops are moved to an assembly area near the ambush site, and security
elements take up their positions. On receiving information that an enemy is approaching or at a predesignated time, when acting against a previously selected and specific enemy column the ambush commander decides whether to ambush it or allow it to pass. This depends on the size of column, guard and security measures, and estimated target value.

(2) If a decision is made to execute the ambush, enemy advance guards are allowed to pass through the main position. When the head of the main column reaches a predetermined point, it is halted by fire, demolitions, or other obstacles. This is the signal for all of the guerilla assault element to open fire. Specifically assigned guerilla details engage the advance and rear guards to prevent them from reaching the main column. Fire is rapid and is directed where enemy personnel are massed, on exits from vehicles, at drivers, and at automatic weapons. If practicable, hand grenades, rocket launchers, and recoilless rifles are used. Machine guns lay bands of fixed fire across escape routes.

(3) If the guerilla commander decides to rush the column, he gives a prearranged signal, and selected groups of men rush forward and attack while other men direct their fire against enemy troops who have succeeded in escaping from the ambush area.

(4) When the commander decides that the
purpose of the ambush has been accomplished, or if the arrival of enemy reinforcements makes it necessary to call off the actions he signals and the assault element withdraws, covered by its security elements.

(5) In some instances, it may be necessary to organize secondary ambushes to intercept enemy reinforcements while the main ambush is carried out.

j. Columns Protected By Armor. Action against columns protected by armored vehicles will depend upon the type and place of armored vehicles in a column and the weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or disabled by rocket launcher fire, land mines, improvised incendiaries, or by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. If these methods are not feasible, an effort is made to immobilize the armor at the point where it will be unable to give protection to the rest of the convoy.

k. Ambush of Railroad Trains. Moving trains may be subjected to harassing fire, but the most effective ambush involves wrecking the train. The locomotive should be derailed on a downgrade, at a sharp curve or on a high bridge. This causes most of the cars to overturn and results in extensive casualties among passengers. There may be times when it is desirable to derail trains so that the wreckage will remain on the tracks to delay traffic for longer periods of time. Fire is directed on the exits of overturned coaches, and designated groups armed with automatic weapons rush forward to attack the immobile coaches. Other groups take needed supplies from freight
cars and then set fire to the train. Rails are removed from the track at some distance from the ambush site in each direction to delay the arrival of reinforcements by other trains. In planning a train ambush, it must be remembered that the enemy will probably include armored cars attached to the train for protection and that important trains will be preceded by advance guard locomotives or inspection cars to check the track.

Section IV. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

77. General

a. Guerilla forces usually lack supporting weapons available to conventional forces and are inferior in strength and training compared to regular forces. Guerillas avoid static defensive operations; if forced to defensive operations, they modify the principles of conventional defensive combat to meet their needs and to offset their deficiencies. They look for terrain that denies or restricts the enemy's use of armor and supporting weapons and complicates his logistical support.

b. Guerilla forces may accept defensive combat to prevent enemy penetration of guerilla-controlled areas and to gain time either for their main force to assemble or to accomplish a specific mission. They may resort to defensive action to contain enemy forces in a position favorable for attacking the enemy's rear or flanks. In addition, guerillas may be assigned defensive missions to hold certain objectives or installations for limited periods of time pending link-up with other friendly forces.

c. If a guerilla force is continually maneuvered
into defensive combat, it cannot accomplish its primary mission offensive operations against the enemy's lines of communication, installations, and centers of war production. An outmaneuvered guerilla force faces eventual destruction or permanent disbandment. The need to engage in defensive operations not actually sought by the guerilla force may be indicative of the incompetence of the guerilla commanders and poor security systems.

78. Defensive Measures

The primary means of defense should be complete security of guerilla areas and installations. This is achieved through the use of security nets, dispersion of installations and personnel, mobility of personnel and equipment, disposition of units, and organization of the civilian population. For details, see chapter 9.

79. Additional Defensive Measures

a. Guerillas may use conventional tactics when it is necessary to conduct a position defense. If such a mission must be assigned in support of a conventional force, it should be carefully timed to coincide with the early arrival of friendly troops. Support may also be provided by other guerilla units in the, form of ambushes and harassments beyond the main defensive position to divert and, if possible, block enemy movements toward the site.

b. In attempting to deny critical terrain to the enemy, guerillas should dominate rather than physically hold the terrain. Enemy units
attempting to reach or maintain themselves on the terrain in question are constantly harassed; supply trains are raided and destroyed; communication facilities are attacked; march security elements and patrols and foraging parties are continually ambushed, and outpost positions are attacked and destroyed. Even main bodies of enemy troop columns may be harassed and attacked by snipers. Such aggressive activities carried out on an around-the-clock basis may frustrate or, damage the enemy to the point of his abandoning an operation.

80. Defense Against Encirclement

a. Initial Actions. An encircling maneuver on the part of a determined enemy is the greatest threat to the existence of a guerilla force. A guerilla commander must be constantly on the alert for indications of this kind of action. Appearance of enemy forces moving from two or three directions should be regarded suspiciously and directly investigated. When information is received that an enemy encircling movement is in progress, the guerilla commander should immediately maneuver his forces to escape while enemy lines are still thin and spread out, and coordination between advancing units not yet well established. Records and surplus equipment are either hidden or destroyed. By these methods, the guerilla force either escapes the encirclement or places itself in position to meet it. If for some reason this is not accomplished, movement to a ridgeline is usually the best course of action. The ridgeline gives observation, commanding ground, and allows quick movement in several directions if all factors
are favorable. The guerillas may then wait on this favorable ground until night for a break-through attempt.

b. Break-Through Action. Two strong combat detachments precede the main body which is also covered by flank and rear guards. If gaps between enemy units exist, the combat detachments seize and hold the flanks of the escape route. When there are no gaps in the enemy lines, these detachments attack to create and protect an escape channel. The break-through attempt should be initiated in order to enable the main body to pass through the opening during darkness or periods of poor visibility, free from observation and accurate enemy fire. During the attempt, guerilla units not included in the enemy circle make attacks against the enemy's rear to lure his forces away from the operation and help to create gaps. After breaking through the enemy, the guerilla force should increase the tempo of its operations whenever possible, raising guerilla morale and making the enemy cautious in the future about leaving his bases to attack the guerilla area.

c. Final Action. If the break-through attempt is unsuccessful, the commander divides his force into small groups and instructs them to infiltrate through the enemy lines at night or hide in the area until the enemy leaves. This action should be taken only as a last resort, as it means the force will be inoperative for a period of time and the morale of the unit may be adversely affected. Reassembly instructions are announced before the groups disperse.

Section V. EVACUATION AND EXFILTRATION
81. General

During the conduct of guerilla operations, requirements will appear for the evacuation of casualties, exfiltration of operational personnel and selected indigenous personnel, both enemy and friendly, pickup of documents and material, and redeployment of elements of the guerilla forces. This will be accomplished by utilizing the most appropriate means of transportation available to the guerilla force. Land, sea, and air transport may be utilized. Helicopter evacuation is particularly suitable for these missions within their range and load-carrying capabilities.
CHAPTER 8
INTELLIGENCE

Note. For further discussion of guerilla intelligence, see FM 31-21A.

82. General

A thorough knowledge of the enemy, terrain, and resistance potential, coupled with an intimate understanding of the indigenous peoples within the operational areas, is essential for the successful conduct of guerilla operations. Such knowledge and understanding are the bases of guerilla intelligence. It is natural that the indigenous guerilla leaders should have these basic capabilities, but commanders of special forces teams must normally acquire them through painstaking work. Prior to infiltration, team commanders are thoroughly briefed at various briefing centers; attached either to the joint task force or the special forces operational base. After infiltration, a team commander must continue to learn from his own situation. By these methods, the team commander can gain the necessary background knowledge for intelligence work, and will be able to meet the indigenous guerilla leader with some understanding of intelligence problems. Together they can coordinate intelligence work for local guerilla operations, and perform the intelligence missions assigned the guerillas by theater.

83. Mission
The mission of the guerilla intelligence organization is to provide the guerilla commander with accurate and timely operational intelligence and to neutralize the effectiveness of enemy intelligence within the operational area.

84. Requirements Prior to Infiltration

Prior to infiltration, the briefing operations in the various centers provide special forces team commanders with what may be broadly classified as basic intelligence and detailed intelligence. Area studies are especially valuable in these briefing operations.

a. Basic intelligence for the projected area of operations may include—

(1) Geography (hydrography, flora and fauna). Pertinent, information on topography, soil conditions, and trafficability; water supply; areas suitable for drop and landing zones; local resources, plant and animal life, endemic diseases; lines of transportation; rivers, lakes, and sea coasts; actual and potential inundations; and cities and towns.

(2) Meteorology. Temperatures, humidity, visibility; cloudiness, rainfall, and winds.

(3) Oceanography. If applicable, information on depths, shoals, tidal waves, local currents, anchorages, harbors, beaches, and natural obstructions.

(4) Light data. Sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset, moon phase, and morning and evening twilight.

(5) Ethnology. Origin, the division into races, and their distribution.
(6) Political background. Organizations, parties, or political factions; minority groups; and the police and judicial systems.

(7) Sociology. The attitudes and behavior of different groups, their customs, taboos, their relationship to one another and toward foreign nationals; resistance motives and information about various personalities involved.

(8) Economics. Chiefly concerned with the standard of living based on domestic production and foreign trade, and with items of limited supply.

(9) History. Military and resistance traditions and events which may affect the motives of indigenous persons.

(10) Religious background. Primarily religious beliefs which aid close relationships or induce antipathy among indigenous persons.

(11) Language. Various linguistic elements, including current idioms, slang, and dialects of the region.

b. Detailed intelligence for projected area of operations may include—

(1) Armed forces (regular and security) and detailed enemy order of battle.

(2) Enemy intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

(3) Scientific and technical developments.

(4) Target acquisition and analysis. Present and potential resistance elements, their composition, motivation, operational activities, enemy, reaction, and civilian
85. Sources of Information Prior to Infiltration

a. Basic intelligence of the enemy in the theater of operations usually is obtainable from higher headquarters and government civilian agencies in the form of basic area intelligence studies. Information from which additional intelligence can be produced may be obtained from diplomatic and consular reports, libraries, tourist agencies, steamship and airlines, commercial firms, refugees, and individuals who have lived or traveled in the area of interest.

b. During hostilities, ground, navy and air force reconnaissance is a source of information. Other sources of information may include—
   (1) Prisoners of war and civilian internees.
   (2) Captured material and documents.
   (3) Political refugees.
   (4) Resistance and guerilla groups.
   (5) Hostile and neutral press and radio.
   (6) Personnel recovered from enemy territory.
   (7) Communication reconnaissance units.

86. Requirements After Infiltration

Immediately after infiltration, the first intelligence responsibility of a team is an area assessment. This involves checking the validity of the information received prior to infiltration from area studies, briefing, etc. against the facts as they are, and making the necessary changes in, the estimate of the situation. Then, in cooperation with the guerilla leader, an extensive intelligence
gathering effort is undertaken within the operational area.

A guerilla command must produce the intelligence needed for its own security and for local plans and operations against the enemy: b. Thorough knowledge of the terrain and of the enemy forces is a prerequisite for successful organization and exploitation of guerilla forces. The "enemy force" includes all antiresistance organizations as well as armed forces. In addition to the usual detailed intelligence concerning the enemy forces, guerilla forces must obtain through nets and informers current intelligence concerning political, economic, administrative, and propaganda activities by the enemy to solicit and to maintain the support of the civilian population.

87. Sources of Information After Infiltration

Guerilla force intelligence will be gathered from the following sources

a. Theater Joint Task Force or Special Forces Operational Base. Intelligence gathered by the armed forces or civilian agencies of the government concerning the area of operations is transmitted to the guerilla forces by means of radio or other established communications media. It may include

1) Political attitudes of the supporting powers concerning the operational area which may affect guerilla activities.
2) Activities of friendly conventional forces which may affect guerilla operations.
3) The situation concerning the existence, actual or anticipated, and activities of government-in-exile which may affect
guerilla operations.

(4) Psychological warfare activities which may affect guerilla operations.

b. Guerilla Units. Intelligence collected by guerilla units is similar to that obtained in conventional force operations. The means employed may include

(1) Reconnaissance.
(2) Interrogation of prisoners of war and civilian internees.
(3) Captured material and documents.
(4) Observations made by team members, guerillas, and civilians.

c. Clandestine Intelligence. This is intelligence gathered through underground networks operating in support of the guerilla force. See FM 31-21A.

88. Dissemination of Information and Intelligence

a. Within the operational area information and intelligence will be disseminated from the command to all echelons by the most expedient means available, which may include

(1) Radio.
(2) Messenger.
(3) Telephone or telegraph.
(4) Mail.
(5) Briefings.

b. Information and intelligence of tactical or strategic importance which may be gathered by the guerilla forces, is transmitted to the theater commander by the most expedient means.

(1) Radio.
(2) Courier.
(3) Air pickup.
(4) Water pickup by surface or subsurface
89. Intelligence Collection Capabilities

a. The organization and operation of guerilla intelligence service creates a valuable source of information which can be effectively utilized by friendly conventional forces in time of hostilities. Because of their advantageous position, guerillas may be called upon to furnish intelligence in support of conventional forces. Military commanders and agencies concerned with intelligence must recognize that guerilla forces are not specially trained, organized, or equipped to function essentially as an intelligence agency. It must be emphasized that excessive intelligence requirements will overtax communications and manpower facilities, and may seriously interfere with the guerillas primary mission. In situations requiring extensive intelligence efforts, trained personnel with adequate communications should be infiltrated into the guerilla area to enlarge the intelligence collection capability and to develop auxiliary communication channels for the dissemination of information.
CHAPTER 9
SECURITY

90. General
Operations behind enemy lines require special security measures that apply particularly to guerilla forces. The survival of the guerillas depends upon constant vigilance on the part of every member of the organization, plus the ability to transmit warnings. Effective counterintelligence is also essential. Security measures must prevent losses by enemy action, insure freedom of action, and minimize interruption of guerilla activities. Dependable security can be achieved by intensive training in security discipline, establishment of warning systems, and extensive counterintelligence.

91. Responsibility
The area commander is responsible for the overall security of the guerilla forces, although commanders of subordinate units must take individual measures for their own local protection. The chief of the security section of the area command controls all security operations, except counterintelligence. He prescribes necessary measures and coordinates those adopted by subordinate commanders. Counterintelligence is the responsibility of the chief of the intelligence section of the area command, although, again, subordinate commanders must establish local counterintelligence for their own security.
92. Factors Affecting Security

a. Security measures developed by the chief of the security section of the area command are affected by the following factors:
   (1) Mission.
   (2) Local situation of individual units.
   (3) Physical characteristics of the area of operations.
   (4) The enemy situation.
   (5) Capabilities and limitations of the guerrilla forces.
   (6) Considerations affecting the civilian population.
   (7) Operations of allied regular forces.

b. During the early phases of guerrilla warfare, the mission of guerrilla forces will necessitate organization of a counterintelligence system alongside of the intelligence system, development of a communications system which will facilitate warnings, and establishment of physical security for installations. Particular attention should be directed towards the enemy state secret police and other internal security formations and their intelligence and communications systems.

c. Military action against the enemy initiated during the early phases of operations should be planned and so executed, for the sake of security, that they will not lead to wholesale enemy antiguerilla activity, reprisals against the civilian population, or compromise of external logistical support in the latter stages of guerrilla warfare, operations are not so sharply curtailed for security reasons, because the established security system provides greater protection for the guerrillas. Also, guerrilla control over the area may rival the
enemy's own influence.

93. Principles of Security

a. Dispersion.

(1) Guerilla forces avoid large concentration of troops in camps or bivouacs. Even though logistical conditions may permit large troop concentrations, commands should be broken down into smaller units and widely dispersed. Dispersion facilities concealment, mobility, and secrecy. Large forces may be concentrated to perform a specific operation, but on completion of the operation, they should again be quickly dispersed.

(2) The principle of dispersion is applied to command, service, and technical installations. A large guerilla headquarters, for example, is divided into several echelons and scattered over the area.

(3) In the event of a well-conducted, large-scale enemy operation against the guerilla force, the area commander may find it necessary to order the division of units into smaller groups to achieve greater dispersion and facilitate escape from encirclement. This action should be taken only when all other means of evasive action are exhausted because such dispersion renders the force inoperative for a considerable period of time, lowers the morale of the guerillas, and weakens the will of the civilians to resist. To
assure successful reassembly of dispersed units, emergency plans must include alternate assembly areas.

b. Mobility.
(1) All guerilla installations and forces must have a high degree of mobility. Evacuation plans for installations and forces must insure that all traces of guerilla activity are eliminated prior to abandonment of the area.
(2) Mobility for evacuation can be achieved by insuring that equipment which must be moved can be disassembled into one-man loads, that suitable caches are provided for equipment that would reduce mobility, that material which could provide intelligence for the enemy is destroyed, that the area is policed, and that signs of the route of withdrawal are eliminated.

94. Security of Information
(1) Information concerning guerilla operations is limited to those who need to know it. Only necessary copies are made or maintained. Each person is given only that information which is needed to accomplish his mission. Special efforts are made to restrict the amount of information given to individuals who are exposed to capture.
(2) Administrative records are kept to a minimum, are cached, and the location made known only to a required few.
Whenever possible, reference to names and places are coded, and the key to the code is given on a need-to-know basis.

Records which are no longer of value to operations, for future reports, must be destroyed.

b. Security Discipline.

(1) Strict security discipline is necessary, and all security measures must be rigidly enforced. Security instruction of personnel must be extensive. They must be impressed with the importance of not divulging information concerning guerilla activities to persons not requiring it. Individuals seeking such information must be reported to proper authorities. In case of capture, guerilla personnel are instructed not to give the enemy any information regarding guerilla activities.

(2) Security violations are extremely serious and demand severe punishment. All cases involving a possible breach of security must be reported immediately.

(3) The key to successful security of information, however, is the individual guerilla himself who must always be security conscious. One careless individual can destroy the best security system devised.

c. Training. During the training phase, security consciousness must be stressed. Special emphasis should be placed on safeguarding plans and records, security of information, and resistance against interrogation.
95. Security of Movement

a. Security of movement can be provided only by an accurate knowledge of the enemy's location and strength. Intelligence regarding enemy disposition and activities is essential. The intelligence section of the area command, informed through its various nets, must provide this vital information for security of movement.

b. After the routes have been selected, the units must be briefed on enemy activity, primary and alternate routes, dispersal and reassembly areas along the way, and security measures to be observed en route. If the route leads through areas outside guerilla influence, auxiliary civilian organizations must provide security of movement for the guerillas.

96. Security of Installations

a. Most installations are located in isolated regions, known as guerilla base areas. They are mobile, and are secured by guards and warning systems. Alternate locations for base areas are prepared in advance, so that any installation threatened by enemy action can be evacuated from the endangered base area to a more secure area. Location of these alternate areas is given to personnel only on a need-to-know basis.

b. Physical security of installations will include terrain counterintelligence. This may vary from simple deceptive measures such as camouflage or destruction and reversal of road signs and mileposts to the creation of physical barriers such as roadblocks and demolition of roadbeds and bridges. The use of civilian guides to misdirect
enemy troops (e.g., into ambush) can also be effective.

97. Tri-Zonal Security System

A typical means of providing adequate security for the guerilla base area is a tri-zonal security system which provides a series of warning nets.

a. Zone A is the guerilla base area itself. It is secured by a regular guard system, but it largely depends for its safety upon advance warnings received from clandestine agents in Zone C, or posted observers in Zone B. If enemy action threatens, the guerillas move to another location prior to the arrival of enemy forces.

b. Zone B, lying beyond the populated Zone C, is territory not well controlled by the enemy in which the guerilla forces can operate overtly. It is usually open, rugged terrain, and the warning system depends upon stationed observers, watching for enemy movements in the area.

c. Zone C, the furthest from the guerilla base area, is usually well-populated and is located inside enemy-controlled territory: Enemy security forces, police, and/or military units, exercise relatively effective control, and the populace may be predominately hostile to the guerillas. At the same time there are excellent and rapid lines of communication, whereby clandestine agents are able to warn the guerillas quickly of enemy activity. This area is known as the clandestine zone, and the functions of the warning system are the responsibility of the underground.

98. Security of Communications
Guerilla communications facilities are rigidly regulated by the Standing Signal Instructions and Signal Operating Instructions. These measures include restriction on what may be transmitted; the use of codes and ciphers; and means of concealment, deception, and authentication. Particular emphasis is placed on restricting time and number of radio transmissions to the absolute minimum.

99. Counterintelligence

a. Guerilla security depends not only on security measures taken to safeguard information, installations, and communications, but also on an active counterintelligence program to neutralize the enemy's intelligence system and especially to prevent the penetration of guerilla forces by enemy agents.

b. Counterintelligence is the responsibility of the intelligence section, of the area command. Specially selected and trained counterintelligence personnel carefully screen all members of the guerilla organization, and protect the guerillas from enemy infiltration. They also carry on an active campaign of deception, disseminating false information to mislead the enemy.

   (1) Counterintelligence personnel must keep a constant check on the civilian population of the area through clandestine sources to insure against the presence of enemy agents within their midst. Civilians upon whom the guerillas depend heavily for support may compromise the guerilla warfare effort as easily as a disloyal guerilla.
False rumors and false information concerning guerilla strength, location, operations, training, and equipment can be disseminated by counterintelligence through clandestine nets. Facts may be distorted intentionally to minimize or exaggerate guerilla' capabilities at any given time. Although such activities are handled within the intelligence section, they must be coordinated with the security section in order to prevent inadvertent violations of security.

100. Outlaw Bands

Outlaw bands, operating as guerillas, also endanger guerilla security by alienating the civilian population through their depredation. The area commander cannot tolerate outlaw bands which are not willing to join the organized guerilla effort. Every effort must be made to persuade these bands to join forces. If all other methods fail, it may be necessary to conduct operations against these groups.

101. Reaction to enemy Operations

Inexperienced guerilla commanders and troops are often inclined to move too soon and too frequently to escape enemy troops conducting antiguerilla operations. Unnecessary movement caused by the presence of the enemy may expose guerillas to greater risks than remaining calm and concealed. Such moves disrupt operations and reduce security by dislodging previously established nets and exposing guerillas to enemy
agents, informants, and collaborators.
PART FOUR
LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 10
LOGISTICS

Section I. SUPPLY

102. General

a. Guerilla warfare is one of the most economical types of modern warfare in both manpower and material. In comparison with the requirements of regular forces, guerilla forces expend a relatively small amount of supplies of all classes and sustain comparatively few casualties.

b. Generally, guerilla forces live off the land. The resources of a country and its distribution influence the size and number of guerilla units that may be organized and maintained in each area. Resources, especially in food supplies, are taken into consideration in establishing area and district commands and unit locations. Areas with a surplus of supplies may be required to furnish support to poor ones. The needs of civilians within these areas must be considered. Supply plans are based on an equitable system that limits, as far as possible, hardship on civilians and does not alienate their loyal and energetic support.

c. The types, quantity, and phasing of theater supplies to special forces in the field influence the organization, capabilities, and missions that may be assigned to the guerilla forces. These supplies also have an effect on guerilla morale, as each
shipment represents encouragement and assurance of support from the outside world. Once such a channel of supply is established, the guerillas will continue to rely on it for support. This is one means used by the special forces commander to control the guerilla force.

103. Types of Supply

a. Class I. Food supplies are generally procured locally. The extent to which this is possible depends greatly upon the attitude of the civilian population and the food situation in the area. In some cases, guerillas may control large enough agricultural areas to completely support themselves. Theater support may become necessary when guerillas are operating in nonproductive areas of the world. In a prolonged war, food supplies become short even in normally productive areas. In such cases, guerillas must be supplied food to remain operational. Consideration must be given either to supplying guerillas with indigenous-type rations or with lightweight combat rations developed for conventional forces.

b. Classes II and IV.

(1) In the initial stages of organization, guerilla requirements for individual clothing and equipment are extremely limited. Maximum use is made of makeshift impedimenta and insignia, and captured enemy weapons and equipment. Shipments of limited quantities of communications equipment, medical supplies, information gathering equipment, and similar special items from friendly territory may be required.
(2) Later, replacement of nonstandard equipment and of worn initial items as well as buildup for optimum scale operations may be necessary. Weapons are normally limited to small arms and light crew-served types. The variety of equipment should be kept to a minimum to ease maintenance and resupply problems.

c. Class III. Petroleum products are not normally required by guerilla forces with the exception of lubricants for small arms and a very limited amount of fuel for radio generators. In a highly developed guerilla force, there may be a requirement for motor vehicle fuel.

d. Class V. Expenditures of ammunition by guerilla forces are considerably less than that of conventional forces. For the most part, guerillas are armed with individual weapons requiring small caliber ammunition. Ammunition expenditure is greatly reduced because guerillas are usually in action for short periods of time and have no supporting artillery. Guerilla units' basic loads of ammunition should be very light so that the mobility of individual guerillas is not reduced.

e. Special items. Special devices and items of clothing and equipment peculiar to a specific area may be required. As a general rule, guerilla forces can operate effectively with standard equipment and with the type of native clothing traditionally used in the area.

104. Procurement

a. General. Guerilla forces may be considered as having three main sources of supply.
(1) The theater commander.
(2) Local civilians.
(3) The enemy.

b. Guerilla forces, as a general rule, cannot be fully exploited unless they receive some supplies and equipment from external sources, although there is great variation in the total amount needed. Some need total logistical support. The amount will be in proportion to operational commitments and will be in accordance with theater policies. To expedite resupply and to minimize radio transmission for requesting supplies, a prepackage bundle code is necessary. External channels of supply, organized through special forces team efforts should never be established with the thought that the channels will be the only or principal sources of support. Guerillas should receive only necessary supplies that are unobtainable within their area of operations.

c. Supplies and equipment requisitioned or confiscated from civilians to support a resistance movement should be receipted or paid for in cash or barter. Such procedure tends to establish and maintain good faith with the supporting population. It further tends to discourage abuses and to limit or expose illegal practices engaged in by guerilla units or bandit groups.

d. All echelons of a guerilla force are encouraged to supplement their supply needs at the expense of the enemy. Battlefields and the scenes of all encounters with the enemy are combed for usable supplies. Raids are conducted against enemy transport, installations, and supply depots to obtain supplies. Friendly civilians employed by the enemy take advantage of the opportunity to
pilfer enemy stocks.

Where required, units may establish workshops to produce essential items of equipment, when replacement items cannot be obtained locally or time does not permit resupply from the friendly base. Such activities are engaged in only when absolutely necessary to continue operations. Workshop production is not ordinarily a guerilla function.

105. Storage

Initially, supplies received in the field from any source may be issued immediately to guerilla units. However, as organization and development of the guerilla force progresses and as combat activity increases, some reserves of supply will be needed in the operational area, especially in the preparation of a guerilla force for final exploitation. Supplies not immediately issued to guerilla troops must be stored in dispersed caches. The area over which these caches are dispersed depends upon the capability of the enemy forces to locate and seize supplies. Large reserves should not be accumulated, as this tends to immobilize guerilla forces in the area in which they are stored. Care should be taken by special forces commanders that guerilla units do not establish reserves of supplies provided by theater for other than military operations against the enemy. In the past, guerilla forces have set aside supplies for future political action, especially when the defeat of the enemy was close at hand.

Section II. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION
106. General
The primary purpose of medical service in support of special forces guerilla development efforts is to conserve fighting strength in an operational area and to minimize the necessity of replacements. Efficient and well-planned medical support will enable guerilla and special forces elements to maintain maximum operational strength and efficiency, improved morale, and foster favorable relations with indigenous personnel.

107. Functions of Medical Service
The functions of a guerilla force medical service include medical and surgical care of sick, wounded, and injured; prevention of the outbreak of disease; evacuation of casualties to prevent capture and compromise by the enemy; maintenance of sufficient medical supplies to support operations; and maintenance of maximum mobility in the disposition of all casualties. Whenever possible, medical intelligence data should be collected.

108. Medical Service
The means available to the special forces team commander and guerilla commander for establishing medical support will include—
a. Personnel.
   (1) Special forces chief medical aidman and requisitioned personnel.
   (2) Indigenous doctors.
   (3) Indigenous nurses.
   (4) Indigenous untrained personnel.
b. Equipment and Supplies.
   (1) Medical aidman's kit.
   (2) Subsequent delivery from theater sources of all types of medical supplies not available locally.
   (3) Indigenous medical supplies.
   (4) Indigenous medical facilities.
   (5) Captured medical supplies and equipment.

109. Aidman's Duties

Among the many tasks the special forces aidman is responsible for the following duties are most important:
   a. Provide direct medical support to his team.
   b. Furnish liaison with local indigenous medical personnel.
   c. Supervise and train indigenous personnel as assistants.
   d. Advise the team leader on health conditions and medical facilities in the operational area.
   e. Assist the team leader in planning medical support for combat operations.
   f. Recommend to the team leader necessary supplies and equipment for resupply.
   g. Collect and disseminate medical intelligence.

110. Preparation for Infiltration

In preparing a team for infiltration, the special forces team is provided area study information to determine—
   a. The existence of an organized medical attachment or a medical net.
   b. Personnel available and status of training.
c. Types and amount of medical equipment and supplies available.

d. Medical facilities available.

e. Organization for the flow of patients from injury or illness to recovery and return to duty.

f. Special health problems.

g. Medical services available to civilians and to the enemy.

111. Medical Support Organization

a. Organization of medical support for special forces operations will be one of three types.

(1) Guerilla medical organization. Full time services paralleling those of any military organization. Patient flow will be organized and medical units of various types will be situated in safe areas away from tactical units as much as possible, guarded and supported by units assigned for that purpose.

(2) Civilian organization. Existing hospitals, local doctors, and friendly homes are used for the treatment, care, and convalescence of guerilla personnel.

(3) A combination of the organizations in (1) and (2) above. This will probably be the type of organization most used. Proper coordination of the two systems will give the guerillas widespread medical assistance, and allow them to take advantage of the best in both operations.

b. The units in the medical organization, whichever form it takes, should include all, or most of the following:

(1) Unit aidmen. Approximately one per 50
men.

(2) Unit medical detachment. One for a unit of 150 to 200 men. The unit aidmen will be in this detachment.

(3) Aid station. One for three or four detachments. Seriously sick and wounded will be routed to the aid station and treated. A doctor and a staff of nurses or aidmen should be available. In the early buildup phase of the special forces guerilla development effort it may perform the functions of a hospital, but should be relieved of these functions as soon as practicable.

(4) Casualty collecting station. This may be set up for an operation in which casualties are expected, or as a way station for several guerilla units sending casualties to a hospital.

(5) Hospital. This may be a civilian hospital to which casualties are sent for surgical and medical care, or a collection of tents or caves in which there are one or more indigenous physicians and surgeons. The primary mission of this hospital will be the treatment of bed patients. The hospital, with its low mobility characteristics, should be away from tactical units and target areas and should be well guarded.

(6) Convalescent camps. Convalescents should be moved out of the hospitals as soon as possible. Their presence in a hospital increases the difficulty of moving the installation and of guarding
it. The convalescent camp may be a ‘civilian home in which one or two convalescents are recuperating, or it may be an isolated camp run along military lines.

(7) Medical training school. In addition to qualified doctors and nurses, indigenous personnel must be recruited and trained as aidmen, nurses, and administrators.

(8) Medical evacuation. Casualties will be evacuated when required, and as the situation permits, to areas under friendly control by air, sea, or over land.

Section III. TRANSPORTATION AND TROOP MOVEMENTS

112. General

a. The theater joint task force or the special forces operational base (par. 40) assumes full responsibility for the transportation of supplies and the movement of special forces personnel to operational areas. This includes briefing the delivery agency on the destination and the contact method.

b. The situation existing at delivery points (drop zones, landing zones, beaches, etc.) is considered when movements are planned. In the initial stages of guerilla force organization, or when enemy troops are active in the delivery area, supply packages should be of a weight and size which allows them to be carried from the point of delivery in one-man loads. Supplies are packaged in light, weatherproof containers. Allowances
should be made for loss and damage, especially if supplies are to be air dropped. All components of each piece or set are loaded in the same aircraft or other conveyance. When possible, instructions included for the assembly, use, and cars for supplies and equipment are printed in the language of the guerilla force receiving the equipment.

113. Means of Delivery

a. Special forces personnel, supplies, and equipment will be delivered to a guerilla force by air, water, or land. The recommendations of the guerilla commander and the theater commander's representative in the field are fully considered before final selection of the means for delivery is made. Aircraft and submarines are the most suitable means during the early phases of guerilla organization when secrecy is of prime concern. During the final phase, secrecy is less important and the most efficient means are used to deliver supplies in the desired quantity when and where needed.

b. Although the delivery of special forces personnel and supplies to operational areas is most popularly conceived as being largely accomplished by parachute or airlanding, in some areas of the world emphasis may shift to the use of amphibious means of delivery. Advantages and disadvantages of the various means of delivery have been discussed in chapter 5.

114. Control of Movements

Since the movement of special forces personnel and supplies from theater bases to operational
areas will have tactical implications, selection of routes and means to be used will be coordinated by the theater joint task force staff.

a. General. Guerilla forces use every available kind of transportation that can be employed under the conditions imposed by the terrain and the enemy situation. During the early phases of organization and operations, they transport themselves and their supplies on foot. The bulk of supplies needed to support a small local unit can be collected within the unit's area of operation. However, the distribution of men, and material from higher headquarters within an area command to lower units gives rise to complex problems in transportation and security. The distances involved are relatively great. Transportation is usually scarce and the terrain is often rugged. Presence of the enemy also imposes security problems. The successful movement of personnel and material depends on sound organization, coordination, vigilance, ingenuity, and determination on the part of all individuals and units involved.

b. Responsibilities. The area special forces commander is responsible for issuing the necessary orders to accomplish and coordinate shipments to or through district special forces. District commanders are, in turn, responsible for issuing orders and coordinating operations within their operational areas. The choice of transportation means and route is delegated to guerilla unit commanders through whose operational areas the shipments pass. For security, a large shipment may be divided into many increments and sent over several routes. The responsibility for protecting shipments from the enemy and for
safeguarding them against pilferage is clearly fixed and is transferred to appropriate guerilla commanders throughout the movement of the shipments. Armed guerilla detachments accompany each shipment.

c. Methods. In initial stages of organization the method normally available to guerillas is man pack. In later stages, porter platoons, pack animal platoons, or cart platoons may be organized as supply trains for guerilla forces. Pack animals and carts may be commandeered either permanently or temporarily from the civilian population. Personnel may be part-time guerillas (members of the auxiliary units) who are called upon for assistance only as needed. Carrying parties are made up to transport loads. In rugged terrain, whenever possible, supplies and equipment are packaged in one-man loads. The shipments are relayed from one carrying party to another along a designated route. For security reasons in case of capture by the enemy, each relay carrying party will be given only the information necessary for them to know in order to deliver the shipment to the next relay transfer point. The final destination will be divulged only to the last relay carrying party charged with the delivery of the shipment.

d. Lines of Communication. The organized and established courier routes of an area command serve as the lines of communication over which personnel and material are moved. The type of shipment and the current enemy situation throughout the area are considered in routing each shipment. Security usually receives greater consideration than speed. Commanders of small guerilla units are allowed freedom of action, in,
rerouting or delaying shipments to cope with unforeseen situations.

Section IV. SERVICE

115. General

The difficulty of supply procurement and delivery dictates that special emphasis be placed on practical aspects of supply service. Guerilla forces should not become involved in all of the administrative supply functions practiced by conventional forces.

116. Service

a. A highly developed, well-organized guerilla force of, district or area command size may, include such special duty element as small arms repair detachments, signal and engineer units.

b. Local civilians may be recruited into auxiliary units on a part-time basis to assist in the movement or caching of supplies.

c. Proper utilization, maintenance, and repair of supplies and equipment should be rigidly enforced.

d. Responsibility for supplies and supply conservation should be stressed.

e. Long periods in the field under primitive conditions require strict observance of proper sanitation principles enforced at all levels of command and closely checked by senior guerilla commanders and special forces personnel.

Section V. MISCELLANEOUS RELATED SUBJECTS
117. General

a. Theater directives establish the support to be furnished special forces operations by the various services and organizations under theater control. Requirements peculiar only to special forces are supplied by theater from local sources and from agencies within the zone of the interior.
b. Preparations for the logistical support of guerilla operations require much time. Often it is necessary to move men and equipment and to start the buildup of needed facilities and supplies before detailed tasks are assigned. In these circumstances, early logistical support activities are based on the broad missions assigned special forces by the theater commander. Time and distance as well as enemy action and capabilities are important factors affecting all logistical activities. The projected area of guerilla operations and the enemy's dispositions and capabilities may require special transportation facilities as well as close coordination with other major forces within a theater.

118. Theater Planning and Organization

a. Logistical plans should provide for support to guerilla forces on a progressively increasing scale within the limitations and capabilities of the theater. In general, the initial plans are based on forecasts prepared by the staff of the theater joint task force. The ability to meet eventual requirements for any projected operation depends to a large extent on the correctness of the initial forecast.
b. The logistical plan, as well as the
organizations and agencies that execute the plan, must be capable of rapid adjustment to meet changes imposed by higher headquarters, enemy action, weather, and unforeseen developments within the objective area. The support provided to guerrilla forces should be continuous, and the plan to provide support must be
overall plans and requests for supplies. All special forces personnel are particularly involved in strictly supervising guerillas in the utilization and conservation of supplies and equipment made available from theater resources. Plans and directives, usually verbal, may include—

(1) Organization of guerilla supply and service units.
(2) Organization and use of civilian units.
(3) Employment of civilians.
(4) Systems of levy on civilians.
(5) Receipt of payment for supplies.
(6) Collection and distribution of supplies.
(7) Levels of supplies to be maintained.

c. Lower guerilla unit commanders are responsible for the supplying of their units and for conducting supply operations in accordance with plans, directives, and orders of their higher headquarters. Supply operations will be decentralized and conducted by lower units within their assigned area. For example, if the basic unit is a platoon, the platoon leader is assigned an area from which he locally collects supplies for his unit. The guerilla unit commander makes his needs known to the next higher echelon for supplies and equipment not available within his area. He is responsible for the distribution of all supplies and equipment received from higher headquarters. Besides supplying his unit, a unit commander may be responsible for supplying adjacent units as directed by a higher echelon.
119. General

Administrative program for guerillas must be simple since guerillas must remain flexible and not subject to rigid administrative controls. The difficulty of maintaining records and the added security risk caused by keeping of records and their storage require that administrative matters be confined to bare essentials.

120. Personnel and Administrative Records

a. The special forces commander determines the form of records or journals to be maintained. Generally, a diary which will include operations, activities, logistical support, personnel, results, conclusions, and after action reports will prove sufficient for newly formed guerilla organizations and may be the only type of record that is possible to maintain in the field for security reasons. Fragmentary information should be forwarded by radio or other means of communication to the special forces operational base to be used to build up administrative records maintained at that location.

b. When the guerilla organization expands, additional records may be kept to maintain control of the indigenous forces only if the security situation permits. Some records which may be maintained are

   (1) Personnel roster. A roster listing the members of the guerilla organization
must be kept current to show date joined, date discharged, and other appropriate personnel matters.

(2) Oath of enlistment. An oath of enlistment will be administered to each new member of the guerilla organization. This will establish jurisdictional authority over individuals by the guerilla commanders and will include special oaths of allegiance considered necessary.

(3) Theater records and reports. Information required by the theater commander for maintenance of records and reports will be maintained in appropriate records to the extent possible under field conditions.

(4) Casualty records. Information concerning personnel killed, wounded, and missing in action must be maintained and reported as soon as the situation will permit.

(5) Payrolls. If a form of payment is made to members of a guerilla force, appropriate records must be maintained.

(6) Recording and settling claims. The guerilla commander will maintain sufficient records to assist in the settlement of claims. When a claim is settled in the field, a quitclaim type receipt will be completed and retained for record, if the situation permits.

(7) Receipt forms. The guerilla commander will have suitable receipt forms for use in obtaining food, services, or supplies from local civilians. These receipts should describe the amount paid or the amount due and may serve as a request for
payment from the local government in the post-war period.

(8) Demobilization. For discussion of administrative requirements during demobilization, see chapter 13.
121. Guerilla Communications

The guerilla forces must have communication between all their units for control, coordination, information, and security. Without communications, a guerilla movement cannot survive for long and usually dissolves into numerous small units of questionable combat effectiveness and short life expectancy. Guerilla communications are limited by the following

a. Logistics. Supply and maintenance problems usually prohibit the use of complex communications equipment by guerilla forces.

b. Geography. Since there are no front lines and few boundaries in guerilla operations, the communications system must be flexible, adaptable to varied terrain, and highly transportable.

c. Degree of Control. Guerilla units must have far greater communications autonomy than conventional units. Seldom, especially in the early phases of a guerilla movement, will units combine for coordinated action and seldom will immediate action be demanded of a neighboring unit. Because of this, internal communications will not require high-speed transmission devices such as those used in conventional communications. Also the volume of traffic will be low.

d. Security. Communications security is
essential for survival and takes precedence over dependability and speed of communication. Transmission time must be limited to the absolute minimum.

e. Personnel. Guerilla organizations usually have few communications technicians. Personnel must be recruited and trained as couriers and messengers, and in some instances as radio operators. Communications plans must be based on the capabilities of special forces personnel available with the guerilla force.

122. Guerilla Communications Systems

The system will include communications to—

a. Commander and his staff.
b. Units of like size.
c. Subordinate tactical units.
d. Security warning system.
e. Training facilities.

123. Means of Communication

a. Messengers or Couriers. If selected with care, messengers or couriers are secure and reliable although not the fastest means of communication. Courier nets are usually the primary means of local communication. Messengers may be men, women, or children.
b. Radio. Radio is the least secure means of communication. Guerilla forces will often be in communication with friendly bases by radio in the absence of more secure means. FM radio is valuable if used sparingly and with regard for security. It is used in raids; ambushes, air-ground communications, and also in security and warning

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nets. Command and support communications should not be based on FM radio since the greater range of the command and support nets necessitates radio equipment using the lower frequency spectrum AM radio. Radiotelephony in the lower frequencies, however, is especially vulnerable to enemy radio intelligence and direction finding, and manual telegraphy requires highly trained radio operators. The reporting of important information obtained incidental to guerilla warfare operations to theater must not interfere with radio communications necessary for the support of the primary mission.

c. Wire. Field telephone and telegraph systems may be practicable in areas firmly under guerilla control, but wire between command posts or guerilla base areas constitutes a great danger to guerillas. Telephone systems can be of value in the warning system and also between staff sections in a well-established guerilla base area.

d. Indigenous Communications Networks. Telephone, telegraph, and postal services in the operational area can be used for communications by guerilla forces under certain conditions. Generally, these networks are more useful for long-range communications and for communications by civilians supporting the guerilla effort.

e. Homing Pigeons. The possibility of using homing pigeons which may be found in an operational area should not be overlooked.

f. Aircraft. Light aircraft may be used if enemy air capabilities in the areas are limited and if the guerillas are in substantial strength. A guerilla force should be able to defend its airstrips and
assess enemy capabilities before using aircraft for communications.

g. Prearranged Communications. This field of communications is useful for transmitting action messages of the command or execution type. The signal may be a word or phrase transmitted by friendly commercial broadcast or tactical radio, a bonfire, or, various other signs. A prearranged commercial or operational radio transmission, which is not acknowledged immediately, is known as a blind transmission or broadcast. This permits maximum security to the team while receiving information or instructions by radio.

h. Short Range Communications In the visual field, flares, bonfires, flashlights, signal flags, heliographs, and arm and hand signals are some of the means employed. Audio signals may include whistles, bugles, rifle shots, and drums and cymbals.

124. Courier Nets

Guerilla operations normally utilize extensive courier nets. Every unit operates a message center; couriers are attached to the unit message center for dispatch as needed. Where the distance between units is too great for efficient courier runs, relay stations are organized. Scheduled messenger runs are instituted when traffic volume indicates a need. Alternate courier routes are organized to continue operation of the net if any part is compromised.

125. Recruiting and Training

Recruiting and training of communications
personnel is a constant and important activity of guerilla forces. The communications system will be no better than the personnel organizing and operating it. Depending on the situation, the picked recruits maybe trained in schools, by the coach and pupil method, by "on the job" training, or by a combination of such methods.

126. Signal Plans

Changing situations cause signal plans for guerillas to vary greatly. Successful communications systems, however, must be preplanned, based on the following factors:
   a. The assigned communication mission.
   b. Communication means available.
   c. Personnel and supplies available.

Section II. SPECIAL FORCES COMMUNICATIONS

127. General

   a. The special forces team commander is responsible for the communications necessary to accomplish his mission.
   b. Communications must be planned on the basis of means and personnel available. The special forces team commander will give this planning a high priority, stressing security and adaptation to the local situation. The effectiveness of communications is a result of training, ingenuity, and the perseverance of personnel.

128. Characteristics of Special Forces Communications

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a. The distance from the operational team to its parent headquarters may be as much as 2,000 miles.

b. Radio equipment used by a special forces team must be long range, light, simple, small, and rugged. Equipment meeting these specifications will necessarily be of low power, and highly trained operators are required to communicate effectively over desired distances.

c. Since the team will be in enemy territory and vulnerable to enemy action, its safety will depend on communications security.

d. The special forces team must assist guerillas in organizing communications.

e. Signal supplies will be difficult to obtain. Resupply by theater headquarters may be limited, and indigenous sources cannot often be relied upon to support a widespread guerilla movement.

f. Signal personnel will be difficult to obtain and training facilities will be limited.

129. Command Net with Base

a. The base station is in friendly territory with physical security and comparatively extensive facilities. The signal officer must discharge the following functions

(1) Establish and distribute SOI and SSI.
(2) Analyze wave propagation conditions.
(3) Operate radio transmitting and receiving stations.
(4) Process and distribute cryptographic equipment and supplies.
(5) Process and disseminate information, on enemy direction finding and radio intelligence capabilities.
(6) Provide for signal supply.

b. The special forces team in enemy territory must practice transmission security to the greatest possible extent, since breaches of security may give the enemy information that may lead either to destruction or ineffectiveness of the team. Radio operators must use every means at their command to insure that messages will reach the base station. Security measures include—

(1) Transmission of all messages at a distance from, the guerilla base area and movement of the radio after each transmission.

(2) Transmission of important messages only, keeping these as short as possible.

(3) Strict compliance with, SOI and SSI.

(4) Use of directional antennas.

(5) Use of high speed transmission devices.

(6) Use of air-ground radios for transmission of messages during resupply drops.

130. Lateral Communications

a. In the early stages of operations when only FA teams have been infiltrated into operational areas, lateral radio communications between FA teams may jeopardize security. Such lateral communications will be established only by approval of the next higher echelon of command. Whenever possible, lateral communications between FA teams should be achieved by relay through a base station or by messenger or by some other means. Direct lateral radio communications should start, only when they are absolutely essential for operational coordination, and the capture of one team will not compromise the
other.
b. If FB, FC, and/or FD teams are infiltrated into the operational areas for coordination or control purposes, command radio communications channels will be established between the controlling teams and their subordinate teams on an individual basis. FA teams will continue to communicate directly with the base station for logistic support unless otherwise directed. This will permit the control teams to devote maximum attention to operational matters. At the same time the number of radio transmissions will be reduced considerably by the elimination of the controlling teams serving as radio communications relay stations. The controlling teams will monitor all transmission by their subordinate teams in order to keep abreast of the logistical situation in their areas of responsibility.

131. Tactical Communications

Communications for raids and ambushes will be organized by the special forces team. Security elements should be in communication with the command group by frequency modulation radio whenever possible. Prearranged visual or audio signals will be necessary for control of the action.

132. Security Net Communications

Communication means for security nets must be instantaneous. Telephone, radio, or visual signals may be used, since in most cases messengers will be too slow for communications in these nets.

133. Choice of Radios
Radios of different types are required for special forces communications nets.

a. Radiotelegraph transmitters of the continuous wave type have long range in the lower high frequency band, but require trained radio operators. They are suitable for the command net with base, guerilla command nets, and special forces operational nets.

b. Amplitude modulation radiotelephone transmitters have medium long range, but do not require highly trained radio operators. They are suitable for guerilla command nets and special forces operational nets.

c. Frequency modulation radiotelephone transmitters are short range but are light and simple to operate. They are suitable for air ground communications, raids and ambushes, and security nets.
134. General
As friendly conventional forces move into the areas of guerilla operations, the ability of guerilla forces to support military operations gradually ceases. At this time the guerilla organization should be demobilized without delay. Units retained beyond their period of usefulness become a liability to the conventional force and a source of potential trouble. As the pressures that hold a guerilla force together during times of danger disappear, the force will tend to break up into rival factions that may clash with one another.

135. Role of Sponsoring Powers,
a. When a theater command has completed the exploitation of a guerilla force, it may release the force to the provisional government or government in exile having primary national interest.
b. The responsibility for physical, psychological, and administrative demobilization of guerilla forces belongs to the provisional government.

136. Demobilization Plan
Military demobilization should be planned and conducted so as to include the following
a. Assembly of the guerilla force.
b. Completion of administrative records.
c. Settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits.
d. Settlement of claims.
e. Awarding of decorations.
f. Collection of arms and equipment.
g. Care of sick and wounded.
h. Discharge.
i. Provision for the rehabilitation and employment of discharged guerillas.

137. Assembly of the Guerilla Force

The guerilla force is gathered by units into assembly areas. All records and equipment are brought with the units. Hospitals and convalescent camps are centrally located, and training programs are conducted to keep the men occupied. The guerilla force at this time may represent a powerful political factor in the liberated area. Support of its members for various causes will be sought by factions both within and outside the guerilla forces. In the interest of orderly demobilization, political activity by or among the guerillas should be closely controlled and movement of the guerillas should be controlled to prevent absence without leave and desertions.

138. Completion of Administrative Records

All elements of the guerilla force complete the administrative record of their units. Certificates are prepared to cover records that have been lost or destroyed. Complete payrolls are prepared and are reconciled with authorized unit strength figures. Arms and equipment are inventoried and accountability is established.

139. Settlement of Pay, Allowances, and Benefits

Members of the force are paid after previous
partial payments have been deducted. Authorized benefits are paid to legal survivors of men who have died or were killed in action.

140. Settlement of Claims

Administrative delay in the settlement of claims arising from the activities of guerilla forces can be a source of ill will and may result in injustice. A method of settlement is outlined below which eliminates the need for an elaborate claims service by a headquarters which may be required to act without adequate information. It also makes possible the prompt payment of claims and minimizes the possibility of fraud.

a. A fixed sum is credited to the guerilla force for the settlement of authorized obligations that it has incurred during its existence. The commander is instructed to divide the credit among his lower units.

b. Claims teams are set up within each unit of the force that has authority to issue receipts or otherwise incur financial obligation. Disbursing officers are attached to each claims team. Notices are published in the area of guerilla operations announcing that claims teams will be present on specified dates to receive and pay claims.

c. The claims team establishes an office in the area and brings with it the records pertaining to receipts and expenditures. Receipts are verified and approved by the guerilla members of the team and presented to the disbursing officer who makes immediate payment to the claimant from funds credited to the unit. Claims for services or damages not covered by receipts, if they are below a specified amount, are processed by the claims
team based on information available. Larger claims are forwarded to the area commander and higher headquarters for action.

141. Awards and Decorations

Prompt action is taken on recommendations for decorations and awards to deserving guerillas and civilian supporters. The awards are made at local ceremonies attended, when practical, by the guerilla troops, the civilian population, high ranking officers of the conventional forces, and officials of the provisional government as soon after the completion of an operation as possible.

142. Collection of Arms and Equipment

Arms and equipment are collected from the guerillas before the settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits. Care is taken that weapons are not hidden for later and unlawful use. Public announcement is made that weapons must be turned in and that after a specified date unlicensed possession of weapons or military equipment will be unlawful.

143. Care of Sick and Wounded

Guerilla hospitals are kept in operation until the patients can be taken over by military hospitals or by civilian institutions. Every effort is made to insure that wounded and sick guerilla soldiers are given the necessary care. Permanently disabled guerillas may be granted pensions by the recognized government.

144. Discharge

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Each person sworn in, as a member of a guerilla force will be given a discharge and testimonial of his services when passing from control of the special forces commander to the provisional government. The discharge provisions applicable to military personnel will be used as a guide. Current Department of the Army forms appropriately modified may be used.

145. Rehabilitation and Employment of Discharged Guerillas

Suitable measures are taken to assist discharged guerillas to assume their places in civilian life. Some may be given employment by the conventional forces or by the newly constituted government. Others may be incorporated into the police or armed forces of the new government. Assistance in rebuilding damaged houses or farms belonging to guerillas may also be granted.
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By order of Wilber DT. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
General, United States Army.
Chief of Staff.

HERBERT M. JONES,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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NG: State AG (6); units—same as Active Army.
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For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.

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