FIELD SERVICE
REGULATIONS
LARGER UNITS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JUNE 1950
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This manual supersedes FM 100-15, 29 June 1942, including C 1, 10 September 1942.
FM 100-15 is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

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By order of the Secretary of the Army:

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FOREWORD

FM 100-15 is published for the information and guidance of all concerned. The functions and operations of larger units are discussed. It presupposes a familiarity with the provisions of FM 100-5, which covers the doctrines pertaining to the leading of troops, and combat of the combined arms; with the provisions of FM 100-10; and with the tactics and techniques of the various arms and technical services.

Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, is not intended as a treatise on war but a guide for commanders and staffs of corps, armies, army groups, and for theater Army forces. Higher echelons are treated only to the extent considered essential to an understanding of the functions and duties of commanders and staffs of the foregoing units. Operations of the division are discussed in FM 100-5.

These Field Service Regulations reflect policy, doctrine, and procedures current at the time of preparation. Tactical and technical developments and organizational changes of the Army will necessitate correction and modification of the manual from time to time. Recommendations for corrections or changes should be forwarded to the Commandant, Command and General Staff College, for consideration and inclusion in future changes to the manual.
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CHAPTER 1
COMMANDS

Section I. HIGH COMMAND

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF. The President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. He exercises command over the Armed Forces through the Department of Defense.

2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. The Department of Defense is headed by the Secretary of Defense. It consists of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and certain other boards and councils which advise the Secretary of Defense and the President on matters pertaining to national security. (See fig. 1.)

3. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. a. The Secretary of Defense is appointed from civil life by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. No person, who has within 10 years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a regular component of the Armed Services, is eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security. Under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions of the National Security Act, as amended, he will have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense and, accordingly, he performs the following duties:

(1) Establishes general policies and programs for the Department of Defense and for all the departments and agencies therein.

(2) Exercises general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies.

(3) Takes appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research.

(4) Supervises and coordinates the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies of the Department of Defense; formulates and determines the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervises the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation act.

b. The Secretary of Defense submits semiannual written reports to the
Figure 1. Organization for National Security.
President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the Department of Defense, accompanied by—

(1) Appropriate recommendations.
(2) Separate reports from the military departments.
(3) Itemized statements showing savings accomplished and eliminations of unnecessary duplications and overlappings.

c. The Secretary of Defense may, without being relieved of his responsibility therefor, and unless prohibited by specific provisions of law, perform any functions vested in him through the aid of such officials or organizational entities of the Department of Defense as he may designate.

4. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the Chairman, who will be the presiding officer thereof but who will have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

b. Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are—

(1) To prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces.
(2) To prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans.
(3) To establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security.
(4) To formulate policies for joint training of military forces.
(5) To formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces.
(6) To review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.
(7) To provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff act as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the Secretary of Defense and perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as prescribed by law (fig. 2).

Section II. ARMY ESTABLISHMENT

5. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS. a. The Army Establishment is headed by the Secretary of the Army. It is organized to provide a Chief of Staff, a Department of the Army General Staff, a Special Staff, Administrative and Technical Staffs and Services, the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, the continental armies, and oversea commands (fig. 3). (See also AR and SR 10—series.)

b. The United States Army includes land combat and service forces
Figure 2. Organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat operations on land. Of the three major Services, the Army has primary interest in all operations on land, except in those operations otherwise assigned by law.

c. The primary functions of the Army are—

(1) To organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land, in order to—
   (a) Defeat enemy land forces.
   (b) Seize, occupy, and defend land areas.
(2) To organize, train, and equip Army antiaircraft artillery units.
(3) To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Services, and to provide Army forces for joint amphibious and airborne operations, and to provide for the training of such forces in accordance with policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(4) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, technique, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere by law.
(5) To provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the Army.
(6) To provide Army forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(7) To provide forces, as directed by proper authority for occupation of territories abroad, to include initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.
(8) To develop, in coordination with the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by the Army and Marine Corps forces in airborne operations. The Army will have primary interest in the development of those airborne doctrines, procedures, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.
(9) To formulate doctrines and procedures for the organization, equipping, training, and employment of forces operating on land, at division level and above, including division, corps, army, and general reserve troops, except that the formulation of doctrines and procedures for the organization, equipping, training, and employment of Marine Corps units for amphibious operations will be a function of the Department of the Navy.

Note. The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will be separately administered by their respective secretaries under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of a military department or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may present to the Congress, on his own initiative, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper.
Figure 3.
(10) To provide support, as directed by higher authority, for the following activities:

(a) The administration and operation of the Panama Canal.
(b) River and harbor projects in the United States, its territories, and possessions.
(c) Certain other civil activities provided by law.

d. The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set forth above will be employed to support and supplement the other Services in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives, for example, the Army's interdiction of enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on and from land. The Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the Service having primary responsibility for a function presents to that body the requirements and plans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He also presents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for final decision, any disagreement within the field of his Service's primary responsibility which has not been resolved. This does not prevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service or Services.

6. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. a. The Secretary of the Army is head of the Army Establishment and performs such duties as are required of him by law or may be enjoined upon him by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

b. He is charged by law with supervision of—

(1) All estimates of appropriations for the expenses of the Army Establishment.
(2) All purchases of Army supplies.
(3) All expenditures of a civil nature as may be placed under his direction by Congress.

c. He is responsible for—

(1) The development of improved weapons and matériel.
(2) The proper instruction of all Army personnel.
(3) The discipline and morale of the Army.

7. CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY. a. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, is the principal military adviser to the Secretary of the Army and is charged by him with the planning, development, and execution of the Army program.

b. The Chief of Staff, under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, supervises all members and organizations of the Army, performs the duties prescribed for him by the National Security Act of 1947 and other laws, and performs such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President or by the Secretary of
the Army. Except as otherwise prescribed by law, by the President, or by the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff performs his duties under the direction of the Secretary of the Army.

c. The Chief of Staff presides over the Army Staff, transmits to the Secretary of the Army plans and recommendations prepared by the Army Staff, advises him in regard thereto, and, upon the approval of plans or recommendations by the Secretary of the Army, acts as the agent of the Secretary of the Army in carrying the same into effect.

d. The Chief of Staff serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. GENERAL STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. a. Under the direction of the Chief of Staff, the General Staff, Department of the Army, is responsible for developing the Army into a well-balanced and efficient military team.

b. The General Staff is charged specifically with the duty of providing such broad basic policies and plans as will enable the Chief, Army Field Forces; continental army and overseas commanders; and the heads of the administrative and technical services to prepare and execute detailed programs.

c. The General Staff assists the Chief of Staff by issuing, in the name of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, necessary directives to implement plans and policies, and supervises the execution of these directives.

d. In performing its duties the General Staff decentralizes to the fullest degree. No function is performed by the General or Special Staff of the Department of the Army which can be assigned to the major commands or the administrative and technical services without loss of adequate control of operations.

e. Each General Staff division plans and supervises the execution of operations within the confines of its sphere of action and reviews and analyzes the results of operations.

f. In carrying out their duties, General Staff divisions are guided by the following broad principles:

1. They plan, coordinate, and supervise on an Army-wide basis. They assist the Chief of Staff in the performance of the Army mission.

2. By means of direct contact with troops, they determine that orders, instructions, and directions are being executed in accordance with the desires of the Chief of Staff.

3. In accordance with the principle of decentralization, they concern themselves primarily with matters which require consideration on an Army-wide level. All other matters are decentralized to the proper echelons of command for action or decision. Adequate authority is delegated to responsible commanders and the heads of the administrative and technical services.

4. They act to minimize duplication and overlapping between the
commands and Services. Mutual confidence, good faith, and collaboration promoted between the General Staff, commands, and services are important factors in accomplishing this objective.

(5) They take action to indoctrinate all officers of their respective divisions with a thorough understanding of the duties, functions, responsibility, and authority of the various echelons of command in the Army.

9. FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. Some of the more important functions of the General Staff, Department of the Army are—

a. Determination, in conjunction with other Government agencies, of the resources, combat strength, major dispositions and military capabilities of foreign nations.

b. Rendition of decisions and preparation of plans and directives pertaining to current and future operations.

c. Determination of the organization and training required for the contemplated operations.

d. Determination of requirements, and allocation and distribution of means.

e. Coordination of the activities of major subordinate agencies, and accurate and clear delineation of their responsibilities.

f. Approval or modification of plans and estimates submitted by subordinates.

g. Attainment and maintenance of high morale, and combat and logistical efficiency.

h. Attainment and maintenance of a leading position in the creation and fabrication of all weapons and equipment essential for ground supremacy.

i. Maintaining continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of operations.

10. GENERAL STAFF ESTIMATE OF MEANS. An accurate and sound estimate of the means necessary to accomplish a desired objective is of critical importance in staff planning. Normally, the General Staff views in their broader aspects the contemplated operations, terrain, lines of communications, enemy forces, and the dispositions of friendly troops and logistical arrangements. However, the detailed requirements for projected operations must be known and provided for if successes are to be made possible. Recommendations for necessary means may be secured from commanders of next lower echelons who are in close touch with the enemy and the actual conditions of terrain, and with supply and combat efficiency pertaining to the units which are to conduct the operation. Under exceptional circumstances when time is short, great secrecy essential, and when details of local conditions are known to the General Staff it may make the detailed study of an operation.
11. GENERAL STAFF PLANS. Assisted by directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the General Staff foresees future requirements and plans far in advance. While current plans and orders are being put into effect, plans for the future must be foreseen in order that means may be accumulated and, if necessary, installations changed or established to execute them. The General Staff must take into its confidence those subordinate commanders from whom preliminary studies, tentative plans, and eventual actions are required. Close coordination with the activities of the State, Air Force, and Navy Departments and other Governmental agencies must be maintained, and all information and intelligence of the international situation must be made available to appropriate subordinate commanders.

12. ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS TO FIELD FORCES. Field commanders whose forces are not components of joint forces are assigned missions by the Chief of Staff, United States Army. These missions are prescribed in directives or letters of instruction. The commander of Army forces which are part of a joint force receives his missions from the joint force commander, or he receives his instructions from the Chief of Staff acting as an executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These directives may prescribe a detailed plan of operations or may authorize great freedom of action to accomplish a specified mission. Usually, the details of execution are left to the field force commander. To provide guidance for the commander and to allow for contingencies, directives should cover considerable periods of time and should be issued well in advance of the time for execution of the contemplated operations.

Section III. THEATER OF OPERATIONS

13. THEATER OF OPERATIONS. a. “Theater of operations” is a term used to designate a portion of the land, sea, and air masses of the theater of war necessary for military operations pursuant to an assigned mission and for the administration incident to such operations. Theaters of operations are designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who normally assign to a theater only so much area as is necessary for the deployment and administration of allocated forces. Sufficient breadth and depth are provided to secure maneuver room for all types of operations, for security and for the operation of lines of communications.

b. The term, “area command,” is used to designate special types of organizations, with specific missions, whose limits of authority and responsibility are defined in terms of the territory assigned to them. The territory assigned to an area command may be a part of the zone of interior, part of a theater of operations, or it may be a separate area, not included in either. The primary mission of an area command, assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or by the theater commander, as appropriate, is other than combat, except for local defense. Typical area commands
are base commands; defense commands; metropolitan areas; island commands; or a designated area command in an ocean area, which is composed of several island commands grouped together for centralized control and administration.

14. THEATER COMMANDER. (a) The President of the United States as Commander in Chief, ordinarily will designate the theater commander. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should recommend such designation to the President. In the event of the existence of allies, the designation of the theater commander should be made by the combined decision of the President of the United States and the designated representatives of the allied powers.

(b) The theater commander organizes the command and administrative structure of the theater according to sound principles of operations and procedures, and the exigencies of the situation. (See fig. 4.)

c. Under the theater commander and in the direct chain of command are the theater Army commander, the theater Air Force commander, and the theater Navy commander. These commanders are responsible to the theater commander for the planning and conduct of operations and the administration of their respective forces.

--- Indicates broad policies and directives.

1 Indicates organizations established by the theater commander, if required.

Figure 4. Typical organization of a theater of operations.
d. Over-all direction and coordination for the efficient employment of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, are exercised by the theater com-
mander.

e. Normally, service forces within a joint theater are organized uni-
laterally; that is, each component force (Army, Navy, and Air Force)
has its own organization for providing the service support which it re-
quires. Depending on the situation and the composition of forces in the
theater, the theater commander may organize over-all logistical support
for the theater by assigning specific common support missions or respon-
sibilities to one component force. The designated force (Army, Navy, or
Air) will act for all three, including any joint task force which may be
organized. On the other hand, the theater commander may organize a
joint logistics command for the common support of all components in the
theater. The staff of such an organization will be a joint staff. (See fig.
4.) In any event, there must be unified logistical and administrative sup-
port of all forces in the theater. The theater commander must provide
for the exercise of close supervision, or even control, of certain logistical
functions which, from their joint scope or interest, require a high degree
of coordination at theater level.

f. The staff of a theater command employing only United States forces
is a joint staff. The staff of a theater employing combined forces (United
States and allied forces) is a combined staff.

15. THEATER COMMANDER'S MISSION. The mission of the theater
commander may be prescribed in an approved war plan or it may be
stated in a letter of instructions or other orders from the President or the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The mission assigned usually will be general in
character and leave great discretion to the theater commander. Ordinarily,
he is consulted prior to the promulgation of the plans. He may be called
upon to make recommendations and to prepare plans pertaining to his
theater.

16. THEATER PLANS. a. The theater commander, pursuant to poli-
cies announced and directives issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is di-
rectly responsible for the administrative and combat operations within
the theater.

b. The theater commander is responsible that operational plans provide
for coordination of the Army, Navy, and Air Force at his disposal and
that such plans are energetically and effectively executed.

c. The theater commander plans far in advance and makes his pro-
jected operational needs known to the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff.
His planning should be projected to include the successful accomplish-
ment of his mission. This may involve several campaigns, depending on
the division of the whole operation into separate campaigns, each includ-
ing operations of considerable magnitude.
17. THEATER CONTROL. a. Theater organization. (See fig. 4.) The theater of operations is organized internally for strategic, tactical, and administrative control as directed by the theater commander. Since combat operations may take place throughout the entire theater, the commander must organize his forces and area so as to insure unity of command for both combat and administration. Normally, the theater of operations is divided into a combat zone and a communications zone, the boundary between them being prescribed to delineate territorial responsibility.

(1) Combat zone. The combat zone comprises that area of the theater required for the conduct of operations by the field armies. It normally is divided for tactical control into army group, army, corps, and division areas or zones, each controlled by the commander of the corresponding unit. The rear boundary of the combat zone, if established, is designated by the theater Army commander and is changed to conform to the movement of the armies.

(2) Communications zone. The communications zone is that part of the theater in rear of the combat zone containing the principal administrative and logistical establishments, lines of communications, communications zone police forces, and other agencies required for the immediate support, maintenance, and well being of all the forces in the theater, and for the security of the communications zone itself. Laterally, it includes sufficient area to provide for the proper operation of supply, evacuation, transportation, and service installations and for their defense. The rear boundary normally is the rear boundary of the theater as designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It may be divided into base, intermediate, and advance sections depending on the length of the lines of communications, geographic features, or other factors. The theater commander will designate the troops and the commander of the communications zone and he will prescribe the mission of the security force for the communications zone. (For a more complete discussion of communications zone, see FM 100-10.)

b. Territorial control. The extent of the territorial control exercised by a theater commander will vary. He may exercise very limited control over the domestic or allied territory included within the area occupied by elements of the communications zone and even over portions of the combat zone. At the other extreme, when a hostile country is invaded, the control by the theater commander over the enemy territory included in the theater may be unlimited. Each situation presents a separate problem. For example, in a theater within home territory, control of vitally important industrial plants, transportation nets, depots, arsenals, and ports of embarkation by a theater commander might so seriously jeopardize the
functioning of the zone of the interior or so burden the theater commander as to warrant exempting them from theater control. Furthermore, a theater commander should be relieved of the administration of any area or activity not important to his mission and for which there is an agency capable of performing these functions without conflicting with or jeopardizing theater interests.

18. FACTORS AFFECTING THEATER PLANS. Theater mission, enemy situation, geography, major terrain features, climatic conditions, local resources, and existing routes of communications play most important roles in the initial organization of the forces and later operations within a theater. Great distances, lack of lines of communications, or serious intervening obstacles frequently dictate the division of the theater into separate areas with varying operations therein and may dictate separate missions for major forces in the same theater.

19. COMMANDERS OF ARMY FORCES IN A THEATER. a. Theater Army commander. The theater United States Army commander is designated by the Chief of Staff, United States Army. He is responsible for the tactical operations of all Army forces in the theater which are not assigned to joint task forces, or unified command. He coordinates his operations with those of the theater Navy and Air Force. When a joint task force is organized, he is responsible for furnishing administrative and logistical support to the Army component and will, in addition, furnish such logistical support to the other components of the joint task force as may be directed or authorized by the theater commander. He exercises command through the commanders of army groups and armies, the Army reserve forces, the communications zone, and the Army replacement command. The theater Army commander is largely a supervisor, a planner, and a coordinator who decentralizes combat and administrative operations, to the maximum degree, to his army groups and communications zone commanders respectively. (For theater Army commanders staff see FM 101-5.)

b. Army group commander. The army group commander is responsible for the tactical operation of the field armies under his command. He estimates the means he requires and makes recommendations for allocations accordingly, to include any additional means required. He allocates replacements to the armies of the group. He allocates available service troops to the armies. He normally controls the allocation of ammunition to armies, and may control the allocation of any item for service facility to insure equitable distribution of means to the armies in accordance with the tactical mission assigned to each. He should assure himself that the administrative arrangements, policies, and procedures for the logistical support of the armies are adequate and not unduly burdensome. He recommends to his immediate tactical commander the rear boundaries for the armies of his group.
c. Field army commander. Depending on the organization within the theater, the commander of a field army is responsible to the army group commander, the theater Army commander, task force commander, or the theater commander for the tactical and administrative operations of his army. In all situations the army commander is responsible for the organization and operation of the necessary services for immediate support within the army. This requires long-range planning; a detailed estimate of personnel and logistical needs; a careful study of lines of communications; and continuous liaison with commanders of adjacent armies, the army group, communications zone, and the theater Army replacement command.

d. Corps commander. The corps commander is responsible to the army commander for combat operations and certain service functions. As a part of an army, the corps has few service functions. The corps commander estimates the over-all service requirements for an operation and requests the allotment of additional means to the corps. When combat or administrative means organic to divisions and corps troops are not sufficient, he allots to them such additional means as are required and are available. Also, when there is a shortage of other support means, he allots to divisions and corps troops such means as are available. He normally controls the allocation of ammunition and may control the allocation of any item requiring his control. When the corps is detached from the army, for combat or other operations, it becomes a self-contained unit and must operate the service installations necessary for the administrative support of the entire corps. In such a situation, it normally must be reinforced by the assignment or attachment of additional service units, and the corps staff requires augmentation.
CHAPTER 2
PLANNING A CAMPAIGN

Section I. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

20. GENERAL. a. The effective execution of an assigned mission necessitates careful planning and preparation, which require that the commander be provided continually with timely intelligence of the enemy and the area of operations. During peace and war, the collection and evaluation of information and the production of intelligence is a continuing process. During peace, the principal intelligence mission of the General Staff, United States Army, in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal agencies, is to provide intelligence on the current capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of the armies of foreign nations, and to furnish timely warning of the nature of an impending attack on the United States or its possessions. As a corollary, it prepares descriptive studies of foreign countries and of possible theaters of operations. Such studies serve current military planning, and provide a fund of basic usable intelligence to the field forces in event of hostilities.

b. These intelligence studies cover, to the extent that they may affect the potential and actual military operations of the United States Army and foreign armies, the topography of foreign areas, including their climate and weather, land forms, drainage, vegetation, and soils; population and manpower resources; actual and potential industrial production, road and rail nets; harbors and all phases of transportation, power sources, water supply, and signal communication; scientific and technical capabilities; strength, organization, administration, disposition, combat efficiency, equipment, and tactical and logistical doctrines of armed forces; the personalities of leaders in military and civilian fields; the ideologies, fanaticisms and religion of the people, and the politics of the nations involved. The evaluated study of these and other factors for a nation comprise its combat potential.

21. GEOGRAPHY. The terrain and climate of a theater are of especial importance since they will influence the organization, equipment, and logistical support of forces involved, and may dictate the type of operation to be undertaken. Early and detailed study of terrain and climate in all possible theaters must be made in order to determine the means necessary for the successful conduct of operations. Topographic and hydrographic intelligence, including maps and charts, terrain studies, aerial
photographs, meteorological and climatological data, must be developed on a long-range basis.

22. PEACETIME INTELLIGENCE. a. The Department of the Army must exhaust every possible source of information to keep itself and commanders of field forces advised of air, ground, and naval dispositions; of movements of potential enemies; and of the trend of diplomatic relations with such potential enemies. Of particular significance is the trend of military research and development activities in foreign countries which may indicate a shift in emphasis from long-range research to development and production of new weapons and equipment for early war use.

b. Commanders of the field forces must keep themselves informed of the possibility of a surprise attack being made both from without and from within the national territory prior to a formal declaration of war. Commanders must dispose their forces so that a sudden attack against them or into their areas or zones of responsibility will be unsuccessful. All intelligence agencies focus their attention on obtaining early information of changes in dispositions of the forces of potential enemies, paying particular attention to the approach of any hostile forces within striking distance.

c. Effective counterintelligence measures must be taken to deny information to agents and sympathizers of potential enemies and, in case of attack, to prevent sabotage and cooperation of fifth columnists with the enemy. Normal dispositions and routine activities must be varied in order to provide deception, and to avoid giving a potential enemy a set pattern on which he may focus. Commanders will keep themselves informed of the measures being taken by Navy, Air Force, other Federal, and local civilian agencies which may be concerned with combating activities of potential enemies and will cooperate with such agencies to the fullest extent.

23. WARTIME INTELLIGENCE. During war, the intelligence agencies of the field forces are concerned primarily with obtaining complete information about hostile forces confronting them or those capable of intervening in the operation, and of the terrain, climate and population in areas of actual and projected operations. Correct evaluation and interpretation of this information and its integration with that furnished by the Intelligence Division of the General Staff, United States Army, assists in providing a sound basis for planning and executing operations. Although many peacetime sources of information will be closed or made difficult of access in war, there can be no lessening of efforts to obtain information. It is especially important that the Department of the Army, in conjunction with other agencies, use every available facility to obtain correct information about the military situation and the internal political, economic, and psychological condition of the opposing nation, or nations. Any weakness discovered must be fully exploited. Information of scien-
tific and technical projects within hostile countries is of vital importance. The introduction of radically new or improved weapons may cause a complete change in the concept and conduct of future military operations.

Section II. THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

24. GENERAL PLANS. General plans are prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in peace to meet all probable situations. Such plans must be characterized by great flexibility so that changes occurring in the international situation, as well as in the economic, military, political, and psychological conditions of the probable enemy will be met promptly and without disruption of the efficient operation of the armed forces. When plans are to be implemented, they are given to the appropriate commander in the form of a directive. The detailed plan for operations usually is formulated by the theater, defense command, base command, or similar commander designated to command in a particular area.

25. SPECIFIC PLANS. a. Regardless of whether the plan of campaign is prepared to meet a probable or an existing situation, there must be detailed consideration of the mission, the composition and capabilities of enemy forces, means required and available, the courses of action which will accomplish the mission, areas in which the forces will be concentrated, logistical requirements, routes of communications, signal communication, and the terrain and weather within the theater. Special consideration must be given to comparative atomic missile, air and armored strengths; and to the enemy potential for waging war with surprise weapons.

b. In planning a campaign, the commander must consider measures to lower the morale of the enemy. Strategic and tactical propaganda activities such as, loudspeaker operations, leaflet drops, and radio broadcasts can reduce the morale of the enemy if they are integrated into the military operation, and are adapted to the status of morale and the characteristics of the enemy. Depending upon the situation, the effect sought may be part of a general campaign against the enemy morale or a local operation to reduce the will-to-fight of the particular force facing the command. Such methods are not a substitute for fighting. The propaganda activities of one command must be adjusted to those of higher and neighboring commands as a part of an over-all integrated plan.

26. COMMANDER'S PLANS. By projecting his planning far into the future, at times for weeks and months, the commander makes every effort to insure that his forces will be suitably disposed to meet the enemy at the time and in the area most favorable to the successful execution of the plan. Special attention is given by advance planning to avoid being surprised at the outbreak of hostilities, or at the start of new operational phases. The plan must provide for a rapid concentration of forces for
employment in the decisive direction. It also should contemplate probable successive operations to continue the success achieved initially, as well as provide for action to be taken should the results be other than those planned. The movement and employment of larger units require long-range planning and preparations. The higher commander must visualize the whole campaign. While focusing his attention on the objective of the campaign he must evaluate the situations which may develop as a result of his planned operations. He cannot be unduly influenced by local reverses or failures.

27. FACTORS REQUIRING ANALYSIS. Certain factors may play a decisive role in the employment of large forces. These factors include—

a. Major terrain features, such as large rivers, lakes, marshes, heavily forested areas, and mountain ranges.
b. The character, position, and outline of frontiers.
c. Density of population and potential refugee problems.
d. Transportation facilities, and the number and location of routes of communications.
e. Probable reaction of the native population of the area; actively hostile, indifferent, friendly, or actively friendly.

These factors require careful analysis as to their effect on contemplated combat operations and the logistical support of the forces engaged.

28. ELEMENTS INCLUDED IN PLANS. Each plan of campaign must include the following major elements:

a. The mission of the force, the objective.
b. The course of action to accomplish the mission.
c. Troops and special equipment or material required.
d. The method of assembly, location, and security of the forces assembled for the campaign.
e. Logistical arrangements, routes and means of communication.
f. The timing of the campaign, including an estimate of the time required to accomplish all necessary measures prior to and during active operations.

29. FLEXIBILITY OF PLANS. Decisive action results from clear-cut, comprehensive plans, based on a full utilization of all available forces and means. The opportunity for decisive action may be foreseen initially or it may have to be created during the operation. In either situation, a flexible plan is of major importance so that the commander may exploit favorable developments in the general situation. This flexibility must exist in all phases of the operation.

Section III. THE OBJECTIVE

30. WAR OBJECTIVE. The object of war is to impose the will of one
or more nations upon that of another nation or group of nations. Its accomplishment requires the destruction of the enemy's will to fight, which normally requires the decisive defeat of his armed forces.

31. ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS. In planning an offensive campaign, the initial problem which confronts the commander is that of selecting decisive objectives. The assigned mission will require the selection of a physical objective or series of objectives, the occupation, destruction, or neutralization of which will bring about the decisive defeat or destruction of the enemy or will constitute a threat so great as to cause him to withdraw or sue for peace. The range and flexibility of air forces and naval forces provide such a large number of objectives as targets that the higher commander must exercise discrimination in their selection. Maximum forces must be concentrated against that particular objective or series of objectives most vital to the success of the campaign.

32. SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES. The selection of objectives will be influenced by two main considerations, which are—

a. The position of the enemy's military forces or the mass of these forces and their lines of communications.

b. The location of the following essentials of the enemy's war potential—

1. Vital industrial, signal communication, and commercial centers.
2. Sources of raw material and food stuffs.
3. Lines of communications and supply within the nation.
4. Seat of government control and administration.

c. A further consideration in selecting objectives may be that a particular enemy installation or resource is desired for our use.

33. PLANNING INITIAL OPERATIONS. a. Whatever the objective selected for the initial operations, the decisions and plans of the commander must be positive and clear cut, and they must visualize the attainment of the ultimate objective. Unless the commander already possesses sufficient air and naval superiority to permit other operations, the initial objective must include the attainment of such superiority. This may require preliminary operations to acquire bases from which effective air and naval operations can be conducted.

b. In planning initial operations to attain air and naval superiority, higher commanders are responsible for employing all suitable means under their control to this end.

c. Possession of objectives which will favor gaining the initiative and force the enemy to regulate his movements on those of the attacker may be necessary initially. Armies or groups of armies do not, therefore, always move directly against the enemy's main forces but may advance toward some locality containing the essentials of his national life and
forcing the enemy to move to its defense, or to abandon important territory or areas of military advantage to him.

d. A nation’s capital is the nerve center of government, and usually is a focal point of economic activities and communications. It is likely to be a symbol of national unity and power, and therefore to have a high psychological value. In addition to the capital, other cities and areas vital to the nation’s life may cause the enemy to defend them strongly. By so doing he may so weaken his forces elsewhere that they are subject to defeat in detail. On the other hand, seizure of the enemy capital, or vital areas, may result in the collapse of his military effort.

e. An objective may be selected which, if attacked, places the enemy in an unfavorable position for decisive battle. Such a situation may exist where the terrain prevents the enemy from employing a certain important type of combat power in which he is superior, or where the enemy is denied room to maneuver his troops in battle. An objective may be selected which forces the enemy, in marching to its defense, to move his army by separate lines of advance out of mutual supporting distance, thus permitting his forces to be defeated in detail.

Section IV. COURSE OF ACTION

34. DETERMINING INITIAL COURSE OF ACTION. The military situation and the political objectives of the war will determine whether the initial course of action of the nation at war is offensive or defensive. Under any circumstances the higher commander should be fully conversant with the political objectives so that his strategic plans of action may attain these objectives.

35. THE OFFENSIVE. When one nation seeks to impose its will on another by force of arms, invasion of territory, or occupation of vital areas, that nation is undertaking the offensive. For success, the commander engaged in the offensive not only must bring superior forces to bear in the air, on the sea, and on the ground, but he also must provide for the security of ever-lengthening lines of communications to include their vital installations. He not only must operate against the armed forces of the enemy, but also may have to protect his forces against a hostile population. Superiority of forces does not rest in numbers alone. It may rest in quality of equipment, in abundance of materials of war, in leadership, in position, in training, in morale, or in a combination of some or all of these factors.

36. SELECTION OF OFFENSIVE COURSE OF ACTION. Once the offensive has been determined as the national policy, a course of action is selected which a careful estimate of the situation indicates will most surely and quickly impose the national will on that of the enemy. The direction of the field forces must insure the defeat of the enemy and insure his
inability to prevent the full realization of our national aim at the peace table. The preparation of peace terms is the responsibility of the civil branch of the Government.

37. THE DEFENSIVE. When the political objective of a nation at war is simply the denial of what is desired by the enemy and the preservation of the status quo, the integrity of its territory and institutions, that nation is on the defensive. Its national objective may be secured by the repulse of the invader, by the exhaustion of all his resources, and the breaking of his will to continue the offensive. The defensive may be assumed initially with the intent to pass to the offensive as soon as the available means and the prevailing circumstances permit.

38. EFFECT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE. a. Whether the general course of action be the strategic offensive or the strategic defensive, both the tactical offensive and the tactical defensive separately or in combination, will be employed to gain the ends sought. (See FM 100-5.)

b. The fundamental principle that decisive results seldom can be achieved except by the tactical offensive applies equally to the strategic offensive and strategic defensive. The exhaustion of the enemy's resources and the weakening of his will to continue the offensive cannot be obtained by the tactical defensive alone: The forces on the strategic defensive will employ effectively the tactical offensive to achieve surprise, upset the enemy's calculations, and achieve local successes which, in increasing numbers, may so change the balance as to permit the original defender to assume the offensive and decisively defeat the enemy.

39. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS. The planning of a campaign and the exercise of high command are concerned fundamentally with strategic matters. They also are weighted with political and other matters. These matters are not the specific subject of this manual but considerations arising from them influence the decisions of the commander. Among the more significant of these matters are national policy, public information, psychological warfare, military government and civil affairs.
CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION

40. THE CONCENTRATION. a. A strategic concentration is the movement and assembly of designated large forces and necessary logistical support into areas from which it is intended that operations will be launched. The purpose of strategic concentration is to permit the commander to assemble the mass of his forces prior to actual operations so that they are best disposed to initiate execution of the plan of campaign.

b. Along with the physical grouping of forces, the strategic concentration includes the assembly of special technical means which are required in order to insure the maximum chance of success. This includes the assembly of new weapons and equipment. Such new weapons and equipment are employed decisively to gain the maximum advantage and surprise in the initial stages of the campaign. These new weapons therefore are normally employed in mass. Exceptionally, they may be employed individually to produce a psychological effect and destroy the enemy’s will to resist.

c. The commander must establish early a solid logistical foundation in the concentration area. When the logistical requirements of the force cannot be met fully by establishments and installations within the area, arrangements must be made whereby additional logistical support can be provided from bases other than in the area, to include floating bases when land bases are not available.

d. Speed and secrecy in concentration, followed by bold, rapid execution of the plan may be a decisive factor in the defeat of the enemy. By the concentration of his forces, the commander takes the first step in executing the plan of campaign.

41. FACTORS AFFECTING CONCENTRATION. The specific locations of the concentration areas and their distance from the enemy are influenced by:

a. Projected employment of the forces.

b. The capabilities of any opposing forces to interfere with the concentration.

c. Probable hostile course of action.

d. Capacity of transportation systems (air, highway, rail, pipelines and water). This affects not only the concentration, but the logistic support thereof. Transport capacity of any of the above means is limited by the availability of personnel, facilities, equipment and the operable condition of facilities and equipment.

e. Terrain and weather.
f. The time required to complete the concentration. Plans envisage coordinated action by the whole force in a decisive blow.

g. The capabilities of defense forces to afford protection from air and airborne attacks directed against the concentration area and lines of communications thereto.

42. PLANNING THE CONCENTRATION. The grouping or disposition to be made of the major units of the force within the concentration areas in order to execute best the plan of campaign is affected principally by the following factors:

a. The organization and disposition of the forces in the area depends on the mission, enemy situation, weather, terrain, projected maneuver, air force capabilities, and logistical support. An incorrect initial grouping will require the subsequent shifting of troops with possible resultant confusion and loss of time.

b. When the situation is defined so clearly that definite plans for the next operation can be formulated, the plan of concentration provides for the assembly and disposal of the available forces and logistical support so as to permit the operation to be launched without delay in a decisive direction against its objectives. Therefore, there may be a direct transition from the concentration to an offensive operation or a defensive operation. Ordinarily, the concentration is followed by an advance. In the advance, it is highly advantageous to include ground reconnaissance elements of higher headquarters and appropriate detachments from the component combat units to facilitate their early entry into action.

c. When the situation is not clear enough to justify the definite planning of a particular plan or maneuver, or if the situation is such that only the most general plans can be made, a plan of concentration is prepared which places the forces in the concentration area so disposed as to meet effectively any probable contingency. This may necessitate provisions for meeting a possible hostile offensive operation or for launching the offensive should a favorable opportunity arise. Such a plan provides for contingencies that may occur during the progress of the concentration as well as after its completion.

d. Ordinarily, the concentration should be so arranged and executed that the enemy is not permitted to discover the location, disposition, and composition of the mass of the forces. To further deception in some situations, it may be desirable to concentrate without particular attempts to obtain secrecy or concealment and thus focus hostile attention on the area. This is especially true when the commander intends to launch a secondary effort from the area in which his mass is concentrated, followed by a shifting of this mass to another area for the decisive blow. In considering such an operation, careful analysis must be made of means, the time and space factors, and the routes of communications to insure that the forces designed for the main blow can be moved rapidly to strike with surprise.

e. Under all circumstances there must be sufficient flexibility to meet
unexpected developments in the enemy situation as well as in the mobilization program and progress of the concentration itself.

43. PROTECTION FOR THE CONCENTRATION. The security measures to protect the concentrations must be based on the following considerations:

a. The plan of concentration must provide continuous protection against observation, and surface or airborne attack. The concentration should be screened and protected by air and surface forces, and, as far as practicable, should be protected by natural features which, while affording security, will not interfere with the execution of the plan of campaign. In some situations, the concentration may be accomplished under the protection of friendly forces not a part of the troops being concentrated. In others, the forces being concentrated must provide all security measures for the concentration. This requirement will affect the sequence of troop movements into the area. It may be necessary to prohibit all daylight movements by large forces. It may be practicable to concentrate by day when the concentration area is distant from the enemy and superior air forces are available with which to protect the concentration against air observation. When the enemy is near and it is impossible to prevent all enemy air reconnaissance, night movements, ruses, and stratagems must be resorted to if any considerable degree of secrecy and deception is to be attained.

b. Concentration areas must be made reasonably secure from air attacks. Air attacks, if delivered in strength, are capable of seriously interfering with the concentration and the subsequent maneuver of the forces. The establishment of air superiority by our own forces should precede or, at the latest, be concurrent with the initial phases of the concentration. This requires the establishment of an integrated air and ground defense system for the protection of vital installations.

c. In view of the possibility that any future wars may be characterized by such new weapons as the atom bomb, radiological or biological warfare, or other weapons of mass destruction, steps must be taken to protect vital installations by dispersing them or putting them underground or both. During concentration armed forces are dispersed so that targets for long-range guided missiles will be unremunerative.

d. In addition to providing for security of troops during a concentration, the lines of communications must be protected. Protection may be given in several ways—

1. By selecting concentration areas so that lines of communications are protected from ground attack wholly or in part by natural obstacles.

2. By locating the concentration area between the source of danger and the lines of communications.

3. By rapidity of concentration, followed immediately by active
operations, thus denying the enemy time to offer serious interference.

(4) By disposition of troops and air bases for protection against air and airborne attack.

(5) By the establishment and maintenance of air superiority, installation of an adequate antiaircraft defense, and strict adherence to camouflage discipline.

e. Constant and intensive reconnaissance throughout the concentration is essential. Accurate information of the enemy forces forms the basis for the best security.

44. CONTROL OF THE CONCENTRATION.  a. Control of the concentration is provided by—

(1) The early arrival of the forward echelons of the principal headquarters and the establishment of their command posts.

(2) The prompt utilization of existing signal communication facilities and the development of an adequate signal communication system.

(3) Staff officers who are sent into the area when the early arrival of the commander is not possible. These officers must be fully informed of the commander's plans and empowered to act for him, in coordinating the actions of covering forces and the movement of troops.

b. The staff insures the orderly and uninterrupted movement of the elements into and out of the concentration area by establishing the priority by which units are to move and by preparing movement plans to take full advantage of the capabilities of the lines of communications.

45. MOVEMENT TO CONCENTRATION AREA.  Troop movements into the areas may be made by marching; by rail, water, motor, or air transport; or by a combination of these methods. The methods employed will be determined by—

a. Location of the troops to be concentrated.

b. Capability of transportation facilities.

c. Time and space factors.

d. Proximity of the enemy and the danger of his interference with the concentration.

46. ARRIVAL IN CONCENTRATION AREA.  The sequence in which troops should arrive in the area is governed largely by the conditions existing in the particular situation. Signal communication and other control elements should arrive early. Other considerations affecting the sequence of arrival are—

a. Convenience.  When the concentration areas are secure and time is not pressing, the order of arrival of elements (other than control elements) is governed largely by convenience.
b. Security. When the concentration areas are not protected adequately, reconnaissance and security elements must be among the first troops to arrive. This usually requires the early arrival of armored cavalry units, antiaircraft artillery, engineers, other mobile ground elements, and Air Force elements.

c. Phasing. When active operations are to be initiated before all the troops can be concentrated, elements of all arms necessary to form the balanced force needed for initial operations should arrive immediately after the reconnaissance and security elements. Necessary service elements must arrive in the area concurrently with the combat units which they serve. Consistent with the adequacy of security, certain service elements should arrive prior to the combat elements in order to provide those services which will be needed immediately on the arrival of the combat elements.

d. Unit integrity. It is desirable that the principal combat units come in as complete units rather than by fragments at widely separated times, except that advance parties should precede parent units.

e. Adequate service support. Service elements usually can be brought in by echelon. It is of the utmost importance that service elements of both surface and air forces necessary to administer the combat echelons arrive sufficiently early to perform their tasks effectively.
CHAPTER 4
ADVANCE FROM CONCENTRATION

Section I. FACTORS AFFECTING THE PLAN OF ADVANCE

47. GENERAL. a. In formulating his plan of campaign, the commander visualizes the operation as a whole from the beginning of the concentration to the completion of the mission. It is fundamental for the commander to evaluate his mission, objective, and available means. He selects final objectives, determines a plan of maneuver for the capture of those objectives, decides upon an attack formation, and then plans for a development for combat which will achieve that formation on contact.

b. The development for combat is that phase in the campaign in which the commander disposes his forces for combat. This phase includes both the advance to contact and the deployment for battle. Preparation, direction, speed, and surprise, all may be of decisive importance during the development. In his planning the commander evaluates factors which affect the development either favorably or unfavorably. Some of these factors are—

(1) Probable weather conditions.
(2) Terrain and hydrography.
(3) Lines of communications (railroads, roads, waterways, airways).
(4) Enemy situation to include location of main hostile forces. Consideration is given to where and how it is desired to meet the enemy or when contact can be expected.
(5) Hostile fortified areas.
(6) Capabilities of the enemy to interfere with the advance.
(7) Means for attaining and maintaining air superiority.
(8) Time and space.
(9) Organization and employment of forces assigned or attached, and cooperating air forces.
(10) Employment of detachments for special missions.
(11) Measures for reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and security.
(12) Logistical support.

48. ENEMY FORCES. a. A command begins the advance to contact in a formation which will facilitate execution of the planned maneuver. This formation must have sufficient flexibility to permit the commander to regulate or change the dispositions of subordinate units during the advance to take advantage of changes in the enemy situation. Aggressive
reconnaissance and the maximum use of other information-gathering agencies will provide timely intelligence concerning the location, disposition, and movement of major hostile forces, and enable the commander to dispose his main forces favorably for decisive action on contact.

b. The enemy may seek to impede the advance with combat aviation, with armor, by sabotage of key points on the rail or road nets, by inundations, and by forcing refugees onto the roads. The enemy may employ biological agents to deny large areas to advancing units, and chemical or radiological agents to deny use of key communications centers and defiles. Enemy air may effectively oppose the advance, necessitating movement either by night or with dispersed formations by day, unless adequate protection of the advance can be provided by combat aviation, antiaircraft artillery, or other anti-air means. Hostile armor may delay, harass, and raid the advancing columns unless such action is nullified by mobile security detachments operating well to the front and flanks of main bodies. These security detachments should include engineer, artillery, motorized infantry, and armored elements; reconnaissance aviation in direct signal communication with the detachments; and combat aviation quickly available on call. The enemy may sabotage critical points. Military personnel, or civilian agencies subject to military control must protect these critical points. It may be necessary to employ airborne troops to secure and protect these points until ground columns arrive. Blocking of military traffic by refugees must be prevented by denying refugees access to all critical roads.

49. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS. Lines of communications exert a dominant influence on the advance and on the operations of large forces. To provide an integrated system of transportation, all routes, operating equipment and facilities (rail, road, pipe line, water, and air) must be studied and evaluated in terms of the requirements to be met. Priorities for movements must be established and effective movement plans developed. The following characteristics of the several means of transportation must be considered in the development of movement plans:

a. Railways provide the most efficient means for hauling bulky items and large tonnages over long distances at high speed, but they are subject to constant damage or destruction by hostile aviation, enemy demolition detachments, and sabotage. When available, they will be the primary transportation facility in comparatively secure areas.

b. Effective use of motor vehicles is possible only if good roads are available; road nets, therefore, are of major importance in the advance and operations of large forces. In planning the concentration and advance, the commander must evaluate carefully the road net in his area of operations. The number of roads available strongly affects the capability of a command for rapid maneuver, supply, dispersion (to afford less remunerative air targets), and concentration (for attack).
c. The use of existing pipe lines, and the construction of additional pipe lines in the area of operations, serve to reduce the demands on other types of transportation. Where conditions justify their construction, pipe lines provide a large volume of liquid petroleum products economically.

d. Waterways, both sea and inland, may play an important role in the movement of supplies and, sometimes, of troops. Although ships, boats, and barges have large volumes and tonnage capacities, they are comparatively slow and particularly vulnerable to attack by hostile forces, especially air and submarine. Their use must be accompanied by special measures for their protection.

e. Air transport is characterized by great speed, comparatively small volume and tonnage capacity, unlimited choice of routes within its range, and freedom from intermediate terrain obstacles. However, it is subject to unfavorable weather variations, restriction to suitable landing fields, and vulnerability to air attack and ground-based fire. It is adaptable to the movement of large units when heavy or bulky equipment is not essential or may be shipped by other means. It may be expected to be an effective method for supporting armored elements or detachments operating at a great distance from supply bases. Its success is predicated on air superiority or surprise, neutralization or avoidance of antiaircraft fire, and the ability to seize or prepare advance landing fields and to protect them.

50. TERRAIN.  

a. Mountains, deserts, jungles, arctic and subarctic areas, large rivers, marshes, and lakes may block, retard, or canalize ground movements. Special equipment and training may be required for some operations. These factors must be considered in the planning and conduct of the advance. The commander must seek in turn topographic features to his advantage. In the proper consideration of terrain, the commander must be careful not to overevaluate terrain difficulties or apparent advantages. Barriers across the line of advance facilitate hostile delaying action. However, there may be critical features whose early seizure will prevent hostile attempts to delay the advance. The commander employs highly mobile units to seize control of defiles and to establish bridgeheads rapidly. When main forces are required to advance through defiles, protection against air attack is essential. Barriers paralleling the line of advance, with few crossings, protect the flanks against a coordinated attack by large hostile forces but provide the enemy with a screen from which to raid the flanks, rear, and lines of communications. These raids can be prevented by thorough reconnaissance and suitable security measures. Parallel barrier masses interlaced with roads may permit the movement of large hostile forces unless the roads are blocked by adequate security detachments. Hostile movement, restricted to defiles, should be delayed or blocked by surface forces and attacked by combat aviation.

b. Operations in deserts, mountains, jungles, arctic areas, and areas
requiring amphibious forces, present special problems, which are discussed in detail in FM's 31-25, 70-10, 70-15, and 72-20. A large proportion of highly mobile, hard-striking ground forces is essential in desert operations. These must be combined with aviation strong enough to insure superiority in the air. Requirements for special equipment and training in mountain, desert, arctic, and jungle areas must be considered early in planning. Special provision must be made for mobility in order to overcome natural terrain obstacles. Measures, including special training, must be taken to protect personnel against the natural hazards peculiar to such areas.

**51. FORTIFIED AREAS.**

a. In determining the direction of advance, the commander must evaluate the effect of hostile fortified areas. It may be advantageous to contain them and continue the general advance of the main force on more distant and decisive objectives. When fortifications impose a continuous barrier, they must be studied in detail to determine where they may be breached most advantageously. The commander must not permit the presence of a fortified area to divert him from the timely accomplishment of his mission.

b. Airborne troops can be used to disrupt enemy lines of communications to fortified areas and to attack fortified areas from the rear. Where depth of the fortified area will preclude early link-up with the airborne units, provision must be made for reinforcing or expanding the airhead by using air-transported troops.

**52. FEINTS.** The commander makes every effort to mislead the enemy and cause him to draw false conclusions concerning the development of his command. Special forces, organized and equipped according to their assigned mission, may be employed for diversions, feints, and attacks on hostile areas in order to deceive the opposing commander. Such missions are justified only when their accomplishment will assist the whole operation. Feints and diversions are effective only when made in a direction in which a major offensive operation by the attacking forces would be practicable from an enemy point of view.

**53. TIME AND SPACE.** Time and space must be considered in their relation to all other factors. Every advantage conferred by modern transport should be utilized to place the enemy in an unfavorable situation. Time permits an enemy to develop resources and organize resistance. A force with an offensive mission should advance to strike the enemy with overwhelming force before he can organize his defenses completely, shift his means, or take other effective counteraction.

**54. WEATHER.** The probable effects of adverse weather conditions must be considered in planning the advance in order that measures may be taken to counteract them. Weather usually can be predicted quite accurately for short periods. Among important weather effects are mud
swollen or flooded streams, snow, ice, and extreme cold: (See FM 70-15.) Lakes and marshes may freeze sufficiently to provide for the passage of troops and vehicles. Roads may become impassable because of rain, snow, or ice, particularly in mountain regions. The known effect of certain weather conditions on troops, mechanized equipment, and other matériel must be considered and planned for well in advance. Consideration must be given to the effects of weather on the logistical support of the operation. The commander must be alert to capitalize on weather conditions which are unfavorable to the enemy.

Section II. THE ADVANCE

GENERAL

55. DISPOSITIONS OF FORCE. a. The direction of movement and disposition of forces for the advance are of major importance. Initial faulty disposition provides an alert, aggressive enemy with an opportunity which he may be expected to exploit fully.

b. Troop dispositions in an advance to contact will be influenced by projected employment, lines of communications, and necessity for protecting certain areas. Because of the time required to change dispositions of large units, a strategic advance is also greatly influenced by the formation in the concentration area. The commander considers this fact during the planning and conduct of the concentration. Additional information affecting the formation for the advance is obtained during the concentration. The commander regulates dispositions so that his main forces will be disposed for decisive action on contact.

RECONNAISSANCE

56. GENERAL. The commander uses every effective agency to supplement existing information of the enemy and of the terrain. Reconnaissance by air, ground, and naval units must be continuous and aggressive during the concentration and advance. Information secured must be evaluated, interpreted and disseminated rapidly or its value is lost. When information of the enemy's dispositions and movements is meager and uncertain, it may be advantageous to employ strong, hard-striking mobile forces as task forces (reconnaissance in force) to break through the hostile protective screen and gain information necessary for the higher commander.

57. CLOSE-IN RECONNAISSANCE. Commanders and staff officers must take every opportunity to make personal ground reconnaissance of areas likely to be the scenes of operations. When possible, ground reconnaissance should be supplemented by observations from the air. On most occasions air observation is the best, if not the only, means of ob-
tain a good general view of an area, and it usually permits observation of enemy-held terrain.

58. DISTANT RECONNAISSANCE. Distant reconnaissance is performed mainly by air and naval forces. Both positive and negative information obtained by the air forces is supplemented and confirmed by mobile ground forces in critical areas. Armored or motorized units are especially valuable for this purpose. Control is obtained by the assignment of areas or zones to the various reconnaissance agencies, taking into consideration their respective characteristics and ability to perform the desired mission. In large forces of all arms, whose principal subordinate elements have organic reconnaissance agencies, reconnaissance lines are designated to fix responsibility in depth between the higher and lower units. The reconnaissance mission assigned to any agency should definitely state—
   a. The specific information desired.
   b. Where information is to be sought.
   c. When information, or intelligence, will reach the commander.

AIR FORCES

59. EMPLOYMENT. Aggressive employment of the air forces is of great importance in the successful conduct of the campaign. Such employment must be in accordance with the general plan to gain and maintain air superiority, to isolate the battlefield, and to render close support to ground troops.

60. RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS. Suitable elements of the air forces execute reconnaissance missions to maintain surveillance of the enemy. Air reconnaissance agencies seek to determine enemy locations, dispositions, movements, strengths, and installations.

61. COMBAT MISSIONS. Combat aviation must be employed during the advance on the following missions:
   a. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority by counter air force operations.
   b. Isolation of the battlefield by paralyzing the enemy routes of communications, while giving due consideration to the communication requirements of the advancing forces.
   c. Close support and assistance of the ground advance by operations to immobilize, disperse, or destroy hostile ground forces.

MOBILE FORCES

62. EMPLOYMENT. a. Mobile forces, especially large armored units strongly supported by other highly mobile ground elements, may be em-
ployed in combination with or closely following the operations of combat aviation. They seize the decisive areas in order to maintain the initiative and to gain quick decisions. Airborne troops may be employed to seize objectives in advance of mobile surface forces.

b. Large mobile forces operating in front of or on the flank of the main force, as well as on special missions, must be supported by adequate combat and reconnaissance aviation.
CHAPTER 5
STRATEGIC MANEUVERS

Section I. OFFENSIVE MANEUVER

GENERAL

63. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE. a. The strategic offensive is a large-scale offensive operation aimed at the destruction of the enemy's capacity or will to continue hostilities. By seizing the initiative, the strategic offensive forces the enemy to accept combat conditions favorable to the attacker. The ultimate objective of this offensive is to occupy the vital enemy areas.

b. At the climax of the strategic offensive, the enemy ordinarily will have been forced to withdraw to positions which he must hold or lose the war. When this point is reached, operations are continued to breach or turn these positions in order to seize objectives which will insure defeat of the enemy.

64. PURPOSE. The strategic offensive seizes and retains the initiative. It permits the higher commander to direct his movements and employ his forces in a decisive effort in accordance with his plans. Its psychological advantage is great; it provides a powerful stimulus to the war efforts of both civil and military components of the nation. When initiated with surprise, the strategic offensive throws the enemy off balance. When followed through energetically, it may result either in the final defeat of the enemy or in the accomplishment of the assigned mission before the enemy can regain control of the situation and assume the offensive himself. Maintaining dominance over the enemy through the strategic offensive requires continuous aggressive employment of all available means, superior leadership, and high morale.

65. REQUIREMENTS. The strategic offensive demands great initial impetus, flexible dispositions, and sufficient reserves of men and matériel to insure continuity of effort. For decisive results, the offensive forces must have air superiority in the areas of operations and, when necessary, sea superiority. Combat aviation, guided missiles, airborne and air-transported troops, mechanized and motorized troops, and amphibious troops have increased the striking power of both offensive and defensive forces. However, offensive forces still have the advantage of the initiative. The initiative offers innumerable opportunities for success, provided that the enemy is unable to canalize or restrict maneuver through the ef-
fective use of terrain and his own combat aviation. The defensive forces not only must conform to the general movements of the attacker, but also must be prepared to counter any one or more of his many capabilities. This tends to disperse the defensive forces and weaken them in areas which are, or lead to, vital strategic objectives.

66. FACTORS. a. The maintenance of routes of communications in hostile territory presents numerous difficulties. Large reinforcements in personnel, munitions, and equipment must be kept moving forward. Considerable force may be required to invest or contain fortresses or large fortified areas and to hold and exploit the occupied enemy areas. The inhabitants, as well as enemy forces, can be expected to interfere with the gaining and transmitting of information and with the maintenance of supply lines. Hostile civilians can be expected to engage in guerrilla operations. Friendly civilians, operating any indigenous equipment and facilities available, can be of much assistance and thus release troops for duties in forward areas. Careful estimates of the situation will enable the commander to foresee many of the difficulties which may be encountered. Thus, he can provide for timely measures to meet them effectively without unduly diminishing the power of his operation through dissipation of his available resources.

b. Whether the strategic offensive can be initiated simultaneously in more than one theater will depend upon many factors. These factors include the mission of the armed forces, the administrative and logistical support available, the relative strengths of friendly and enemy forces, terrain and weather, lines of communications, and strategic commitments in other areas. When adequate forces are not available, the strategic offensive rarely should be undertaken in secondary theaters. If such an offensive becomes necessary for political or other reasons, boldness, rapidity, and surprise must compensate for lack of adequate forces. The assumption of the strategic defensive in one or more secondary theaters forcing the enemy to divide his forces may permit launching the offensive in the primary area of operations with results which will be conclusive in all areas.

67. OPERATIONS ON INTERIOR LINES. Offensive operations on interior lines are those conducted from a central locality against enemy forces advancing along convergent lines or against forces of two allied countries which are separated by a common enemy. The advantage of interior lines increases in proportion to the distances separating the converging forces. Time and space initially favor forces operating on interior lines. This advantage is at the maximum when the converging forces can be struck and defeated in detail. Delay of converging forces to permit their defeat in detail may be gained by employing small, highly mobile forces against one or more of the converging columns. The primary mis-
The primary objective of a penetration launched in one area is the separation of the enemy’s forces into two parts in order to permit the defeat or destruction of each part in turn.

Penetrations launched in two or more areas ordinarily provide for the junction of the several exploiting forces at specified objectives well to the rear of the hostile defenses. They further provide for the encirclement and annihilation or capitulation of the forces surrounded, or the capture or investment of the strategic area encircled. The striking and exploiting forces must be prepared to meet counterattacks both from the encircled enemy forces and from enemy reinforcements. Strong pressure along the entire original hostile front will fix those enemy forces in contact and restrict their ability to interfere with the success of the operation. Airborne forces may be employed to impede the movement of enemy reserves to the area of the penetration. They will contribute to the general exploitation of the penetration.

A penetration consists of three impulses. First, the creation of a gap in the enemy’s defenses or dispositions; second, the widening of the gap thus created, by enveloping one or both hostile flanks; and third, the seizure of the objective. The exploitation which follows is aimed at the destruction of the hostile forces enveloped and may include operations against objectives deep in the hostile rear.

Penetrations require careful planning, deception, surprise, adequate logistical support, preponderance of strength in both the striking and exploiting forces, and favorable enemy dispositions in the area of attack. Enemy dispositions include locations of reserve capable of launching counterattacks against either the striking force of the exploiting force. Whether the penetration is initiated by infantry elements or by armored elements, it is supported by combat aviation and by mobile ground forces, including both armored and motorized elements capable of exploiting the penetration to the maximum.

Planning is initiated with the selection of the area, or areas, for the penetration. This selection will be influenced by the objective (whether enemy forces or vital areas), by the suitability of terrain...
throughout the area of operations, by the forces to be employed, by hostile troop dispositions (including large reserves), and by the time required to move the necessary forces to the area. In some situations it may be desirable to select an area in which the terrain is relatively unfavorable in order to take advantage of enemy dispositions, or to increase surprise as to the direction of the advance and the intensity of the attack. When the hostile forces are composed of armies of two or more allied nations, the area in which these armies make contact may be particularly suitable for the penetration. This consideration also applies, although to a lesser degree, to the area of contact between the two armies of the same nation. Areas of contact are often the places where coordination and cooperation are weakest because of national jealousies or conflicting aims. Large salients along the opposing fronts may offer especially favorable areas for the penetration since partially exposed hostile flanks already exist.

c. Full advantage must be taken of all means to deceive the enemy commander. It may be feasible to build up a strong force in one area and to attack with a part of this force in that area. Then, when the enemy has reacted to this initial attack the bulk of the force may be secretly moved to and committed in the area where the principal effort is to be made. An operation of this type requires plentiful lateral routes of communications and transportation facilities. The forces employed in the area of the initial concentration must be strong enough to strike a continuing blow. Otherwise, there will be little deception, and the enemy will be able to block the original attack with minimum forces and effectively meet the forces intended for the principal effort.

d. Surprise can be attained by concealing the concentration of the force to be launched in the principal effort, by rapid concentration of this force, or by a combination of these methods. Since the enemy will be able to maintain some air observation even under conditions of friendly air supremacy, rapid concentration is the most effective method of achieving surprise. During the concentration the attacker uses the advantage which the initiative gives him to conceal the time of his attack and the exact area of his main effort until the penetration is under way.

e. Adequate logistical support includes the ability to maintain the exploiting force to or beyond its designated objective.

f. The offensive forces must have air superiority throughout the operation unless weather conditions preclude the effective use of hostile air forces. Combat aviation assists the penetration by isolating the battle-field, by attacking the hostile ground forces in contact, by attacking large enemy reserves capable of interfering with the operation, and by providing fighter protection over the area of operations. Reconnaissance aviation gains and transmits important information prior to the initiation of the operation and, during the operation, reports all events within the commander's area of interest. Air superiority in itself is an important factor in helping to prevent the enemy from gaining timely information of an
impending attack. It may prove of immeasurable importance in gaining surprise over the enemy.

73. CONDUCT OF THE PENETRATION. The three impulses of the penetration take place without a noticeable line of demarcation between successive impulses. In each area of penetration the striking force starts to roll up the shoulders of the gap as it breaches the hostile position. Widening the gap continues while the exploiting force is passing through. It is imperative that the exploiting force pass unimpeded through the gap in the hostile defenses and retain its maximum strength for employment behind the enemy position. Continued pressure is maintained all along the front and against the shoulders of the gap in each area, while the exploiting forces complete the encirclement of the enemy position. The presence of exploiting forces in the enemy rear will assist the rapid advance of other ground forces who are attacking the enemy from the front, flanks, or rear. The rapid advance of supporting forces provides protection to the flanks and rear of the leading elements, keeps supply routes open, and completes the encirclement of the enemy. Supporting (or follow-up) forces release the leading elements of the exploiting forces for other missions by taking over their fronts. Other missions for leading elements may include operations against large enemy reserves, threats to or capture of vital areas link-up with airborne forces, exploitation beyond the area of encirclement, or release for movement to other fronts.

74. ARMOR IN THE PENETRATION. Unless terrain and other conditions prevent, large armored formations are employed as the leading elements of the forces exploiting the penetration. Missions assigned to armored units will be governed by the objective to be attained. In one situation they may constitute an element of the encircling force whose task is to envelop and destroy a major hostile force. In another, they may be assigned strategic area objectives for the purpose of destroying hostile lines of communications, blocking movement of large reserves, or capturing facilities vital to the opposing force while the encirclement and destruction of the forward hostile elements is assigned to other ground units. Against a retreating force they may be employed to gain the rear or flank of this force and block its retreat while less mobile elements advance to complete the destruction or cause the surrender of the enemy. In whatever maneuver the components of the penetrating forces are employed, the forces must be organized and have sufficient strength to execute a complete penetration and must have plans sufficiently flexible to permit them to take full advantage of favorable changes in the situation.

THE ENVELOPMENT

75. DEFINITION. An envelopment consists of a main attack and a sec-
ondary attack. The main attack is directed against the flank(s) or rear of the initial dispositions of the enemy's principal forces toward an objective in rear of his front lines. The secondary attack is directed against the front of the enemy's principal forces to hold those forces in position and prevent their redispersion to meet threats to the flank. There are three types of enveloping maneuver—the envelopment, the double envelopment, and the turning movement. In the envelopment, the forces making the attack remain within mutual supporting distances. (Supporting distance is the distance by which forces may be separated and yet permit one to move to the aid of another before it can be defeated by an enemy force.) A double envelopment is executed by three principal tactical groups; two enveloping attack forces and a secondary attack force. A simultaneous envelopment of both flanks generally requires considerable superiority. In a turning movement the force making the main attack usually operates beyond supporting distance of the force making the secondary attack. Hence, each force must be strong enough, or mobile enough, to avoid defeat in detail.

76. EXECUTION. a. An envelopment may be made either before or after contact with the enemy is gained. The strategic objective, the terrain and weather, the relative strengths of opposing forces, and enemy dispositions may make advantageous the initiation of the envelopment before contact is gained. Rapid movement will facilitate the execution of the main attack simultaneously with the fixing of the hostile forces by the secondary attack. It is highly desirable that the forces making the main (enveloping) attack more secretly and strike with surprise.

b. An envelopment may be the result of an advance to contact with a frontage sufficient to extend beyond one or both flanks of the known hostile dispositions. In such an advance, the higher commander must guard against an over-extension of his forces, or against the division of his forces by terrain barriers. Otherwise, he may be unduly delayed or even prevented from concentrating in the decisive area. Flexible plans, adequate routes of communications, both laterally and in depth, adequate logistical support, and a superiority of forces (air and ground) in the decisive area are important to the successful execution of such a maneuver. Various combinations of these favoring factors may result in the desired outcome.

c. An enveloping maneuver may be executed after contact has been gained and the hostile forces have been developed. When the maneuver aims to strike the hostile force well to the flank in order to seize objectives deep in the hostile rear areas, it is preferable to employ in the main attack reserve or other mobile elements not in close contact with the enemy. Such a maneuver requires thorough reconnaissance, excellent staff work, suitable security measures, and the exercise of great initiative by all commanders. Freedom of action ordinarily must be granted to subordinate commanders since a capable enemy will not remain idle while
the offensive force maneuvers. It must be expected that the opposing commander will take suitable measures, including offensive action, to counter the planned maneuver.

d. When one or both of the enemy’s flanks rest on navigable waters and the attacker has superiority in land, sea, and air forces, decisive results may be gained by an envelopment of the enemy with seaborne troops. Suitable landing beaches and inlets or other waters favoring the movement of small landing boats along and in rear of the main hostile flank are essential for an envelopment by seaborne forces. Maximum results are to be expected when the maneuver can be launched with surprise. When the envelopment by seaborne forces can be accompanied by a simultaneous attack with airborne forces, the capture of the objective will not only make the position of the defender untenable but, at the same time, will block the retreat of all of his forces.

77. TURNING MOVEMENTS.  
a. The turning movement may consist of operations by land, air, or water (or a combination of these) to gain the hostile rear or other vital areas. Since turning movements pass around the enemy’s main force to strike deep in the hostile rear, they are the type of envelopment most likely to achieve decisive results. The enemy cannot ignore a threat to his vital lines of communications. His ability to fight depends on the movement of adequate supplies and replacements to his combat forces. Therefore, he must move to counter this threat even if to do so necessitates his withdrawal from an otherwise advantageous position and requires him to maneuver in conformity with a plan not of his own choosing.

b. For large forces the turning movement frequently is executed in conjunction with the frontal advance to contact. It is particularly suited as the maneuver for highly mobile, hard-striking forces, such as large armored formations strongly supported by combat aviation and other suitable means. Its objectives may be at a great distance from the area in which the forces in the frontal advance initially engage the enemy.

c. Forces executing the turning movement may be required to sustain themselves for considerable periods of time. Because of the vulnerability of their own lines of communications they may be required to transport supplies with them in amounts considerably greater than the normal loads. Special provision for supply by air may be desirable or necessary.

d. The successful turning movement results in great strategic and tactical victory. However, the commander must give consideration to certain dangers inherent in this maneuver. The possibility always exists that the turning forces will turn too soon or too close to the main hostile forces, find themselves confronted by a defended enemy front, and be forced into either a frontal attack or a change in direction of movement which will delay the maneuver and jeopardize its success. The commander of the turning movement must not be diverted from his objective by the sometimes tempting bait of a tactical success which falls short of
the objective. When the two forces are widely separated there is the risk of defeat in detail.

e. Objectives which are suitable for turning movements by ground elements may at times be seized with greater ease by airborne forces. Provisions for sustained air support over an extended period of time or for rapid link-up by ground elements must be made at the time an airborne operation is planned. The ultimate result is the same, except the denial of vital areas to the enemy is achieved more quickly by the employment of airborne forces.

f. In determining the practicability of a turning movement, the higher commander must evaluate the means he has available, the means with which the enemy can oppose his maneuver, and the possible hostile reactions. Each of the separate forces must be strong enough to execute its mission without assistance from the other. Each must be capable of fully exploiting a success gained by the other. The elements allotted the commander of the turning force should be strong in mechanized and motorized units. The turning force must be supported by adequate combat aviation and provided with suitable reconnaissance agencies both ground and air. The commander executing the turning movement must be bold and aggressive. He must weigh carefully the factors of the situation and daringly put his decision into execution. He must give full play to his initiative and be able to exploit successes quickly and to turn seeming disadvantages into situations favorable to himself.

STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL AND COUNTEROFFENSIVE

78. GENERAL. Uniform advances along the entire front of an offensive force cannot be expected. Success will be notable on some parts of the front; no progress will be made on others; and local reverses may be expected on still others. These varying degrees of success, stalemate and local reverse provide the energetic bold commander with opportunities to achieve unexpected results by exploiting situations which seem unfavorable to him and favorable to the enemy. For example, the higher commander may direct a withdrawal in areas where a stalemate has resulted or where he is experiencing reverses, and follow this withdrawal with a counteroffensive to envelop and encircle the attacking hostile forces. Boldly conceived, carefully planned, and energetically executed, this maneuver may win the campaign.

79. REQUIREMENTS. Following a withdrawal from action for the purpose of enveloping and encircling the hostile forces, certain fundamental doctrines are applicable to the execution of the counteroffensive. These are—

a. The withdrawing forces preferably should withdraw from an area whose recapture is considered important by the enemy.

b. Terrain, preferably on both flanks of the withdrawing force, should
permit the flanks of the withdrawing elements to be held and protected. Behind these protected flanks strong counteroffensive forces are secretly assembled. When the counteroffensive is initiated, these forces are launched toward areas vital to the enemy's conduct of the war. Consideration should be given to employment of airborne forces as the counteroffensive striking force.

c. Adequate mobile reserves are required for the rapid concentration of forces necessary to accomplishment of the encirclement. Armored and motorized divisions are particularly suited for this component of the counteroffensive. It is essential that the movement of these reserves be unknown to the enemy. To move by day requires absolute control of the air and positive counterintelligence action. Even with these assets considerable risk is involved. If the situation permits, movement of reserves to the area of the principal effort should be made during darkness.

d. During the withdrawal, and particularly just prior to the launching of the counteroffensive, the withdrawing forces must be aggressive. They must force the opposing commander to focus his attention on the situation on his immediate front. Local counterattacks and strong covering force actions characterize this maneuver.

e. When the counteroffensive is launched, a strong frontal attack is combined with the attack of the encircling forces. Both attacks are directed to isolate the opposing forces and destroy or capture them.

f. The conduct of such an operation requires the most careful planning, a highly trained and disciplined command, and great initiative in all ranks. There is a tendency inherent in troops moving to the rear to become panicky and move beyond the prescribed positions. Close control and staff supervision, and plans in minute detail will overcome this tendency on the part of the withdrawing force. Plans must be prepared to meet unexpected enemy reactions, especially those that interfere with or jeopardize the accomplishment of the scheme of maneuver and ultimate mission.

Section II. DEFENSIVE MANEUVER

GENERAL

80. STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE. a. The strategic defensive is the adoption of measures to protect the areas of vital interest to a nation while accumulating the resources to assume the offensive. Defensive measures may include abandonment of some bases, reinforcement of other bases, and offensive operations in certain areas to deceive the enemy.

b. Various factors may dictate the adoption of the strategic defensive in one or all areas at the opening of hostilities. Included among these factors are national policy; the superior state of readiness of the enemy; inferior strategic position, such as frontiers exposed on the flank; inferior combat strength in one or more theaters; or the advisability of deliberately adopting a defensive attitude initially to let the enemy expose his plans and commit himself.
81. ADVANTAGES. The strategic defensive confers some advantages initially on the nation or force which must gain time in order to fully mobilize its effort for offensive action. The defender will have neither long lines of communications in hostile territory to protect, nor large hostile populations to control. Where time and space permit, the defender may trade space for the time necessary for the full mobilization of his offensive power. However, for psychological reasons, not only the troops but also the civilian population must be informed of, and impressed with, the concept that such losses are only temporary. The commander has a responsibility to the entire nation. A nation correctly oriented as to the aims and requirements of the military forces can be expected to, and will give its utmost to support the action of its armed forces. The strategic defensive, ably conducted and appropriately employing the tactical offensive, will permit the field commander to assemble his forces as they become ready. By assembling in such areas and at such times as to permit him to take full advantage of enemy mistakes, and by moving decisively to the offensive, he will be able to defeat the enemy’s armed forces and break the hostile state’s will and ability to resist. The execution of such maneuvers requires that the higher commander possess the highest qualities of character and leadership; he must be decisive and must exercise adamant will power. He must be able to select the correct time for offensive operations.

82. DISADVANTAGES. Although conditions may require the adoption of the strategic defensive initially, the fundamental consideration remains that no decisive results can be achieved by the defensive. The power of initiative, over-all threat, and the ability to strike at the tactical or strategic area of his own choosing remains with the higher commander who is on the offensive. It is he who forces his opponent to conform to, and seek to parry, his movements. Only by the offensive can decisive results be achieved.

83. EXECUTION. a. The strategic defensive employs the tactical offensive and defensive under suitable conditions to gain time, to block hostile advances, and to threaten seriously enemy dispositions, lines of communications, or strategic areas. The tactical offensive also may be employed to gain a local success as a stimulant to troop and civilian morale. Unnecessary or needless expenditure of personnel and material in minor tactical offensive operations, which do not contribute to the general success, must be avoided. This does not imply, however, that a calculated risk should not be taken to gain a tactical success which will operate to facilitate the later general offensive. Such an operation may entail the employment of suitable forces to regain an objective of great importance or to reinforce elements engaged in combat against greatly superior forces seeking to capture an area of decisive strategic importance. However, the higher commander must not be influenced too greatly by...
the conditions on a small part of his front. He must visualize the whole
and estimate the situation as a whole.

b. Whether the defensive will be conducted initially with the intention
of holding a general area and offering decisive battle in this area, or of
executing delaying or retiring maneuvers, will depend on many factors.
Among these are—

1. The time during which it is estimated the defensive attitude
must be maintained.

2. The space in which the defender can maneuver without engaging
in decisive battle.

3. The necessity of protecting vital strategic areas such as essential
industries, mines, or other sources of raw material.

4. The terrain on or near the boundary.

c. Whatever the character of the defensive maneuver decided upon, it
must be predicated upon maximum mobility and achievement of sur-
prise, both in dispositions and conduct. The ultimate objective is to turn
to the offensive and defeat the enemy decisively.

84. DEFENSE AGAINST ARMOR. It must be expected that an oppo-
ponent strong in armored and other highly mobile elements will seek to
use these means to strike deep into the defender's rear. In many situa-
tions, terrain and weather conditions may restrict armored and motorized
elements to roads. It is imperative therefore that the commander give
consideration to, and make adequate provision for, suitable antitank de-
fense-measures in great depth along all roads in rear of his forward ele-
ments. Highly mobile enemy elements which succeed in breaking through
or enveloping a position can jeopardize the defender and frequently can
make his position untenable. Unless these forces are blocked or delayed,
they may be able to disrupt the orderly withdrawal or retirement of the
friendly forces. Where time and facilities permit, the antitank defenses
along roads in rear areas can be provided by prepared installations. This
permits the commander to retain his mobile elements for employment in
an active defense as the situation dictates.

DEFENSIVE IN ONE POSITION

85. SELECTION OF POSITION. When strategic considerations cause
the high commander to decide to execute his defensive mission in one
position, the selection of the area for this position is his next major deci-
sion. Whether the force engaged be a corps, army, or the entire field
forces of the nation, the position must be such that the enemy cannot risk
passing the defender without offering battle. On the other hand, the
defender must not take a position which will permit his forces to be
contained by a part of the enemy forces while the remainder advance
with slight opposition to vital objectives. The flanks of the position must
be protected. Where other conditions permit, they are rested on difficult
obstacles.
86. **FLEXIBILITY.** The defensive in one position may be the result of systematic planning and preparation, during which the complete structural development of the position has been accomplished. It may be adopted on the outbreak of hostilities to block the maneuver of the enemy, on terrain which then must be organized, or it may be the culmination of a maneuver to block hostile moves. Under either condition, it is of the utmost importance that the mobility of the defending forces be such that hostile successes in one area can be met effectively by elements from other areas. A primary purpose of the defense is to prevent the enemy from exploiting any initial success; and, at the proper time and place, be favorably disposed to launch a decisive counteroffensive.

87. **FACTORS FAVORING ONE POSITION.** Factors indicative of or favoring the defensive in one position include the following:

- **a.** Early arrival of adequate reinforcements.
- **b.** Strong defensive terrain.
- **c.** The necessity of defending a vital strategic objective.
- **d.** Location of a position on the flank of the enemy advance which will force him to change direction and commit his forces in a maneuver less favorable to him.
- **e.** Strong natural or prepared flanks which cannot be turned or which will require long, tedious operations to turn.

88. **ALTERNATE PLANS.**

- **a.** Although the commander may plan to hold on one position until he can launch the offensive, he must be prepared to meet enemy successes. Rear positions must be reconnoitered and prepared. Under suitable conditions on a part of the front, the commander may execute a withdrawal to these positions and follow with a determined counteroffensive.

- **b.** Not only must the commander assure himself that suitable defensive measures are taken against hostile ground forces, but he also must be especially vigilant to defeat attacks against his rear by troops transported by air or water.

- **c.** The commander also must take necessary measures to control and restrain dissident elements of the population so as to prevent aiding the enemy by sabotage or civil disturbance.

**STRATEGIC RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS**

89. **PURPOSE.** The strategic retrograde movement avoids large scale battle until adequate measures can be effected for the successful assumption of the offensive. It delays the enemy, draws him farther from his major supply bases, and elongates his lines of communications; it inflicts losses by offensive tactical operations; and it disrupts his plans by the operations of detachments in his rear. The retrograde movement in one area may be combined with the offensive in another area. This combina-
tion of maneuver finds special application when it tends to draw component elements of the hostile force away from each other. The strategic retrograde movement is suitable when time and space factors are favorable and the initial loss of terrain will be more than compensated for by the reasonable expectation of subsequent favorable results.

90. DISADVANTAGES. Inherent in retrograde movements is the danger that the defending forces will become involved in a decisive engagement at an unfavorable time. For instance, the enemy may strike while a withdrawal or retirement is in progress, or the actions of subordinate commanders may precipitate a major engagement prematurely. The essence of this maneuver is to cause the enemy to prepare for a series of battles, not one of which the defender permits to reach culmination until the favorable time arrives.

91. DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT. The commander's decision as to the direction of movement to be taken by subordinate elements will be influenced by the general situation, the lines of communications, the operations planned for the future, and the location of strategically important areas. They may be directed to move straight to the rear; or they may be directed to converge on a given area; or the convergence may follow after a series of moves straight to the rear. Under any condition, control of the entire force must be such that, at the proper time, a concentration of forces may be effected and launched in an overwhelming counterblow. Throughout the retrograde action, suitable reserves must be available to prevent an enemy penetration or exploitation of local enemy successes.

92. MANNER OF WITHDRAWAL. a. The withdrawal straight to the rear simplifies execution of the maneuver. It permits the maximum use of road and rail nets. It confronts the enemy with a broad front and with protected flanks which decreases the possibility of an enemy envelopment. However, it favors hostile concentrations and rapid advances, especially by armored and motorized elements, on parts of the front. The commander must be particularly alert to block attempted penetration and breakthrough by highly mobile units. Combat aviation and armored elements may be employed effectively to delay, block, or destroy these hostile components. Should these enemy elements succeed in effecting a breakthrough, the commander must limit the effect of the hostile operations by utilizing all suitable means, including armored and motorized elements and combat aviation, to cut off and destroy the attacking forces and prevent them from encircling large elements of the defending forces. Rapid, positive action against such hostile forces may contribute largely to the successful assumption of the general offensive and subsequent decisive defeat of the enemy. On the other hand, the commander must not permit local enemy successes to assume a value out of proportion to their importance in the general plan of maneuver. He must bear in mind, con-
stantly, that the successful prosecution of the campaign and the war is his
objective. He must realize that successes and reverses are inevitable on
local fronts and each must be evaluated as to its effect on the whole
operation.

b. The converging strategic rétrograde movement has for its purpose
the coordinated movement of forces to a previously selected favorable po-
sition in the rear. The maneuver may be designed to shorten "defensive
lines by straightening out salients and reentrants; to rest flanks on pro-
tective obstacles; or to concentrate the forces for decisive battle. The
convergence of the defensive forces in one area may be combined suitably
with the assembly in another area of the reinforcements whose mission
will be to strike after battle has been offered the enemy in the area of
convergence.

Section III. RESERVES

93. DEFINITION. A reserve is that part of the command withheld
from action pending its employment at the decisive time, in the decisive
place, in a decisive manner.

94. COMPOSITION. A fixed figure for the size of a reserve, or a
percentage of the command that should be retained as a reserve, cannot
be established. The nature of the operations, enemy actions, terrain and
weather, lines of communications, comparative strengths of the opposing
forces, and the availability of friendly forces must be evaluated in their
relationship to each other in arriving at a suitable size and composition
for the reserve. Enemy knowledge that a reserve exists influences enemy
strategic plans. Mobility is essential to any reserve. Reserves controlled
by higher echelons of command must be capable of rapid and decisive em-
ployment anywhere within the sphere of the commander’s responsibility.
Airborne forces are especially suited for employment as theater reserves.
In some cases, a weapon or a form of munition serves as a reserve force.

95. LOCATION. Reserves must be so located that they can be em-
ployed at any point desired by the commander. As the mobility of the
reserve increases, its location assumes less importance, provided there is
no foreseeable danger of hostile interference with movement of the re-
serve. The location of the reserve should change as the situation changes,
in order to be readily available for employment.

96. EMPLOYMENT. The decision to commit his reserve is the respon-
sibility of the commander alone. Premature commitment of the reserve
may jeopardize the success of an action or of an entire campaign. With-
holding the reserve too long may have the same result as premature com-
mitment. The reserve must be employed in the right place, in the proper
manner, at the decisive time. Complete, accurate, up-to-date information
provides the commander with the facts upon which he must base his deci-
sions as to employment of his reserve. Plans are prepared and rehearsals are held to insure that the reserve is able to act quickly and effectively under all conditions that can be anticipated. Any plan that provides for committing the reserve must provide for another reserve or show conclusively that a reserve is no longer required.
97. ORGANIZATION.  

a. Theater Army forces include all Army units and personnel assigned to a theater of operations and constitute the Army component of a theater command. The theater Army commander commands all Army forces assigned to the theater except those assigned to a theater joint force. He administers and logistically supports all Army forces assigned to a theater. Army forces receive logistical support from the theater logistics command, if the theater is so organized.

b. Theater Army forces normally are organized under a theater Army headquarters into army groups or armies, and communications zone forces. Other major elements, such as an army replacement command or army reserve force may be organized when required. (See fig. 5.)

c. Combat forces include all army groups, separate field armies and any separate special theater Army tactical forces. All combat forces are under the direct command of the theater Army commander, who assigns
their tactical missions, administers them, and logistically supports them.

d. Army reserve forces include all Army tactical units not committed to action with a joint force or with one of the combat forces listed above. This reserve of the theater Army commander normally will include units newly arrived in the theater and undergoing orientation and refresher training before commitment to combat; units relieved from combat for rest and rehabilitation; and large units, up to the size of a field army, being concentrated for commitment on a new mission. Army reserve units may be commanded and administered by an Army reserve force commander, or they may be commanded directly by the theater Army commander and administered by the communications zone commander.

e. For detailed information on the organization and functions of the communications zone and the Army replacement command, see FM 100-10.

98. THEATER ARMY COMMANDER. The theater Army commander is under the command of the theater commander. (See par. 14.) He is assigned and relieved, administratively, by the Chief of Staff, United States Army. He is responsible to the theater commander that theater Army forces, not assigned to joint forces, are commanded and administered so that missions assigned are accomplished. He is further responsible to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, that approved Department of the Army doctrines and procedures are observed incident to the command and administration of theater Army forces. He receives administrative support and technical guidance from the Department of the Army. For a more detailed description of the position of the theater Army commander with respect to the theater commander and the chief of staff of the Army, see FM 100-10.

99. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THEATER ARMY FORCES. Operational control of Army forces in a theater of operations may be exercised by either of two methods appropriate to the geography of the theater.

a. In a land mass theater of operations where all Army forces are deployed and maneuvered in army groups or separate field armies to accomplish missions of destroying enemy forces and capturing and holding terrain areas, operational control of Army forces normally is exercised by the theater Army commander under the direction of the theater commander.

b. In an oceanic theater in which small land areas, widely separated by water, are to be captured and held and enemy forces thereon destroyed, operational control of Army forces assigned to such missions normally is exercised by a theater joint force commander under the direction of the theater commander.

100. OPERATIONAL PLANNING. a. The theater Army commander
receives his missions from the theater commander. These missions, appropriately phased with respect to time and physical accomplishment, are a part of the theater campaign plan.

b. The theater Army commander must make estimates of the situation in order to determine his best course of action both for the conduct of the campaign and for the accomplishment of each specific mission which forms a part of the campaign. In addition to determining the best course of action, the estimates made by the theater Army commander must include a complete analysis of the Army forces required to accomplish the missions assigned. This analysis of requirements is of major importance at this level of command because it will carry much weight in determining the allocation of Army forces to the theater by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, in turn, the Department of the Army. Any errors in estimating theater requirements usually cannot be rectified in the midst of battle because the reinforcement of theater Army forces requires long periods for training, equipping, and transporting the troops involved.

c. The theater Army commander must keep the theater commander and the Department of the Army continually apprised of his future troop and logistical requirements. He must give them the benefit of his analysis, comparison, and recommended methods to resolve any differences between his estimated requirements and the Department of the Army planned allocations of Army troops and supplies to the theater. These recommendations to the theater commander, the Department of the Army, or both, may propose—

1. A change in the theater Army troop and supply allocations.
2. A change in the theater Army mission with respect to scope or time phasing.
3. The acceptance of a greater calculated risk on certain missions.
4. A change in the type and amount of support to be rendered to Army forces by theater or strategic Navy and Air Force.

d. The theater Army commander, within the theater campaign plan, projects his planning for specific operations as far into the future as is practicable at any given time. This means that future planning must be continuous. Once a plan for a specific operation has been completed, it must be revised as required by the changing situation. These plans are used as the basis for long-range planning by subordinate commanders, both operational and administrative.

e. As the time approaches for the issuance of specific directives for an operation, the theater Army commander treats the plan as a current matter. The original estimate for the operation and the details of the plan are reviewed and specific directives to subordinate commanders are drafted and issued.

101. OPERATIONAL METHODS. The directives issued by the theater Army commander to army group or field army commanders are broad in scope. They indicate the over-all theater Army scheme of maneuver, the
phasing of the actions; the forces and supplies available to each command, the support from theater Navy or Air Force available, and the specific mission of each subordinate command. The detailed tactical plans within the army group or field army boundaries are properly left to the commanders of those forces. In general, the theater Army commander gives each subordinate command every possible means available, assigns him a mission, and thereafter holds him responsible for the accomplishment of that mission.

102. COORDINATION. The theater Army commander maintains close liaison with the theater Navy and Air Force commanders. All operational plans must be coordinated with the plans of the other Armed Services in the theater before orders are issued. This is particularly necessary where close cooperative effort is required by the theater plan. The theater Army commander must assure also that appropriate liaison and coordination of plans is established at lower levels of command in order that the full benefit of supporting action be realized.

Section II. ARMY GROUP

103. ORGANIZATION (See figure 6).

a. The army group is a tactical unit organized for strategic and tactical operations. Normally, it has few supply or administrative functions. The army group consists of a headquarters and required troops. These troops consist of supporting troops, a variable number of field armies, and in some situations, separate corps and divisions. The allotment and grouping of troops are the responsibility of the army group commander. The army group may operate under a theater commander or a theater Army commander. The army group may be organized as a unified command if the theater commander so directs.

b. The commander of an army group may be designated by the theater commander or by the Department of the Army. He usually will be designated as the army group commander in a letter of instructions or in an order supplemented by a letter of instructions. The letter of instructions directs that designated armies or other units constitute the army group effective on a specified date or upon arrival in certain areas.

c. The mission, area of operations, and probable hostile resistance will
influence the composition and strength of additional troops allotted the army group commander. For powerful offensive operations in suitable terrain the allotment of armored and motorized elements should be proportionately large. Under these conditions superiority in combat aviation support must be insured. Based upon his estimate, if the need arises the army group commander requests the allotment of additional or special means. It is especially important that the army group be provided with adequate signal communication agencies.

104. COMMAND. a. The army group commander is responsible for conducting all operations, both defensive and offensive, within the boundaries of his area. In the discharge of this responsibility, the army group commander should utilize all the resources under his control and, in emergencies determined by him, he may utilize other military personnel, located within his area but normally not under his control. In some instances, it may be necessary for the army group commander to dispatch troops on combat missions into the communications zone for short periods of time. In such an event, command of these troops may be retained by the army group commander or it may pass to the commander of the security forces of the communications zone as directed by the theater Army commander.

b. The mission assigned the army group must be clear and specific. The army group commander prepares plans for the army group operations, allots to the field armies additional troops and administrative support which have been provided by higher headquarters, assigns zones of action or sectors, and coordinates the movements and efforts of his major subordinate elements. He assigns missions and objectives to the field armies or other major subordinate elements but decentralizes the execution of the tasks to his subordinate commanders. During the execution of current operations, the army group commander must be planning future operations. He must be prepared for further operations on his present front or be ready to regroup and move to other areas and execute other missions.

c. The army group commander must estimate the means required and make recommendations for the allotment of additional troops and administrative support. Ordinarily, he does not operate supply or administrative installations. He exercises control over supplies and credits for his forces. He establishes priorities for movement, and makes provision for adequate movement and traffic control.

105. STAFF. The general and special staffs of the army group commander will be occupied more with operational than with administrative matters. The employment of experienced liaison officers is one of the best means of insuring a mutual exchange of information between the army group commander and subordinate, higher, and adjacent commanders.
106. RESERVES. It is highly important that army group reserves be kept mobile and concealed. When employment is contemplated, their movement to position should be protected from air and ground attack. Employment of army group reserves constitutes one of the major methods whereby the commander can decisively influence the outcome of battle. They must be employed in a decisive area against decisive objectives. Their piecemeal employment is seldom justified.

107. METHODS OF INFLUENCING THE ACTION. Other methods through which the army group commander can influence the action are the shifting of major combat units, the reallocation of artillery, control of logistical resources, the employment of such airborne forces as may be made available to him by the theater Army commander, and by the employment of such guided missile units as are retained under army group control. The army group commander may recommend a shift of the resources of the tactical air command to influence the action in any desired sector.

Section III. THE FIELD ARMY

108. ORGANIZATION (see fig. 7). a. A field army consists of a headquarters, certain organic army troops, a variable number of supporting combat and service troops, a variable number of corps, and a variable number of divisions, of which, some or all may be attached to corps. A field army has both tactical and administrative functions and is the largest self-contained unit. It may operate under a theater Army commander or an army group commander.

b. It is not desirable that a fixed organization be prescribed for the field army. The number of corps, the number and types of divisions, and additional combat troops and service elements from the Department of the Army reserve or other sources will be determined primarily by the mission, the terrain and weather in the area of operations, and the probable hostile forces. In a given area, because of terrain conditions and because of the tactical situation, it may be highly desirable to have a larger proportion of armored units; whereas in another, the field army may be composed primarily of infantry divisions. Similarly, in one area, a great number of engineer bridge units may be required, whereas in another, a preponderance of the engineer effort must be placed on road construction and maintenance.

109. OPERATIONS—OFFENSIVE. a. A field army is the ground unit of maneuver. It is the unit which is the basis for executing strategic and tactical ground operations. The field army has territorial responsibilities and administrative functions.

b. The field army commander must be assured of continuing, reliable information as to the dispositions, strength, composition, and movements of hostile forces. He must use every resource at his disposal to gain in-
Figure 7. Organization of a typical field army.
formation of the enemy forces on his front, as well as those on other fronts and in other areas which may affect the preparation and execution of his plans. A failure to exploit every source of information may deny important information as to hostile dispositions, movements, and operations, a knowledge of which would permit the field army commander to strike decisively at enemy weakness.

c. During the planning phase, the field army commander keeps his major subordinate commanders advised of the contemplated operations so that these commanders can prepare plans, make recommendations, execute required troop movements and reconnaissance, and employ deception and surprise measures. In his planning, the field army commander must project himself well into the future. His plans must cover considerable periods of time. While one operation, which may extend over many days or weeks, is progressing, he must be planning the next. The planning of the field army commander must be flexible so that full exploitation of favorable situations can be obtained and unfavorable situations, should they occur, can be rectified.

d. The field army commander issues orders to subordinates in furtherance of the general plan; allot divisions, supporting troops, and logistical support to the corps; makes provision for the organization of any special task forces; and coordinates the efforts of the major components of the field army.

e. On the offensive, the field army commander accomplishes his mission by assigning to his corps suitable missions, objectives, and directions of advances or zones of action and by employing reserves, artillery, guided missiles, or other means at his disposal to further the impetus of the attack. The commander's plans and orders provide for the employment of a decisive mass in a decisive direction at the decisive time. The mission of the field army, the terrain and weather, enemy dispositions, the composition of the army, and the extent or logistical support will determine to a great extent the allotment of means to the main and secondary attacks. When part of a larger force, the direction of the field army's main attack and terrain objectives frequently will be assigned by the higher commander. A flank army will execute the enveloping maneuver or turning movement of the larger force, while an interior army will make the frontal attacks and the penetrations.

f. Offensive plans must consider the capabilities of the enemy to execute strong countermeasures (including attacks by air, airborne, and armored forces) and defense measures designed particularly to slow down, block, or completely stop the rapid advance of armored and motorized elements. Great depth of organized enemy defenses must be anticipated along the avenues favorable to movement of mobile units. These defenses may consist of mobile gun units, hasty emplacements, well-camouflaged permanent emplacements containing large caliber antitank weapons, and man-made or improved natural obstacles. Therefore, provi-
sion should be made to insure that suitable weapons and troops are available to the leading elements to destroy or neutralize these antitank defenses. Otherwise, the delay caused by such defenses may prevent the timely accomplishment of the assigned mission.

110. OPERATIONS—DEFENSIVE.  

a. When acting alone on the defensive, the field army ordinarily will have great latitude in the selection of the area or areas in which it will conduct the defense. In some situations, however, strategic considerations or the assigned missions may limit very definitely the field army's freedom of maneuver. As part of a larger force, the field army must conform to the decisions of the higher commander and must operate as one element in the general defensive scheme.

b. In organizing the defense, the three basic elements of a defense must be considered in the Army plan—covering forces, organization of the battle position, and reserves. (See FM 100-5.) The designation and the command of advance covering forces are normally the responsibilities of the corps commanders supervised by the army commander. The detailed organization of the battle position is the responsibility of the division and corps commanders, supervised by the army commander to insure coordination across corps boundaries. The principal concerns of the army commander in the organization of the defense are—first, the organization of the battle position in depth, particularly with respect to antitank defense; and, second, the disposition of army reserves and plans for major counterattacks by those reserves.

c. The defense must be so organized in depth that it can throw back the attack of foot elements and can effectively block and defeat armored and motorized elements. This requires an antitank defense organized in great depth and consisting of demolitions, obstacles, mobile gun units, and readily available reserves, including armor. It must be anticipated that armored and motorized formations may succeed in penetrating the defense zone. Having penetrated they may encircle the defending forces or assist other mobile hostile units which may have penetrated in another area. In order to gain their objectives and insure the encirclement, the hostile forces must move rapidly. This indicates that they must move over roads of terrain favorable to fast armored and motorized unit movement. Unfavorable terrain and weather conditions and the demand for speed frequently will confine their advance to roads. To prevent or delay this movement may be decisive in the continuity of the defense and in the ultimate defeat of the hostile forces. Consequently, antitank defenses should be disposed in great depth along routes favorable for the rapid advance of armored and motorized units.

d. Successful conduct of the defense requires the preservation of the offensive spirit, which is manifested in the counterattack. The defense is but a preliminary to counteroffensive operations, for which the field
army commander must prepare timely plans. The initiation of the counter-offensive requires a careful evaluation of the enemy situation. Inadequate information and a consequent misconception of enemy capabilities may delay the launching of the counteroffensive at the decisive time or it may lead the defender into a planned enemy trap. Daring and boldness must characterize the commander; they must, however, be the result of a careful analysis of the situation, based on far-reaching and detailed information.

111. MEANS OF INFLUENCING ACTION. The field army commander influences the outcome of battle by personal leadership; the assignment of missions and boundaries; adequate logistical support; timely employment of reserves; use of artillery and guided missiles; and by thorough planning with the associated tactical air force. The flexibility of field army organization permits the transfer, during operations, of one or more divisions from one corps to another. Likewise, divisions in field army reserve may be assigned to front line corps to insure the continuity of effort by the corps and to permit the relief and reorganization of tired, depleted, or disorganized divisions. However, the field army commander should retain under his command a reserve of suitable size and composition to exploit fully the successes of his attacking echelons or to insure the integrity of his defense. When the field army reserve is employed, prompt measures should be taken to reconstitute a reserve from combat elements as they become available.

112. SECURITY MEASURES. a. The speed with which modern operations can be conducted requires that field army commanders give special attention to the protection of flanks. Although an interior army is provided a certain degree of flank protection by adjacent armies, the field army commander cannot rely on that protection alone. Failure to provide flank protection, in consequence of which strong enemy forces may be able to strike the flank and rear of the army, may result in disorder and disorganization. Furthermore, the resulting enemy threat and successes may delay, stop, or even cause the abandonment of the general offensive operation. The flank army especially must make adequate provision for the protection of its exposed flank and rear. Whether the protection of the flank of theater forces will be assigned to the flank army commander, or whether special provision will be made by the theater Army commander, will depend on the terrain and weather, available troops, the mission of the flank army, and the general situation. In general, subordinate combat commanders should be free to focus their primary attention on the effective prosecution of combat operations in progress.

b. Highly mobile elements strong in antitank facilities and engineer units for the preparation of obstacles and demolitions are favorably employed in flank protection. These elements should be provided with suit-
able Army light aviation, ground reconnaissance components, and a signal communication system. Employment of tactical air forces, in conjunction with suitable ground forces, is a most effective method of disrupting hostile threats against a flank and of providing reconnaissance over areas beyond the operating capabilities of Army light aviation.

113. ADMINISTRATION. The field army commander is responsible for the organization and operation of administrative arrangements to serve the elements of the field army. This requires long-range planning, a detailed estimate of personnel, supply and evacuation needs, a careful study of routes of communications, provision for suitable traffic control, and transportation and supply facilities. Modern means of warfare demand an adequate, flexible, and continuing logistical system.

Section IV. THE CORPS

114. ORGANIZATION (See fig. 8). The corps is a tactical unit of execution and maneuver. It consists of a headquarters, certain organic and attached elements designated as corps troops and directly administered by corps headquarters, and a variable number of divisions allotted in accordance with the requirements of the situation. The composition of the corps will depend upon its mission, the terrain and weather, and the situation. The flexibility of its organization permits an increase or decrease in the size of the corps, or a change in the type of divisions and other elements constituting the corps, by the attachment or detachment of divisions and reinforcing units at any time during the operation. Re-inforcing elements will be allotted initially to the army, which in turn will make such suballotment to corps as is indicated for the effective execution of the army mission. When the corps is operating alone, reinforcing elements from higher headquarters may be allotted directly to it by that headquarters. The corps may operate under an army group commander or an army commander.

115. OPERATION—GENERAL. a. For tactical operations the corps commander prepares plans based on instructions received from the field army; if the corps is operating independently, the corps commander prepares plans based on the mission assigned the corps by the army group and the general situation. He issues orders to divisions and other units directly under his control. He allots reinforcing troops, such as armored units, artillery, and special troops, to divisions in accordance with their availability and the requirements of the divisions, giving primary consideration to those executing the decisive effort of the corps.

b. When a corps is part of a field army, the corps commander estimates the means required, recommends to the field army commander such additional means as may be required, recommends the allocation of supply for his forces, supervises the administrative functions of his divi-
Figure 8. Organization of a typical corps.
sions, and provides suitable traffic control measures. Ordinarily, the corps operates logistical and administrative installations only for the supports of its corps troops. When the corps is detached from the field army, reinforcing elements are allotted directly to it.

c. The corps commander ordinarily issues his orders as instructions which specify the missions of the divisions and corps troops. He leaves the method and details of execution to the subordinate commanders. In battle he coordinates the action of his divisions, determines the employment of corps troops, and employs the corps reserve in accordance with the requirements of the situation. He influences the action by changes in disposition, use of his reserves, use of the corps artillery, allocation of logistical support, and by recommending missions for supporting tactical aviation.

116. THE ADVANCE. a. General. The following discussion applies equally to the corps as part of the army and to the corps operating alone or detached. However, when the corps is a part of a field army, the corps commander will have less independence in the conduct of the advance. Major decisions concerning the advance will be made by the field army commander. The general formation, the frontage, the rate of advance, the objective or objectives, the conduct of reconnaissance agencies, and special measures for secrecy and security may be prescribed by the field army, or may be influenced by limitations or special requirements prescribed by the field army. Under certain conditions the general location of the mass of the corps within its zone of advance may be prescribed by the field army commander. The field army plan and scheme of maneuver may impose specific limits on the movements and actions of the corps. Normally, however, the corps commander will be given great freedom of action in accomplishing his mission. Absence of restrictions by the higher commander leaves the corps commander's freedom of action still dependent upon other factors. He necessarily is influenced by the current tactical situation and scheme of maneuver both within his own zone and within the zones of friendly units on either or both flanks.

b. Planning. In planning the advance of the corps, a careful study is made of the critical areas of contact with the enemy and where they are likely to exist. These areas are determined for each day's advance. Suitable objectives are determined in this manner. The advance must be so planned that the corps will be in the desired formation when each of these critical areas is reached. The enemy situation is one of the controlling factors in planning the advance. When the enemy is near, no other consideration is so important. Since the enemy situation will probably change constantly with the passage of time, it is essential that the commander of the corps be kept continuously informed of the location, strength, dispositions, and movements of the hostile force. He must know not only what the enemy is doing but also, as far as possible, what the
enemy is capable of doing. Early and continuous provision for the procurement of information prior to and during the advance is essential.

c. Formation. The formation adopted for the advance should be the most flexible permitted by the situation, so that expeditious and decisive employment is insured on contact with the hostile main forces. In determining the march formations of the corps, the missions of the divisions must be taken into consideration. Any one of a number of formations may be adopted. The one selected depends upon the mission, information of the enemy, the terrain and weather, the road net, the supply situation, the projected plan, and the types of divisions available. Three common formations based on a corps of three divisions are outlined below. These represent but three of many possible combinations.

(1) One division in advance, the other two divisions echeloned to the right (or left) rear, and corps troops following in trace of the leading or the center division. This formation is valuable when one flank is secure. It facilitates maneuver to the front or right (left) front.

(2) One division in advance, the other two divisions echeloned to the right and left rear, and corps troops following in trace of the leading division. This formation provides for maximum security and maneuverability, both to the front and to either flank.

(3) Two divisions in advance, one echeloned slightly to the right (or left) rear of the other and the third division and corps troops following in similar formation. This formation is especially applicable when approaching an enemy who is on a broad front and when commitment of the corps is indicated initially on a broad front.

Similar formations are suitable for corps consisting of either a greater or lesser number of divisions.

d. Timing. The factor of time is important. When a definite position or locality is the march objective, the formation adopted for the advance must be such that the objective can be reached by the bulk of the corps within the time allotted.

e. Maneuverability. The formation of the corps during the advance must be such as to facilitate maneuver or change of direction of march, to provide flank protection, and to utilize all available roads, railroads, and bivouacs. The preservation of freedom of maneuver until the corps engages in decisive combat is essential.

f. Enemy influence. When a hostile force is the objective, or when hostile forces threaten to interpose themselves between the corps and its objective, the formation adopted for the advance will be governed largely by the available information concerning the strength and location of the hostile forces. When such information is definite, the formation adopted should provide primarily for early decisive action by the corps and second-
arily for the protection of the corps while in movement. When the information concerning the enemy is indefinite, the formation of the corps should provide for protection of the main force and for mutual support by all elements of the corps; the formation also must permit prompt maneuver in any direction from which hostile forces may appear in strength.

g. Supporting troops.

(1) The place of the corps artillery in the march formation is selected to insure its early availability for action at the time and place desired. When the need for part or all of the corps artillery as reinforcing artillery for one or more divisions can be definitely foreseen, units of the corps artillery may be attached to such divisions for control during the march. In determining when and where corps artillery will be marched, consideration must be given to its probable employment and to the road net. If early need for corps artillery in the forward areas cannot be foreseen and security measures permit, it may be left behind initially and brought forward later, or it may advance by bounds behind the divisions. As a general rule, corps artillery should move as far forward as it possibly can, and still be capable of employment where most needed.

(2) Other corps troops and reinforcing units are moved so that they will be in suitable locations when they are needed. Considerations of supply, control, and possible or probable interference with combat elements of the corps indicate that service troops should not be advanced until their presence in the forward areas is required.

h. Control.

(1) In accordance with the field army plan or, when the corps is operating alone, in accordance with the corps commander's plan, the advance of the corps is coordinated by prescribing the zones or routes of advance for subordinate elements. Orders also may prescribe the successive lines to be reached and the hours they are to be reached by corps ground reconnaissance agencies, advance guards, and the heads and tails of divisions, units of corps troops, and reinforcing elements. Provision is made for special security measures. When practicable, the axes of signal communication for the corps and major subordinate elements are announced. Routes of march are prescribed for divisions when the road net is limited. They always must be prescribed, however, for corps troops and reinforcing units which are not attached to divisions.

(2) The orders for the advance may be accompanied by a march table, the purpose of which is to insure the orderly advance of the corps. So far as possible, control of the movements of the
major subordinate elements is decentralized to the commanders of those elements.

(3) The corps commander utilizes all possible methods of control in order to be able to take corrective action in unforeseen situations and to assure himself that instructions regarding the reaching of lines or areas are being executed. Reports may be required in advance of the prospective time of arrival at objectives and in advance of actual arrival. Reports of necessary deviations from the prescribed advance are required. Liaison officers must be used freely by the corps to maintain close touch with the movements of the major elements. Frequent command and staff visits are essential.

i. Future planning. The corps plans must be projected well into the future; they must envisage action days in advance. Since the movement of large forces requires careful staff planning and supervision, and the proper balancing of time and space factors, subordinate commanders must receive timely information of the developments of the corps plan and of the decisions by the corps commander. Such information will permit subordinate commanders to plan well in advance and to make the necessary timely arrangements for the effective participation of their units in the corps effort.

j. Intelligence. Adequate and timely information of the enemy must be insured if the commander is to make the maximum use of his forces and is to employ them decisively. Whenever appropriate, higher and adjacent units should be requested to provide specific intelligence. All information collection agencies under corps control must be used to their maximum capabilities. Corps reconnaissance agencies must reconnoiter continuously and far in advance of the corps. Reconnaissance aviation and the corps armored cavalry regiment are available to the corps commander for distant reconnaissance missions. Information which is pertinent to subordinate commanders should be given promptly to these commanders in sufficient detail to permit them to use it in formulating their plans. In addition to general information of value to certain elements, all major subordinate commanders must be kept advised of the situation and capabilities of the enemy by means of intelligence estimates, reports, and situation maps. Liaison officers are particularly valuable in keeping the corps and higher, lower, and adjacent units informed of the situation.

k. Security. Security must be provided on the march and in assembly areas. This is done by the following means: advance, flank, and rear guards; division outposts; especially constituted mobile task forces; and by antitank and antiaircraft elements. Mobile task forces are suited particularly to provide flank and rear protection, to block defiles, or to delay hostile forces. They should be strong in antitank and engineer components and demolition equipment and they should be provided with suitable reconnaissance units and signal communication facilities. Reconnaissance
aviation and the corps armored cavalry regiment facilitate security measures by the expeditious reporting of the location of hostile forces and their dispositions and movements.

I. Preparation for contact. As the corps approaches the enemy more closely, the corps commander increases the readiness of his command for decisive combat. He makes such changes in formation and disposition as will assure the greatest flexibility of maneuver and the prompt availability for combat of the various elements of the command. When the corps armored cavalry regiment has been relieved by the advance guards it may be employed on one or both flanks, it may be withdrawn and placed in corps reserve for future employment, or occasionally it may be employed in an interior position. Based on the information he has received and the capabilities of the hostile force, the corps commander indicates the action to be taken by the leading divisions. The conduct of the advance guards will be governed primarily by the general plan of the corps commander.

117. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. a. Planning. (1) The attack by a force as large as a corps requires planning well in advance of the actual tactical action. Plans are developed fully and completed as close contact with the enemy is gained. The division constitutes the unit of execution on which the corps commander bases his plan. (2) In the plan of attack, the corps commander so apportions the means as to give the maximum strength possible to the main attack. Close coordination of the attacks by ground and air forces must be insured.

b. Control. For the attack the divisions are assigned missions, general lines of departure or areas from which the attack will be launched, zones of action, the time or times of attack, and objectives or successive objectives, if required by the scheme of maneuver. Provision is made for the mutual support and coordination necessary between adjacent divisions to carry out successfully the corps scheme of maneuver. Allotments of corps troops and reinforcing units are made to divisions in accordance with their missions, requirements, and the terrain.

c. Use of armor. The armored division(s) available to the corps commander should be employed in such a manner as to take best advantage of its high mobility, heavy firepower, and shock capabilities. Normally, this employment of the division, as a part of a corps on the offensive, would indicate that the armor be held in reserve initially, prepared to exploit any success achieved on the corps front. The strength of the armored division should be massed at the decisive point and thrust quickly through the enemy defensive organization on a relatively narrow front. Attacking with armored strength too small, or too dispersed, to produce decisive shock effect, often results in heavy losses and inconclusive re-
suits. Once the armor has broken through the enemy defensive zone, the corps commander should follow it up with motorized infantry or other mobile forces to consolidate gains, protect lines of communications, and reduce or contain by-passed centers of resistance. The armor may be assigned the decisive objective of the corps. Its forward movement should be restricted only by the minimum essential controls.

d. Supporting units.

(1) The corps artillery supports the attack primarily by counter-battery and long-range missions, thus permitting the division artillery to concentrate on close-support missions. The corps artillery should be employed to reinforce the close-support fires of the division artillery whenever such reinforcement is needed. The division artillery may be called on to supplement the corps artillery in counterbattery fires, when necessary. Control of corps artillery and of reinforcing heavy and medium units is centralized when practicable. The major effort of the corps artillery should be in support of the main attack.

(2) Separate armored, artillery, engineer, chemical, and similar units attached to the corps to assist or support the corps offensive action, may be attached to divisions in accordance with the missions assigned and the powers and limitations of the attached units, or they may be employed under corps control as the situation indicates.

e. Air reconnaissance. The air reconnaissance requirements of corps and divisions are fulfilled by the tactical air force. Division requests are coordinated by the corps G-2 Air, and the consolidated corps request is forwarded to army for inclusion in the tactical air force—army reconnaissance plan. Information resulting from such requests is forwarded directly to corps and divisions by the most expeditious methods available.

f. Conduct of the attack.

(1) The attack by a corps ordinarily is a matter of days and not of hours. Throughout the battle the corps commander must add power to the attack at the decisive points by the use of the corps artillery and corps reserves and by requests for air support missions. Reserves should be so located and so moved that they can be rapidly employed on any section of the corps front. Untimely or frequent moves of reserve units are to be avoided in order to maintain the vigor of the reserve for the time when it will be committed to action. They preferably should be provided with motor transportation and when in movement they should be fully protected against both ground and air attacks. Plans for the movement and employment of the reserves must be prepared to meet various possible contingencies. When reserves are committed to battle, they should be replaced at the earliest practicable time as other elements become available. However, the at-
tacking echelons should not be weakened unnecessarily to gain a reserve component. The commander must not hesitate to employ his last reserves when such action gives promise of decisive results. Piecemeal employment of corps reserves seldom is justified.

(2) The corps commander follows the progress of battle through personal contact, reports of staff and liaison officers, and in information received from subordinate commanders and from suitable reconnaissance agencies. As the course of the combat indicates, he adjusts or modifies the missions assigned to subordinate elements and makes such changes in zones of action, timing, objectives, and assignment of supporting means as may be necessary to take full advantage of enemy weaknesses, to exploit those weaknesses, and to defeat decisively the hostile force.

g. Exploitation. The corps commander must make timely provision for the pursuit and destruction of a demoralized enemy. The means for this exploitation must be on hand and must not be dissipated in inconclusive actions. In general, the attacking elements which produce the opportunity for exploitation should not be expected to perform the exploitation to appreciable depth; full exploitation should be carried on by fresh, mobile troops held in reserve for this specific purpose.

118. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. a. General. When the corps constitutes a part of a field army, the area assigned the corps for defense and the general conduct of the defense will be decided by the field army commander. For a corps operating independently or on a detached mission those decisions are made by the corps commander; they are based primarily on his mission, time and space in which he has to accomplish the mission, terrain and weather, and strength and composition of the opposing forces. Whether the plans contemplate a defense in one position or a delaying action they must visualize sharp aggressive action under suitable conditions and the eventual adoption of decisive counteroffensive action.

b. Intelligence. In order that the corps commander may most suitably dispose his subordinate elements he must be provided continually with intelligence of the situation and capabilities of the hostile forces. The corps reconnaissance agencies must be given well defined missions so that they can search for and secure the most vital information.

c. Command reconnaissance. The selection of the area to be defended cannot be made solely from the map. Ground or air reconnaissance, or a combination of the two, by the corps commander and members of his staff are necessary. Otherwise, decisive defensive locations may be overlooked thus requiring a readjustment in defense plans at a later, more critical time.

d. Dispositions-normal front. The plans and orders for the defense provide for the disposition of the divisions and other corps elements in
width and depth suitable to the defensive capabilities of the various components and the requirements of the situation. In a delaying action the division normally may be assigned a greater frontage than that permissible in a defense made on one position. To allot a division an excessive frontage invites a hostile penetration. The weapons of modern warfare demand that the defensive position be organized in great depth and that organized areas be mutually supporting. The defense against an enemy, strong in armored and motorized elements, requires that an attack by these elements be met by ever increasingly powerful antitank facilities distributed in depth. These will include obstacles and fixed emplacements along routes favorable to the rapid movement of armored elements. Highly mobile armored units usually are held in reserve for the purpose of counterattacking.

d. Disposition—broad front.

(1) Modern warfare often may require that the corps defend on what normally is considered an over-extended front. This can be brought about as a result of an effort to economize forces for other undertakings, to relieve front-line divisions temporarily in preparation for future operations, or to effect protective dispersion against mass destruction weapons. Certain battlefield conditions are more favorable to the success of this type of defense and advantage should be taken of them when desirable. Such conditions are air superiority which restricts the enemy's capability to concentrate for major attacks, the lack of armored units and general mobility on the part of the enemy which likewise restricts the enemy's ability to strike quickly.

(2) When a corps assumes the defense on a broad front, organized forward areas cannot be mutually supporting, and thus must be carefully located at critical points and prepared for all-around defense. These dispositions are intended to canalize enemy penetrations into areas of the defender's choice and most favorable to the success of the defender's counterattack plans. Depth is gained by the selection and preparation of rear defense areas, chosen to canalize further and to block enemy penetrations, and by the judicious location of division and corps reserves. Rear defense positions are reconnoitered and laid out, but occupied only on order.

e. Planning. Plans for the employment of the corps cannot be improvised. From the initiation of operations until their conclusion the corps commander and his staff must be planning far in advance of the current situation. The occupation and organization of a defensive position are but initial steps in the whole operation. Plans to meet various enemy capabilities, plans for the coordination of fires, plans for counterattack, plans for the counteroffensive, or plans for further retrograde action must be prepared while the initial defense measures are being taken. Failure
of the corps commander to prepare suitable plans for future action may so
delay the execution of orders that the operations of the corps and higher
units are jeopardized. Major subordinate commanders must be kept in-
formed of projected plans so that they also may make necessary plans to
meet various contingencies.

g. Divisions. Divisions occupying portions of the defensive position
must be given missions and general instructions for the conduct of the
defense. They are assigned areas or sectors and are allotted appropriate
reinforcing means, and may be directed to provide covering forces and
flank or rear protection. When the tactical situation requires the assign-
ment of broad frontage to front-line divisions, the higher commander
must be prepared to intervene with highly mobile reserves. The corps
issues the necessary instructions to assure coordination between adjacent
divisions. As a rule, the detailed execution of defensive measures will be
left to the divisions. Inspections are made by the corps commander and
the corps staff to assure complete and effective defense organization
throughout the corps.

h. Armor. The most advantageous employment of the armored divi-
sion(s) available to the corps commander in the defense is in the role of
major counterattacking force in the corps reserve. The armored divi-
sion’s high mobility, firepower, and shock effect make it ideal for this
purpose. It can be moved rapidly to any part of the front and constitutes
an ever-present tactical and strategic threat to enemy operations. While
defense of a position is not the role normally associated with armor, it is
capable of taking its place in the line adjacent to infantry divisions on the
corps front when necessary.

i. Artillery. The corps artillery has for its principal mission the
neutralization or destruction of hostile artillery. It also will be used for
interdiction, for counterpreparation, to fire in front of the outpost posi-
tion, to protect mine fields and obstacles, and to reinforce the artillery of
the divisions. The missions assigned the corps artillery are those which
will most favor the success of the defense. In preparing plans for em-
ployment of the corps artillery, arrangements are made for the mutual
assistance of the artillery of adjacent corps and for assistance by army
artillery units which might be held under army control.

j. Corps armored cavalry. In a defensive situation the corps ar-
moored cavalry regiment is employed on its primary mission of security.
It may be reinforced by suitable armored, infantry, artillery, and engi-
neer units and be employed as an advance covering force or a flank-
security force or be given an interior defense sector; or it may be with-
drawn into corps reserve for later employment.

k. Reserves.

(1) Corps reserves may be employed to occupy previously prepared
positions, block hostile envelopments or penetrations, reinforce
frontline units, relieve exhausted units on the battle position,
cover a retrograde movement, counterattack, or participate in the general counteroffensive.

(2) The effective employment of the corps reserve requires careful planning, detailed reconnaissance of routes and areas of employment, rehearsals where practicable, rapid methods of movement, protection against ground and air attack while in its original location and during movement, and a signal communication system which insures the rapid transmission of orders.

I. Counterattack.

(1) The counterattack is the decisive action of the defense. For the counterattacks, corps reserves either may be employed under corps control or they may be attached to an appropriate division. When the reserve is a division or larger and is employed as a unit, it should be committed under corps control. Reserves smaller than a division may be suitably attached to the division which has been assigned the counterattack mission. In any situation, the counterattacking forces should be supported by all available artillery and ground weapons and by available combat aviation. Armored forces as part of the defensive forces find their most appropriate employment in the counterattack and counteroffensive.

(2) Every effort must be made to move the counterattack forces secretly and to launch the counterattack with surprise. However, the sacrifice of secrecy must not deter the commander from launching his counterattack force at the most decisive time and place. With modern modes of transportation a delay or a gain of a few hours may be decisive.

m. Counteroffensive. The counteroffensive must be the ultimate goal of all defensive operations. It is by the counteroffensive that the commander regains the initiative and is enabled to impose his will on that of the enemy. Whether the corps is acting alone or is part of a larger force all plans must envisage the offensive and, during the defensive, plans and preparations must be made for decisive counteroffensive action.

Section V. RECONNAISSANCE AGENCIES OF LARGER UNITS

119. GENERAL. Ground reconnaissance agencies normally employed by larger units may be attached or assigned to subordinate units. It is advantageous to make these attachments or assignments as constant and permanent as possible, since intimacy of contact between the higher commander and staff and the reconnaissance agency tends to increase efficiency of operation. Reconnaissance units held under higher headquarters control may be allotted to subordinate units to reinforce organic reconnaissance elements, or to provide those larger units which do not have
120. CORPS ARMORED CAVALRY. a. Missions.

(1) The primary mission of the armored cavalry regiment is the performance of reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. In the execution of this mission, it also serves as a screening and security force. The regiment is organized and equipped to execute offensive or defensive combat in order to defeat enemy efforts to observe or harass the friendly main force in the execution of its mission. The gathering and reporting of military information is one of the best means of accomplishing security. By aggressive reconnaissance, to the front, flanks, and rear, the regiment insures that time and space are available for the higher commander to meet and defeat an enemy threat.

(2) The armored cavalry regiment also is an economy force for employment by the higher commander. The regiment, or regiment reinforced, may be used to economize on commitment of infantry or armored divisions, or parts thereof. The employment of the regiment on supplementary missions will permit concentration of mass, economy of force, and rest and rehabilitation on the part of major components of the force.

b. Methods. The methods of employment of the regiment in reconnaissance vary with each situation depending upon the character of the terrain, road net, and enemy opposition and require a high degree of flexibility in the operation of the unit. Initially, only such part of the regiment is deployed as may be necessary to fan out to the front and flanks over the roads, while the remainder of the regiment is kept in reserve.

c. Frontages. Frontages suitable for the regiment and its elements vary widely depending upon enemy resistance, terrain and weather, road net, and the mission and movements of the main force. The density of coverage and the effective rate of advance is in inverse proportion to the width of the front or flank assigned. The effectiveness of the opposition which the regiment can place in front of an enemy force decreases as the front or flank increases. Responsibility for more than four to six primary axes of advance or enemy approach reduces the capabilities of the regiment to that of an information gathering and warning service.

d. Missions in contact. Once contact has been firmly established and the battle joined, reconnaissance agencies are employed on missions complementing that of the major command. Security missions may include—

(1) Protection of one or both flanks.
(2) Filling a gap between major elements.
(3) Liaison and contact between major units.
(4) Support or reserve element.
(5) Security of rear areas, axes, and installations.
(6) Escort duties.

The armored cavalry regiment may be assigned a primary zone or axis of attack, a pursuit mission, or a sector for defense or delay. Its capacity to perform these operations is limited by its strength and equipment. It is especially capable of primary combat tasks in which mobility and dispersion over wide areas are inherent.

e. Reinforcements. When the mission assigned to the armored cavalry regiment separates it by time or space from immediate support of other forces, it may be necessary to provide reinforcements. Whenever the primary combat task indicates the requirement for support not organic to the unit, it should be reinforced. Such reinforcements may include any or all of the following:

(1) Artillery (direct support or attached).
(2) Engineers.
(3) Medium or heavy tanks.
(4) Infantry (armored or motorized).
(5) Service support elements.

121. RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION. The use of reconnaissance aviation to augment and supplement the reconnaissance activity of the corps armored cavalry regiment is mandatory. Periodic reconnaissance missions over the area in which the regiment is operating are integrated into the air-ground plan, and provisions are made for the regiment to intercept the radio transmissions of the aircraft in flight. If sufficient aircraft are available it frequently is desirable to have continuous daylight coverage of the reconnoitered area by high performance combat aviation. Full use also is made of liaison type aircraft organic to the corps armored cavalry regiment and other elements of the corps.

122. DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE UNITS. The operations of division reconnaissance companies must be coordinated carefully with those of the corps armored cavalry regiment when both are working in the same area. Division units execute supplementary reconnaissance necessary to secure accurate information of routes and terrain features not covered by the corps armored cavalry regiment and to detect and prevent hostile infiltration.

123. ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE UNITS. When other forces such as an armored division are present, it is necessary that these units and the corps armored cavalry regiment each understand the missions, locations, and actions of the others at all times. The corps or higher commander, through the intelligence and operations sections of his staff, coordinates the work of these units and insures liaison and communication between them.
CHAPTER 7
SPECIAL FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

24. SCOPE. During the course of a campaign, special situations occur which stem from success gained in normal combat and present themselves as opportunities to exploit such success. These special situations frequently can be dealt with better by large units specially organized to give them characteristics best suited to the particular situation. The exploitation of a success has as its object the complete destruction of enemy forces which, in turn, demands that strong forces be placed in rear of the enemy main strength in order to cut lines of communications and to prevent escape. The placing of strong forces in the enemy rear can be done by two methods, rapid movement on the ground and movement by air. The two methods can and should be combined frequently. When such a maneuver is successful, it is very likely to demoralize the enemy and precipitate a complete rout, thus permitting a full scale pursuit by all forces available.

125. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES. Amphibious forces are special forces organized to conduct amphibious operations. These operations are conducted jointly by the Army, Navy, and Air Force for the purpose of effecting a successful landing on a hostile shore. Amphibious operations present many technical and tactical problems which require special organization and equipment. For further details see FM 100-5.

Section II. ARMORED-INFANTRY FORCES

126. MISSION. When a penetration of the enemy position has sufficient speed and power to create a complete break and it is possible to widen the gap thus created, a large force consisting of one or more armored divisions and one or more motorized infantry divisions is sent through the gap without delay with the mission of advancing rapidly to seize vital objectives deep in the enemy rear. It may be necessary, in some cases, for the exploiting force to assist in breaking the final crust of the enemy defenses thus freeing itself to race for its distant objectives.

127. ORGANIZATION. There are two methods of providing command for a large armored-infantry force. The use of either depends upon the size of the force and the distance in rear of the enemy it is expected to travel.
a. The penetration and exploitation may be carried out by a corps within its own boundaries as a part of a continuous mission. In such a case, the exploiting force may consist of only one armored and one motorized infantry division and it operates as the spearhead of a corps advance in which all divisions are under direct control of the corps commander concerned.

b. When the exploitation is on a larger scale involving a force of more than two divisions, the exploiting force usually is organized and commanded by its own corps commander. It then becomes necessary for the field army commander to coordinate the action of the corps creating the gap with the action of the corps organized to exploit.

128. EMPLOYMENT. a. Timing. The purpose of maneuver is to strike the flank or rear of the enemy force. It is almost always necessary, however, to penetrate first in order to create an open flank. A complete break-through and its resulting opportunity to exploit should be executed any time the commander's estimate indicates that such an action is feasible and desirable. A commander occasionally will find that he unexpectedly has broken the enemy defenses and suddenly is presented with an opportunity to exploit the penetration. In this situation, the commander must act with the utmost speed, improvising where necessary, to organize and dispatch an exploiting force.

b. Method.

(1) As in the case of any military operation, a penetration and exploitation is most likely to succeed when carefully planned as a single operation. The point or points of attack are selected in such a manner that they will open the desired routes for the exploiting force. When the attack is launched, the armor and motorized infantry are in reserve, prepared to move on order.

(2) As the attacking units deepen the penetration, the armor follows closely and, at the first indication that a break in the enemy defenses has been accomplished, begins passing through while the attacking units widen the gap. Combat power of the exploiting force should not be expended by using that force to assist in the attack to create a break. It is important that the exploiting force arrive on its final objective with the maximum possible strength. The armor, once free, advances rapidly, closely followed by the motorized infantry. Whenever possible, enemy resistance is bypassed in order to reach the final objective as early as possible and with the maximum strength. Ordinarily, intermediate objectives should not be assigned because much valuable time may be lost and combat strength needlessly expended in their capture.

(3) Close coordination between the infantry divisions and the armored divisions within a large exploiting force is of the same
major importance as that of any armor-infantry combination in smaller forces. Each component has its own capabilities and limitations and, therefore, the commander must assign each type division those missions which exploit its characteristics to the fullest and, at the same time, contribute most toward accomplishing the mission of the entire force.

(a) In general, the armor is better suited for missions involving speed, fire power, and maneuverability over firm terrain. The prime mission, therefore, of the armor in an exploitation force is to seize the final objective. The mission of motorized infantry, which complements that of the armor, is to increase the freedom of action and the speed of the armored units. This is done by keeping the line of supply open behind the armored force, by relieving armored units containing by-passed enemy centers of resistance and reducing them where necessary, and by assisting the armor in breaking enemy resistance blocking the routes to the final objective.

(b) During rapid advances against light resistance the armor leads and the motorized infantry closely follows, taking over critical points seized by the armor.

(c) Where heavy enemy resistance blocks the way to the final objective, the infantry makes the direct or holding attack acting as a base of fire around which the armored element is maneuvered in order to attack the enemy in flank or rear.

Section III. AIRBORNE AND ARLANDED FORCES

129. MISSION. Large forces may be moved to vital objectives in the enemy rear by air transport. Such forces may be employed to seize important centers of communications, to seize vital river crossings, or to seize and prevent destruction of airfields or other important installations. They may be employed as blocking force to prevent the escape of withdrawing enemy forces or to attack enemy defenses from the rear. They also may be used to establish an independent lodgement, completely supported by air supply, as a base of operations for both Army and Air Forces.

130. LIMITATIONS. Air transport restricts the movement of heavy tanks, artillery, and other heavy equipment into the target area, and thereby limits the capability of airborne and airlanded forces to protect themselves against counterattack by large armored forces. This limitation is offset to some extent by the use of light but powerful antitank weapons and by the provision of adequate air support. The mobility of the forces, once on the ground, also is limited by the lack of heavy truck transportation. The difficulties of resupply by air will sometimes limit the period of time during which the forces can be supported logistically. As long as
these limitations exist, commanders must be cognizant of them when assigning missions to airborne forces.

131. ORGANIZATION.  a. Airborne divisions normally are held in theater Army reserve initially and committed only on theater order. They usually are committed as a theater airborne task force consisting of appropriate theater Army and Air Force units.

   b. When more than one division is used on a mission, Army airborne forces should be organized as a corps or a field army with appropriate command organization.

   c. When contact is established on the ground with other friendly forces, the airborne force normally will come under the command of the appropriate commander in whose zone it is operating.

132. EMPLOYMENT.  a. Timing. Because of the limitations on airborne forces with respect to combat power and sustained effort, these forces should be employed only when the risk involved is commensurate with the probable success to be gained. This balance usually can be attained through reduction of the risk by using such forces in situations where the enemy is unlikely to have massed armor available for counterattack and where other friendly forces can effect juncture on the ground within a reasonable time.

   b. Method.

      (1) Airborne divisions are trained and equipped to land by parachute and glider in order that transporting airplanes need not land in the target area. Accordingly, in any large operation, one or more airborne divisions land first with the mission of seizing landing areas in order that airlanded infantry and supporting troops can be brought in without delay. These fields also serve as the terminal point for replenishing air supply for the operation until friendly contact is made.

      (2) Airlanded divisions and separate units are brought into landing areas seized by airborne divisions.

      (3) Operations by an airborne force normally are conducted in three phases—first, the seizing and securing of one or more airfields for the landing of reinforcements and resupply; second, the protecting of the airhead while seizing the vital objectives of the operation; and third, effecting juncture with friendly forces advancing on the ground. In the case of an independent airhead, the third phase does not apply.

Section IV. COMBINED USE OF ARMORED AND AIRBORNE FORCES

133. GENERAL. As enemy combat strength ebbs, opportunity to initiate pursuit will occur more frequently. In this situation the commander
must maintain relentless pressure in an all-out effort to destroy enemy military strength so as to prevent the preparation of new defenses and the rehabilitation of enemy forces. The cutting off and destroying of large segments of the enemy forces becomes the main objective.

134. EMPLOYMENT. a. Whenever the use of airborne forces can be combined with a penetration and exploitation by armored-infantry forces, the size of enemy forces thus trapped and destroyed can, in most cases, be increased to a considerable extent. For that reason, commanders should use this scheme of maneuver whenever the terrain and the situation permit.

b. A combined armored-airborne operation normally includes an attack to create one or more breaks in the enemy main defenses, the landing of the airborne force on the most critical area deep in the enemy rear, and the armored-infantry rapid advance to effect juncture with the forces in the airhead. Direct pressure on a broad front is exerted by all other forces until the encircled enemy is destroyed.

c. The timing of the airborne attack is of major importance. The decision as to whether it should precede, coincide with, or follow the dispatching of the exploiting armored forces through the break must be given special consideration by the commander. This decision is based upon a balancing of the risks involved to the airborne force against the probable success to be gained in each situation.
# APPENDIX

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