

FM 31-16

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

FM 31-16, 24 March 1967, is changed as follows:

Page 3, paragraph 2c. In line 3, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 3, paragraph 3. In lines 11 through 20 (last two sentences) are changed to read as follows: "For example, in jungle and mountains, emphasis may be placed on the use of footmobility; in swamps and inundated areas, on the use of watercraft; and in level terrain or desert, on the use of vehicle mobility. Airmobility of counter guerrilla units provides a distinct advantage over footmobile guerrilla forces, especially in difficult terrain, and should be exploited for troop lift, resupply, reconnaissance, and fire support."

Page 3. Paragraph 4 is superseded as follows:

4. Changes and Comments

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Infantry Agency, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and followup.

Page 5, Paragraph 6. Subparagraphs *i* and *j* are added as follows:

i. Throughout this manual, the terms regular armed, paramilitary, and irregular are used to identify the probable force structure used by guerrillas. These terms have been superseded by main, regional, and local force, respectively. For details on the guerrilla's organization see FM 31-23.

j. Throughout this manual, the terms reserve and reaction force are synonymous; however, in counter guerrilla operations, commanders enjoying a positive mobility differential normally do not retain an uncommitted reserve, but use least engaged units as reaction forces (reserves).

Page 5, paragraph 7. In line 7, "repetition" is changed to read "repetitive."

Page 7, paragraph 10. Lines 8 through 11, are changed to read "Since the essence of the counter guerrilla campaign is the control of the populace, emphasis must be placed on winning the support of the people by providing security and by conducting civil affairs activities. The situation in"

Page 8, paragraph 10b(3). In lines 4 and 5, "to press an advantage" is deleted.

Page 8, paragraph 11b. In line 1, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "insurgent wars"; and in line 6, "operations" is changed to read "tactics."

Page 8, paragraph 11c. In lines 2 and 3, "Howeve" is changed to read "However."

Page 8, paragraph 11c. Line 5, and 6, are changed to read "the people, civil affairs activities directed towards controlling the people, gaining their support, and increasing their

self-sufficiency become primary missions of the counter guerrilla forces of the host country and the United States."

Page 9, paragraph 12. In line 5, the word "stability" is changed to read "internal defense."

Page 9, paragraph 13b. In lines 2 and 3 "internal defense operations" is changed to read "insurgency situations."

Page 9, paragraph 13c. In line 3, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 9, paragraph 13e. In line 2, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 10, paragraph 17. In line 5 and 6, "defense is achieved by" is changed to read "defense is achieved is by"; and in line 13, "Counter guerrilla operations" is changed to read "A counter guerrilla operation."

Page 11, paragraph 19b. In line 1, "military" is changed to read "stability"; and in line 3, "development" is changed to read "development."

Page 11. Paragraph 19b(1) is superseded as follows:

(1) *Tactical operations* directed against guerrilla forces. Tactical operations are conducted in support of either strike or consolidation campaigns. Strike campaigns are primarily offensive operations, characterized by brevity, which are conducted in an assigned area of operations, to find, fix, destroy, and capture the guerrilla. Consolidation campaigns are primarily defensive operations, characterized by long duration, which are conducted in an assigned area of responsibility, to provide a secure area in which positive effort can be devoted to internal development.

Page 11. Paragraph 19b(4) is superseded as follows:

(4) *Civil affairs operations.* Any project or activity of U.S. forces involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment or designed to influence or control civilian activities and civil organizations can be classified as a civil affairs operation, unless the activity is being conducted solely or primarily for intelligence purposes. Intelligence operations must, however, be conducted in a manner compatible with the overall goals of the internal defense and internal development programs, to include

especially civil affairs aspects. In counter guerrilla operations, control of the civilian populace and denial of material resources to the guerrilla along with gaining the support, loyalty, and respect of the people are major concerns of the force commander. These civil affairs functions are achieved by the force commander primarily through populace and resources control and military civic action. Military civic action has proven effective in gaining civilian support for military operations and isolating the guerrillas physically and psychologically from the civilian support without which the guerrillas cannot exist. The military civic action program can encompass everything from a soldier imparting his particular skill or knowledge to a civilian (in order to help the civilian solve a problem or better his condition) to the entire unit providing security for crop harvest and aid in projects that contribute to social and economic improvement of the local civil government or population.

Page 12. Paragraph designation "19b(4)(a)" is changed to read "19b(5)."

Page 12. Paragraph (19b(4)(b) is rescinded.

Page 12. Paragraph 19b(6) is added as follows:

(6) *Advisory assistance.* Advisory assistance programs include assistance of host country military, paramilitary, and police forces by furnishing advice on organization, training, doctrine, operations, and materiel. In addition, it may include providing and controlling U.S. combat support and combat service support for host country military forces.

Page 15, paragraph 27. In lines 9 and 10 "terrain to insure" is changed to read "terrain and susceptibility of local vegetation and foliage to available herbicides to insure".

Page 18, paragraph 33. In lines 6 and 7, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 18, paragraph 33a(3). Line 9, the following is added "In this regard, early consideration must be given to an effective herbicide program."

Page 20. Paragraph 34 is superseded as follows:

34. General

This chapter provides general guidance on typical insurgent or resistance organizations and focuses on their military forces as opposed to their cadres and political organizations.

Page 22. Paragraph 39 is superseded as follows:

39. Organization

Guerrilla forces may vary from groups of squad and platoon size to units of division size or larger with extensive support organizations including elements for combat, intelligence, counterintelligence, political, and logistic support. Guerrilla forces may be organized in three principal types of forces: main and regional forces and local forces. The distinction between these forces is based on differences in organization, training, weapons, equipment, and mission.

a. Guerrilla main force units are only employed militarily when there is maximum chance for success. They usually operate for given periods of time in various regions, moving from region to region according to operational requirements and the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations. These main force units possess the best available equipment, weapons (including mortars and artillery), and uniforms, and are used primarily against the counterinsurgency regular armed forces. Guerrilla main force units usually are well organized (into regimental-size units or larger), well trained, and well led. They operate in close conjunction with the paramilitary and irregular guerrilla forces. Fillers for the guerrilla regular forces usually are selected from the best of the guerrilla regional force troops. Sponsoring powers may provide elements of their armed forces as advisors or to reinforce guerrilla regular forces.

b. Guerrilla regional force units are less well organized, trained, and equipped than the regular forces. They may be organized into platoons, companies, battalions, and at times, regiments (or equivalent organizations). Guerrilla regional forces launch limited attacks, harass installations and troops, and ambush counterinsurgency force reinforcements. Normally they are assigned to a specific area of operation

(e.g., state (province) or country (district)) and do not normally move from that area for conduct of operations elsewhere. Fillers for regional forces usually are obtained from guerrilla irregular forces.

c. Guerrilla local forces are auxiliaries responsible for collecting intelligence information, building bases, fortifying villages, acting as scouts or porters for the guerrilla main and regional forces, and providing security for insurgent officials at the local level. Members of local forces receive limited military training but receive extensive political indoctrination. They normally retain their civilian occupations and function as combatants on a part-time basis in delaying and harassing the counterinsurgency force. These limited military activities may include sniping and employment of improvised antipersonnel boobytraps and devices. The local forces normally do not operate in the military chain of command.

d. Sponsoring power resources, to include combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations and military organizers and advisors, and civilian political, economic, and psychological organizers and advisors may be provided to guerrilla forces to assist in organizational and operational missions and activities.

Page 25, paragraph 40f. In line 10, after the word "battle" the following sentence is added "Occasionally, guerrilla units may occupy and defend a population center to gain some advantage, usually political."

Page 26, paragraph 40f (3). In line 7, "regular forces" is changed to read "main force units," and to the end of the paragraph the following sentence is added "Main force units will frequently defend until dark before attempting to exfiltrate the contact area."

Page 28, paragraph 48. In line 12 the following sentence is added "In any event, the base area complexes will become meaningful targets for attack by U.S. and host country forces."

Page 29, paragraph 49. In line 4, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations."

Page 29, paragraph 50. In lines 4 and 5, "in internal defense and development" is changed to read "during stability operations."

Page 29, paragraph 51b. In line 10, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 29, paragraph 51d. In lines 4 and 5, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations"; and in lines 15 and 16, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 31, paragraph 52. In line 3, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations."

Page 31, paragraph 52a. In line 7, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 31, paragraph 52b. In line 3 "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 31, paragraph 52e. Subparagraphs (6) and (7) are superseded as follows:

(6) Integration of Civil Affairs in all aspects of planning to include:

(a) Detailed planning and coordination of activities with civilian officials.

(b) Incorporating and monitoring civilian assistance in the operational plan by preparing and executing integrated civil affairs plans that embrace military civic action, populace and resources control, and psychological operations.

(7) Organizing and training, through advisory assistance, paramilitary and police forces for local defense, and insuring continuous support for these forces.

Page 32. Paragraph 52f is superseded as follows:

f. Subordinate commanders are allowed maximum flexibility in the execution of their assigned missions but should be assigned specific responsibilities and given sufficient guidance to insure a coordinated effort. The nature of guerrilla is such that, on occasion, plans for counter-guerrilla operations must be changed instantly to take advantage of opportunities to employ brigade resources against elusive guerrilla forces.

Page 32, paragraph 53. In line 2, "indicate" is changed to read "dicate"; and in line 16, "may" is changed to read "will."

Page 32, paragraph 53a. In lines 3 and 4, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "internal defense and internal development."

Page 32, paragraph 53d. In line 3, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "internal defense and internal development."

Page 34, paragraph 55. In line 2, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations."

Page 34, paragraph 55e. In line 1, "Military civic action" is changed to read "Civil affairs operations."

Page 35, paragraph 56a. In lines 21 and 22, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations."

Page 36, paragraph 58a. Line 1, is changed to read "a. Guerrilla forces and base areas are the targets, not the "; and in lines 6 and 7, "guerrilla rather than" is changed to read "guerrilla and his bases rather than".

Page 36. Paragraph 58e is superseded as follows:

e. Large-scale reconnaissance-in-force operations should be conducted when sufficient counter-guerrilla forces are available, if other forms of intelligence operations have failed to provide targets for attack. Reconnaissance-in-force operations can be conducted in all types of tactical operations (para 114).

Page 36. Paragraph 59a is superseded as follows:

a. Once a guerrilla force has been located, all available combat power, with emphasis on artillery, tactical air, Army aviation fires, and naval gunfire, is applied in order to destroy it. Normally, such operations require that the brigade force be larger than the guerrilla force; but if the brigade force is numerically inferior the difference in combat power can often be overcome with additional firepower. The encirclement may offer the greatest possibility of

fixing the guerrilla force and achieving decisive results, provided the following conditions exist:

(1) Reliable intelligence on location of guerrilla elements.

(2) Troops are emplaced rapidly to maximize surprise.

(3) An effective counterintelligence system insures security of plans and movement.

(4) Sufficient troops are utilized to achieve an effective encirclement.

(5) Ample time is taken to search adequately the encircled area.

(6) Plans are made to offset the advantages which darkness affords the encircled guerrillas.

Page 38, paragraph 64. In line 17, the following is added "in this regard, consideration should be given to the employment of riot control munitions details of which are in FM 3-10 and TC 3-16."

Page 38, paragraph 64a(2). In line 7, "their logistical" is changed to read "their total logistical."

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(3)(e) is superseded as follows:

(e) Maintenance of highly mobile all-weather, around-the-clock reaction forces to reinforce or relieve engaged units.

Page 38, paragraph 64a(4). In line 2, "strike" is changed to read "tactical".

Page 38, paragraph 64a(5). In lines 3 and 4 "consolidation operations designed to" is changed to read "consolidation campaigns assigned to."

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(6)(d) is superseded as follows:

(d) Providing reaction forces.

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(7) is added as follows:

(7) In areas where guerrilla forces have established base areas, the U.S. brigade commander should consider requesting aerial defoliation of these areas in order to improve vertical and horizontal visibility in these areas and to deny the guerrilla the natural cover and concealment afforded by the dense growth in jungle areas. If this dense growth can be defol-

iated, the guerrilla will suffer from the elimination of his natural concealment and he may then be pursued by friendly forces and destroyed by aerial and/or ground weapons.

Page 39. Paragraph 65a(5) is added as follows:

(5) Types of vegetation and susceptibility to available herbicides.

Page 40. Paragraph 65c(10)(b) is superseded as follows:

(b) Availability of arms, ammunition, demolition, medicines, CBR protective equipment and other supplies.

Page 40, paragraph 65e. Line 1 is changed to read:

e. Civil Affairs Operations.

Page 40. Paragraph 68a is superseded as follows:

a. Tactical operations which may support:

(1) Strike campaigns.

(2) Consolidation campaigns.

Page 41. Paragraph 68e is superseded as follows:

e. Civil Affairs Operations.

Page 41, paragraph 69b. In line 14, a new sentence is added as follows: "Consideration should be given to the integration of indigenous personnel in maneuver units to provide specialized knowledge of the area, the enemy, and the population."

Page 41, paragraph 70a. In lines 10 and 11, "control attached host" is changed to read "control, or coordinate, when authorized by national agreement, combined operations with host."

Page 41. Paragraph 70a(1) title is changed to read *Support operations.*

Page 42. In figure 6, in list of augmentations is added "Chemical," "Indigenous Personnel (Interpreters, Guides, Defectors, etc.)," and "Combat Tracker Teams."

Page 43. In figure 7, in list of augmentations is added "Chemical," "Indigenous Personnel (Interpreters, Guides, Defectors, etc.)," and "Combat Tracker Teams."

Page 44, paragraph 76b. In line 12, "augmentation to" is changed to read "increased authorization in."

Page 45. Paragraph 78 is superseded as follows:

78. Special Forces

a. U.S. Army Special Forces are trained in both unconventional warfare and stability operations and may be employed under the direction or operational control of a unified command, another U.S. Army unit, a military mission, a MAAG or a MAC. The Special Forces group, augmented as required with civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, medical, military police, signal, engineer, and Army Security Agency elements is responsive to the advisory assistance needs of the host country's armed, paramilitary and irregular forces, as well as to governmental agencies and officials. Close coordination and exchange of information between Special Forces elements and U.S. conventional forces is essential.

b. Special Forces units, augmented as required, possess the following specific capabilities:

(1) See FM 31-21 and FM 31-21A.

(2) Provide planning, training and operational advice and assistance, including the management or supervision of fiscal and logistical support, as appropriate to:

(a) Host country Special Forces type units operating in areas dominated or controlled by insurgents.

(b) Host country armed paramilitary, or irregular forces engaged in remote area operations.

(c) Selected forces assigned to specialized missions such as raids or long-range patrol operations.

(d) Host country province and district level leaders and to paramilitary or irregular forces under their direction.

(3) To provide temporary support, in the absence of U.S. conventional units, to small MAAGs, military groups, or missions in the following:

(a) Advisory assistance to host country armed and paramilitary forces.

(b) Training or training assistance to host country ranger, airborne or Special Forces type units.

(4) Provides teams for operations or training assistance in civil affairs activities of host country armed forces which are engaged in internal development programs designed to prevent insurgency.

(5) To establish an operational evasion and escape system in hostile areas.

c. Special Forces tables of organization and equipment are designed to satisfy the requirements of unconventional warfare. Prolonged employment in stability operations may require equipment and personnel in addition to that normally authorized.

Page 45. Paragraph 79 title is changed to read **MILITARY DOGHANDLER TEAMS.**

Page 45. Paragraph 79, line 1, is changed to read "Scout, sentry, and tracker dogs have value in" and subparagraphs c, d, and e, are added as follows:

c. Combat tracker teams (CTT) composed of tracker dogs and visual trackers are provided by increased authorization to TOE of combat brigade elements. These teams are employed in interpreting signs left by the enemy and in tracking him. The primary function of the CTT is to investigate areas of suspected enemy activity, follow retreating enemy groups, and reestablish contact with the enemy. This requires the use of highly developed skills by both the tracker dog and the visual tracker. (See FM 20-20 for tracking techniques.)

(1) The tracker dog has an advantage over the visual tracker in that the dog usually can track faster and can track at night. The tracker dog can also follow a track that does not leave a visible sign.

(2) A visual tracker is an expert at observing and interpreting the signs that men have left when they pass over terrain and through vegetation. He is able to provide detailed information about persons being tracked. For example, a well experienced visual tracker is able to tell the sex of the people making the track and the type of weapons that they are carrying, information on the size of the group, direction and speed of movement, morale and condition of the enemy being tracked, and recency of track.

(3) When these two capabilities are combined into a working team the result is a valu-

able reconnaissance capability for maneuvering infantry elements.

d. The organization of U.S. Army combat tracker team elements follows the lines of the combat force it supports. All men in the team are cross-trained in visual tracking to provide the team with extra capabilities. For a CTT to be effective in the operational environment, all members must be highly trained in tracking, fieldcraft, and weaponry. Another factor that contributes to their effectiveness is mobility. All team members are lightly equipped; readily transportable by air, road, or on foot; and able to remain in the field for 48 hours without resupply. When the teams can be resupplied regularly, they can remain in the field for an indefinite period of time, except the tracker dogs, which should be relieved every 48 hours. The same principles of integrated operations as employed with scout dog teams are applicable.

e. Generally speaking, the CTT has three limitations which influence its effectiveness. First, the team is unable to track through heavy jungle at night, although with sufficient moonlight some tracking tasks can be performed through ground cover that consists of grass or low shrubs. Second, visual trackers and dogs often find it difficult to follow a track that has been subjected to heavy tropical rainfall. Third, it is difficult to follow a track that is more than 24 hours old. Subject to these limitations, combat tracker teams can perform a number of missions, including:

(1) Follow a retreating enemy and reestablish contact.

(2) Follow local enemy to villages or homes.

(3) Follow and recover U.S. personnel captured by the enemy.

(4) Follow and recover U.S. Army patrols or individuals who are lost or separated from their units.

(5) Backtrack captured personnel to determine where they have been and where they hid any supplies or equipment they may have had.

Page 47. Paragraph 88.1 is added as follows:

88.1. Chemical

Missions, concepts, organization, and operations of a chemical nature are discussed in chapter 9 and in the 3-series manuals.

Page 49. Paragraph 94a is superseded as follows:

a. This chapter provides guidance on the missions, concepts and organization of the brigade in conducting counter guerrilla tactical operations. Its scope includes the operational environment, the forces required, and the types of counter guerrilla tactical operations, and the combat support required for each type.

Page 49, paragraph 96b. In lines 8 and 9, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 49. Paragraph 96.1 is added as follows:

96.1. Security

a. The commander is responsible for providing continuous, allround security for his unit and other forces as well as installations in the area for which he has been assigned responsibility. He must accomplish appropriate actions to guard against subversion, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and tactical surprise. Security measures insure freedom of maneuver in response to an enemy threat.

b. The commander provides for his security by coordinating all available security elements to:

(1) Provide timely and accurate warning of enemy movement into and within the area for which he has been assigned responsibility.

(2) Provide time and space for maneuver of his forces in reaction to enemy threats.

(3) Orient on installations, lines of communication, and units in his area of responsibility that are known or suspected enemy targets.

(4) Provide or coordinate protection of all fire bases, logistical installations, and lines of communication.

(5) Insure that reaction forces are provided and fires are coordinated for use in the event of enemy attack or other action.

(6) Provide for a counterreconnaissance screen and coordinate counterintelligence activities to insure detection and denial of enemy espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and provide deception for his own operations.

(7) Destroy or neutralize enemy threats by appropriate action to include coordinated attack and application of all available firepower.

Page 50, paragraph 98. In lines 5 and 6, "larger reserves will be maintained" is changed to read "a larger reaction force must be available."

Page 50, paragraph 98a. In line 7 after the word "force" the following sentence is added "However, to prevent entire units from becoming immobilized by the fires of guerrilla forces, every effort should be made to gain contact, using minimum forces, followed by maximum employment of maneuver forces and supporting fires to block possible routes of withdrawal or reinforcement and to destroy the enemy force."

Page 50. Paragraph 98b is superseded as follows:

b. Since terrain, organized fires, and maneuver are used by guerrilla forces to seize and hold the initiative and not terrain for itself, maneuvers such as envelopments, penetrations, and turning movements may not produce the same effects on guerrilla forces as they would on field army-type tactical forces. Caches, and other sources of supplies may be so dispersed that guerrilla units are not dependent on a few critical logistical bases which they must protect. Under these conditions, a turning movement, for example, launched by counter guerrilla forces to cause the guerrilla force to react to protect a base, may produce movements in entirely different directions than those anticipated.

Page 51. Paragraph 99 is redesignated "99a"; and subparagraph b is added as follows:

b. Heavily fortified guerrilla defenses in dense jungle are often so well concealed that their presence is not known until physically encountered at close range. In this situation, use will not have been made of preparatory fires to soften enemy defensive positions. The use of

massive supporting fires at this time usually is necessary to defeat the guerrilla and destroy his position without suffering undue friendly casualties. Once such defenses are encountered, the commander may have to adjust his forward disposition while maintaining contact, in order to permit extensive employment of supporting fires. Simultaneously, additional maneuver forces are committed and supporting fires are used to block the enemy's possible routes of withdrawal. When the preparatory fires have been completed, forces are maneuvered to defeat him in detail.

Page 51, paragraph 100. The following sentence is added after line 16. "This employment of armor is often decisive in engagements with dug-in enemy forces."

Page 51, paragraph 100a. In line 7, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 51, paragraph 101. In line 4, "Attack and pursuit are" is changed to read "Attack, pursuit, and reaction are."

Page 51, paragraph 101a. In line 6, "mounted" is changed to "mechanized."

Page 51, paragraph 101b. In line 1, "carriers where possible" is changed to read "carriers and mechanized flamethrowers where possible", and in line 3, "mobility advantage" is changed to read "mobility and firepower advantage".

Page 52, paragraph 104. In line 1, "carriers as part of" is changed to read "carriers, and mechanized flamethrowers as part of."

Page 52, paragraph 105. Line 21, the following sentence is added: Because of its organization and lack of heavy organic weapons, airmobile infantry relies heavily on supporting firepower to overcome a dug-in enemy.

Page 52, paragraph 105c. Line 9, the following sentence is added: Airmobile forces are ideally suited to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations.

Page 54, paragraph 107. In lines 5 and 6, the text in parentheses is deleted; and in lines 11 and 12, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 54, paragraph 109. In line 3, "located" is deleted; and in line 12, "usually entails" is changed to read "may entail."

Page 55, paragraph 110. In line 2, "either" is changed to read "ideally"; and in lines 3 and 4, "preferably" is deleted.

Page 55, paragraph 111b. In line 6, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction forces)."

Page 57. Paragraph 111g is superseded as follows:

g. Separation of tactical units from parent headquarters is normal in counter guerrilla operations, but they must operate as part of a well-coordinated plan and be prepared to concentrate rapidly. Objectives normally are not oriented on terrain, but rather on destroying guerrilla forces and bases. Once guerrilla forces have been located, priority of all available combat power is given to operations to destroy or incapacitate the guerrilla. Destruction missions normally require a counter guerrilla force larger than the located guerrilla force. Reserves (reaction forces)—normally the main destruction units—immediately apply sufficient combat power to engage and destroy guerrilla forces before the guerrilla forces disperse. The use of airmobile and airborne forces is emphasized for the conduct of strike operations. The use of chemical munitions to disorganize and incapacitate a guerrilla force will enable the counter guerrilla force to attain its objective with minimum firepower and casualties. After a successful attack on guerrilla forces, the area is thoroughly searched for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, and documents.

Page 58. Figure 10 is changed as follows: The night patrol route (dotted black line) indicated as leaving the patrol base from the six o'clock position and returning to the base at the five o'clock position is changed to indicate the reverse, that the patrol leaves from the five o'clock position and returns at the six o'clock position.

Page 58, paragraph 112. Line 6 is changed to read as follows: "capture the guerrillas. When maneuver elements encounter a strongly fortified position in the jungle and are unable to reduce the position by employment of organic

weapons and maneuver, the commander may have to reposition his forward elements while still maintaining contact to permit maximum utilization of tactical air and artillery fires. The guerrillas' ability."

Page 59. Paragraph 114 is superseded as follows:

114. Reconnaissance Operations

a. This paragraph provides general guidance on the conduct of reconnaissance operations during counter guerrilla operations.

b. Reconnaissance is the directed effort to collect information of the enemy and the area of operations by ground and air activities. The purpose of reconnaissance is to obtain combat information of the enemy and the area of operations for the production of combat intelligence. The combat intelligence produced is used in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

c. Reconnaissance and security complement each other and cannot be readily separated. Effective ground and air reconnaissance provides a certain amount of security, and a security force provides information of the enemy and the area of operations.

114.1. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance Operations

Reconnaissance operations vary with the situation and conditions vary with the situation and conditions in the area and with the assigned missions, size, type, and composition of the reconnaissance units. Ground combat reconnaissance operations are performed in conformance with the following five fundamentals.

a. *Orient on the Location or Movement of the Intelligence Targets.* Units performing reconnaissance must maneuver according to the location or movement of the intelligence target rather than the location or movement of friendly forces. The target may be enemy troops, a terrain feature, or a locality. To perform the operation, commanders of units conducting reconnaissance must be allowed maximum freedom of action.

b. *Report All Information Accurately.* Reconnaissance is conducted to obtain information to

be used in the production of combat intelligence. To be of value to the commander, this information must be timely and accurate. All members of units conducting reconnaissance missions must report all positive and negative information rapidly and accurately to the next higher headquarters. When considered in conjunction with information from other sources, information that is unimportant to one level of command may be extremely valuable to the next higher commander. The use of a brief reconnaissance spot report form facilitates the rapid transmission of essential information. A unit performing reconnaissance has not fully accomplished its mission until it has reported all information gathered to the next higher headquarters.

c. Avoid Decisive Engagement. Except in a reconnaissance in force where the mission is to engage the enemy, units performing reconnaissance obtain information by stealth whenever possible, but fight when necessary to gain the desired information. The reconnaissance mission must not be jeopardized by combat with the enemy when combat is not essential to obtain the information desired.

d. Maintain Contact with the Enemy. In the performance of a reconnaissance mission to obtain information of an enemy force, contact with the enemy is gained as soon as possible. Once contact has been made, it is maintained and is not voluntarily broken without authority from higher headquarters. Contact can be maintained by ground and/or air observation.

e. Develop the Situation. When contact with the enemy is made, or an obstacle is encountered, the situation must be developed quickly and a decision made regarding subsequent operations. In the case of enemy contact, the following actions, known as actions on contact, are taken:

(1) *Deploy and report.* Units move immediately to positions from which they can fire, observe, or be employed against the enemy. The commander immediately reports the enemy contact to higher headquarters in as much detail as possible.

(2) *Reconnoiter.* The enemy's location, strength, composition, and disposition are determined, with a special effort to determine the

flanks of his position. Patrols, whether mounted or dismounted, are supported by fire and by other elements of the unit.

(3) *Choose a course of action.* After reconnoitering the enemy position to gains as much information as he can, the commander must choose a course of action appropriate to the immediate situation as well as to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. A decision to attack, bypass, or contain the enemy must be made as quickly as the reconnaissance will permit. In counter guerrilla operations, enemy units are rarely bypassed.

(4) *Report.* After developing the situation, the commander gives a report to his higher headquarters. This report includes the additional enemy information gained by the reconnaissance and the decision as to what course of action the commander plans to follow.

114.2. Types of Reconnaissance Missions

There are three types of reconnaissance missions: route, zone, and area. The type to be employed is determined after considering the information desired, where the information is to be sought, the known enemy situation, terrain, size of the reconnaissance force, and the time available for obtaining the information.

a. Route Reconnaissance

(1) Route reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain information of the route, obstacles, and enemy along a specific route, and the terrain adjacent to the route which, if occupied by the enemy, would affect movement along the route.

(2) Route reconnaissance may be assigned to obtain information of a specific route or of an enemy force moving generally along a specific route. When intelligence indicates that the enemy is moving on one or more routes, or when terrain features canalize his advance, these routes may be reconnoitered to obtain enemy information. Routes of advance of friendly forces may be reconnoitered when specific information of a route or series of routes is required.

(3) The technique employed and the requirements of a route reconnaissance are less time-consuming and normally can be performed more rapidly than zone or area reconnaissance.

b. Zone Reconnaissance.

(1) Zone reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of all routes, terrain, and enemy forces in a zone defined by boundaries.

(2) When the enemy's location is in doubt, or when it is desired to locate suitable routes or determine cross-country trafficability in a zone, a zone reconnaissance may be directed. The width of the zone assigned to subordinate units is determined by the pattern of the road net, terrain features, type of information desired, anticipated enemy action, troops available, weather, visibility, and time available to accomplish the mission.

c. Area Reconnaissance.

(1) Area reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of all routes, terrain, and enemy forces within a clearly defined area.

(2) The area may be reconnoitered for possible enemy or to determine its suitability as an assembly area or for other uses by friendly forces. The area to be reconnoitered must be clearly delineated. The unit assigned the mission moves directly to the area and conducts the reconnaissance employing the same techniques as in a zone reconnaissance.

114.3. Reconnaissance in Force

a. General. Reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation to discover and test the enemy's positions, locations, and strength, and to gather information. In counter guerrilla operations, its objective is collection of information of the enemy and the destruction of his units and facilities. The commander must be prepared to exploit meeting engagements and meaningful intelligence to achieve tactical success by conducting a coordinated attack to destroy discovered enemy units and facilities, or take additional security measures if required. The committed force may conduct the operation as a unit, or only selected subordinate units may be committed on a limited scale.

b. Basic Considerations.

(1) Reconnaissance-in-force operations normally develop enemy information more rapidly and in more detail than do other reconnaissance methods; therefore, when firm intelli-

gence is lacking, the principal effort of the committed unit may be a widespread and continuous reconnaissance-in-force operation coupled with mandatory security missions. In arriving at a decision to reconnoiter in force, the commander considers:

(a) His overall mission.

(b) His knowledge of the enemy situation.

(c) The urgency and importance of other information.

(d) The efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection agencies.

(e) The possibility that the reconnaissance may lead to a general engagement under favorable conditions.

(f) The continuing requirements for local and area security.

(g) The availability of adequate reserves (reaction forces) and the resources to deliver them quickly to the area to be exploited.

(h) The availability of adequate, all-weather fire support means.

(2) The ground maneuver elements conducting the reconnaissance in force should have mobility at least equal to that of the enemy. Reserves (reaction forces) must have a mobility differential or capability that permits them to quickly exploit enemy weaknesses and influence the action.

(3) The size of the subordinate reconnaissance units depends on the mission, the size of the area being investigated, combat power available, the ability to quickly commit reserves (reaction forces), and the enemy's strength.

c. Area Reconnaissance in Force. An area reconnaissance in force is an offensive action designed to develop enemy information rapidly within a specific area, and it is only conducted when available intelligence is not adequate to support operations with more specific objectives. These operations are not executed without benefit of intelligence about the enemy forces suspected of being within the area of operations. However, these operations are conducted only in the most likely areas in which guerrilla elements or installations should be found based on the best intelligence available. All available intelligence and the commander's estimate of the commander of the probable loca-

tions and activities of the enemy are utilized in planning area reconnaissance-in-force operations.

(1) *Concept.*

(a) In an area reconnaissance in force, commanders—especially small-unit commanders—may have restrictions placed on them to avoid decisive engagement. The ground maneuver element gains contact through aggressive patrolling by small reconnaissance elements, thereby exposing minimum forces to surprise attack or ambush.

(b) The commander exploits contacts gained by the reconnaissance in force by destroying the enemy unit engaged and his facilities when possible. Those facilities not destroyed by artillery or other fire support means are destroyed during the local exploitation using demolition teams when appropriate. Commanders must be prepared to extract the friendly unit if decisive engagement is unfavorable at that time.

(c) The destruction of large enemy forces, usually employed in prepared fortifications, is accomplished by a coordinated attack of the enemy's position with appropriate forces supported by all available combat power including artillery, tactical air, naval gunfire, Army aviation fires, and armor. During the conduct of the attack, possible escape routes are put under surveillance or blocked by maneuver elements, artillery fires, naval gunfire, or the use of chemical munitions. The actual attack force which in many cases is smaller than the defending enemy unit, should not execute the ground attack until the enemy unit and his defensive position have been neutralized to the degree possible by the massed firepower. When entering the enemy's position, the infantry close with the remaining enemy and destroy or capture them, conduct a thorough search for materiel, and destroy the positions prior to extraction or continuation of the operation when possible. When available, other units conduct pursuit operations and attempt to regain contact if it is lost.

(2) *Conduct.*

(a) In selecting the area to be reconnoitered in force, the commander directing the operation must consider the size of the assigned

area of operations (AO), the terrain and vegetation within the AO, size and location of any known or suspected enemy units within the area, the size of the force available to him to conduct the area reconnaissance in force, and the support available to accomplish the mission, to include fire support and the Army aviation elements available for transportation. There is no specified frontage for a given size force conducting a reconnaissance-in-force mission. After considering all of the above elements, the commander decides how the area will be subdivided to accomplish the mission.

(b) Any number of techniques may be used to reconnoiter an area in force; however, they generally will be variations of one basic concept. To thoroughly reconnoiter an area, it must be saturated with ground elements aggressively patrolling their assigned reconnaissance areas to locate and engage the enemy. In order to accomplish the necessary complete saturation of an area, the area must be subdivided by the controlling headquarters into subordinate unit reconnaissance areas. To the maximum extent possible, the insertion of the individual reconnaissance elements should be as nearly simultaneous as possible in order to achieve maximum surprise and mutual support. However, this saturation of an area of operations may not always be possible to the degree that is desirable. This may be due to the lack of sufficient ground units and support to adequately saturate the designated area of operations. In this situation, a variation of the technique of complete saturation of an area may be used. The number of variations, as to the initial positioning of ground units and the plan for their movement within the area, is usually limited only by the adaptability of the units. Once inserted, the units act independently in their assigned areas of responsibility until an enemy unit is located or its security is threatened. The overall objective is to locate and engage the enemy forces. Once contact has been made, maximum fires are placed on the enemy positions. The controlling headquarters directs adjacent units to occupy blocking or ambush positions along likely avenues of escape, while others are directed to converge on the target. Where superior forces are encountered, the requirement is to fix the enemy until sufficient

combat power can be massed to defeat the guerrillas. Guerrillas characteristically operate in difficult terrain which limits the capability to rapidly move ground units to the decisive point. When this occurs, all available fire support should be used to achieve the necessary massing of combat power.

114.4. Reconnaissance by Fire

a. Reconnaissance by fire is accomplished by firing on likely or suspected enemy positions in an attempt to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or firing. During reconnaissance by fire, positions being reconnoitered must be continuously observed so that any enemy movement or return fire will be definitely located.

b. Reconnaissance by fire is used when time is critical. It is made at the risk of losing surprise, but it tends to lessen the probability of moving into a well-concealed enemy position without being aware of its presence.

c. If the enemy returns the fire, the unit proceeds to develop the situation. If the fire is not returned, the unit continues on its mission. However, caution should be exercised because reconnaissance by fire may fail to draw the fire of seasoned enemy troops.

114.5. Reconnaissance by Aircraft

a. Army aircraft extend, supplement, or in some instances replace ground reconnaissance means. Commanders not having organic aircraft should request them to support their reconnaissance efforts.

b. Army aircraft normally are employed in conjunction with, and in close support of, ground reconnaissance forces. Aircraft are used to extend the reconnaissance effort by air observation, air photography, and electronic surveillance.

c. Army aircraft may be used to conduct radiological surveys and to locate routes through or around contaminated areas.

114.6. Coordination and Control During Reconnaissance Operations

a. Reconnaissance must be coordinated at all levels of command. This will insure maximum

results from the intelligence effort, prevent duplication of effort, and provide for economical use of reconnaissance forces. Coordination is accomplished primarily by assigning a specific mission to each unit conducting the reconnaissance.

b. The commander conducting the reconnaissance uses radio as the primary means of control. Phase lines, checkpoints, contact points, boundaries, routes, objectives, and time limitations are used by the commander in controlling his unit. Liaison personnel, staff officers, messengers, and aircraft are used to assist in the rapid transmission of reconnaissance instructions and reports.

114.7. Reconnaissance Instructions

Reconnaissance instructions must be complete and must include exactly what combat information is to be obtained, the time by which the information must be reported, where the information is to be sought, and when the mission is to be executed. Essential details may include:

- a. Pertinent information of the enemy and friendly troops.
- b. Plans of the higher commander.
- c. Specific information desired.
- d. Zone, area, or route to be reconnoitered.
- e. When, where, and how information is to be reported to the higher commander.
- f. Time of departure.
- g. Appropriate control measures.
- h. Action to be taken when mission is completed.

Page 59. Paragraph 115 is superseded as follows:

115. Movement to Contact

Movement to contact in counterguerrilla tactical operations is basically the same as in limited and general war operations. Night movement, clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions are emphasized. Lead elements of advancing units may move by bounds. Where terrain permits, the lead element moves from one favorable position to the next, covered by a strong base of fire in position to engage

any resistance encountered. Leading elements of the advancing strike forces gain and maintain contact with the guerrillas. Close-in supporting fires are used in conjunction with the direct fires of elements in contact to destroy the enemy. If the guerrillas withdraw, every effort will be made to retain contact. In many situations, action by committed forces and subordinate elements may develop into a series of meeting engagements. Care must be taken to avoid ambushes in movement to contact. The infantry maintains contact by aggressive frontal and flank patrolling by small security elements, thereby exposing a minimum of troops to ambush. Supporting fires are placed close-in along, and parallel to, the route of advance. When brigades move by ground to the strike area, and on subsequent unit maneuvers, tactical movements must be employed. Habitual use is made of the movement to contact and reconnaissance in force. To prevent ambush of counter guerrilla forces, to gain or reestablish contact, or to develop guerrilla force dispositions, strike operations are best accomplished by airdrop or airmobile assault. Movement by air insures surprise and avoids the inherent dangers in ground movement to contact.

Page 61. Paragraph 118 is superseded as follows:

118. Operations in Built-Up Areas

Built-up areas usually are unfavorable for guerrilla force operations. Guerrillas normally will not choose to fight in these areas; however, underground elements in cities and towns may incite organized rioting, seize portions of urban areas, erect barricades, and resist attempts of counter guerrilla forces to enter the area. They may be reinforced by main force guerrilla units. Noncombatants in the area usually are held as hostages and used as shields by guerrilla forces to deter the application of maximum combat power by counter guerrilla forces. Riot control munitions can temporarily neutralize such targets so that counter guerrilla forces can close with and capture the enemy with minimum injury to the noncombatants. Operations to counter these activities will be assisted by civilian police actions. For details of combat in fortified and built-up areas, see FM 31-50.

Page 63, paragraph 119. In line 7, "Reserves" is changed to read "Reserves (reaction forces)."

Page 63, paragraph 119a. In line 1, "Reserves" is changed to read "Reserves (reaction forces)."

Page 63. Paragraph 119b is superseded as follows:

b. Dispersal of reserves (reaction forces) provides flexibility, and locations that facilitate rapid movement to point of probable employment are occupied. In tactical operations, emphasis is placed on transporting those forces by air. Regardless of how they move, they must be positioned within supporting distances of committed forces.

Page 63. In paragraph 120, lines 5 and 6, the test in parentheses is deleted.

Page 67, paragraph 129h(2)(f). In line 1, "Mobile reserves" is changed to read "Mobile reserves (reaction forces)."

Page 68, paragraph 129i. To line 16 the following is added: "The reserves (reaction forces) must be available around the clock to relieve beleaguered posts. Herbicides may be used to defoliate and/or kill the vegetation along lines of communication for security purposes."

Page 68, paragraph 130. In lines 4 and 7, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 68, paragraph 130a. In line 4, "reserves" is changed to read "reserves (reaction forces)."

Page 68, paragraph 130b. In lines 2 and 7, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 69, paragraph 130c. In lines 3, 7, 9, and 12, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 69, paragraph 132. Line 9 is changed to read: "in counter guerrilla tactical operations. Field artillery must be capable at all times of extremely rapid and precise massing of all available fires onto a fleeting or well-fortified enemy at close ranges to friendly troops. The"

Page 71, paragraph 132d(5). In line 8, "105-mm howitzer" is changed to read "105-mm and 155-mm howitzer."

Page 73, paragraph 134b(1). In line 1, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 74, paragraph 137a. Subparagraphs (2) and (8) are superseded as follows:

- (2) Armed/attack helicopter operations.
- (8) Dissemination of chemical munitions.

Page 75, paragraph 137c(1). In lines 1 and 6, "airmobile company (light)" is changed to read "assault helicopter company"; and in line 3, "of combat" is changed to read "of troops, combat."

Page 75, paragraph 137c. Subparagraphs (1.1) and (1.2) are added as follows:

(1.1) The medium helicopter company, when in support of counterguerrilla forces, provides tactical air movement of troops, combat supplies, and equipment within the brigade operational area. Capabilities of the medium helicopter company include:

- (a) Same as (1)(a) above.
- (b) Augments other troop lift capability. (Normally not used for initial assault, but provides a capability for rapid troop buildup in an airhead.)
- (c) Same as (1)(d) above.
- (d) Provides airlift for light artillery units.
- (e) Provides airlift for emergency aircraft evacuation.
- (f) Provides aerial movement of supplies and equipment within the operational area.

(1.2) The heavy helicopter company, when in support of counterguerrilla forces provides tactical air movement of combat supplies and equipment within the brigade operational area. Capabilities of the heavy helicopter company include the following:

- (a) Same as (1)(a) above.
- (b) Provides aerial movement of supplies and equipment within the operational area.
- (c) Provides airlift for mobile surgical unit.

(d) Provides airlift for light and medium artillery units.

(e) Provides airlift for heavy equipment to include engineer equipment.

(f) Provides airlift for emergency aircraft evacuation.

Page 75, paragraph 137c(3). In lines 1 and 7 "Armed" is changed to read "Armed/attack."

Page 75, paragraph 138b. In line 3 "guerrilla forces" is changed to read "guerrilla forces, especially in prepared positions."

Page 76, paragraph 141. In lines 12 and 13, "populace and resources control operations," is deleted and "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs."

Page 78. Paragraph 147a(9) is superseded as follows:

(9) Interrogator teams trained in the language of the host country, and document and materiel exploitation specialists.

Page 88. "Section V. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION" is rescinded.

Page 93. Paragraph 175e is superseded as follows:

e. Reaction forces are vital considerations in planning and coordinating movements. The guerrilla must be convinced that ambushes will inevitably produce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response by counterguerrilla supporting forces, to include airstrikes and ground pursuit. The reaction force is designated to cover the possibility of ambush. Prior to a movement, reaction force commanders and aviators must be briefed on the general area of operations, with emphasis on landing areas and known and suspected guerrilla locations, and on communications, as well as usual preoperations information. Reaction forces are designated in successive areas if the route is of sufficient length to make reaction time of a single reaction force prohibitively long.

Page 100. In Section III title, "WATERBORNE" is changed to read "RIVERINE."

Page 100, paragraph 186. In line 8 the following is added "See FM 31-75 for detailed discussion of riverine operations and see FM

31-11 and FM 31-12 for discussion of amphibious operations."

Page 100, paragraph 187. In line 11, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs."

Page 100. Paragraph 188 is superseded as follows:

188. Concept

The brigade may participate in riverine operations along with host country regular armed forces (particularly naval forces), paramilitary forces, and U.S. naval forces.

Page 101, paragraph 190a, lines 3 through 5, delete portion of first sentence beginning with "but should be . . . war operations."

Page 101. In paragraph 190b, line 2, "naval craft" is changed to read "watercraft."

Page 101. Paragraph 191 is superseded as follows:

191. General

This section provides general guidance on the purposes, concepts, organizations, and operations of brigade units employing riot-control munitions in counter guerrilla operations. These munitions are particularly useful where there is difficulty in pinpointing actual guerrilla locations, and where the area coverage provided by riot-control munitions would be greater than that of other available weapon systems. Nonlethal chemical munitions can be effective in areas in which the guerrilla force is intermingled with the local population and the employment of firepower such as artillery and air-delivered ordnance must be avoided. For additional information on CBR munitions, see FM 3-10, 3-12, 3-50, 21-40, and 101-40.

Page 101, paragraph 192b(1). In line 2, "deny" is changed to read "restrict use of."

Page 102, paragraph 193. In line 4, "The munition is" is changed to read "Some munitions are"

Page 102, paragraph 193a. The first sentence is changed to read:

a. Riot-control agents are used to support operations in which the counter guerrilla forces

desire to restrict the use of an area for a short period of time using nonlethal means.

Page 102. Paragraph 193b is rescinded.

Page 102, paragraph 194. The introductory text in lines 1 through 8 is superseded as follows:

Since there may not be sufficient chemical personnel available to meet requirements in counter guerrilla situations, brigade personnel must be able to handle smoke, flame, and nonlethal agents such as riot-control munitions.

Page 102. Paragraph 194a is superseded as follows:

a. Ground Units. Any size ground tactical organization can employ riot-control agents. A platoon, for example, may designate one squad as the riot-control agent squad to provide target coverage. Larger units (company and battalion) may employ the munitions against more extensive targets, particularly in conjunction with air delivery of the agent. The agent may be employed in any desired quantities to gain the desired effects on target.

Page 108. Paragraph 201a is superseded as follows:

a. The need for a counter guerrilla force to conduct search operations or to employ search procedures will be a continuous requirement in stability operations. Most search operations will support strike operations or consolidation operations, or they may be conducted as the main effort in populace and resources control operations. A search may be oriented to people, to materiel, to buildings, or to terrain. It usually will involve both civil police and military personnel.

Page 113, paragraph 204c(3)(c). In lines 1 and 3, "reserves" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 115, paragraph 209a. In lines 2 and 3, "in internal defense operations" is changed to read "during stability operations."

Page 118, paragraph 212. In line 3, "infantry, airborne" is changed to read "infantry, airmobile infantry, airborne"

Page 120, paragraph 217. In line 9, "affars" is changed to read "affairs."

Page 123, paragraph 225k. In line 7 "intelligence channels. In" is changed to read "intelligence channels and the remainder through logistical channels. In"

Page 123. Paragraph 225l is superseded as follows:

l. Destruction of Supplies and Equipment.
Destruction of supplies and equipment (less

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
*Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.*

Distribution:

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medical) may be accomplished to deny their use to the guerrilla. Under the provisions of Geneva Conventions, medical supplies will not be intentionally destroyed (FM 27-10). For information on which to base destruction plans, see FM 5-25.

Page 141. In numerical sequence, "FM 31-23, Stability Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine" is inserted as a reference.

W. C. WESTMORELAND,
*General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.*

FIELD MANUAL }
No. 31-16 }

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 24 March 1967

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

	Paragraphs	Page
PART ONE. INTRODUCTION		
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION		
Section I. General -----	1-4	3
II. Terminology -----	5-7	4
CHAPTER 2. CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS -----	8-11	7
PART TWO. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT		
CHAPTER 3. INTRODUCTION		
Section I. General -----	12, 13	9
II. Relationships of operations and activities -----	14-19	9
III. Internal defense and development forces -----	20-23	12
CHAPTER 4. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT		
Section I. General considerations of the area of operations -----	24-30	15
II. Effects of the characteristics of the area -----	31-33	17
CHAPTER 5. THE HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE		
Section I. Disposition -----	34-37	20
II. Composition -----	38, 39	21
III. Activities -----	40, 41	22
IV. Strengths -----	42-44	27
V. Peculiarities and Weaknesses -----	45-48	27
CHAPTER 6. CONCEPTS AND PLANNING		
Section I. Concepts -----	49-51	29
II. Planning -----	52-67	31
III. Brigade organization for operations -----	68-89	40
IV. Phasing deployment to the host country -----	90-98	47
CHAPTER 7. TACTICAL OPERATIONS		
Section I. Introduction -----	94-160	49
II. Strike operations -----	107-119	54
III. Consolidation operations -----	120-130	63
IV. Combat support -----	131-138	69
CHAPTER 8. RELATED OPERATIONS		
Section I. Introduction -----	139-143	76
II. Intelligence operations -----	144-148	76
III. Psychological operations -----	149-153	82
IV. Civil affairs operations -----	154-160	83
V. Military civic action -----	161-165	88
VI. Advisory assistance operations -----	166-170	90
CHAPTER 9. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES		
Section I. Movement security -----	171-181	92

* This manual supersedes FM 31-16, 19 February 1963.

	Paragraphs	Page
Section II. Border control operations	182-185	98
III. Waterborne operations	186-190	100
IV. Chemical, biological, and radiological operations	191-195	101
V. Tactical base operations	196-200	104
VI. Search operations and procedures	201-206	108
VII. Airbase/airfield defense	207-211	114
 PART THREE. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT		
CHAPTER 10. INTRODUCTION	212-216	118
11. LOGISTICS AND SERVICES		
Section I. Introduction	217-221	120
II. Supply	222-225	121
III. Maintenance	226-230	123
IV. Transportation	231-234	124
V. Medical service	235-239	126
VI. Other logistical services	240-243	128
CHAPTER 12. PERSONNEL	244-251	130
13. CIVIL AFFAIRS	252-256	133
 PART FOUR. REAR AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS		
CHAPTER 14. INTRODUCTION	257-261	136
15. BRIGADE OPERATIONS	262-266	137
APPENDIX A. REFERENCES	-----	139
B. MILITARY TRAINING	-----	142
INDEX	-----	150

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose

This manual provides guidance to commanders and staffs of brigades and subordinate units, and combat, combat support, and combat service support units in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations.

2. Scope

a. Part One introduces the subject of counter-guerrilla operations and discusses the contrasts between the operational environments of these operations in limited and general war and in stability operations.

b. Part Two discusses brigade counter-guerrilla tactical and related operations applicable to stability operations.

c. Part Three discusses combat service support aspects common to counter-guerrilla operations in both internal defense operations and in rear area security operations, differentiating where appropriate between the two operational situations.

d. Part Four discusses counter-guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war.

e. All parts are applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclear war situations.

3. Application

The doctrine prescribed in this manual ap-

plies to existing brigade organizations which may be tailored or modified to meet the requirements of counter-guerrilla operations. The principles generally have universal application; however, since the guerrilla normally conducts his operations on the most difficult terrain in an area of operations, counter-guerrilla force commanders must modify the tactics and techniques discussed in this manual to fit the particular terrain in which they must operate. For example, in jungle and mountains, emphasis must be placed on the use of footmobility; in swamps and inundated areas, on the use of watercraft; and in level terrain or desert, on the use of vehicle mobility. This manual emphasizes the use of attached or supporting aviation for troop lift, resupply, reconnaissance, and fire support in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations.

4. Changes and Comments

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve it. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text to which change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Infantry Agency, Fort Benning, Ga., 31905.

Section II. TERMINOLOGY

5. General

The terms used in this manual are based upon those defined in AR 320-5 and related publications. To the extent that these publications do not provide terminology applicable to this manual, terms found in branch and general field manuals are used. Terms which pertain to specific parts of this manual are discussed in the appropriate paragraph. The terms, applicable to counter guerrilla operations and environments, are discussed below.

a. Area coordination center—a composite area headquarters at various political/military levels in which internal defense operations are planned, coordinated, and directed. Its members include the local chiefs of military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their U.S. counterparts.

b. Area oriented—a term applied to personnel or units whose organization, mission, training, and equipping are based upon operational deployment to a specific geographical area.

c. Asset (intelligence)—includes any resource—person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role.

d. Consolidation psychological operations—psychological operations conducted toward populations in friendly areas of operations or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil population.

e. Exfiltration—the removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.

f. Penetration operation (intelligence)—the use of agents or technical monitoring devices in a target organization or installation for the purpose of gaining access to the secrets or of influencing and controlling its activities.

g. Populace and resources control—actions undertaken by a government to control the populace and its material resources or to deny

access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against that government.

h. Stability operations—The term is used in the generic sense. It can be described as the full range of Internal Defense and Development operations and assistance which the U.S. Army can employ to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which government under law can function effectively and without which progress in modernization cannot be achieved.

6. Type Forces and Operations

The following terms in addition to those in AR 320-5, describing forces and operations, are used throughout this manual and are applicable to counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development and to counter guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war:

a. Regular Armed Forces. Permanent armed forces maintained in the highest state of organization, training, and equipment readiness to perform assigned missions in peace or war.

b. Irregular Forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (Irregular forces may include organized youth groups, auxiliary political organizations and part-time, armed civilian militia.)

c. Guerrilla Operations. Tactical operations which utilize tactics characterized by surprise; brief, violent action; and elusiveness, and which may be supported entirely from resources within the operational area or in varying degrees by external sources.

d. Guerrilla Force. A combatant force employing guerrilla operations tactics. (The term is not used to indicate a type force based on organization, mission, and equipment, but only on the type tactics employed. Any type force—regular armed force, paramilitary or irregular force may be a guerrilla force when it conducts guerrilla operations.)

e. Counter guerrilla Operations. Operations and activities conducted by military forces and

nonmilitary agencies to defeat hostile forces employing guerrilla operations tactics.

f. Operation. A military action, or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.

g. Tactical Operation. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.

h. Campaign. A series of related military operations to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.

7. National Structures and Subdivisions

The following terms, describing national structures and subdivisions, are used throughout this manual and are applicable to counter-guerrilla operations in internal defense and development and to counter-guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war. To avoid repetition mention of the variances of political subdivisions between

and among nations, the structures discussed below will be used throughout this manual. The principal term used herein is given first, followed by equivalent or related terms in parentheses. The structures and their relationship are illustrated in figure 1.

a. Nation (Country, Republic, Union, Kingdom). Depending on the form of its government or the title of its leading or ruling figure or group, a *nation* may be otherwise designated as a country, republic, union, or kingdom. U.S. policy will determine the appropriate designation to be used in liaison between the U.S. and a given counterpart, with due regard for the preference of the counterpart. *Country*, although not used in the official title for a nation, applies generically to all nations.

b. Region (Zone, Territory). Most nations are divided naturally into two or more *regions* (zone, territory). Often, these regions have no formal governmental structure. They may be based on geographical land forms such as highlands, deltas, or valleys; they may be based




Figure 1. National structures and subdivisions.

on the general compass location of the area within the parent nation, such as Northwest, South, or Central; or they may be based on common religious, economic, or social ideas of the inhabitants.

c. State (Province). Most nations use formal *state* (province) type organizations as the first major subnational political subdivision. These may be purely administrative organizations, or they may be administrative and policy-making entities. State (province) organizations are usually subordinate to the regional (zone, territory) governmental structure when the regional structure exists.

d. County (District, Parish). A *county* (district, parish) is an administrative subdivision of a state (province). Counties (districts, parishes) may have certain policy-making options granted to them by the state (province); otherwise, they are administrative in nature.

e. Township (City, Village). A township

(city, village) is a subdivision of a county (district, parish), and it is administrative in nature except when specifically granted political options by the state (province). The options can rarely be granted by the parent county (district, parish). In some cases, townships serve merely as a basis for electoral districting. In figure 1, it should be noted that *village*, as used in some nations, implies an area somewhat larger than a town.

f. Town (Hamlet). This locality constitutes a population center within a township (village). It generally has formal governmental structure and may exercise considerable local options granted to it by the state (province). Within towns, further divisions may consist of *precinct, block, neighborhood, or ward*. These usually do not have formal governmental organizations and they may only serve as a basis for electoral districting or for dividing public services.

CHAPTER 2

CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

8. General

This chapter summarizes the operational differences between counter guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war and counter guerrilla operations in stability operations.

9. Limited and General War

These operational environments imply a state of open, *de facto* belligerency between nations, and a direct confrontation of their armed forces.

a. The Guerrilla Situation. In field army-type operations in limited and general war, hostile guerrillas may operate deep in the communications zone, or throughout the rear of engaged forces in the combat zone. The guerrilla forces may be composed of regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, irregular forces, or any combination of these forces. The following characteristics are typical of the guerrilla in limited and general war:

- (1) When the conventional force which he is supporting is defeated, the guerrilla normally loses his incentive to fight.
- (2) The personnel and equipment resources provided to the guerrilla in rear areas by a sponsoring power may be limited by the requirements of the sponsoring power to conduct warfare with its conventional forces.

b. The Counter guerrilla Situation. Essentially, counter guerrilla operations as part of the rear area security mission will be conducted to prevent interference with friendly operations in support of forces engaged in combat operations along the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area).

- (1) The counter guerrilla force commander may have almost complete authority over all aspects of the area of operations, particularly when operating in an occupied country.
- (2) Local political activities are normally not a major consideration affecting the activities of counter guerrilla forces.

10. Internal Defense and Development

This operational environment encompasses internal conflicts short of overt armed conflict between the regular armed forces of two or more sovereign nations. There is no recognized state of belligerency. The insurgent apparatus and the guerrilla normally operate to some degree throughout the affected nation. Since the essence of the counter guerrilla campaign is to win back the support of the people for the established government, the importance of civil affairs is paramount. The situation in the area of operations could vary widely. Under the best conditions the host government would be in firm control, and a relatively secure area as a base for U.S. counter guerrilla operations would be available. Alternatively, the guerrilla influence could predominate to such a degree that control by the host government would have been disrupted and the effect of the host government armed forces destroyed and the securing of an initial base area for U.S. forces made difficult. All counter guerrilla doctrine must be flexible to take into account varying situations.

a. The Guerrilla Situation.

- (1) The hostile guerrilla wages an ideological battle for the support of the population of a country. The guerrilla's objective in the conflict is not necessarily dependent on total defeat of the country's armed forces.

- (2) The external sponsoring power, if any, of the guerrilla may be able to provide personnel, equipment, and supplies with impunity.
- (3) The enemy of the guerrilla is the government, which may not be popularly supported by the majority of the people.

b. The Counter guerrilla Situation.

- (1) The U.S. counter guerrilla force commander does not have complete authority over all activities in his area of operations.
- (2) The host country may be limited in the resources it can expend to defeat the guerrilla force or its sponsoring power.
- (3) The major portion of available military resources within the host country may be fully committed; therefore, when major reserves are needed to press an advantage, they must be withdrawn from other operational areas and thus create situations in those areas which can be exploited by hostile guerrilla forces.
- (4) Divergent policies of political parties or economic, religious, or other organizations, while not supporting the hostile guerrilla force morally or actively, may undermine stringent government efforts to defeat the guerrilla force by seeking concessions or advantages during the period of internal conflict.

11. Comparisons of Operational Environments

a. Limited and general war military forces move amid their own systems of subsistence, law, and security largely apart from, or minimally involved with, their surroundings. In effect, they establish their own environments. Weather and terrain generally have equal in-

fluence on operations by both opposing forces. The military objectives of the two forces will usually be oriented to terrain and its occupation and defense, or to the denial of its use by the opposing force.

b. In internal defense and development, the two opposing forces are a national government and an insurgent movement within the country to overthrow that government. The military arm of the insurgent movement is the guerrilla force that employs guerrilla operations in its internal attack of the government. This guerrilla force and the counter guerrilla force organized to combat it will both move amid the populace of the country with the objective of winning their support and denying such support to the opposing side. The influence of weather and terrain on the operations of the two opposing forces will vary. Inclement weather and rugged terrain may favor the guerrilla force; fair weather and level, open terrain generally favors the counter guerrilla force.

c. In limited and general wars, civil affairs is used primarily in a supporting role. However, in internal defense operations, because of the importance of isolating the guerrillas from the people, civil affairs becomes one of the primary missions of the counter guerrilla force. This is because all internal defense operations plans must be based on an integrated civil-military approach designed to progressively reassert host government control and gain the trust, confidence, and active cooperation of the people. For this reason paragraphs 154 through 160 stress civil affairs because of its importance in internal defense operations. This must not be construed as meaning that specialist civil affairs units or personnel are requisite to the conduct of civil affairs operations. On the contrary, civil affairs operations, like intelligence operations is a command responsibility. If a commander is not provided with specialist civil affairs support, he must discharge his responsibilities with the resources available.

PART TWO
INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 3
INTRODUCTION

Section I. GENERAL

12. Purpose

The purpose of this part is to provide guidance to commanders and staffs of brigades and subordinate units, and combat, combat support, and combat service support units in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations in stability operations.

13. Scope

This part details the general doctrine promulgated in FM 61-100, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20.

a. This chapter introduces the subject of counter guerrilla operations in internal defense operations and presents general data and concepts applicable to the other chapters of this part.

b. Chapter 4 discusses the counter guerrilla operational environment in internal defense operations.

c. Chapter 5 discusses type guerrilla forces which may require brigade-size forces to combat them in internal defense operations.

d. Chapter 6 discusses military counter guerrilla concepts and planning factors.

e. Chapter 7 discusses counter guerrilla tactical operations in internal defense operations.

f. Chapter 8 summarizes the missions, concepts, organization, and operations of related counter guerrilla operations which are integrated with tactical operations.

g. Chapter 9 summarizes special operations which are of particular importance in supporting all counter guerrilla operations.

Section II. RELATIONSHIPS OF OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

14. General

This section presents a perspective from which to view the integration of U.S. brigade counter guerrilla operations with the overall internal defense and internal development of a host country.

15. Host Country/U.S. Relations

A nation becomes a *host country* when representatives or organizations of another nation are present because of governmental invitation or international agreement. The formal liaison

between a host country and the United States will normally be conducted by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission (usually an ambassador). The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body is normally the U.S. Country Team. The country team is composed of the senior members of each represented U.S. department or agency and is headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission.

16. Internal Security

a. During the course of normal national life, a host country's objectives and policies include

those which deal with preserving its *internal security*, the state of law and order within a nation, as determined by the government's capability to cope with violence, subversion, and lawlessness, and the prevailing public confidence in that capability.

b. In insuring or restoring its internal security, a host country conducts among other measures *counterintelligence*, that aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of hostile intelligence activities and to protecting information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage.

(1) In the context of counterintelligence activities, *espionage*, the clandestine or covert use of agent personnel and/or equipment in order to obtain information, is met by *counterespionage*, a category of counterintelligence, the objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.

(2) *Subversion*, which is action, principally clandestine or covert, designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength is met by *countersubversion*, that part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversion activities, through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

(3) *Sabotage*, any deliberate act undertaken by an individual, group, or organization which employs disruptive or destructive methods against critical materials, facilities, and installations for the purpose of denying or limiting their use, is met by *countersabotage*, which is action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating, and manipulating, neutralizing, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations

conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

c. The internal security of a country may be threatened by an *internal attack*, the full range of measures taken by organized insurgents to bring about the internal destruction and overthrow of a constituted government. An internal attack is countered by a combination of *internal defense* and *internal development*.

17. Internal Defense

Internal defense is the full range of measures taken by a constituted government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. One of the means by which internal defense is achieved by the conduct of *internal defense operations* which include any operation conducted by a host country or its allies—security establishment, military, paramilitary, or security organization—directly against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, external sanctuary, or outside supporting power. Counter guerrilla operations as discussed in this manual in a stability operational environment is classified as an internal defense operation. The host country capability to perform internal defense is assisted by the U.S. and other allies through *internal defense assistance operations*, which include any operation undertaken by the military, paramilitary, police, or other security agencies of an outside power to strengthen the host government politically, economically, psychosocially, or militarily.

18. Internal Development

Internal development is the strengthening of the roots, functions, and capabilities of government and the viability of the national life of a country toward the end of internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency. Internal development is achieved by the conduct of *internal development operations*, which include any direct operation undertaken by a host government or its allies to strengthen the local government politically, economically, socially, or militarily, or make more viable its national life. The host country capability to perform internal development is assisted by the U.S. and other allies through *internal development assistance operations*, which include any organized action taken by

government or nongovernment agencies of an outside power to support host government internal development efforts.

19. Related Activities in Internal Defense and Development

a. The host country activities associated with internal defense and development plans oriented primarily toward countering an internal attack may be categorized in the following actions:

- (1) *Political action*, which includes activity in political channels or the use of political power to attain specific objectives. It involves such activity as appointing officials, initiating and operating political organizations, providing political education, and enacting laws or decrees.
- (2) *Economic action*, to include the planned use of measures designed to generate economic stability within the host country and serve to improve the standard of living of the individual.
- (3) *Psychological action*, which includes political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in hostile, neutral, or friendly groups, the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.
- (4) *Civic action*, which includes the participation by an agency, organization, or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels, but for which the sponsor does not have primary governmental responsibility. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare, and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population.
- (5) *Military action*. Host country military and paramilitary action is only a part of the overall internal defense and development effort, and this ac-

tion must be in consonance with the overall effort of the host country and will normally be conducted as described in this manual for the U.S. brigade.

b. The U.S. brigade will conduct military operations in support of both the internal defense and the internal development efforts of a host country. In the conduct of counter guerrilla operations in support of internal defense and development, the brigade will concentrate its efforts toward the following:

- (1) *Tactical operations* directly against guerrilla forces. Tactical operations may be either *strike operations* or *consolidation operations*. Strike operations are primarily offensive operations, characterized by brevity, which are conducted in an assigned area of operation, to find, fix, destroy, or capture the guerrilla. Consolidation operations are primarily defensive operations, characterized by long duration, which are conducted in an assigned area of responsibility, to provide a secure area in which positive effort can be devoted to internal development.
- (2) *Intelligence operations* which will extend host country civil intelligence programs, and provide information useful in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development. Military intelligence systems will be coordinated with host country activities.
- (3) *Psychological operations*. In order to extend the civilian psychological operations campaign to the lowest levels, and to support their own activities, brigade forces will conduct psychological operations, integrated with the national psychological operations campaign.
- (4) *Civil affairs operations*. Any project or activity of the brigade forces involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment or designed to influence or control civilian activities and civil organizations can be classified as a civil affairs operation.

In counter guerrilla operations, control of the civilian population, denial of material resources along with gaining the support loyalty and respect of the people are major concerns of the force commander. These civil affairs functions are achieved by the force commander primarily through populace and resources control and military civic action. Hereafter, they will be discussed separately as the most evident manifestation of civil affairs operations in the brigade, but the two programs must always be considered with respect to the total relationship between the military force, the host government, and the people.

(a) *Populace and resources control operations.* In order to isolate guerrilla forces from both in country and sponsoring power logistical and manpower support, the brigade may be called upon to augment over-

taxed civil police and other host country forces in actions to control the populace and its resources or to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against the host country government.

(b) *Military civic action.* Military civic action has proved effective in gaining civilian support for military operations and isolating the guerrillas physically and psychologically from the civilian support without which they cannot exist. The military civic action program can encompass everything from a soldier imparting his particular skill or knowledge to civilian in order to help the civilian solve a problem or better his condition to the entire brigade providing security for crop harvest and aid in developing living needs.

Section III. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT FORCES

20. General

Internal defense and development forces comprise organizations, both civilian and military, of the host country, U.S., and allied nations which are employed to free and protect the host country society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

21. Host Country Internal Defense and Development Forces

Host country internal defense and development forces may consist of varied types or organizations: regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, irregular forces, and civilian agencies.

We took place of
→ *d. Regular Armed Forces.* Regular armed forces, composed of standard and specially trained units, may make up the largest contingent of readily available indigenous troops which can be moved at will throughout a country. These units are normally employed in the counter guerrilla role.

(1) Divisions, brigades, or regiments can be organized into a number of vari-

able sized task forces. These forces engage in reconnaissance and combat patrols, or operate in larger formations organized to strike rapidly against guerrilla forces. Regular armed forces are situated to permit rapid reaction to guerrilla attacks, or to conduct planned operations in coordination with other counter guerrilla forces. Regular armed forces also are frequently available for, and should always be considered in planning and executing, military civic action projects. The extent to which their work in military civic action is made known to the people by effective PSYOP will contribute to the degree of cooperation and amount of intelligence information received from the population for counter guerrilla tactical operations.

(2) Special units of the regular armed forces of a host country may include ranger, airmobile, and airborne units.

(a) Ranger-type units normally operate

within the military chain of command, either as companies or battalions, or in ranger task forces. Their form of combat is offensive in nature and characterized by aggressive reconnaissance patrols and combat operations aimed at the destruction of guerrilla forces by raids and ambushes, long-range patrolling, and the disruption of guerrilla lines of communication. They can provide the forces for intelligence and operational screening missions.

- (b) Airmobile troops with their assault-type helicopters are located to meet established reaction time criteria for reaching planned objective areas in the shortest possible time.
- (c) Airborne units provide troops to assault by parachute objective areas which are too distant for airmobile or other forces to respond within the required reaction time.

b. Paramilitary Forces. The organization of the paramilitary force may be similar to regular armed forces. They are frequently constituted from indigenous volunteers whose knowledge of the terrain and people is equal to that of the guerrilla. Paramilitary units are composed of armed personnel and have the primary mission of relieving the regular armed forces of security missions and local defense duties within a given political subdivision, such as a state (province). Armament for paramilitary forces will consist primarily of individual weapons, light machineguns, and light mortars. Communication equipment may be limited. Paramilitary units may be organized as squads, platoons, companies, or battalions and may be trained to perform limited tactical missions. Often, they are charged with enforcing the law and maintaining public order and security in rural areas. In their security roles, paramilitary units conduct raids, and ambushes, either alone or with irregular forces or regular armed forces. Paramilitary units may be called upon to reinforce security posts under attack or to pursue withdrawing guerrillas. Other typical tasks for which paramilitary units may be responsible are defense of towns and guarding

headquarters, bridges, key installations, and local airstrips.

c. Police Forces. Police forces, consisting of local, regional, and national security elements, normally constitute the primary populace and resources control forces of a host country. They are oriented on the population and in addition to ferreting out the insurgent underground elements they may be the only effective indigenous counterguerrilla force in a given locale. Police forces are normally charged with the responsibility of securing key governmental installations, public facilities, and preserving a state of law and order.

d. Irregular Forces. Irregular forces, or armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces or paramilitary forces, consisting of civilian political organizations, trade unions, youth groups, and others, may be mobilized, trained, and armed to supplement the regularly constituted military, paramilitary, and police forces described above. They may also be organized primarily to indoctrinate their members to support the government.

e. Civilian Agencies. Governmental and private civilian agencies, organizations, and religious welfare groups normally address problems associated with internal development. These groups may well perform immediate impact programs in areas provided troop protection for limited periods of time (strike operations) in addition to performing long-range impact programs in areas under firm and continuous governmental control (consolidation operations).

22. U.S. and Allied Internal Defense and Development Forces

U.S. and allied internal defense and development forces may consist of military advisory groups; combat, combat support, and combat service support units; governmental civilian agencies; nongovernmental assistance organizations; and religious and welfare groups. Some or all of these agencies may be performing tasks with indigenous elements in the brigade operational area. The brigade commander or senior military combat commander must coordinate all allied and U.S. activities

with similar host country organizations and activities to the extent necessary for successful brigade operations.

a. U.S. and allied civilian organizations provide funds, facilities, and personnel to assist the host country population in economic, social, political, and civic internal development, and in providing emergency relief measures.

b. U.S. and allied armed forces missions are described in subsequent chapters; however, of particular interest to brigades committed in internal defense are MAAG personnel and specialized units which may have been deployed earlier than the brigade and who know the population, operational area, and military and civilian leaders, and who have cooperated with host country regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and irregular forces in the area. These personnel and units can provide the brigade with intelligence information and identify the necessary points of contact for coordination and planning.

c. U.S. Air Force and similar allied units can assist in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations by—

- (1) Maintaining air superiority.
- (2) Preventing air delivery of supplies and equipment by a sponsoring power.
- (3) Conducting aerial resupply and other logistical functions.
- (4) Conducting close air support, interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance.
- (5) Delivering airborne and air landed forces.
- (6) Disseminating chemical agents, flame, smoke, riot-control agents, and defoliant agents on selected targets.

d. U.S. and allied naval forces can assist in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations by—

- (1) Disrupting guerrilla coastal supply channels.
- (2) Providing sea transportation, support of amphibious operations and assault craft for river and other waterborne operations.

- (3) Conducting shore bombardment, close air support, interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance.
- (4) Preventing seaward escape of guerrilla forces.
- (5) Providing seaborne supply and other logistical functions.

e. U.S. Marine forces and similar allied forces can assist in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations by conducting operations in the air and on the ground similar to those performed by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Marine forces are specially trained to conduct amphibious operations.

23. Brigade Considerations of Host Country Internal Defense Forces

Although host country military forces may not be organized along U.S. lines, the doctrine developed and tested by U.S. agencies may prove useful in many countries of the world. Chiefs of MAAG and Missions and brigade commanders should encourage the military leaders of the host country to adopt organizations similar to those which have been proven effective in dealing with guerrillas. It may often be necessary to compromise between those forces organized conventionally to deal with an external threat and the forces necessary to combat guerrillas. However, with appropriate modifications and additional training, most host country forces can perform both roles. Host country military establishments will probably not be modern. They may not have the capability to administer themselves adequately so as to operate efficiently, lacking such things as—

- a. A central personnel record system to include pay records.
- b. Regulations, training literature, and other guidance material.
- c. Standard uniforms and insignia.
- d. Adequate reporting procedures.
- e. Capability of conducting combined-arms operations.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Section I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

24. General

This chapter outlines environmental factors which must be considered in planning and conducting brigade counter guerrilla operations. It includes a general description of typical operational areas, to include economic, political, and social aspects of the areas, the military aspects of the area, and effects of the characteristics of the area on brigade operations. Department of the Army area and country studies provide details on specific areas or countries, while FM 100-20 provides additional general guidance on the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces, and which bear on the decisions of the counter guerrilla force commander.

25. Planning for Counter guerrilla Operations

Information concerning a host country which affects planning for counter guerrilla operations includes a detailed examination of the country with regard to its geography, sociology, economy, politics, and other specific fields constituting areas which may have an effect on counter guerrilla operations. The following is a general discussion of some principal factors which should be considered. It is not exhaustive in scope; rather, it is intended to illustrate the importance of considering these factors in planning for brigade counter guerrilla operations.

26. Military Considerations of the Area of Operations

Counter guerrilla operations may be required in areas which vary from mountains to plains and deltas; from deserts to jungles and rain forests; and from relatively open areas to obstacle-studded terrain. Each area has its own

peculiarities, and brigades committed in a particular area must be organized appropriately. Administrative and logistical support will be complicated by variances of terrain. Each area presents significantly different problems of supply, transportation, maintenance, medical support, and other logistical services. Similarly, personnel services, as well as the brigade personnel, must be fitted and acclimated as the operational area dictates.

27. Geography, Topography, Terrain, Climate, and Vegetation

Mild or tropical climate favors the guerrilla forces, who must depend largely on the land for subsistence, since this type of climate insures year-round vegetation and foliage for subsistence, cover, and concealment. Rigorous cold climates hamper guerrilla operations, since increased logistical support is required for operations under these conditions. The brigade must have an intimate knowledge of the terrain to insure effective counter guerrilla operations.

28. Political Considerations

a. Brigade commanders and staffs must consider the political forces which influence the operation of the society in a host country.

b. Important considerations in politics are the leaders and their motivations, ambitions, and influence. An understanding of the formal structure of the host country government and its operations is important, to include its relationship with the population, the relationships among the internal departments such as police and revenue, and the relationships each of these departments has with the population, to include those between the government services provided and the taxes levied by the government.

Equally important is a complete understanding of the informal and actual civilian power structure of the area wherever and whenever this differs from that of the formal government. In many areas, actual social controls are in the hands of religious, tribal, economic, or other nongovernmental power structures which may wield more effective influence over the local populace than does the host country government.

29. Economic Considerations

Among the economic considerations relevant to an area of operations are the types of economy (agricultural or industrial), living conditions, transportation, communications, food supply, and standard of living of the various segments of the population. The causes of unrest which lead to emergence of guerrillas almost always include, and may consist chiefly of, frustration resulting from living in backward economic environments with corresponding undeveloped national infrastructures. The following common problems are faced by host countries countering guerrillas and simultaneously trying to remove the cause of the emergence of the guerrillas.

a. Raw Material. While some developing nations are richly endowed with raw material resources, other countries have only one or two basic resources and are vulnerable to the destruction of their markets by development of synthetic substitutes, fluctuating world markets, or by rising transportation costs.

b. Agriculture. Most developing nations must rely on agricultural export for foreign exchange. Dependent on one or two crops, they are vulnerable to various weather and world market fluctuations. Antiquated agricultural technology, an expanding population, and the need to export in exchange for medicine and other necessities create problems for even potentially rich agricultural nations.

c. Industry. Few newly independent nations have modern industrial complexes. Shortages of capital, management capability, skilled labor, raw materials, power, transportation, and marketing techniques all inhibit modernization, consequently, many nations must import manufactured goods.

d. Utilities. Modernization depends on basic

utilities such as power, communications, and transportation. In developing nations, the capital required to establish utilities is usually not available. A nation countering guerrillas has committed its resources largely to the military effort; thus it has little left to underwrite improvement of the environment. Generally, guerrillas who claim to struggle for improvement of the economic, social, and political environment are themselves responsible for its stagnation.

30. Sociological Considerations

Population size and distribution, basic racial stock and physical characteristics, ethnic minority groups, social structure, religion, and culture—all must be considered relevant to an area of operations.

a. Concentrated, urban populations are more easily controlled and protected by host country forces than are scattered populations in rural areas.

b. The racial stock and physical characteristics of the population of an area are important considerations in counter guerrilla operations. A tendency exists among the populations of developing countries to fear and distrust persons who are not of their own race.

c. Ethnic groups, constituting minority factions, become a consideration in counter guerrilla operations; because of discrimination or persecution, they may be either a source of discontent or of major assistance.

d. Social groups may exercise great influence and control over their members.

e. In countries where religion exerts a strong influence, gaining the favor of, and some influence with, the clergy could be valuable.

f. Languages may be diverse within any one country. Various ethnic and tribal groups will have significantly different dialects which are incompatible and these may be unintelligible to those speaking the official language of the government and of the metropolitan areas.

g. Customs and traditions may vary greatly, but respecting and accommodating them will assist in understanding those which affect brigade counter guerrilla operations.

Section II. EFFECTS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA

31. General

This section outlines some typical effects of area characteristics on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. The discussion is based upon guerrilla and counter-guerrilla force disposition, capabilities, weaknesses, composition, and peculiarities outlined in chapters 5 and 6, and in this chapter.

32. Effect on Guerrilla Force Courses of Action

a. Geography, Topography, Terrain, Climate, and Vegetation. Rugged topography provides ample cover, concealment, and obstacles, and few good road nets. The deemphasis on critical terrain by guerrilla forces, coupled with the inability of the constituted government to control the people living in remote areas, permits guerrilla forces relatively free access to all but those areas under direct control of the host country government. A geographical position adjacent to a sponsoring power or powers further facilitates the development and operations of guerrilla forces. The following are significant examples of area characteristics which must be given constant attention by the counter-guerrilla force:

- (1) Areas suitable for guerrilla bases. Such areas have the following characteristics:
 - (a) Difficulty of accessibility, as in mountains, jungles, or marshes.
 - (b) Concealment from aerial reconnaissance.
 - (c) Terrain which favors defense and covered withdrawals.
 - (d) Location usually a one-day journey from small civilian settlements which may provide food and act as outposts.
- (2) Numerous concealed trails approaching possible guerrilla areas of operation.
- (3) Principal roads and trails traversing and passing along the circumference of friendly-controlled areas.
- (4) Principal routes connecting separate guerrilla-controlled areas.

- (5) Roads and trails in the vicinity of host country installations and lines of communication.
- (6) Fords, bridges, and ferries across rivers; seasons when the rivers are in flood.
- (7) Areas where drinking water is available and where foot approaches are difficult or impossible.
- (8) Small settlements and farms in and near guerrilla-controlled areas.
- (9) Suitable areas for airdrops or boat or submarine rendezvous; roads and trails leading into guerrilla or sponsoring power controlled areas, or areas friendly to the guerrillas.
- (10) Suitable helicopter landing zones.

b. Political Considerations. The lack of well-developed political and administrative structures which do not reach, or are not responsive to, the population, or which prevent host country police or armed forces from being effective, reinforces the guerrilla force capability of coercion or persuasion to gain the support of remote local populations. Guerrilla operations in these areas may go uncountered or unpunished by the host country, and political bickering or host country administrative confusion is capitalized upon by guerrilla psychological operations emphasizing the separation of the host country government from the local population.

c. Economic Considerations. The low standard of living and lack of basic comforts, or unemployment among the population in the area, are psychological themes frequently used against the host country government. These conditions may be a disadvantage to guerrilla forces because logistical support derived from a population living under substandard conditions may engender counter-guerrilla attitudes. On the other hand, these people may be attracted to the guerrilla force by promises or relatively minor acts of economic assistance provided by the guerrilla force.

d. Sociological Considerations. Sociological conditions in the area may have the same general effects as do economic conditions described

above. The groups of a fragmented society may be played off against one another, be subverted from host country allegiance, and recruited to the guerrilla force more easily than a monolithic population, thus permitting guerrilla forces logistical, personnel, psychological, and intelligence support essential to successful guerrilla operations.

33. Effect on Brigade Courses of Action

Consideration of the military aspects of the area must encompass all of the operations in which brigades may become involved, to include not only tactical operations, but also intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance performed in support of brigade tactical operations. In all of the counter guerrilla operations described later in this manual, certain factors (*a-d* below) which are significantly different from normal limited and general war employment must be recognized in brigade counter guerrilla planning and operations.

a. Geography, Topography, Terrain, Climate, and Vegetation.

- (1) The guerrilla force usually knows intimately the area of operations. This may not be true of the host country forces or of the U.S. or allied forces which may assist the host country. Increased emphasis on complete intelligence, habitual employment of brigade forces in the same area, and the integration of the brigade activities into the activities of the population are required to gain and maintain familiarity with an area equal to that of the guerrilla.
- (2) Undeveloped surface transportation networks (roads, canals, and railroads) may prevent free use of sophisticated, organic brigade means of transportation. Operations under these circumstances stress footmobility and the possible use of nonorganic means of transportation, such as boats, pack animals, bicycles, and others.
- (3) Increased reliance on host country

sources of intelligence, and an increased overall intelligence collection effort to locate guerrilla bases and caches and approaches thereto, will be required because difficult terrain which the guerrilla favors can provide excellent cover and concealment for his installations.

b. Political Considerations. The possible lack of well-defined responsibilities within a host country may confuse command lines and hamper operations. This will require the brigade to coordinate with numerous governmental officials in order to locate sources of authority and decision.

c. Civil Affairs Considerations.

- (1) *Economical.* Brigade operations must be conducted to assist in improving the economic status of the population in the area, and to insure that operations disrupt as little as possible the normal economic activities of the local population. If logistical support is available from the population, and if gaining this support from the local population will assist rather than harm the economy, local procurement may be authorized. If this is not the case, the brigade must be more dependent on logistical support from outside the operational area. In any case, damage to economic installations incident to tactical operations must be minimized, and just compensation made for damage which does occur.
- (2) *Sociological.* Brigade operations must be conducted to disrupt, as little as possible, the customs, social activities, relationships between ethnic and tribal groups, and the physical well-being of the population. The brigade is committed to assist the host country and its people; therefore, the application of firepower must be selective and restrained to prevent injury or death to the civil population. Psychological operations and military civic action programs must be tailored to the specific attitudes and needs of the local population. Language differences be-

tween brigade personnel and the population, and between various ethnic or tribal groups within the population, must be minimized by use of interpreters or multilingual personnel from the host country or the U.S.

d. Combat Service Support Aspects. The operational aspects discussed above are generally applicable to combat service support aspects. Because of the requirement for integration of brigade activities with the population, the political structure, and economic activities, emphasis must be placed on the civil affairs aspects of operations. This may require civil affairs

staff sections at brigade and battalion level, and may entail civil affairs augmentation to company, or lower levels, and, concurrently, the capability of all personnel to function effectively without civil affairs assistance must be recognized, ingrained in all troops, and accommodated, by training, in planning and operations. Logistical activities must include planning to support not only the brigades, but also civilian supplies or commodities, goods, or services to be made available to the civilian population, government, or economy in areas administered by brigades or in areas in which brigades are committed.

CHAPTER 5

THE HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE

Section I. DISPOSITION

34. General

This chapter provides general guidance on typical insurgent or resistance organizations, and focuses on their tactical forces, the guerrilla, as opposed to their underground cadres and auxiliary organizations.

35. Areas

In general, the size of areas of operation, the types of guerrilla activity conducted in each, and the distribution of the elements of the guerrilla force within areas depend primarily on the degree of control exercised by the counter guerrilla force. The degree of control of an area will fluctuate with the effectiveness of the overall internal defense and development effort; the size and capabilities of the guerrilla force; and the attitudes of the population. Guerrilla operations are conducted in areas generally as follows:

a. Guerrilla Controlled Areas. Normally, guerrilla headquarters, camps, and bases are located in these areas, and determined resistance may be offered to counter guerrilla forces attempting to penetrate them. The guerrilla and his support organizations normally concentrate their propaganda and recruiting programs in these areas.

b. Contested Areas. These are the principal areas of offensive operations by the guerrilla force. Guerrillas may not offer determined resistance to the entry of counter guerrilla forces into this area, preferring instead to conduct harassing operations against them.

c. Friendly Controlled Areas. Guerrilla offensive operations in these areas are normally limited to raids, small ambushes, sniping, and mining operations. Guerrillas may occasionally attempt to penetrate these areas by coordinated

attacks launched by battalion or larger sized formations. Other hostile activities include covert operations such as subversion, espionage, psychological operations, terrorism, and sabotage.

36. Guerrilla Areas of Operations

Guerrillas can be expected to divide their area of operations, including areas controlled by the host country, into smaller areas of responsibility which are assigned to subordinate guerrilla units. Within these areas, guerrilla units carry out tactical missions and psychological operations, and attempt to control the populace and collect taxes, food, and supplies. Guerrilla areas of operation may be structured on established host country political boundaries, and may include a complete insurgent shadow government in each area with designated political chiefs and economic, political, social, and civic organizations designated to replace host country functionaries as the situation permits. Irregular, paramilitary, and regular armed guerrilla forces generally are assigned local, regional, and national missions, respectively, as the situation dictates, and function as extensions of the insurgent shadow government.

37. Distribution and Location


The distribution and location of forces within guerrilla operational areas is highly flexible, shifts in forces being made as opportunities to strike the counter guerrilla force and the host country government are presented. Guerrilla forces normally employ frequent moves as a counterintelligence technique to prevent their location and destruction by counter guerrilla strikes against them. Guerrillas often disperse and intermingle with the populace when any sizable counter guerrilla action threatens the guerrilla force operations.

Section II. COMPOSITION

38. General

Composition of a guerrilla force varies according to purpose; terrain; character and density of the local population; availability of food,

medical supplies, arms, and equipment; quality of leadership; amount and nature of external support and direction; and countermeasures used against it by counterguerrilla forces (fig. 2).



LEGEND

————— COMMAND

- - - - - POLITICAL CONTROL

ALL FIGURES ARE REPRESENTATIVE.

Figure 2. Type guerrilla force organisation.

39. Organization

Guerrilla forces may vary from groups of squad and platoon size to units of division size or larger with extensive support organizations including elements for combat, intelligence, counterintelligence, political, and logistic support. Guerrilla forces may be organized in three main types of forces: regular, paramilitary, and irregular armed forces. The distinction between these forces is based on differences in organization, training, weapons, equipment, and mission.

a. *Guerrilla regular armed forces* (sometimes called main force) are only employed militarily when there is maximum chance for success. They usually operate for given periods of time in various regions, moving from region to region according to operational requirements and the effectiveness of counter guerrilla operations. The regular forces possess the best available equipment, weapons (including mortars and artillery), and uniforms, and are used primarily against the counter guerrilla regular armed forces. Guerrilla regular forces usually are well organized (into regimental-size units or larger), well trained, and well led. They operate in close conjunction with the paramilitary and irregular guerrilla forces. Fillers for the guerrilla regular forces usually are selected from the best of the guerrilla paramilitary troops. Sponsoring powers may provide elements of their armed forces as advisors or to reinforce guerrilla regular forces.

b. *Guerrilla paramilitary forces* are less well organized, trained, and equipped than the regu-

lar forces. The guerrilla paramilitary force may be organized into platoons, companies, battalions, and at times, regiments (or equivalent organizations). Guerrilla paramilitary forces launch limited attacks, harass installations and troops, and ambush counter guerrilla force reinforcements. A guerrilla paramilitary force is normally assigned to a specific area of operation (e.g., state (province) or county (district)) and does not normally move from that area for conduct of operations elsewhere. Fillers for paramilitary forces usually are obtained from guerrilla irregular forces.

c. *Guerrilla irregular forces* are auxiliaries responsible for collecting intelligence information, building bases, fortifying villages, acting as scouts or porters for the guerrilla regular forces or paramilitary forces, and providing security for insurgent officials at the local level. Members of guerrilla irregular forces receive limited military training but receive extensive political indoctrination. They normally retain their civilian occupations and function as combatants on a part-time basis in delaying and harassing the counter guerrilla force. These limited military activities may include sniping and employment of improvised antipersonnel boobytraps and devices.

d. Sponsoring power resources, to include combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations and military organizers and advisors, and civilian political, economic, and psychological organizers and advisors may be provided to guerrilla forces to assist in organizational and operational missions and activities.

Section III. ACTIVITIES

40. Tactical Operations

When guerrilla forces first become operational, they engage in limited or small-scale activities and operations; if guerrilla forces are permitted to reach a level of sophisticated organization, training, and equipment, they can conduct large-scale operations which will require regular armed forces to combat them.

a. *Guerrilla Operations.* Guerrilla operations constitute a sustained campaign utilizing tactics characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and

brief, violent action. Basically, guerrilla forces employ raid and ambush tactics in the offense. There usually is little attempt, in contrast to normal combat operations, to seize with the intent of holding physical objectives. In any given action, small hostile guerrilla units, usually lacking the weapons for indirect fire support and staying power, are involved. Attacks are executed and the units disperse, leaving the scene of action in order to avoid engaging more powerful counter guerrilla force reserves com-


mitted against them. Guerrilla operational principles include—

- (1) Attack vulnerable objectives with superior strength.
- (2) Avoid direct, decisive engagement with superior counter guerrilla forces.
- (3) Concentrate rapidly for action, then disperse to avoid counteraction.
- (4) Intermingle with the populace.
- (5) Maintain the initiative.
- (6) Conduct all operations to surprise counter guerrilla forces. Guerrilla forces attempt to achieve surprise through accurate intelligence, detailed planning including rehearsals, clandestine approach to objectives, foot mobility in rugged terrain, speed and determination in execution of operations, and camouflage and deception measures.
- (7) Conduct defensive operations characterized by delaying tactics, harassment, sniping, and deceptive maneuver. On occasion, forces conducting guerrilla operations will establish defensive positions around towns or bases or on favorable terrain in areas under guerrilla control, withdrawing before the position becomes untenable.
- (8) Attack by mortar and artillery fire fixed installations such as logistical installations, airbases/airfields, compounds, outposts, and other base complexes.

b. Ambushes. The ambush is a common form of guerrilla attack (fig. 3). It is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning, and is executed with surprise and determination. Ambushes are directed against troop and supply movements and drop zones and landing areas. Defiles and ravines in mountainous or wooded areas are good sites for ambushes; however, ambushes are sometimes conducted in open areas. Commanding ground, concealment, and camouflage are fully utilized. Attacks usually are made at close range to gain maximum shock effect. Automatic fire may be used to cover the entire target in depth. Shotguns, grenades, and mortars may be used. Road-

blocks, demolitions, mines, or recoilless weapons often are used to halt fast-moving columns or trains at the desired place of ambush.

- (1) Silence and immobility are scrupulously observed by the guerrilla ambush forces in the area of the ambush. Small elements of the advance security of a counter guerrilla force usually are permitted to pass through the ambush position to be attacked by a guerrilla element separate from the main ambush force. Fire is opened and the attack is launched by prearranged signal, usually given by the guerrilla element charged with halting the head of the main column. If the ambush is successful, usually the ambush force quickly salvages usable supplies and equipment, destroys the remainder, and withdraws. The guerrilla will be particularly certain to salvage armament and ammunition left at the site of the ambush since, in the early stages of guerrilla force organization, this is an important source of his resupply of these critical items.
- (2) The guerrilla force uses extensive security measures to cover its movement to the ambush position, preparation of the ambush position, and the withdrawal. Secondary ambushes, some distance from the site of the principal ambush, frequently are used to destroy or delay counter guerrilla force reinforcements. Often, an initial or preliminary ambush is used to lure counter guerrilla reaction force into a primary or major ambush.
- (3) When the guerrilla force is not strong enough to destroy ambushed forces, action is terminated by a prearranged signal as counteraction begins to form. A planned withdrawal covered by security detachments is executed. Often, the guerrilla will withdraw by detachments in several directions to complicate pursuit. Elements of the guerrilla irregular force, or civilians, are used to maintain visual contact and to harass and delay by sniping action or to report on pursuing units.



- ① ELEMENT TO HALT LEADING VEHICLE OR PARTY
- ② ASSAULT ELEMENTS
- ③ ELEMENT TO ISOLATE ADVANCE GUARD
- ④ ELEMENT TO CUT OFF RETREAT
- ⑤ ELEMENT TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT
- ⑥ ELEMENT TO COVER WITHDRAWAL

Figure 3. Type guerrilla ambush.

c. *Raids.* Guerrilla forces conduct raids to destroy fixed installations or capture arms, equipment, and supplies, to kill or capture personnel, and/or to harass or demoralize counter-guerrilla forces. The raid, like the ambush, is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning, including rehearsal, and it is executed with speed, surprise, and violence. Infiltration is normally employed by the guerrilla raiding force and is covered with extensive security measures and by clandestine movements generally made at night. The guerrilla force making a raid usually is organized into three principal elements, each being assigned a specific mission. One element eliminates the guards. Since surprise is indispensable to the success of this type of operation, ruses may be used in eliminating sentries before they can sound an alarm. The use of firearms in this task usually is forbidden. Following the elimination of the guards, a second element kills or captures personnel, and destroys or carries away equipment and supplies. A third element of the raiding force covers the operation and the withdrawal. Sometimes, individuals of the raiding force will infiltrate the target area prior to the raid and assist by causing confusion and operating according to prearranged plans. Such supporters of the raiding force may be indigenous to the target area.

d. *Operations Against Lines of Communication.* Guerrilla forces may continually attack host country lines of communication to deny their use to the counter-guerrilla forces and harass, delay, or prevent movement along the routes. Guerrilla elements normally are assigned sectors of the line of communication to be blocked. Within each sector, the bridges and roadbeds may be destroyed to the degree necessary to prohibit or regulate traffic. Often, trees are felled and slides are caused to further block the route. Mines and demolitions are used extensively. Guerrilla units usually are deployed along the line of communication. They engage small elements of the counter-guerrilla force to prevent the route from being repaired or cleared. They ambush counter-guerrilla supply and troop movements. If superior counter-guerrilla force is massed against any sector, the guerrillas withdraw and seek to block another sector of the line of communication which is less strongly protected. By constantly shifting

their forces to weak points, lines of communication may be so thoroughly disrupted that the host country is forced to abandon the route or to employ sizable forces to protect it.

e. *Attacks in Force.* Guerrilla regular forces which have attained a high level of organization and are adequately armed, equipped, and supported, are capable of attacks in force against isolated garrisons, combat units, and installations. Operations of this nature closely parallel conventional offensive operations. Normally, the guerrilla force tries to isolate the objective from adjacent areas. The roads, railroads, and wire communications leading to the objective area are systematically disrupted. Paramilitary and irregular guerrilla forces may be used to establish defenses of drop zones and landing zones and use sabotage and ambushes to intercept, delay, or destroy counter-guerrilla troops and supply movements into the objective area, while the guerrilla regular force executes the main attack.

f. *Defensive Combat.* Defensive combat in the limited and general war sense seldom is used by a guerrilla force, partly because the guerrilla lacks adequate weapons and equipment, such as artillery and antitank weapons, which normally are required for a successful defense. In addition, control of any given terrain is rarely so critical to the guerrilla's operations that he is willing to defend it at the risk of meeting counter-guerrilla forces in set battle. When the guerrilla does defend an area, he modifies the principles of defensive combat to meet his needs and offset his deficiencies.

- (1) Occasionally, guerrillas may resort to defensive action to contain an opposing force in a position favorable for attacking its rear or flanks. These attacks may include raids, ambushes, and attacks on the lines of communication, flanks, reserve units, supporting arms, and installations. Snipers may fire on key personnel, radio carriers, drivers, messengers, and other targets. Routes of approach may be mined. Diversionary action in adjacent areas may be intensified to distract attacking counter-guerrilla forces or to lure them into dividing their efforts.

- (2) Guerrilla forces may defend to prevent counter guerrilla force penetration of guerrilla-controlled areas, and to gain time for guerrilla regular forces to react. Defensive combat by a guerrilla force is characterized by flexibility, mobility, and aggressiveness.
- (3) When surrounded or cut off, guerrillas may immediately attempt to break out by force at a single point, or they may disband and exfiltrate individually. If both tactics fail, individuals attempt to hide or intermingle with the population. Guerrilla regular forces will have a lesser capability to hide among the population; therefore, they are more likely to maintain unit integrity and attempt to break out as units. Often, tunnel complexes are used by guerrillas to escape detection and to withdraw from certain areas.

41. Populace Control

An insurgent movement attempts to exercise physical, psychological, and political control of the civilian populace. Control of the populace generally is established through a network of well-indoctrinated local leaders, rather than tactical guerrilla forces. These leaders will act covertly or overtly within the different political subdivisions of a country, depending on the degree of guerrilla control. Attempts are made to make every man, woman, and child feel that he is a part of the struggle. A portion of each supporter's time is devoted to some task in support of the guerrilla force. Measures used by the guerrilla to control the population include organization of the civilian population, propaganda, and threats and terrorism against uncooperative individuals and communities.

a. Intelligence. The danger to the guerrilla force of counter guerrilla spies, informers, and collaborators is stressed, and everyone supporting the guerrilla is charged with the responsibility of detecting and reporting all suspects. Besides these counterintelligence missions, civilians may be organized to perform intelligence missions for the guerrilla, to create civil disturbances, to incite subversion, to sabotage equipment or installations, to compose security details, and to perform supply work.

b. Psychological and Terrorist Operations. Guerrillas use propaganda to gain and maintain civilian support. They appeal to the people's national pride or the lack of a people-government relationship, and they attempt to foment or exploit dissatisfaction with the host country government. To control civilian activities and to discourage cooperation with the government, guerrillas may enforce restrictive orders and policies. Individuals who fail to comply with these orders and policies are punished or killed. Normally, guerrillas make a few ruthless examples to influence the population of a large area to comply with the desires of the guerrilla.

- (1) Guerrillas may resort to taking prominent individuals from a community and holding them as hostages. The people are told that no harm will come to the hostages as long as the community cooperates with the guerrilla force.

- (2) Communities which cooperate with the government or refuse to support the guerrilla may be punished. This may include the destruction or looting of local food supplies and stocks or blocking the movement of food supplies from rural areas. Public gatherings, communication centers, or administrative offices may be bombed. Arson is often used to destroy communities, thus warning surrounding communities to support the guerrilla. Officials or soldiers of the government force may be killed and the guerrillas may deposit corpses in pro-government communities, intending that the discovery of the bodies will expose the entire community to investigations and punishment by the host country government, a result which will be vigorously exploited by the guerrillas to gain sympathizers and to strengthen their cause.

c. Civil Disturbances. To hamper government operations and production, and to weaken popular support of the established government by demonstrating the weakness of the government, underground and auxiliary organizations may be expected to organize and instigate labor

strikes, slowdowns, protest meetings, and riots. Under cover of this confusion, industrial property, machinery, products, and raw materials may be sabotaged. Power, communication, and transportation facilities may be damaged, and government officials, industrial leaders, and military leaders may be abducted or assassinated.

d. Sabotage. Sabotage is used by guerrillas to lessen the government's internal security capabilities. When conducted under a well-organized plan and on a large scale, it becomes one of the guerrilla's most effective tactics. Sabotage may be conducted by the overt guerrilla force, but it is usually a mission of the guerrilla's covert organization. Its scope and

application, in relation to both objectives and areas, are almost unlimited. Objectives of sabotage activities may include industry, government, administrative offices, power sources, materials, transportation, public services, agricultural production, and communication agencies. Sabotage lends itself to guerrilla operations because it does not necessarily require a time schedule, and it can be accomplished with means readily available requiring neither elaborate equipment nor logistical support from outside sources. Destruction or removal of cables, machinery, and rails are common forms of sabotage. Arson is committed against goods, installations, and raw materials. Explosives are used to destroy buildings, bridges, and roadbeds.

Section IV. STRENGTHS

42. General

This section discusses advantages that guerrilla forces may have over counter guerrilla forces. These strengths must be avoided or compensated for in counter guerrilla operations.

43. Host Country Weaknesses

The economic, social, psychological, and political weaknesses of the host country can be major contributing factors to guerrilla strengths. These factors may include—

a. Discontent of the population with host country government policies, and their environmental conditions as a result of host country activities, or lack of them, to accommodate the needs of the people.

b. Defeatist feeling which affects host country forces and the belief among most of the people that the internal attack will succeed. These attitudes can develop after a base of population support for the guerrilla is established and the attitudes may become self-propagating.

44. Guerrilla Strength

Some factors of guerrilla operational strength include—

a. A lack of responsibility, except in guerrilla base areas or other areas under their control, to maintain normal governmental obligations toward the population to include economic development, security, and associated activities.

b. Guerrilla leaders generally are highly motivated and trained.

c. Disciplinary measures to include the immediate, effective application of punitive measures without recourse to time-consuming judicial processes.

d. Devotion to a cause which many guerrillas may accept as a religion.

e. Capability to escalate or de-escalate methods of operations, almost at will, from subversion through open warfare.

Section V. PECULIARITIES AND WEAKNESSES

45. General

This section discusses considerations of tactical and psychological aspects of guerrilla operations to permit understanding of basic guer-

rilla attitudes, situations, and motivating factors. The guerrilla must not be underestimated nor must he be thought of as being invulnerable. He has many basic weaknesses which, if ex-

ploited by counter guerrilla forces, are certain to defeat him.

46. Personnel Weaknesses

Basically, the guerrilla endures a life of physical danger, privation, and isolation, cut off from friends and family and subject to extreme restrictive measures. Some factors of personnel weaknesses include—

a. Mental and physical stress, caused by fighting in a hostile environment and being subjected to periods of violence and physical combat.

b. Terror or the threat of violence to himself or his family and friends, which may be imposed by his own organization to insure his cooperation.

c. A feeling of numerical inferiority to the forces arrayed against him, particularly in the early stage of guerrilla force development.

d. The possibility of being treated as a common criminal by the government which he opposes.

47. Operational Weaknesses

Some factors of guerrilla operational weaknesses include—

a. Security which is a continuing, major consideration requiring extensive resources to maintain.

b. Technologically superior forces committed against him, using sophisticated means of mobility, fire power, and communication.

c. Training bases and areas which are difficult to acquire and operate effectively against counter guerrilla forces.

d. The guerrilla force effort and the insurgent or resistance movement will topple if its popular base can be won away and realigned with the government.

48. Logistic Support Weaknesses

Logistic support is a continuing weakness of the guerrilla. As the guerrilla force develops and expands, its logistical requirements will increase to a point where the internal popular support base can no longer provide subsistence items to the guerrilla force without creating hardships or lowering living standards of the populace. If the guerrilla force is supported by an external source, the guerrilla is faced with the continuing problem of securing supply lines, transport means, and storage facilities.