

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCEPTS AND PLANNING

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#### Section I. CONCEPTS

##### 49. General

This chapter provides guidance for brigade contingency planning activities during pre-deployment phases and for counterguerrilla operations in internal defense and development. Possible missions, broad concepts, type organizations, and planning procedures are outlined. The general provisions of FM 101-5 and the other staff officers' field manuals apply to counterguerrilla planning.

##### 50. Brigade Planning, Organization, and Operation

This section provides a general basis upon which brigade planning, organization, and operations may be conducted. It correlates all counterguerrilla operations in internal defense and development, the details of which will be discussed in following chapters, and it identifies the overall plans, policies, and programs which brigade operations are designed to extend.

##### 51. Military Plans and Operational Areas

The primary reason for the use of armed forces, either host country or U.S., in counterguerrilla operations is to assist the host country in insuring its internal security by countering subversion, lawlessness, and/or insurgent activities. The national level host country military campaign plan outlines the use of regular armed forces and paramilitary forces in furthering the overall internal defense plans, and relates these forces to other national level host country economic, social, political, psychological, and civic internal development plans and forces.


- a. The brigade operates as a force governed

by the national military campaign plan, as promulgated by intervening higher headquarters, at the regional, state, or local levels.

b. The military campaign plans directly affecting the brigade provide guidance, in the form of missions, concepts, and operational instructions, of its activities in the operational area, describing the manner and extent to which the brigade will concentrate on tactical operations (both strike operations and consolidation operations), intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations.

c. Brigade plans must coordinate and extend these operations, activities, and programs to its subordinate units, in comprehensive plans and orders, insuring that subordinate unit commanders are presented with sufficient operational guidance, coordinated with the overall requirements of the brigade operational area.

d. Operational areas may be a part of friendly controlled areas, guerrilla-controlled areas, or contested areas. Counterguerrilla tactical and related operations in internal defense and development are applied, to varying degrees, depending on type operations conducted, the operational area (fig. 4), and the intensity of guerrilla activity in the area in which the brigade operates. Operations in friendly controlled areas may dictate that the brigade support civilian governmental economic, social, political, and civic activities by tactical consolidation operations, and may require that intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations also be conducted. Operations in contested areas or guerrilla-controlled areas may



**LEGEND:**

- |                                  |                             |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| —■— INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY       | ○ STATE (PROVINCE) CAPITOL  |
| —■— STATE (PROVINCE) BOUNDARY    | ● COUNTY (DISTRICT) CAPITOL |
| --- COUNTY (DISTRICT) BOUNDARY   | ■ TOWN (HAMLET)             |
| ---- TOWNSHIP (VILLAGE) BOUNDARY | GUERRILLA CONTROLLED AREA   |
| RAO - REMOTE AREA OPERATION      | FRIENDLY CONTROLLED AREA    |

*Figure 4. Operational concepts (schematic).*

require the brigade to accentuate tactical strike operations (para 107-119), and relegate other related counterguerrilla operations in internal

defense and development to supporting status during the period of the strike.

## Section II. PLANNING

### 52. General

This section outlines brigade planning activities prior to and during counterguerrilla operations in internal defense and development. It discusses differences from limited and general war planning to include predeployment and in-country tailoring, estimates, and the general decision-making process. For further guidance on planning, see FM 101-5 and the various branch field manuals.

a. The principles of command and staff action in battalions and brigades discussed in FM 7-20 and FM 7-30 are applicable in counterguerrilla operations; however, the techniques of their application conform to the conditions created by the local situation. Counterguerrilla operations in internal defense operations emphasize political, economic, sociological, and psychological considerations to a much greater degree at lower levels than is normal in limited and general war operations.

b. The maintenance of high morale in brigades engaged in counterguerrilla operations in internal defense operations presents problems different from those encountered in normal limited and general war operations. Operating against an elusive force that seldom offers a clear target, and where tangible results are seldom observed, requires continuous troop indoctrination in the importance of, and challenges inherent in, counterguerrilla operations.

c. Independent missions for prolonged periods of time, where much of the brigade support depends on the ingenuity, skill, knowledge, courage, and tenacity of the commander, will be usual at all echelons.

d. Other factors of counterguerrilla operations which require increased emphasis on command are—

- (1) Difficulty of maintaining combat-area thinking of psychology during extensive, continuous operations, while making little contact with guerrilla

forces. To counter the guerrilla tactic of ceasing operations in an area in order to create a false sense of security and then capitalizing on this by surprise attacks, commanders continually emphasize security even though guerrilla activity within their areas has apparently diminished.

- (2) Operations in a hostile environment, coupled with language difficulties and unfamiliar customs and religions.
  - (3) Less desirable food, shelter, and sanitary conditions imposed on counterguerrilla forces when operating independently and for extended periods.
  - (4) The aspect of guerrilla operations which includes terrorism and murder of civilians.
- e. Command and staff action in counterguerrilla operations emphasizes—
- (1) Detailed planning of small-scale, decentralized tactical operations.
  - (2) Command and control over extended distances.
  - (3) Extensive contingency planning for employment of reserves, and fire support means.
  - (4) Deception operations.
  - (5) Detailed coordination and direction of the intelligence collection effort by—
    - (a) Coordination with host country and U.S. civil intelligence agencies, and host country regular armed and paramilitary force intelligence agencies.
    - (b) Use of the local population in the development of overt and covert intelligence collection systems.
    - (c) Systematic and thorough interrogation of prisoners and suspects.
  - (6) Detailed planning and coordination of activities with civilian officials.
  - (7) Incorporating and monitoring civil-

ian assistance in the operational plan by—

- (a) Preparing and executing integrated civil affairs plans that embrace military civic action, populace and resources control, and psychological operations.
- (b) Organizing and training, through advisory assistance, paramilitary and police forces for local defense, and insuring continuous support for these forces.
- (8) Integrating combat service support functions, especially aerial resupply, into all planning.

f. Subordinate commanders are allowed maximum flexibility in the execution of their assigned missions but should be assigned specific responsibilities and given sufficient guidance to insure a coordinated effort. The nature of guerrilla is such that, on occasion, counter-guerrilla operations is such that, on occasion, counter-guerrilla operations plans must be changed instantly to take advantage of opportunities to employ brigade resources against elusive guerrilla forces.

### 53. Area Coordination Center

The command and staff actions discussed above indicate a requirement for a single headquarters or coordination center in which all of these actions can be accomplished expeditiously. This may be accomplished by the organization of an area coordination center (ACC) (fig. 5). The ACC is a composite facility at various political/military levels in which internal defense operations and internal development operations are planned, coordinated and directed. Its members include the local chiefs of military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their U.S. counterparts. U.S. and host country policy and agreements will determine command relationships between U.S. and host country forces in the ACC. The brigade may retain its own tactical operations center (TOC), and the ACC is not intended to take the place of the normal host country political organization in the operational area.

a. *Mission.* The ACC has two primary missions; first, to provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of all of the internal

defense and development effort in a given tactical area of responsibility; second, to insure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. In addition, it insures communication with the people and their participation in programs designed to improve their security and well-being.

b. *Concept.* In order to provide a means for coordinating the counterguerrilla effort at all levels, particularly at the state (province) and county (district) or township (village) levels, ACC are established. ACC are composed of representatives from all forces and agencies participating in the total internal defense and development effort. The chiefs (or chairmen) of ACC may be military or political officials selected on the basis of leadership ability, reliability, intelligence, and freedom from conflicting partisan interests. Staffs are constituted of selected representatives of participating forces and agencies.


c. *Organization.* Membership of ACC may include the following, subject to modification to meet local situations:

- (1) The senior military commander in the area.
- (2) Senior police representatives.
- (3) Representatives of local and national intelligence organizations (police, military, and civilian).
- (4) Representatives of public information and psychological operations agencies.
- (5) Representatives of paramilitary organizations (local security and self-defense units).
- (6) Representatives, military and civilian, of key communication activities.
- (7) Other local and national government representatives to include, for example, project directors of the local economic, social, political, and civic internal development agencies.

d. *Operations.* ACC should operate continuously to make decisions and coordinate actions of the total internal defense and development effort.

### 54. Civil-Military Advisory Committee

The civil-military advisory committee



NOTES: (1) ACC DOES NOT REPLACE STATE (PROVINCE) GOVERNMENTS.  
 (2) ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF ACC WILL BE DETERMINED BY LOCAL RESOURCES, BUT AS A MINIMUM, ACC SHOULD CONTAIN ELEMENTS FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL GROUND FORCES, FIRE SUPPORT, AIR SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT.

Figure 5. Type state (province) area coordination center.

(CMAC) participates in the ACC function primarily by providing advice and assisting in planning and executing programs. It evaluates

the effects of various projected actions affecting the civil population, and so informs the ACC. It also reports civilian attitudes toward

operations, activities, and programs currently in progress.

a. Like the ACC, the organization of the CMAC will vary depending on local requirements and must be flexible enough to meet changing situations. It will ordinarily be headed by the appointed or elected civilian leader of the community or area, such as the state governor (province chief), mayor or other political appointee, and may include the following:

- (1) Local police chief.
- (2) Superintendent of schools or school principal(s).
- (3) Senior members of dominant religious faiths.
- (4) Judges and/or other judiciary representatives.
- (5) Labor union president(s).
- (6) Editors of influential publications.
- (7) Representatives of major business or commercial interests.
- (8) Other influential persons.

b. The CMAC will meet as necessary, on call of the chairman of the committee. It should be noted that possibly some persons, such as the police chief, may be members of both the ACC and the CMAC.

## 55. Missions

Variations of counterguerrilla missions in internal defense and development which might be assigned to the brigade include relief of host country regular armed forces performing static security and populace and resources control missions to permit these host country forces to engage guerrilla forces in combat operations. The brigade may also be assigned border control missions and combat support and combat service support rather than combat missions. These variations in missions usually will require the accomplishment of the following:

a. Tactical operations against guerrilla forces.

b. Intelligence operations, to include integrating unit capabilities with, and extending, the overall host country and U.S. intelligence program and system.

c. Psychological operations, to include integrating unit capabilities with, and extending, the overall host country and U.S. information program and system.

d. Populace and resources control operations in support of host country police and other civil security organizations.

e. Military civic action supporting host country economic, psychological, and sociological activities.

f. Advisory assistance operations in organizing, equipping, and training regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and irregular forces as required.

## 56. Operational Information

Information sources upon which to base brigade intelligence collection, and upon which to base operational planning required prior to commitment to a host country will be from data bases at higher headquarters. After deployment of the brigade in-country, host country and U.S. civil and military information sources must be used. Host country military forces and police and U.S. military forces, the U.S. country team, unified command, and MAAG already deployed are examples of principal sources of in-country information. Maximum efforts, to include locating brigade intelligence personnel in-country prior to deploying the brigade, must be made to establish as early as possible adequate information for brigade planning.

a. *World Situation.* Brigade commanders faced with planning and executing counterguerrilla operations in internal defense and development must consider several categories of information concerning the possible operational environments, and of guerrilla warfare and its peculiarities which may affect the attitudes, motivations, and actions of their organizations, staffs, and subordinate commanders. All personnel must understand the motivations and philosophy of the social-political-economic movement from which the guerrilla originates so as to better prepare themselves psychologically for the military implications of that origin. For example, the scheduled campaigns, quick victories (or defeats), measurable successes or failures in terms of ground, men, or materiel

gained or lost, secure rear areas, and the cleared battlefields of limited or general war situations must not be expected; but, rather, protraction and attrition in internal defense and development counterguerrilla operations must be expected and accommodated.

b. *The Host Country.* Information—geographical and cultural—concerning the area is essential if successful counterguerrilla operations are to be waged by the brigade. The desires, drives, aspirations, language, and customs of the people among whom the U.S. unit is to operate must be understood if support by the population is to be mobilized (ch 4). The forces employed, the policies followed, and the political-social-military structure within which operations are to be conducted will condition the methods employed.

- (1) The guerrilla force must be thoroughly understood. To assess guerrilla capabilities properly, the commander must understand not only how the area of operations will affect his operations, but also how the hostile guerrilla uses the area to his advantage (ch 5).
- (2) The geographic, economic, social, and political characteristics of the host country are essential areas of information in normal limited and general war (field army-type) operations. They become even more meaningful to brigades conducting counterguerrilla operations because the principal strength of the guerrilla lies in his intimate knowledge of the terrain and of the people among whom he operates.

## 57. Operational Considerations

Since the guerrilla will probably react to applied pressure by moving to another area, by intermingling with the local population, or by remaining inactive until the vigor of current countermeasures has lessened, commanders must be particularly cautious not to consider the guerrilla force eliminated merely because opposition has ceased. Continuous pressure must be maintained throughout a campaign against guerrilla forces.

### a. *Need for Constant Pressure Upon the*

*Guerrilla.* If contact with the guerrilla force is lost, aggressive efforts must be made to re-establish contact by using timely and accurate intelligence and harassing actions through such means as covert agents, aerial surveillance, ground patrols, and airmobile combat patrols. Periods of inactivity will permit the guerrilla to rest, reorganize, and resume offensive operations. Around-the-clock operations by the counterguerrilla force must be emphasized.

b. *Importance of Offensive Operations.* Purely defensive measures allow the guerrilla to develop and become stronger. The maintenance of the offensive at all levels is vital to the success of the counterguerrilla campaign.

c. *Requirement for Secrecy and Surprise.* The need for secrecy must be emphasized in all plans and operations. The guerrilla's intelligence system may make it difficult to deny him information concerning impending counterguerrilla operations. This makes it all the more important that every echelon of command within brigades, to include squads and platoons, employ the most ingenious and imaginative methods of operation. Security will be enhanced and surprise more likely achieved when plans provide for—

- (1) Constant indoctrination of the individual soldier with the importance of security.
- (2) Effective and secure communication.
- (3) Avoidance of established operational patterns by varying methods of operations and using unorthodox tactics and techniques.

d. *Requirement for Mobility.* Superior mobility is essential in counterguerrilla tactical operations. To achieve surprise and to successfully counter the mobility of the guerrilla, brigade plans should consider the need to use all means of mobility available, to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, and pack animals.

e. *Importance of Intelligence.* To be successful, brigades engaged in counterguerrilla operations must have accurate and timely intelligence about the terrain, the guerrilla, and the population. Since the guerrilla may live among and be protected by the population,

intelligence may be difficult to secure. Counter-guerrilla planning must provide for the collection and rapid dissemination of all available intelligence so that counterguerrilla forces can take immediate action to destroy the fast-moving guerrilla.

*f. Importance of Popular Support.* Military operations must take into account protection of the civilian population. This is a problem in counterguerrilla operations because the guerrilla usually hides himself in the civilian population and fights from that base of support. Bringing artillery or airpower to bear on a town from which sniper fire was received may neutralize the guerrilla action, but it will almost certainly alienate the civilian population as a result of casualties among noncombatants.

## 58. Methods of Operation

*a. Guerrilla forces are the targets, not the terrain.* Terrain, as a tactical objective, means little to the guerrilla unless he is allowed to develop conventional warfare capabilities. Commanders must orient their efforts continually on the destruction or neutralization of the guerrilla rather than the terrain. The guerrilla usually can yield the terrain with little tactical loss.

*b. Front or rear lines do not exist in an area threatened by the guerrillas.* Counterguerrilla units throughout the threatened area must maintain the same overt and aggressive attitude as frontline combat troops in conventional operations. Priorities of effort must be designated by brigade planners to provide guidelines for the allocation of counterguerrilla forces within the brigade operational area.

*c. Areas of responsibility assigned to military commanders usually encompass political subdivisions of the affected area, and are not defined by straight, linear boundaries.* Such assignments are made to insure maximum coordination and assistance from civil agencies. This will also serve to coordinate counterguerrilla operations more closely with other operations and activities in internal defense and development.

*d. The brigade assigned offensive strike missions should not dissipate its offensive capability by the widespread assignment of small de-*

tachments to defensive tasks such as garrison, rail, or road sentries. When the situation demands that small detachments be employed in defensive tasks, such tasks should be performed by paramilitary forces or brigades assigned missions of consolidation operations.

*e. Expenditure of manpower in large-scale reconnaissance operations should be avoided except when sufficient counterguerrilla force and intelligence is available to achieve decisive results.*

*f. Large military forces are not garrisoned in areas of guerrilla activity to deter guerrilla operations by the mere physical presence of counterguerrilla troops.* Movement of the brigade out of the garrisons and into the realm of the guerrilla insures maximum effect of operations in the area. Effort should be made to keep brigades in continuous operations under all conditions of weather.

## 59. Offense

Offense applied in strike operations has as its purpose the destruction, or the neutralization by harassment, of guerrilla forces. These operations are characterized by gaining and maintaining contact with the guerrilla.

*a. Once a guerrilla force has been located, combat power is applied in order to destroy it with the least possible delay.* Normally, such operations require that the brigade force be larger than the guerrilla force. The encirclement offers the greatest possibility for fixing the guerrilla force and achieving decisive results, provided the following conditions exist:

- (1) Positive intelligence on location of guerrilla elements.
- (2) Troops are emplaced rapidly to maximize surprise.
- (3) An effective counterintelligence system insures security of plans and movement.
- (4) Sufficient troops are utilized to achieve an effective encirclement.
- (5) Ample time is taken to search adequately the encircled area.
- (6) Plans are made to offset the advantages which darkness affords the encircled guerrillas.

b. Harassment will prevent the guerrilla from resting and reorganizing, inflict casualties, prevent massing of personnel and supplies for large-scale attacks, aid in gaining intelligence of the area of operations, and cause the guerrilla to expend his resources. Harassment may be conducted as an economy-of-force measure in order to deny the guerrilla absolute freedom of operation in an area of low priority. During the conduct of harassment, the majority of the counterguerrilla force will operate from patrol bases and maintain continuous pressure on the guerrilla force by vigorous patrolling efforts. Harassment is conducted primarily by the use of—

- (1) Reconnaissance patrols to locate guerrilla units and bases.
- (2) Extensive ground combat patrolling and raids.
- (3) Airmobile combat patrolling and raids.
- (4) Ambushes.
- (5) Artillery and naval gunfire.
- (6) Air Force bombing and strafing.
- (7) Mining probable guerrilla routes of communication as appropriate and as prescribed by U.S./host country policies.
- (8) Continuous aerial surveillance.
- (9) Employment of chemical and biological agents as appropriate and as prescribed by U.S./host country policies.

## 60. Defense

Defense applied in consolidation operations provides the physical and moral base from which offensive strike operations against guerrillas are launched. Population defense and denying the guerrilla manpower and materiel support and defense against guerrilla attacks are instrumental in gaining the support of the population and in incapacitating the guerrilla force.

## 61. Retrograde

Since guerrilla forces (except in the later stages of development) will seldom be able physically to push counterguerrilla forces from an area, it may be desirable—for economy of force or other reasons—to retire. Therefore,

retrograde movements must be planned and executed. As guerrilla organizations develop, delaying actions, withdrawals while in contact, and other tactics associated with retrograde must be planned and executed.

## 62. Commander's Guidance

The commander's guidance for counterguerrilla operations in internal defense and development must be far more detailed and comprehensive than in limited and general war, and must accommodate all operational aspects inherent to brigade counterguerrilla operations. Prior to the receipt of the specific mission, the commander's guidance and subsequent planning must be based on all probable missions to include supporting consolidation operations or conducting strike operations, as well as on the specific characteristics of the guerrilla, terrain, and population in the specific operational area. After receipt of the mission, his guidance will become more specific and will include the extent to which the brigade will become involved in tactical operations (strike or consolidation), intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations.

## 63. Decisions

Decisions made in counterguerrilla operations in internal defense and development will be in accordance with techniques outlined in FM 101-5.

## 64. Concepts

Planning and actions must be flexible. Guide figures for operational areas assigned to units must not be expected; rather, each situation must be estimated by itself. Not only fire and maneuver, but military civic action, political action, and cultural peculiarities must be considered in counterguerrilla operational planning. Combat power will be applied selectively and its effects modified to preclude harming the population. In many instances, a U.S. commander will be faced with choosing between a course of action which will assure entrance into a given area by utilizing maximum combat power and a course of action which will require him to apply his combat power with less vio-

lence, and most selectively so as not to harm the population.

a. *Tactical Operations.* Tactical operations are based upon sound intelligence.

- (1) Planning and conducting tactical operations against well-developed guerrilla forces must be anticipated. As the guerrilla force gains experience and materiel support and/or receives reinforcement from a sponsoring power, his forces may become more sizable and highly organized, and consequently more easily identified. Combat units must be capable of both counter-guerrilla operations and conventional operations because the guerrilla will retain the initiative in selecting the type of warfare employed.
- (2) Appropriate tactics must be employed, depending on guerrilla capabilities. Having developed multiple base areas, guerrilla forces may maneuver in any direction in reaction to an offensive maneuver against them and still not sacrifice their logistical support capabilities.
- (3) Counterguerrilla operations require the movement of small units throughout zones wherein normal civilian activities must be maintained, and must be conducted against forces which may materialize from, fight behind, and dissolve into the population. These conditions require special measures or emphasis from the counter-guerrilla unit. Some of these measures are—
  - (a) Use of stay-behind patrols.
  - (b) Unit communications to control dispersed elements.
  - (c) Communication systems to permit instant location of units over vast areas.
  - (d) Extensive coordination measures to prevent engaging friendly forces either ground-to-ground or air-to-ground.
  - (e) Maintenance of highly mobile, all-weather, around-the-clock reserves (quick reaction forces) to reinforce or relieve engaged units.
- (4) The U.S. brigade commander must be prepared to operate his forces in strike operations against guerrilla forces operating in contested or guerrilla-controlled areas. These operations are essentially offensive in nature, brief in duration, and involve primarily military tactical operations.
- (5) The U.S. brigade commander must be prepared to employ his forces in conjunction with consolidation operations designed to neutralize permanently the guerrilla influence in areas designated for friendly control. The use of U.S. forces in this operational mode involves both offensive and defensive tactical operations; advisory assistance in training paramilitary forces for area defense; and support of civilian economic, political, social, civic, intelligence, psychological operations, and populace and resources control programs in the area. The overall operation is basically civilian and may involve subordination of military operations to those of civilian programs. Operations such as these are of long duration, thorough in execution, and require the continuous presence of counterguerrilla forces.
- (6) In addition to the strike operation and the consolidation operation normally conducted by the brigade, the brigade may be concerned with those operations normally conducted by special forces organizations. These operations are undertaken largely in contested areas or in areas under guerrilla control. The brigade may support special forces operations by—
  - (a) Providing fire support.
  - (b) Providing supplies and equipment on an emergency basis.
  - (c) Coordinating combat actions.
  - (d) Providing reserve (reaction) forces.

b. *Civilian Populations.* Since civilian support is required for the restoration of national internal security, there is a requirement to conduct counterguerrilla tactical operations without destroying civilian life and property. It may be necessary to subordinate combat re-

quirements to the general welfare of the populace.

- (1) Full combat power and the violence of counterguerrilla operations may be diminished in order not to endanger the civilian population. Application of combat power will have to be far more selective than in conventional combat operations, and limited to the minimum required to accomplish the mission.
- (2) Local socio-political aspects may complicate the planning and conduct of operations.

*c. Special Operational Considerations.* Commanders must be aware of the various military and civilian support operations being conducted in their areas of responsibility, and anticipate the various missions they might be assigned.

- (1) They must appreciate that all components of internal defense and development are integrated; that is, a unit assigned a counterguerrilla tactical mission must devote resources not only to the primary tactical mission, but also to others not traditionally military.
- (2) Brigades may be employed defensively to free host country forces for offensive operations; in such cases, brigades become virtually integral to the civilian socio-political structure. In any case, elements of many or all of these components of internal defense and development will be present regardless of the primary mission assigned. The significant point is that resources devoted to other aspects of internal defense and development will not be available to support the counterguerrilla tactical effort.
- (3) All brigade personnel must be taught not to underestimate the guerrilla, but to be aware of his weaknesses. Unless this indoctrination is accomplished effectively, commanders, staffs, and troops will be surprised psychologically and tactically.

## 65. Staff and Commander Estimates

Planning for counterguerrilla operations requires a detailed estimate of the situation. Close attention is given to both the civil and military situation. Estimates are based on the analysis of the area of operation, the mission, commanders' guidance, and other information outlined previously. These considerations are governed by the techniques outlined in FM 101-5, modified to the operational environment. This paragraph outlines some of the salient modifications required for counterguerrilla operations. The following specific factors are among those emphasized in the estimates:

### a. Weather and Terrain.

- (1) Effects of weather, seasons of the year (to include planting and harvesting periods), phases of the moon (which affect night visibility), and tides on both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.
- (2) Suitability of terrain and road net for both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.
- (3) Suitability of terrain for guerrilla bases.
- (4) Control of border and coastal areas, if applicable.

### b. Population.

- (1) Loyalty of various segments of the population to include their morale, will to resist, and willingness to undergo hardship.
- (2) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in, or assist, guerrilla activities.
- (3) Size and proportion of population likely to support host country, U.S. and allied forces.
- (4) Relative susceptibility of various elements of the population to propaganda.
- (5) Basic or potential causes of unrest.

### c. Guerrilla.

- (1) National and regional origins.
- (2) Organization, to include effectiveness and unity of command.

- (3) Strength, morale, and status of training.
- (4) Leaders and their personalities.
- (5) Relations with the civil population.
- (6) Status of equipment and supplies.
- (7) Effectiveness of communications.
- (8) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence, to include the extent of probable infiltration of host country civil and military establishments by guerrilla informers, supporters, or sympathizers.
- (9) Tactics being employed.
- (10) Resources available.
  - (a) The capability of the area to furnish food and water.
  - (b) Availability of arms, ammunition, demolitions, fuels, medicines, and other supplies.
  - (c) External support from sponsoring powers.
    - 1. Amount and type of support—personnel, materiel, and moral.
    - 2. Lines of communication.

*d. Host Country, U.S., and Allied.*

- (1) Forces available for counterguerrilla operations.
  - (a) Host country and U.S. forces.
  - (b) Paramilitary units.
  - (c) Civil police and irregular units.
  - (d) Friendly guerrilla forces.
  - (e) Host country and U.S. civil officials and agencies.
  - (f) Other forces available within area if needed.
- (2) Size and composition.
- (3) Ability to operate on the terrain.
- (4) Vulnerabilities.

### Section III. BRIGADE ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATIONS

#### 68. General

Brigades will be organized for counterguerrilla operations according to the threat, environment, and the type operation supported, in order to conduct—

*a. Tactical operations which include—*

- (1) *Strike operations* by means of fire and

*(5) Resources.*

- (a) Effectiveness of measures for employment of local manpower and materiel resources within the area to meet critical deficiencies such as personnel for security of communities, installations, and lines of communication.
- (b) Effectiveness of measures to deny the guerrilla access to resources required by him.

*e. Other.*

- (1) Policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of the civilian population and guerrilla forces.
- (2) Organization, effectiveness, reliability, and key personalities of the local host country government and its agencies.

#### 66. Preparation of Plans

Consolidation operations may require detailed planning for commitment of the brigades to a long-term host country and U.S. combined operational plan. On the other hand, strike operations may require relatively simple planning, accentuating the usual tactical operations over short periods of time.

#### 67. Approval of Plans

Plans must be closely coordinated with those U.S. and host country military and civilian agencies which the plans may affect. Commanders and staffs must anticipate delay in gaining approval for brigade plans because of the unusual coordination required. Adequate time must be allowed for this coordination of brigade plans at higher, subordinate, and adjacent levels.

maneuver in order to destroy or capture the guerrilla; to repel an attack by fire, close combat, and counterattack; to conduct extensive combat and reconnaissance patrolling, to include long-range patrolling; to conduct air-mobile operations when provided with sufficient air transport; to conduct

airborne operations with minimum marshaling and planning procedures (airborne units only); and to participate in limited amphibious operations.

(2) *Consolidation operations* in which all internal defense operations and internal development operations can be conducted to maintain or restore internal security. Consolidation operations include the capability to conduct strike operations.

b. *Intelligence operations.*

c. *Psychological operations.*

d. *Populace and resources control operations.*

e. *Military civic action.*

f. *Advisory assistance operations.*

## 69. Organization for Operations

a. Normally, the specific terrain and civil and military situations in the area of operations will require some reorganizing of the brigade, battalion, and company prior to each operation. Emphasis in organizing for tactical operations is placed on firepower, mobility, and command-control communication.

b. Task organization should strive for tactical self-sufficiency by attaching or placing in direct support sufficient intelligence, signal, transportation, and other combat support and combat service support to make units capable of semi-independent or independent operations. Moreover, consideration must be given to providing capabilities for dealing with the civilian population in the area by giving the force sufficient translators, interpreters, civil affairs personnel, psychological operations personnel, and other supporting resources from higher level organizations (or from the TOE -500 and -600 series).

## 70. The Brigade (Divisional and Separate)

a. In counterguerrilla operations, divisional brigades may be employed as subordinate elements of the division, particularly during large-scale operations, or with appropriate reinforcing combat, combat support, and combat service support units, as independent or semi-independent forces. The brigade has the


capability to command and control up to five attached maneuver battalions (fig. 6). It also has the capability to command and control attached host country regular armed forces and paramilitary forces.

(1) *Support.* Combat, combat support, and combat service support units are attached to, or placed in support of, the brigade as required by the specific mission assigned. In counterguerrilla operations, the emphasis is normally on the attachment of combat and combat support units. The missions assigned to the brigade may vary from control over a segment of the population in areas partially or completely under friendly control, to the execution of purely combat tasks in a contested area or in areas under control of the guerrilla.

(2) *Tactical consolidation operations.* When assigned consolidation operations missions in support of internal defense and development, the brigade organization will require the attachment and support of civilian and military personnel and units to assist in the conduct of intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action programs, and advisory assistance. In such situations, the brigade normally will receive attachments of engineer, military police, military intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, signal, and other units. Host country regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, irregular forces, and police and other nonmilitary agencies may be attached for consolidation operations missions.

(3) *Tactical strike operations.* When the brigade is organized for the conduct of strike operations, the emphasis is on the attachment of primary combat and combat support units which enhance the combat power of the brigade.

b. The *separate brigade* has the organic capability to command and control up to five maneuver battalions in independent offensive and



*Figure 6. Type brigade task force for counterguerrilla operations.*

defensive combat operations. The separate brigade differs from a divisional brigade in that the combat, combat support, and combat service support elements of the separate brigade are designated by TOE on a permanent basis.

## 71. Maneuver Battalions

Battalions are the basic maneuver elements of the brigade. The personnel, equipment, and training of battalions provide versatile forces which can combat guerrilla forces effectively with a minimum or reorganization to meet the exigencies of the mission, terrain, and situation. The command structure of the battalion is designed to accept augmentation (fig. 7).


a. In counterguerrilla tactical operations, infantry battalions normally are employed as subordinate elements of a brigade. In exceptional cases, they may be employed directly under the control of a higher headquarters, or

may conduct independent operations. Because of the decentralized nature of counterguerrilla operations, the battalion normally will receive the attachment of combat, combat support, and combat service support units, or have these units placed in direct support to assist in the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Battalion task organizations depend on the particular requirements of each situation. Under unusual circumstances, task forces may have continuous operational control of tactical aircraft to provide an airmobile capability; however, tactical transport aircraft will normally be retained under the operational control of higher headquarters to be allocated specific task assignments as required.

## 72. Companies

Companies are the basic maneuver elements of the battalion. They may be detached from



*Figure 7. Type battalion task force for counterguerrilla operations.*

the parent unit for employment as part of combined arms, joint, or combined task forces.

### 73. Reconnaissance Platoons and Armored Cavalry Troops

If the area of operations will not permit extensive use of vehicles, the reconnaissance platoon or cavalry troop may be employed dismounted, thereby having the advantage of retaining the unit as a valuable intelligence collection agency. If the area of operations will permit use of vehicles, the platoon or troop may be employed as an economy-of-force unit to conduct operations in areas facilitating wheeled or tracked mobility, thereby releasing other units for dismounted operations against the guerrilla force in less trafficable areas. With their organic mobility, reconnaissance platoons or cavalry troops can disperse over relatively large areas—periodically visiting the civilian communities in the area, patrolling lines of

communication—and still mass rapidly to counter a guerrilla element elsewhere in the area. For further discussion on the organization and employment of the armored cavalry troop, see FM 17-1 and FM 17-36.

### 74. Antitank Platoons

If the particular situation requires conducting operations against a guerrilla force in remote, undeveloped areas where the armor threat is minimal or nonexistent, consideration should be given to organizing this element to accomplish other more pressing missions such as antipersonnel or point target (fortifications) missions, or as a security force for the unit combat base.

### 75. Heavy Mortar Platoons

For security, the firing elements of the heavy mortar platoon normally will occupy positions

within the combat base. If sections are required to occupy firing positions outside combat bases, rifle elements are used to secure the positions.

## 76. Communications

a. Radio is the primary means of communication in counterguerrilla operations. The planning and implementation of radio communications nets for the brigade and its maneuver battalions may become highly complex in counterguerrilla operations as compared to operations in limited and general war. As communication advisor to the commander, the brigade signal officer must be prepared to advise, in the early planning stages, on the capability of available communication means to support each course of action being considered. Platoon and company-level communications take on added significance in counterguerrilla operations, since employment of such units in patrol bases and on area missions may often overtax their organic signal communication capability.

b. Requirements of maneuver battalions will be principally for manpack-type radios to replace vehicle-mounted radio sets and the shorter range manpack sets organic to squad communications. Aerial relay stations may be required to extend the ranges of FM radio equipment. Since the brigade communication platoon has no reserve from which to provide augmentation, special communication needs of brigade elements must be provided either by redistribution of equipment organic to the combat elements of the brigade, or by obtaining augmentation to the TOE. For long-range radio communication between battalion combat bases, and for patrol bases at extended distances from their next higher unit, communication support teams may be required.

c. Extensive use of radio for communication expands the communication security problem. The tendency to consider the guerrilla force as too unsophisticated to be able to acquire communications intelligence must be avoided. Conventional communication security measures should be employed at all levels with emphasis on the changing of operational codes at the lower tactical echelons.

d. The vulnerability of wire communication

to guerrilla action will normally dictate that wire be used only for internal communication within secure bases and installations. The physical wire system employed in the conventional role to connect brigade with battalion and battalions with companies will often not be feasible because of the vulnerability of such a system to guerrilla action and the difficulty of installing and maintaining wire in a counterguerrilla environment. Such lines as are installed and allowed to remain will be subject to monitoring by the guerrilla. When distances permit, consideration should be given to requesting radio-relay and carrier teams from the division signal battalion to provide a usable telephone and teletype system below brigade level.

e. Emphasis at all levels should be placed on the use of visual communication. Prearranged visual signals are especially effective for surface-to-surface communication between small units in proximity to each other, and for surface-to-air communication. Both infrared and visible light should be employed.

f. Motor messenger service is one of the most secure, economical, and reliable means of communication in limited and general war. In the counterguerrilla environment, however, its use is extremely limited. Motor messengers are vulnerable to snipers, mines, and roadblocks, and cannot be employed as a reliable means of communication without expending sizable combat strength on escort missions. Air messengers should be employed to carry the communication loads normally carried by motor messenger in limited and general war. Message drop and pickup methods should be employed when landing of aircraft is not feasible. For economy, aircraft on resupply, medical evacuation, or transport missions should also be utilized concurrently as air messenger vehicles.

g. Temporary or immediate requirements for communication with regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, or civil governmental agencies of the host country may be satisfied by exchange of communication equipment and liaison personnel. Continuing liaison communications requirement, or requirements beyond resolution on the local level, should be submitted to the appropriate ACC.

h. The expanded use of Army aircraft for

many types of missions in counterguerrilla operations increases the need for emphasis on a responsive and reliable air-ground communication system. Provision must be made to insure that any ground unit operating independently has the capability of communicating with its air support. In addition to radio communication, backup visual signal means with comprehensive codes should be provided.

i. Communication sites are prime targets for the guerrilla force. Communication personnel must take all feasible measures to secure and defend their installation within the capabilities of their own resources. However, commanders should be made aware of the limited capability for defense inherent in most signal teams or units and be prepared to commit combat forces to their security in the degree warranted by the importance of retaining command-control communication.

## 77. Ground Surveillance Sections

a. Since most tactical operations against guerrilla forces involve the use of small-unit patrols, particular consideration should be given to the use of radar teams at combat base and patrol bases to assist patrols by locating guerrilla activity, vectoring patrols toward guerrilla activity or on a desired route, and receiving coded signals from counterguerrilla patrols.

b. During the conduct of an encirclement, radar may be used effectively for surveillance forward of the line of encirclement to give early warning of an attempted breakout by encircled forces.

c. Since the nature of radar limits its use in densely vegetated areas, the defensive use around the combat base and other strongpoints should be emphasized. If properly sited, radar can give early warning of impending attacks by reporting guerrilla movement into probable attack or assault positions and along avenues of approach.

d. The ability of radar to vector aircraft during periods of low visibility increases the capability of resupplying isolated units during these periods.

## 78. Special Forces

U.S. special forces usually are employed un-

der the direction of the unified command when conducting unconventional warfare operations, but special forces may be assigned to, or function under the operational control of, other U.S. Army forces employed in counterguerrilla operations.

a. Special forces units are trained in both unconventional warfare and counterguerrilla operations. As far as counterguerrilla operations are concerned, special forces units have the capability to provide planning, training, advice, and operational assistance to selected host country forces.

b. U.S. Army special forces have the following capabilities:

- (1) To train, advise, and provide operational assistance to host country special forces-type units in unconventional warfare.
- (2) To advise host country special forces, provincial authorities, and tribal leaders in remote areas in organizing, training, and operating tribal elements; or to assist ethnic minority groups in providing security to local communities, conducting border operations, and performing military civic action.
- (3) To function as advisors to host country regular armed forces and paramilitary forces at division level and below, and to provide advisory assistance for special missions such as raids and long-range patrols.
- (4) To establish an operational evasion and escape system in hostile areas.

## 79. Military Dogs

Both scout and sentry dogs have value in counterguerrilla operations and should be used; however, the presence of a dog in a unit creates varied reactions among its personnel. Some may become apprehensive; others may feel an exaggerated sense of security. To avoid extreme reactions, the handler must brief the unit on the dog's mission, capabilities, and limitations (FM 20-20).

a. Scout dogs are organic to Infantry Scout Dog Platoon TOE 7-167, and are employed

with their handlers in support of brigade operations. The scout dog platoon leader should know in advance the numbers and types of patrols he is required to support. This allows him to use the most effective dog-handler teams, and gives the handlers time to prepare themselves and their dogs for the mission. The handler (and the dogs, as appropriate) should be completely integrated into the patrol during planning, rehearsal, execution, and debriefing phases. During planning, the handler makes recommendations to the patrol leader on the most effective employment of the dog.

b. Sentry dog units are composed of teams from TOE 19-500. The sentry dog is used principally on guard duty as a watchdog. He can be used to the best advantage in such critical areas as airfields, munition storage areas, ration dumps, motor pools, and warehouses. The sentry dog's primary function while on post is to detect an intruder and to alert the handler. The dog's secondary function is to pursue, attack, and hold any intruder who attempts to evade apprehension. The local commander is responsible for determining policies regarding the releasing of sentry dogs to attack intruders. Innocent people should be warned that they are approaching a restricted area guarded by sentry dogs.

## 80. Army Security Agency Units

The Army Security Agency (ASA) will be utilized to provide those types of intelligence security and electronic warfare support set forth in AR 10-122. Application of ASA support to elements will be organized to fit the specific missions. ASA unit mobility will be compatible with that of the supported unit. To accomplish its task, ASA support is echeloned into three compatible and integrated types as follows:

a. Manpack subsystem to furnish direct support to lower echelon combat troops in contact with the enemy.

b. Forward area subsystem to provide direct support to forward elements while utilizing vehicle mobility.

c. Rear area subsystem to incorporate ASA activities in support of all rear elements.

## 81. Military Police

Military police units in the performance of

their normal functions are an effective part of any counterguerrilla force. Early employment of military police units in an operational role provides a distinct advantage in accomplishing the police-type operations of the populace and resources control program. Military police operate in conjunction with the host country civil and military police. Planning is required to insure that an adequate number of military police units are available if populace and resources control operations are included as a mission. Military police units may require augmentation from TOE 19-500 to be prepared to fully engage in internal defense and development. Military police are particularly suited for employment in the following tasks:

a. *Populace and Resources Control Operations.* Operations in internal defense and development may involve extensive police activities to control the host country populace and material resources, including relocation, screening, identification, registration, enforcement of curfews, operation of patrols and checkpoints, and investigation of crime.

b. *Intelligence Operations.* Since criminal and guerrilla activities often overlap in their spheres of action, police activities will develop, over a period of time, informants and informant nets which will produce intelligence information for the brigade force.

c. *Searches.* Searches are conducted by military police in support of security operations conducted by combat and other units. Of particular importance in the military police support of the search are manning or supervising of search parties, securing persons or property captured, and evacuating prisoners. For details on search procedures, see paragraphs 201 through 206.

d. *Securing Ground Lines of Communication.* Military police assist in securing lines of communication by road and aerial patrolling; establishing traffic control points; escorting convoys, individual vehicles, and dignitaries; and by conducting continuing reconnaissance of their area of responsibility. In this capacity, they apprehend individual guerrillas and their supporters and are prepared to combat small guerrilla bands, or act as reporting and fixing forces until the arrival of combat units.

e. *Physical Security.* Military police provide

physical security to individuals and installations, to include populations of designated communities. See FM 19-30.

*f. Handling of Prisoners.* Military police process, secure, and evacuate captured persons and detainees in accordance with FM 19-40 and Department of the Army directives. See paragraph 249 for further information on handling captives and detainees.

## **82. Engineer**

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of engineer units are discussed under combat support and combat service support operations later in this manual, and in engineer branch manuals.

## **83. Military Intelligence**

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of military intelligence units are designed to support intelligence operations outlined throughout this manual and in the intelligence series field manuals.

## **84. Civil Affairs**

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of civil affairs units and personnel are covered throughout this manual and in the civil affairs series field manuals.

## **85. Psychological Operations**

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of psychological operations units are discussed later in this manual and in FM 33-1.

# **Section IV. PHASING DEPLOYMENT TO THE HOST COUNTRY**

## **90. General**

When the decision has been made to commit U.S. brigades to counterguerrilla operations in internal defense operations, planning will commence immediately for their employment. The operation must be considered against a background of a serious and deteriorating situation, because direct U.S. military action, as distinct from internal defense assistance, and internal development assistance, will not otherwise be required. The deployment of brigades normally includes some but not necessarily all of the following steps (the operations may overlap and be a part of a coordinated plan):

## **86. Artillery**

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of artillery organizations are discussed in combat support later in this manual, and in the artillery series field manuals.

## **87. Army Aviation**

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of Army aviation organizations are discussed under combat support and combat service support sections of this manual, and in aviation and airmobile operations series field manuals.

## **88. Medical Service**

The brigade will require significant augmentation of medical service organizations not only to support its tactical operations but to administer to the civilian population with which it comes in contact in base areas or during strike or consolidation operations. These organizations are particularly effective in military civic action. The missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of these units are discussed throughout this manual, particularly under combat service support, and in medical service field manuals.

## **89. TOE 500/600-Series Organizations**

Resources from these TOE will be required by the brigade to conduct counterguerrilla operations, and are discussed throughout this manual and in branch field manuals.

### **a. Preparatory operations.**

### **b. Points of entry, to include tactical bases.**

### **c. Consolidation operations to establish controlled areas.**

### **d. Strike operations.**

## **91. Preparatory Operations**

During the preparation for movement to the host country, commanders should consider the following:

### **a. The mission.**

### **b. Contingency plans.**

- c. Intensification of training for counter-guerrilla operations.
- d. Status-of-forces agreements.
- e. Liaison with U.S. advisors, MAAG, Missions, and unified commands or joint task forces, and host country organizations, as applicable.
- f. Language barriers.
- g. Geographical studies.
- h. Area intelligence.
- i. Organization of forces, to include prepositioning of heavy equipment needed in case of escalation.
- j. Organization and dispatch of an advance party.
- k. Reconnaissance and selection of points of entry.
- l. Selection of operational areas.
- m. Selection of tactical base sites.
- n. Communication support.

## 92. Points of Entry

The purpose of establishing a point of entry is to position brigades in areas from which they can initiate and sustain subsequent operations.

a. *Movement.* Brigades normally will be moved to the area of operations by air and/or sea, although in some instances overland movement may be possible. In some situations, entry may be necessary by amphibious, airdrop, or airlanded combat operations.

b. *Opposition.* Although it is assumed that the host country government will be in control of the point of entry, brigades must be prepared to meet opposition at the outset.

c. *Deployment.* Brigades will initially be concentrated in the general area of the point of entry, which will most probably remain as a logistical base for the forces. The situation may

dictate that U.S. forces be deployed to battalion or brigade areas and be prepared for guerrilla force reaction which may escalate to limited or general war, either nuclear or nonnuclear.

d. *Relationship with Host Country Forces.* During the initial period when brigades are being established at points of entry, the command-control and liaison relationships between brigades and host country military forces and civilian agencies should be established. As soon as practicable after brigades arrive at the points of entry, liaison within area coordination centers (para 53) should be established. The initial concern of the brigade within these centers should be the coordinated defense of the points of entry, to include coordination of patrolling and other security measures. Also, at these centers U.S. brigade commanders, in coordination with host country officials, may begin screening and recruiting local nationals for duty as scouts, guides, interpreters, porters, and laborers.

e. *Local Security.* Whatever the assumed reliability of local government elements, U.S. brigades will be responsible for their own local security. This may include the control of civilians in base areas, and control measures instituted by U.S. brigades on civilian populations coordinated with control measures of the local government.

f. *Operations.* During the establishment of the points of entry, it may be appropriate for brigades to initiate limited tactical operations as well as intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance, to assist host country forces charged with the responsibility of preserving law and order.

## 93. Strike Operations and Consolidation Operations

These operations are discussed in chapter 7.

# CHAPTER 7

## TACTICAL OPERATIONS

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### Section I. INTRODUCTION

#### 94. General

a. This chapter provides guidance on the missions, concepts, and organization of the brigade in conducting counterguerrilla tactical operations. Its scope includes the operational environment, the forces required, and the two primary types of counterguerrilla tactical operations: *strike operations* and *consolidation operations*, and the combat support required for each type.

b. References which provide further guidance on the various underlying concepts of counterguerrilla tactical operations include FM 31-22, FM 61-100, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20.

#### 95. Mission

The brigade will conduct tactical operations, in a coordinated campaign with host country, allied, and other U.S. military and civilian agencies, to harass or destroy the guerrilla force by strike operations, or to neutralize the guerrilla force and secure an area by consolidation operations.

#### 96. Concept

a. When guerrilla activities first begin to emerge, hostile activities range from threats of violence to situations in which antigovernment incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. These initial activities are usually countered by civil police and other government agencies capable of performing populace and resources control. Since there is no major outbreak of violence, and since there are no operational guerrilla forces which are uncontrollable by existing law enforcement elements, the host country regular armed forces and paramilitary forces are usually only mar-

ginally involved in tactical operations to counter the developing guerrilla force. If the guerrilla gains sufficient local and/or external support, he will initiate operations characterized by surprise; brief, violent action; and elusiveness. Various forms of guerrilla activity and operations may be conducted simultaneously, or in any combinations, in various geographical areas (ch. 4 and 5). Regardless of the method of employment of brigades—either to independent strike operations or in consolidated operations—they must be prepared tactically to counter concurrently all forms of guerrilla activity.

b. Guerrilla forces must be harassed and destroyed by strike operations, and concurrently they must be denied support from local civilians and/or external sponsoring powers. Civilian support may be denied to guerrillas by actions and operations in consolidation operations through intelligence/counterintelligence, populace and resources control, and military civic action. Support from an external sponsoring power may be denied to guerrilla principally by border control.

#### 97. Countering Small Guerrilla Forces

Operations conducted by regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, irregular forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government to counter small guerrilla forces include operations by squad and platoon forces widely dispersed to find, fix, and destroy small guerrilla forces. The following concepts are employed.

a. *Continuous, extensive patrolling* by small, highly mobile units moving by foot, track or wheel vehicle, air, or water. They will operate day and night in visiting populated areas, establishing surprise checkpoints on routes of communication, and preserving order outside

the boundaries of populated areas. In counter-guerrilla operations, the fundamentals of patrolling are generally the same as in conventional operations; however, patrolling will be more extensive and will frequently be the principal combat activity of small units. Commanders should recognize and emphasize the following employment considerations.

- (1) The common lack of detailed information concerning the guerrilla force and terrain.
- (2) The requirement to assign patrol areas rather than precise routes.
- (3) The increased time required for patrols to cover assigned areas (or routes).
- (4) The difficulty and undesirability of controlling patrols by means of a detailed time schedule.
- (5) The requirement for assigning patrols missions which provide flexibility to act on information gained during the patrol.
- (6) The increased difficulty in reinforcing and supporting patrols.

b. *Area ambushes* in which companies and battalions establish dispersed, but mutually supporting, small ambush sites over an area organized in depth and width, being careful to maintain an adequate reserve to prevent defeat in detail of individual ambush sites. The area ambush, when based upon accurate intelligence, is an effective technique for achieving maximum results against guerrilla forces moving about within an area. The area ambush consists of the primary ambush element which triggers the ambush, supported by smaller ambush groups which cover all likely routes of guerrilla withdrawal. Once the ambush is triggered, the smaller ambush groups open fire as the guerrilla force attempts to withdraw from the area.

c. *Numerous small raids* against towns and outlying areas suspected of harboring guerrilla personnel and/or materiel.

d. *Minimizing reserves* to permit employment of maximum resources in operations directly against the guerrilla.

e. *Minimizing static defenses* of outposts and other installations, depending on fire support,

close air support, and/or small mobile reserves to relieve posts under attack by guerrillas.

f. *Maximum use of civilian police* to patrol areas and to conduct populace and resources control operations.

g. *Maximum area coverage* by fire support weapons, with less emphasis on the requirement to mass fires on large forces.

h. *Immediate destruction of guerrilla forces* by units establishing the contact.

## 98. Countering Large Guerrilla Forces

The concepts outlined in paragraph 97 must be modified to meet a threat from large guerrilla forces. While the same activities and objectives in countering small guerrilla forces will be sought, larger reserves will be maintained, the size of operating units will be increased, the need to mass artillery fires will be greater, and larger security and defense detachments will be required.

a. The overall effect of the introduction of a large regular force capability by the guerrilla will be concentration of counterguerrilla forces. Brigade units may be centralized and required to conduct strike operations of brigade-size, or brigades may participate in strike operations as part of a larger force. The threat of the guerrillas' increased tactical capability must be watched closely and provisions made to concentrate larger counterguerrilla forces on short notice to counter this increased capability of the guerrilla force.

b. Since terrain, organized fires, and maneuver are used by guerrilla forces to seize and hold the initiative and not terrain for itself, maneuvers such as envelopments, penetrations, and turning movements may not produce the same effects on guerrilla forces as they would on field army-type tactical forces. Caches, guerrilla safe areas, and populations sympathetic to, or dominated by, the guerrilla may be so dispersed that guerrilla units are not dependent on a few critical logistical bases which they must protect. Under these conditions, a turning movement, for example, launched by counterguerrilla forces to cause the guerrilla force to react to protect a base, may produce movements in entirely different directions than those anticipated.

## **99. Countering Strong Guerrilla Defense**

A strong, position-type defense conducted by the guerrilla entails his use of limited and general warfare tactics and techniques. In these situations, the guerrilla will employ consolidated frontlines and highly coordinated positions, and will have rear areas normal to limited and general war. Countering such defenses will require conventional offensive operations, which are discussed in FM 7-20, FM 7-30, and FM 61-100.

## **100. Armor Employment**

Limited road nets, heavily wooded or inundated areas, and generally rugged terrain are usually characteristic of the operational environment of a guerrilla force. Since tank movement may be considerably limited in these areas, large-scale employment of tanks by counterguerrilla forces may be restricted. When tanks are used in counterguerrilla operations, careful selection of routes and axes of advance is necessary. Armor units of the counterguerrilla force will normally operate with infantry-heavy teams or task forces. However, in areas that permit mounted operations, tank-heavy teams and task forces should be employed to take advantage of the tank's firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect.

a. When employed, armor units, will be committed primarily in counterguerrilla tactical operations, but tank units may also be used to reinforce police and other civilian agencies in intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations. The tank, with its appearance of massiveness, is an excellent show-of-force weapon.

b. The tank unit commander must exercise firm control of fires and tank movement in counterguerrilla operations, and he must use minimum combat power required to accomplish his missions, as contrasted to employment of massed armor in limited and general war operations. A limitation may be placed on the use of the tank's firepower because of the presence of a population whose support may quickly be alienated if innocent people are killed or injured by indiscriminate application of fire. Even in areas permitting cross-country mo-

bility, uncontrolled movement of tanks may adversely influence a population if fields or crops are damaged.

c. For further details on armor employment, see FM 17-1, FM 17-15, FM 17-30, FM 17-36 and FM 17-95.

## **101. Mechanized Infantry Employment**

In counterguerrilla operations, terrain permitting, mechanized infantry units may operate independently or as part of a combined-arms team or task force. Attack and pursuit are primary roles for mechanized infantry when employed mounted in carriers. When dismounted or separated from the carrier, mechanized infantry will conduct offensive operations discussed in this manual in the same general manner as infantry units. See FM 7-11, FM 7-15 and FM 7-20.

a. Mechanized infantry forces are suited to counterguerrilla operations, terrain permitting, because of their flexibility and ability to operate equally well either mounted or dismounted. The increase in firepower and ground mobility associated with mounted infantry forces can produce decisive results if properly employed, especially against larger guerrilla forces.

b. Use of armored personnel carriers, where possible, will result in achieving a significant ground mobility advantage over guerrilla forces. If guerrilla forces have limited anti-armor capabilities, the armored personnel carrier can be used as a fighting vehicle against guerrilla forces in the open. Premature dismounting from carriers may cause unnecessary casualties and the loss of the carrier's speed, armor protection, and psychological effect. Riflemen usually dismount when—

- (1) Securing an objective after an assault, when prisoners must be secured, and when the area must be searched for hidden guerrillas and materiel. This task is accomplished by carriers and dismounted riflemen working as a team.
- (2) Terrain obstacles preclude armored vehicles closing with guerrilla forces. In this situation, a dismounted attack is immediately launched. If possible, carrier-mounted weapons are used to

fix the guerrilla by fire while dismounted elements maneuver to close with him.

- (3) The unit is unavoidably halted in an area which has not been secured. Observation and listening posts, patrols, and local security are provided by dismounted riflemen.
- (4) Missions such as search of an area are assigned.

## **102. Armored Cavalry Employment**

Terrain permitting, armored cavalry units are well suited for offensive operations against guerrilla forces. Their extensive means of communications, mobility, combined-arms organization, and capability to perform reconnaissance and security missions permit their operation over relatively large areas. Armored cavalry units may be used as separate maneuver units or to support the offensive operations of larger units.

## **103. Air Cavalry Employment**

Air cavalry units are used in offensive actions against guerrilla forces as separate maneuver units to support ground operations of armor and infantry units and to support airmobile operations. Since air cavalry units are not normally affected by the terrain obstacles usually encountered by ground maneuver units in counterguerrilla operations, the tactics, techniques, and procedures for offensive operations contained in FM 17-36 are readily adaptable to counterguerrilla operations.

## **104. Tank and Mechanized Infantry Team/Task Force Employment**

Tanks and carriers as part of a combined-arms team can be of value in counterguerrilla tactical operations, and every effort should be made to take advantage of the team's mobility and firepower. Limitations placed on the employment of armored vehicles by the terrain may be reduced significantly by reconnaissance, especially aerial reconnaissance, to determine favorable routes.

a. When tanks or carriers are used against guerrilla forces, they must be supported closely by infantry to guard against ambush. In the

early stages of their development, guerrilla forces usually lack sophisticated antitank weapons in great quantity; however, they may be skilled at improvising means to destroy or cripple tanks and carriers.

b. Terrain permitting, tanks or carriers may be used effectively in counterguerrilla tactical operations to—

- (1) Execute offensive strike operations, including harassment, against well-organized guerrilla forces.
- (2) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
- (3) Perform reconnaissance-in-force missions.
- (4) Provide convoy escort.
- (5) Provide mobile reserves for destruction missions or movement to blocking positions.
- (6) Conduct demonstrations and feints.
- (7) Assist in defense of base complexes and airfields.

## **105. Airmobile Forces Employment**

Airmobile forces offer effective means to fix and destroy guerrilla forces. Airmobile combat patrols may be employed to locate guerrillas by reconnoitering suspect localities, and assaulting guerrillas to capture or destroy them. Small numbers of troops and aircraft can patrol extensive areas, and centrally located reserves can reinforce units in contact. Airmobile teams, to include troop-carrying and armed aircraft, are formed. Armed helicopters engage guerrilla forces and maintain contact until other forces are deployed. Airmobile forces exploit their mobility by attacking guerrillas located in difficult terrain. During offensive operations, airmobile forces may be employed to block avenues of escape. The ability of aircraft to deliver assault forces quickly and immediately on guerrilla forces enhances tactical surprise. Aggressive ground attacks in conjunction with airmobile assaults exploit surprise and thereby aid in the destruction of the guerrilla force.

a. Detailed plans for airmobile operations against guerrilla forces are prepared to cover as many contingencies as practicable. As soon

as possible after units move into areas of operation, aviation unit commanders determine the location of potential landing areas, drop zones, and assembly areas throughout the area of operations. Whenever possible, detailed reconnaissance is made of these areas to determine suitability for use and the number and type of aircraft which can be accommodated. A catalog of these areas, together with all other available information, is of significant assistance in planning airmobile assaults to include employment of reserves in strike operations or consolidation operations.

b. The operational control of transport aircraft is retained at the lowest level of command commensurate with requirements for continuous employment to support the tactical operation. Whenever possible, sufficient aircraft will be provided to the brigade for the performance of routine support missions and for the simultaneous lift of the brigade force reserve. Under unusual circumstances, aircraft may be placed under operational control of battalions or companies for prolonged periods of time; however, it is more normal for aircraft to be placed in support of these units for the conduct of specific tasks or for specified short periods of time. Priority for the employment of transport aircraft is given to the reserve when committed. Aviation elements may be in an alert status within combat bases or at locations convenient to supported forces. When practicable, reserves and aircraft are held in the same general location.

c. Available information of the guerrilla force location, strength, disposition, and composition should be considered before airmobile elements are committed. Information collection is continued throughout the operation with emphasis on guerrilla antiaircraft fire capabilities. All means and sources are exploited to collect accurate and timely information to support continuing estimates of the situation.

d. In counterguerrilla operations conducted where a field army is not available to provide weather information, alternative measures must be adopted to obtain the information such as having deployed units down to battalion level regularly submit weather data of their area.

e. After the initial mission is completed, the

airmobile force may engage in a variety of other operations to include linkup with other forces to encircle the guerrilla forces, pursuit operations to exploit initial success, establishment of new combat bases, or withdrawal of troops from the area. Combat forces and logistical support are air-delivered as required. During operations, plans should stipulate that supporting aircraft continue to deliver troops, supplies, and equipment directly to the using ground units, thus reducing the requirements for stocking supplies or maintaining vulnerable land lines of communications. See FM 57-35 for detailed discussion of airmobile operations.

## 106. Airborne Force Employment

With their capability for vertical entry into areas of operation either by airdrop or air-landing, airborne forces are well suited for strike operations. Airborne infantry units may be assigned primary missions of combatting guerrilla forces. Airborne infantry battalions or rifle companies may be attached to infantry units conducting counterguerrilla tactical operations. The essential difference between airborne forces and other combat forces employed against guerrillas is the mode of entry into the area. For discussion of U.S. Army forces in joint airborne operations, see FM 57-10. An airborne infantry unit assigned the primary mission of combatting guerrilla forces will conduct the operations discussed in this manual in the same general manner as infantry units.

a. When airborne units compose all or part of reserve forces, the following considerations apply:

- (1) Ground alert of sufficient troop transport aircraft to airlift these forces is maintained.
- (2) Each airborne rifle company is reinforced with fire support and logistical support necessary to accomplish its mission.
- (3) Planning for the utilization of Army and Air Force aircraft must be considered. The use of Army aircraft necessitates utilization of Army pathfinders to mark the drop zone and operate the necessary communications and guidance equipment to insure dropping on the selected drop zone.

When Air Force aircraft are used, the combat control teams perform this function. These personnel should be maintained on 24-hour alert by the appropriate level of command.

- (4) Each airborne unit should maintain in a ready status all combat and parachute delivery equipment and rations to sustain itself in combat operations for required periods.
- (5) The use of an airborne forward observer (FO) during the early stages of an airborne operation must be considered. In addition to his ability to adjust indirect fire for the attacking force, his use as an airborne communication relay is indispensable.

b. The immediate employment of airborne forces in counterguerrilla tactical operations normally dictates that the troops drop on ex-

tremely small drop zones. Often, drop zones will be selected and marked by the pathfinder observer flying in an observation aircraft after the unit is airborne. The following measures are taken to insure drop patterns which will produce effectively deployed tactical units on small drop zones:

- (1) Aircraft are loaded tactically so platoons and squads land as units.
  - (2) Aircraft formations are employed which will provide a narrow drop pattern and facilitate rapid assembly of troops after the drop.
  - (3) Complete delivery of the personnel load of each aircraft is made in one pass over the drop zone.
- c. Unit SOP must provide for immediate employment without deliberate and detailed planning for a specific reserve mission.

## Section II. STRIKE OPERATIONS

### 107. General

This section provides general guidance on the missions, concepts, organization, and operations—to include tactics and techniques—involved in conducting strike operations. Strike operations (sometimes called search and clear, or search and destroy operations) inflict damage on, seize, disrupt, or destroy an objective—either terrain or hostile guerrilla forces. Other operations (consolidation operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations) are minimized during the period of a strike operation. Because strike operations are of relatively short duration (generally, from one day to several weeks), other activities are pursued only to the extent that they assist the brigade force while it is in the area of the strike operations. While the guidance outlined here is focused on the infantry brigade and its supporting organizations, the provisions of this section may be extended to apply to any combined-arms organization conducting counterguerrilla operations in any environment.

### 108. Mission

- Brigade strike operations are conducted to—
- a. Harass the guerrilla by all means available to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.
  - b. Destroy the guerrilla force and his base complexes.
  - c. Demonstrate support for the populace in the area.

### 109. Concept

Strike operations may be conducted in support of consolidation operations, but generally they are conducted against located guerrilla forces and bases. Additionally, they serve to keep the guerrilla forces on the move and off balance. Areas of strike operations are usually outside of those undergoing consolidation operations or those under friendly control, and generally comprise either areas under guerrilla control or contested areas. The objective of a strike operation is to harass or destroy guerrilla forces and usually entails no intent to remain permanently in the area of operations. Ground

or water means of entry may be used, but air-mobile or parachute delivery means are most adaptable to this type of operation, and these modes of entry should be stressed. Usually, a combination of means is required. Strike operations include offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in force, and coordinated attacks, or combinations of these operations.

## 110. Organization

Brigades assigned strike operations missions either are relieved from *area responsibility* well in advance of the strike mission, or preferably, will be constituted as specialized forces held at the national or regional levels, having no permanently assigned area responsibilities. Brigade strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces capable of operating for given periods of time in areas of operations normally remote from logistical bases, and capable of being sustained logistically by air. For organizations of brigade and battalion task forces, and their supporting elements, see paragraphs 70 and 71.

## 111. Areas of Operations

The brigade normally is assigned a specific area of operation, similar to an airhead, in which to conduct strike operations (fig. 8). Commanders will coordinate through area coordination centers (para 58) which will be responsive to the employment of all U.S. and host country resources available throughout their area of operations.


a. The brigade commander normally will assign operational areas to the subordinate battalions which, in turn, assign areas to companies. Company commanders may assign specific areas to platoons; however, platoons are normally assigned missions to further the accomplishment of the company mission throughout the company area. Brigades and battalions normally will each establish at least one combat base. Companies normally will operate from patrol bases, but at times may operate from separate company combat bases. The size of the area assigned to a unit depends on the mission, the terrain, the nature of the guerrilla force, and the counterguerrilla forces available. When the areas assigned to units are too large to be reconnoitered concurrently by sub-

ordinate units, commanders establish a priority for reconnaissance of the areas.

b. Battalion areas of operations are dependent upon the mission, the nature of the terrain, the guerrilla forces, and friendly troops available. Battalion commanders assign areas of operations to the rifle companies, retaining sufficient battalion reserve to react rapidly as opportunities occur. A typical battalion area containing three company areas is shown in figure 9. Each of the rifle company areas of operation will be patrolled continuously and aggressively. The location of the company patrol base and routes assigned must be varied to insure complete coverage of the area.

c. The size of the company area assigned will vary, depending on the nature of the terrain and the estimated strength of the guerrilla force. A typical rifle company area is shown in figure 10. The rifle company moves to, secures, and occupies the company patrol base, carrying sufficient supplies to permit independent operations based on resupply capabilities. If the unit is to operate in the same area for a relatively extended period of time, consideration should be given to establishing several small ration and ammunition caches. The company headquarters normally accompanies one of the platoons. The company area is patrolled to provide complete coverage day and night with emphasis on the night patrols where terrain and other conditions permit. Generally, a rifle platoon-size patrol has sufficient firepower to fight most guerrilla elements it is likely to encounter; however, if larger units are encountered, the company commander may concentrate his other platoons against these forces, and/or request that the battalion reserve (reaction force) be committed. Emphasis is placed both on engaging the guerrilla with organic means of fire and maneuver, and employing artillery, aerial fire, and close air support.

d. Orders issued to the company commanders include the area to be patrolled, time allocated to patrol the area, and resupply instructions. The conduct of operations is based on decentralized planning and execution. Company commanders keep fully informed of the activities of their platoons in order to coordinate their activities and to insure maximum success of the overall company mission. Platoons on patrol



NOTES: (1) APPLICABLE TO BOTH STRIKE OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS.

(2) DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRES MUST BE PLANNED THROUGHOUT THE BRIGADE AREA OF OPERATIONS.


*Figure 8. Brigade area of operations.*

carry assault rations and leave unnecessary equipment at company or battalion bases.

e. Battalion combat bases normally are resupply points for rifle companies. Rifle company mortars may be located in battalion combat bases, with mortar FO accompanying the companies. If the terrain and situation permit, battalion combat bases may be moved as the companies move their patrol bases. If communities are located in the area, and if security conditions permit, battalion bases are located

near (but do not include) the community to conduct concurrent psychological and intelligence operations and military civic action missions, and to insure security of the base and afford secrecy of base operations. Suitable landing zones for aerial evacuation and resupply are established at battalion combat bases and at company patrol bases as required.

f. Raids and ambushes to harass and destroy guerrilla forces will be used to the maximum within battalion areas of operations. Night op-



NOTES: (1) APPLICABLE TO BOTH STRIKE OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS.


(2) DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY AND ORGANIC MORTAR FIRES MUST BE PLANNED THROUGHOUT THE BATTALION AREA OF OPERATIONS.

*Figure 9. Battalion area of operations.*

erations are conducted against guerrillas moving about the area of operations on tactical and administrative missions. Daylight operations are directed primarily against guerrilla encampments or installations.

g. Separation of tactical units from parent headquarters is normal in counterguerrilla operations, but they must operate as part of a well-coordinated plan and be prepared to concentrate rapidly. Objectives normally are not oriented on terrain, but rather on destroying guerrilla forces. Once guerrilla forces have been located, priority of all available combat power is given to operations to destroy or incapaci-

tate the guerrilla. Destruction missions normally require a counterguerrilla force larger than the located guerrilla force. Reserves (reaction forces)—normally the main destruction units—immediately apply sufficient combat power to engage and destroy guerrilla forces before the guerrilla forces disperse. The use of airmobile and airborne forces is emphasized for the conduct of strike operations. The use of chemical agents to incapacitate a guerrilla force will enable the counterguerrilla force to attain its objective with minimum firepower. After a successful attack on guerrilla forces, the area is



LEGEND:

- DAY PATROL ROUTE
- NIGHT PATROL ROUTE
- AMBUSH SITE
- TOWN (HAMLET)
- ROAD OR TRAIL

- NOTE: (1) APPLICABLE TO BOTH STRIKE OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS.  
 (2) AMBUSH SITES ARE OCCUPIED ON A 24-HOUR BASIS.  
 (3) NORMALLY, THE MAJORITY OF THE UNIT'S STRENGTH IS DEVOTED TO NIGHT PATROLS.

*Figure 10. Type patrolling in rifle company area of operations (schematic).*

thoroughly searched for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, and documents.

## 112. Operations

Intensive reconnaissance and reliable intelligence is required to develop the situation to include the size and location of guerrilla forces. Once guerrilla forces have been located and fixed in place, strike forces maneuver to kill or capture the guerrillas. The guerrillas' ability to hide weapons and assume noncombatant roles in attempting to avoid capture will require strike forces to conduct thorough search of the

area and to capture and collect all suspected, as well as known, guerrillas. In planning strike operations, commanders and staffs must allot sufficient time to perform thorough search operations. Suspects must be handled with firmness but with fairness and respect to avoid turning innocent suspects into guerrilla sympathizers. When small units conducting reconnaissance missions discover relatively large guerrilla forces, mobile reserves (reaction forces) may be required to destroy the guerrilla forces. Deliberate attacks undertaken after thorough reconnaissance, methodical evalua-

tion of relative combat power, acquisition and development of targets, and analysis of all other factors affecting the situation are rare in counterguerrilla operations. The elusive nature of guerrilla forces normally precludes this time-consuming preparation. If intelligence is sufficiently reliable to locate guerrilla forces precisely, or if guerrilla installations or troops are fixed, the raid is feasible. If, as is usually the case, an area is only suspected of harboring guerrilla forces or installations, a reconnaissance in force followed by a coordinated attack or raid will be required.

### 113. Raid

A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, harass the hostile guerrilla force, or destroy his installation. It ends in a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. A successful raid is based on accurate, up-to-date, and detailed information of the area, unit, or installation to be raided. Inclement weather or periods of limited visibility, or terrain considered impassable are used to assist in attaining surprise.

a. The raiding force may vary in size from a squad to a reinforced battalion. The force is normally organized into an assault element and a security element. Larger raiding forces may have support elements. Small raiding forces may be organized into assault and security elements only, with supporting weapons included in the assault element.

b. The use of airborne and airmobile reserves in a raid, where the terrain permits, enhances surprise; and airdropping troops at night into objective areas offers a variety of tactics to be used in areas the guerrilla may consider relatively secure. If night airborne or airmobile raids are conducted, the area must be one in which the counterguerrilla force can easily orient itself on the ground, and measures must be taken to insure accurate delivery. Airmobile combat patrols supported by armed helicopters offer infinite possibilities for conducting raids on guerrilla installations, taking advantage of the firepower and mobility of the helicopter. This type of raid force can move in, strike the objective, and withdraw without extensive preparation or support from other sources.

c. For additional information on the composition and organization of raid forces, see FM 7-20 and FM 21-75.

### 114. Reconnaissance in Force

A reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation by a considerable force to discover and test the hostile guerrilla force dispositions and strengths or to develop other intelligence. It must be followed immediately by a coordinated attack or raid on located forces or installations. Reconnaissance in force in counterguerrilla operations is characterized by thorough search of the area. When guerrilla units are operating in smaller-than-platoon size, counterguerrilla force platoons may conduct reconnaissance in force, using the combat power provided by artillery and other fire support. If large, guerrilla forces are located, small units should maintain contact and attempt to fix the guerrilla forces until reserves can be employed to assist in the capture or destruction of the guerrilla. Brigade forces engaged in reconnaissance in force have the capability to attack in company and battalion strength, when required, by maneuvering units to the location of the guerrilla force. The advantages brigade forces possess in firepower, communications, and ground and airmobility are exploited.

### 115. Movement to Contact

Movement to contact in counterguerrilla tactical operations is basically the same as in limited and general war operations. Night movement, clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions are emphasized. Lead elements of advancing units move by bounds. Where terrain permits, the lead element moves from one favorable position to the next, covered by a strong base of fire in position to engage any resistance encountered. Leading elements of the advancing strike forces gain and maintain contact with the guerrillas. If the guerrillas withdraws, every effort will be made to retain contact. In many situations, action by committed forces and subordinate elements may develop into a series of meeting engagements. Care must be taken to avoid ambushes in movement to contact. When brigades move by ground to the strike area, and on subsequent unit maneuvers, tactical movements must be employed.

Habitual use is made of the movement to contact and reconnaissance in force. To prevent ambush of counterguerrilla forces, to gain or reestablish contact, or to develop guerrilla force dispositions, strike operations are best accomplished by airdrop or airmobile assault. Movement by air insures surprise and avoids the inherent dangers in ground movement to contact.

## 116. Pursuit

The pursuit (fig. 11) is an offensive operation against a retreating hostile force. It may consist entirely of direct-pressure forces (as in a frontal attack) or a combination of direct-pressure and encircling forces (as in envelopment). It is the final phase of the exploitation and occurs when the guerrilla attempts to disengage. It has as its primary purpose the destruction of the guerrilla force, which is in the process of disengaging, rather than preventing the guerrilla force from reorganizing an effective defense. Although terrain objectives may be assigned, the primary objective is the guerrilla force itself. When direct-pressure forces combined with encircling forces are employed, the direct-pressure force maintains constant pressure on the guerrilla as he withdraws. The encircling force should have a mobility advantage over the guerrilla. Both the direct-pressure force and the encircling force employ all available fire support (artillery, air, and naval gunfire) to assist in the accomplishment of the destruction mission.

## 117. Encirclement

Encirclement (fig. 12) offers the best possibility for fixing guerrilla forces in position and achieving decisive results. The brigade, battalion, and (to a limited degree) the company may conduct encirclements. The company, and smaller units, normally possess insufficient personnel strength and command and control capability to conduct encirclements except against small, concentrated guerrilla forces. All units of the brigade may participate in encirclements conducted by a larger force.

a. Planning, preparation, and execution are aimed at complete encirclement of the guerrilla force. Maximum security and surprise can be

gained by completing the encirclement during the hours of darkness.


b. Encircling movements are executed rapidly. Maximum use of airmobile and airborne troops will contribute speed and surprise to the early phases of the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneously in order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not possible, escape routes most likely to be used are covered first. Initial occupation is the most critical period of the operation. If large guerrilla formations realized during this period that they are being encircled, they can be expected to react immediately to probe for gaps or attack weak points to force a gap.

c. Units occupying the encircling positions provide strong combat patrols well to their front so early warning of attempted breakouts may be received and escape routes blocked. Mobile reserves are positioned for immediate movement to counter any threat of a breakout, and to reinforce difficult areas such as deep ravines or areas containing cave or tunnel complexes.

d. Indirect fire support can serve to cloak an impending encirclement by gaining and maintaining the guerrilla's attention through interdiction and harassing fires while encircling units move into position. Fires, including fires of field artillery, should be planned in detail to support the encirclement after it is discovered.

e. Following the initial encirclement, the capture or destruction of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly by use of fire and maneuver in a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the line of encirclement is progressively contracted, and depending on terrain, units may be removed from the line and added to the reserve. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by progressive contraction; however, against larger guerrilla forces, it is probable that, at some point, some action other than further contraction will be required.

- (1) One technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide it, permitting the destruction of guerrillas in each subarea.
- (2) Another technique, employed after




*Figure 11. Pursuit.*


some degree of contraction, is to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeter while part of the line of encirclement forces the guerrillas against the blocking force by offensive action. Either element may accomplish the actual destruction, but it will usually be accomplished by the attacking element. This technique is most effective when the blocking force is located on, or immediately in the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.

### 118. Operations in Built-Up Areas

Built-up areas are usually unfavorable for guerrilla force operations. Guerrillas will not normally choose to fight in these areas; however, underground elements in cities and towns may incite organized rioting, seize portions of urban areas, erect barricades, and resist attempts of counterguerrilla forces to enter the area. Noncombatants in the area are usually held as hostages and used as shields by guerrilla forces to deter the application of maximum com-



A. INITIAL ENCIRCLEMENT BY A THREE-BATTALION BRIGADE TASK FORCE.



B. PLATOON POSITIONS FOR INITIAL ENCIRCLEMENT.

LEGEND: SECURITY DETACHMENTS  
 AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

NOTE: (1) SECURITY DETACHMENTS MOVE IN AS COUNTERGUERRILLA FORCES MOVE FORWARD.

(2) APPLICABLE TO BOTH STRIKE OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS.

*Figure 12. Occupation of the initial encirclement.*

bat power by counterguerrilla forces. Operations to counter these activities will be assisted by civilian police actions. For details of combat in fortified and built-up areas, see FM 31-50.

### **119. Reserves**

Reserves (reaction forces) are retained by the brigade and its subordinate units either within the strike area or at some distance from the strike area, or both, to enter combat offensively at a decisive time and place to complete the accomplishment of the destruction mission. Reserves also provide commanders with means to deal with unforeseen contingencies. Mobility, particularly airmobility, vastly enhances the employment of reserves.

a. Reserves may be used to exploit success by—

(1) Reinforcing the attack.

(2) Maintaining or increasing the momentum of the attack.

(3) Defeating or blocking counterattacks.

(4) Providing security.

(5) Creating diversions.

b. Dispersal of reserve elements into multiple assembly areas or march columns provides flexibility, and locations that facilitate rapid movement to points of probable employment are occupied. In strike operations, emphasis is placed on transporting reserves by air. Regardless of how they move, reserves must be positioned within supporting distances of committed forces.

## **Section III. CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS**

### **120. General**

This section provides general guidance on the missions, concepts, organization, and operations used by the brigade in conducting consolidation operations. Consolidation operations (sometimes called clear and hold operations) are, in essence, the application of all aspects of national internal defense and internal development programs to specific regions, states (provinces), counties (districts), or other political subdivisions to maintain or restore internal security of that area.

### **121. Mission**

The brigade will conduct consolidation operations to neutralize the guerrilla domination of a given area and to provide a secure area in which continuing civilian and military internal development operations may be conducted.

### **122. Methods of Operation**

Consolidation operations maintain or restore host country governmental control of the populace and resources of the area and provide an area within which the economic, political, social, and civic activities of the population may be pursued and improved. Brigades committed to consolidation operations support

the overall internal defense and development effort by the application of their resources in the following methods:

a. In the offensive phase, tactical offensive operations of the strike variety are stressed, the other internal defense and development operations being subordinated to the tactical mission during this phase.

b. In the defensive phase, tactical defensive operations, to include extensive patrolling and defense of the area, will be the primary missions of the brigade. During this phase, U.S. brigades will perform advisory assistance in training host country paramilitary and irregular forces for defensive missions, populace and resources control operations, and intelligence and psychological operations, and the brigades will initiate military civic action programs. When guerrilla activity within an area being consolidated has been neutralized, and when normal host country civilian and governmental agencies have resumed control of the consolidated area, the brigade will be free to expand its counterguerrilla operations to other areas.

### **123. Concept**

Consolidation operations involve the implementation in the field by area governmental heads (usually at state level) of integrated

permanently, the main theme should stress the security of the population and the internal development program. In strike operations, which are not intended to provide continuous security for the inhabitants, the theme employed should state the purpose of the operation and may invite the populace to move to friendly controlled areas for their own welfare and safety. In combat actions, every effort must be made to provide for the safety of the civilian population and, if possible, to separate them from the guerrilla forces so that the maximum available firepower can be employed against the guerrilla. The decision to employ psychological operations media to accomplish this task must be carefully weighed against compromising surprise and security. Themes employed against guerrilla forces should stress the failures of their economic or political systems as they apply to the individual, rather than using ideological rebuttals; the power of the host

country and U.S. forces; and the hardships endured by the guerrilla.

c. Brigade intelligence operations can be facilitated by employing psychological operations media to inform the people that they should report to the proper authorities information pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, unusual activities by neighbors, and guerrilla activities. Posters and leaflets should provide definitive instructions as to persons and places that are available to receive this information. The message should indicate what rewards, if any, are available.

d. Captured or defected leaders of the guerrilla force should be exploited. Written and broadcast messages prepared by these individuals and reviewed by trained psychological operations personnel of the brigade may be used in communities suspected of supporting guerrilla forces, and in tactical operations against guerrilla forces.

## Section IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

### 154. General

This section provides general guidance in the missions, concepts, organization, and conduct of brigade civil affairs operations as part of counterguerrilla operations. Only those aspects that are particularly pertinent to internal defense operations have been expanded in this section. For further details of civil affairs operations see the FM 41-series.

### 155. Responsibilities

a. Civil affairs operations are those activities of a command, which obtain for a military commander essential civilian cooperation and support or reduce civilian interference in a given locality, area, or country in the attainment of his objective. They affect the relationship between his military forces and the civil authorities and people of the country or area in which such forces are located and may involve the performance of military forces of some or all of the functions normally performed by civil government.

b. The civil affairs responsibilities of the counterguerrilla force commander can be broken down into seven major activities.

- (1) Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.
- (2) Provision of or support for the functions of government for a civilian populace.
- (3) Community relations of the military force.
- (4) Military Civic Action as part of the Internal Development Program.
- (5) Military Involvement in the Populace and Resources Control program as part of Internal Defense Operations.
- (6) Military support of Civil Defense.
- (7) Consolidation Psychological Operations.

c. Command priority will be given to those major CA activities which are most closely related to the accomplishment of the command mission. The CA staff element will plan and supervise all CA activities of the command to provide for maximum command effort in support of this mission. In internal defense operations, priority of CA activity will normally be given to military civic action and to military participation in the populace and resources control program, but as important as these two

functions are the commander cannot presume that they will meet his total civil affairs responsibility.

### 156. Objectives

In counterguerrilla operations, the objective of civil affairs operations will always be to provide civilian support for, and to prevent civilian interference with, the Brigade tactical operations against guerrilla forces. Success in achieving this objective largely depends on—

- a. Adequate plans at all levels stating official guidance, policy, decisions, and detailed directions on matters which are likely to arise.
- b. Proper organization for the conduct of civil affairs operations at all levels.

### 157. Concept

a. During the initial stages of guerrilla development, U.S. military forces already deployed to a host country, may not yet be involved in counterguerrilla tactical operations and, although they may be heavily involved in training, it is during this period that they are able to make significant contributions to national development programs through military civic action. Through these efforts, the co-operation and active support of the population will be engendered, and vital intelligence, personnel and resources support, and psychological support will be rendered the host country and denied to the guerrillas. This program supports populace and resources control operations and, in turn, is supported by PSYOP and intelligence operations; therefore, these operations should be closely coordinated.

b. Both the guerrilla force and the host country government conduct operations based on the population. Each side seeks to deprive the other of manpower, resources, and intelligence support. Initially, the national government usually has at its disposal almost all of these assets, although it may not actually control them. The guerrillas seek to gain control of these assets through a combination of persuasion, terror, and tactical operations. In many cases, the government of a developing country learns too late that it actually does not control the more remote regions of the country. The time, administration, and know-how required

to develop a populace and resources control program may not be available in the more isolated areas, and for this reason, guerrilla influence may expand rapidly in these areas. The brigade normally will assist host country civil police agencies and U.S. civilian agencies in populace and resources control missions. Populace and resources control operations support, and are supported in turn by, tactical operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations. Populace and resources control involves every phase of governmental activity needed to insure mobilization of people and resources for the government and to deny them to the insurgent movement or antigovernment guerrilla force. Among the aspects of populace and resources control those of primary interest to the brigade involve the provision of security to host country and U.S. resources, institutions, industries, and personnel. While civil police have primary responsibility for the provision of such security, they may require military augmentation for the accomplishment of this mission. Where the civil police are unavailable or unreliable, military and paramilitary forces may have to undertake primary responsibility until adequate and reliable civil police can be recruited and trained.

### 158. Organization

In counterguerrilla operations, civil affairs staff representation is required at all levels from battalion task force upward. If a commander is not provided with specialist Civil Affairs elements, he must discharge his responsibilities with the resources available. Specialist Civil Affairs elements including functional teams from the TOE 41-500-series are discussed in chapter 18.

### 159. Military Civic Action

This manual focuses on military counterguerrilla tactical operations, and brigades assigned these missions are required to participate to varying degrees in military civic action. In the consolidation phase of tactical operations, priority of the brigade effort may be given to military civic action, while in strike operations, or in the offensive phase of counterguerrilla tactical operations, relatively few brigade re-

sources will be devoted to this activity. U.S. brigades will probably have technical capabilities which exceed anything available in a developing area. This is true particularly in the more remote areas where military forces are likely to be employed in counterguerrilla tactical operations. Units at fixed or semifixed installations are particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attack, subversion, and sabotage. In many cases, however, they are, by the same token, well equipped to participate in military civic action. The opportunity to develop the loyalty of the surrounding population is capitalized upon. All military civic action must be co-ordinated through the appropriate Area Coordination Center (ACC). Civil affairs staff sections plan and provide staff supervision for the military civic action program. This involves integrating the efforts of such elements as medical specialists, engineers, transportation, and others. Specialist Civil Affairs elements if assigned, also may perform certain military civic action tasks if the tasks fall in functional areas dealing with host country governmental procedures and economies. In any case, civil affairs staff sections assist commanders to coordinate brigade military civic action programs with the internal development effort of the host country. Working with brigade troops, the civil population gains knowledge and experience in performing future similar tasks unassisted, and, through personal contact, mutual respect is fostered. Where possible, units should be utilized to support the military civic action program by providing teams to advise and assist the people during the progress of work. Combat units are capable of supporting the majority of military civic action missions; however, when technical assistance and construction beyond their capabilities is required, augmentation from higher headquarters or from TOE-500-series should be assigned.

a. Military civic action must not be a haphazard and chance operations. Basic planning steps are—

- (1) Consider the political, economic, and sociological background of the area and people.
- (2) Consider the capability of the brigade, including time, know-how, and equipment available to do the job.

(3) Determine the most critical projects required, taking into account national internal development plans, the desires of the local people, and the local situation.

(4) Select courses of action.

b. Critical considerations in executing military civic action programs are—

- (1) The projects should be desired by the local population so that they can be persuaded to maintain them. In many cases, what appears to be military civic action is merely a case of local citizens meeting their tax assessments through labor instead of cash payment.
- (2) At the other extreme, desired results might not be achieved by having brigade forces perform all of the work. A gift from the government is apt to mean something quite different to a traditionally voteless villager than it would to an American.
- (3) The national internal development plan usually prescribes certain types of projects which can be undertaken as military civic action, and local desires usually encompass a certain number of projects. Projects actually undertaken should be those which are found on both lists.
- (4) Care must be taken that the project does not favor one segment of the population.
- (5) Care must be taken to avoid having brigade units assist villagers of questionable loyalty to achieve higher standards of living than other loyal citizens enjoy.
- (6) The basic reasoning behind projects must be understandable to the citizens. A project to develop a clean water supply will soon fail if the villagers do not understand the need for clean water. Villagers who do not understand the disease-carrying characteristics of rats will soon lose interest in a rodent-control program.
- (7) Provision must be made for maintenance of the project after the project

team departs. A technical capability should exist in the village, and the local host country government should be prepared to supply spare parts, as necessary. Responsibilities should be fixed.

- (8) Elements of the U.S. Country Team, international nonprofit organizations, or multinational organizations may be engaged in internal development activities. Where cooperation with these elements is possible and productive, it should be exploited.

## 160. Populace and Resources Control

The brigade populace and resources control program has the basic objective of isolating the guerrilla force from the population and resources of the brigade operational area. It is designed to complement and support other counterguerrilla operations and environmental improvement being conducted by the military forces, and to contribute to the overall stability of the country or the operational area. To the maximum extent possible, control of the populace and resources should be performed by host country agencies. This is a matter of practicality, but there are also legal and psychological implications. Brigade participation in the populace and resources control program could range from very minor support in the countryside at large to complete control in U.S. bases. In any case, the program must be coordinated in the appropriate ACC.

a. The control measures established are a joint military/civilian effort. Administrative measures imposed to control the populace and resources, and to minimize the ability of the populace to collaborate with guerrilla forces, may include the following tasks:

- (1) Checkpoint and patrol operations.
- (2) Search operations.
- (3) Surveillance.
- (4) Apprehension of guerrilla sympathizers.
- (5) Prevention of illegal political meetings and rallies.
- (6) Registration and documentation of all civilians.

- (7) Inspection of individual identification documents, permits, and passes.
- (8) Restrictions on public and private transportation and communication means.
- (9) Curfew.
- (10) Censorship.
- (11) Control of production, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs, and protection of food-producing areas.
- (12) Control of the possession of arms, ammunition, demolitions, drugs, medicine, and money.
- (13) Evacuation of areas, as required.

b. Execution of the brigade populace and resource control program will be based on, and closely integrated with, the host country populace and resources control operations. It may not be possible for the host country government to spare a sufficient number of qualified personnel to accompany brigade operations; nevertheless, the populace and resources control aspects of all operations will remain important.

c. Brigade units must be trained to recognize and react to the many populace and resources control problems which they will encounter in their normal screening and checkpoint operations. Combat troops searching an area must know what critical items are subject to licensing or are considered contraband in the hands of civilians (para 201-206). Examples of this are—

- (1) Civilians found possessing such combinations as potassium chlorate and arsenic sulfide, which make lethal explosives when combined, should be immediately suspect.
- (2) Objects which appear to be harmless, such as blacksmith equipment, or a concentration of sewing machines in a possible uniform factory, should alert brigade elements to the possibility of a well-camouflaged guerrilla base area.
- (3) It is possible that apparently suspicious circumstances may be quite innocent. To destroy or confiscate a stock of medicine found in a hut, without investigation for example, could have

crucial psychological consequences. It could be insulin required by a diabetic, possibly a close relative of a host country soldier who is also combatting guerrillas. A concentration of sewing machines might be a tailor shop licensed by the host country government and subject to regular inspection by the local police.

- (4) The host country government probably will have an extensive list of chemicals, medicines, fertilizers, machines, and equipment which are subject to regulation.

d. Other populace and resources control measures may include identification card systems, photographs of all household members, permits to travel outside the area, curfews, block-reporting systems, "staged" incidents to test informant nets, and work, school, and civil organization attendance records.

e. The extent of control imposed upon the civilian populace depends on the degree of co-operation by the population within the assigned area. Often, it will be necessary to insure rigid control of a populace collaborating with guerrilla forces. Brigade troops screening an area or manning checkpoints must be able to deal with a broad spectrum of critical items and unknown individuals. U.S. elements performing these missions must be able to make rapid decisions which are in accord with the comprehensive national program for populace and resources control.

f. Checkpoint operations are employed normally as surprise checks, to control the movements of civilians, to confiscate illegal goods, to apprehend guerrillas, and to check the adequacy of other controls such as the use of identification passes and travel permits. Elements of the brigade must be trained and rehearsed so as to be capable of quickly establishing checkpoints.

- (1) Checkpoints normally are located where there is sufficient space for assembling people under guard and for parking vehicles for search and investigation. Troops must be positioned in the vicinity of the checkpoint, to apprehend those vehicles and individuals attempting to avoid the checkpoint,

and to provide fire support. Local security must be posted to protect the checkpoint.

- (2) The processing of individuals and vehicles at the checkpoint is as rapid and efficient as possible. The attitude of the personnel conducting the operations should be impersonal. Search must be thorough.

g. Search operations, in populace and resources control, are conducted to clear a built-up area, search watercraft, apprehend guerrillas, and seize illegal arms, communication means, medicines, and other items of a critical nature. A search operation is conducted as a preventive measure against the accumulation of critical items by the population and the harboring of guerrillas, and in accomplishing administrative control measures previously established. (For details on search operations, see para 201-206.)

h. Block control is the constant surveillance and reporting of activities within a block or other small, populated area by a resident who has been appointed and is supervised by an appropriate authority in the counterguerrilla force. Block control is one of the most effective and economical means of populace and resources control; however, the system takes considerable time to establish and, by its nature, operates more effectively under civil authority than under military control. Brigade forces must actively support and exploit existing block control systems in their assigned area.

- (1) Block control is instituted by dividing each block (or area) in zones, each of which includes all the buildings on one side of a street within a block. A zone leader is appointed from among the residents for each zone, and a separate block leader is appointed for each block. Zone leaders report to block leaders all movements, to include arrivals and departures. The block leader reports periodically to the military commander or civil authority on all movements within his block. Unusual activities are reported immediately.

- (2) If the loyalty of the zone and block

leaders is questionable, informants may be located throughout the area as an effective check on their operations.

i. Under certain conditions, the rural population may be concentrated, by relocation, in protected villages. The potential loss in goodwill should be balanced carefully against the probable increase in security before deciding to relocate villagers.

j. Materiel and equipment must be controlled

at the point of origin, in storage, in transit, at the distribution point, and in the end use. Control may be accomplished through licensing, outright prohibition, or the substitution of relatively harmless materials. An example of substitution would be to prohibit the import of 82-mm pipe (convertible into mortars) but to permit uncontrolled import and manufacture of 77-mm construction pipe which would have no particular value to guerrilla forces.

## Section V. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

### 161. General

This section provides general guidance on the missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of brigades conducting military civic action in counterguerrilla operations in internal defense and development environments. While this manual focuses on military counterguerrilla tactical operations, brigades assigned these missions are required to participate to varying degrees in military civic action or that civic action performed or supported by military or paramilitary forces using their military skills, equipment, and resources in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups. Civic action is the participation by an agency, organization, or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels, but for which the sponsor does not have primary governmental responsibility. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population. In the defensive phase of consolidation operations, priority of the brigade effort may be given to military civic action, while in the offensive phase of consolidation operations, or in strike operations, relatively few brigade resources will be devoted to this activity. For more details of U.S. policy and doctrine governing military civic action, see the FM-41-series, and FM 100-5 and FM 100-20. For branch involvement in military civic action, see the branch series field manuals.

### 162. Purpose

The brigade, either voluntarily or by direction, contributes to the economic and social development of the population in order to improve its environment, to improve the standing of host country, U.S. and allied armed forces with the population in the operational area, and to develop the spirit and practice of cooperation between civilian and military members of the community.

### 163. Concept

National economic and civic development programs provide the overall matrix of national programs which prescribe economic modernization and social progress activities. The military involvement in these activities is called military civic action. It is a critical element in the counterguerrilla program, and in the initial stages of guerrilla development, national internal development receives great emphasis. It is during this period that the military forces are least employed in counterguerrilla tactical operations and, although they may be heavily involved in training, they are able to make significant contributions to national development programs. Through these efforts, the cooperation and active support of the population will be engendered, and vital intelligence, personnel and resources support, and psychological support will be rendered the host country and denied to the guerrillas. Military civic action supports, and in turn is supported by, tactical operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, population and resources control operations, and advisory assistance operations.

Military civic action should be coordinated in the local ACC.

## 164. Organization

The standard U.S. brigade organization will probably have technical capabilities which exceed those available in a developing area, especially in those remote areas where the brigade is likely to be employed in counterguerrilla tactical operations.

a. *Civil Affairs Personnel.* When available, civil affairs personnel may plan and provide staff supervision for the military civic action program. This involves integrating the efforts of such elements as medical specialists, engineers, transportation, and others. Civil affairs elements also may perform certain military civic action tasks especially when the tasks fall in functional areas dealing with host country governmental procedures and economies. In any case, civil affairs personnel assist commanders in coordinating brigade military civic action programs with the internal development effort of the host country.

b. *Engineers.* The support of that portion of the military civic action program which requires assistance and planning in the construction of facilities for use and benefit of the civil population is best accomplished by engineer units, which are well suited by their organization, equipment, and skills to undertake such tasks. Construction units normally remain under control of a higher headquarters, but may be attached lower than division level. For a discussion of engineer construction units, see FM 5-162.

## 165. Operations

Working with brigade troops, the civil population gains knowledge and experience in performing future similar tasks unassisted, and, through personal contact, mutual respect is fostered. Where possible, units should be utilized to support the military civic action program by providing teams to advise and assist the people during the progress of work. Combat units are capable of supporting the majority of military civic action missions; however, when technical assistance and construction beyond their capabilities is required, augmentation

from higher headquarters or from TOE -500-series may be assigned.

a. Military civic action must not be a haphazard or chance operation. Basic planning steps are—

- (1) Consider the political, economic, and sociological background of the area and people.
- (2) Consider the capability of the brigade, including time, know-how, and equipment available to do the job.
- (3) Determine the most critical projects required, taking into account national internal development plans, the desires of the local people, and the local situation.
- (4) Select courses of action.

b. Critical considerations in executing military civic action programs are—

- (1) The projects should be desired by the local population so that they will voluntarily maintain them.
- (2) Projects should be accomplished predominantly by the local population; little is achieved by having brigade forces perform all of the work.
- (3) The national internal development plan usually prescribes a list of projects which can be undertaken as military civic action, and local desires usually encompass another list of projects. Projects actually undertaken as military civic action should be those which are found on both lists.
- (4) Care must be taken that the project does not favor one segment of the population.
- (5) Care must be taken to avoid having brigade units help citizens of questionable loyalty achieve higher standards of living than other loyal citizens enjoy.
- (6) The basic reasoning behind projects must be understandable to the citizens. A project to develop a clean water supply will soon fail if the population does not understand the need for clean water. A population that does not

- understand the disease-carrying characteristics of rats will soon lose interest in a rodent-control program.
- (7) Provision must be made for maintenance of the project after the project team departs. A technical capability should exist in the area, and the local host country government should be prepared to supply logistical support,

as necessary. Responsibilities should be fixed.

(8) Elements of the U.S. Country Team, international nonprofit organizations, or multinational organizations may be engaged in internal development activities. Where cooperation with these elements is possible and productive, it should be pursued.

## Section VI. ADVISORY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

### 166. General

This section provides general guidance on brigade advisory assistance operations in counterguerrilla operations in internal defense and development. Advisory assistance is considered to be that advice and assistance provided by allied personnel to host country regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces and to civilian agencies to permit them to become more effective in the performance of their missions. These activities support and, in turn, are supported by tactical operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, and military civic action. For general policy and doctrine governing advisory assistance activities, see FM 100-5 and FM 100-20. For branch involvement in advisory assistance operations, see branch field manuals, and FM 31-73.

### 167. Purpose

The brigade may be required to organize, train, equip, and advise host country civil and military personnel and units to perform counterguerrilla missions. Some included tasks may be—

- a. Organizing, equipping, training, and advising paramilitary and irregular forces locally recruited to assume local defense missions from the brigade.
- b. Equipping, training, and advising host country regular armed forces on new equipment provided by Military Assistance Program (MAP).
- c. Organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country police organizations.
- d. Advising host country regular armed

forces, paramilitary forces, and local governments in all aspects of internal defense and development.

### 168. Concept

Brigade advisory assistance to host country personnel and organizations, as differentiated from military civic action, usually is performed to extend MAP activities. Such activities as organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country forces may best be accomplished while in base areas or during the defensive phase of consolidation operations of counterguerrilla tactical operations. If U.S. military assistance organizations are operational, advisors usually will be provided for this purpose; however, in cases where U.S. advisors and/or mobile training teams are not immediately available, brigades may be required to assume this function. Advisory assistance must be co-ordinated closely with both the internal defense and the internal development programs through the local ACC.

### 169. Organization

All brigade organizations must be prepared to provide individuals or teams capable of performing advisory assistance within their areas of specialization. Organization for advisory assistance operations may require the tailoring of specific teams to accomplish specific missions.

- a. Military police, augmented by brigade elements, may be required to train host country police organizations in the area, while combined-arms teams may be required to train local host country artillery and armor units in artillery and armor tactics and techniques.

*b.* Training centers may be required if the training load is sufficient to warrant them.

*c.* Teams from brigade units may be organized for on-duty training of host country specialists. These specialists are trained in use of specialized equipment which is organic to brigades but which will be supplied to host country forces in the near future.

*d.* Mobile training teams formed by the brigade may be dispatched to local host country

forces to conduct training at host country unit bases or training centers.

## **170. Operations**

Advisory assistance operations inherently involve the requirement to use advisory techniques. Consequently, tact, discretion, language qualification, expertise in the subject, and other qualifications normally associated with U.S. advisors and advisory operations must be stressed. For additional information on U.S. advisory techniques, see FM 31-73.